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REINVIGORATE FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
DONALD L. BECI*
INTRODUCTION
Today, Government officials performed an early morning warrantless
search of a local handyman's home. At 2:10 a.m. police kicked in the
door of his house and riddled the dwelling with 183 bullets. Mr.
Durwood Foshee was shot and killed, apparently while still in bed.
The mistaken raid location, chosen on the basis of an informant's
erroneous tip, took place without the constitutional safeguard of a
warrant. The search was performed under one of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement allowed by the Supreme Court. In this case
the reasoning was that the agents did not have the time or geo-
graphic ability to obtain a warrant.'
In this modem day of electronics and computers, we foresee a time in
the near future when the warrant requirement... can be fulfilled
virtually without exception. All that would be needed... would be a
central facility with magistrates on duty and available 24 hours a day.
All police. . . could call in by telephone or other electronic de-
vice .... The magistrates would evaluate [the] facts and, if deemed
sufficient to justify a search and seizure, the magistrate would imme-
diately issue an electronic warrant authorizing the officer on the scene
to proceed.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell Univer-
sity. B.A., University of Illinois, 1977; M.A., University of Illinois, 1978; J.D., University of
Illinois College of Law, 1984. The author gratefully acknowledges Gerard V. Bradley and Sheldon
H. Nahmod for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Lee Cumbie and Shannon
Hall provided excellent research assistance. Furthermore, Austyn, Jenna, and Rose Beci are espe-
cially deserving of thanks, as they provided the inspiration and sacrifices that made this article
possible.
1. See Susan Watson, A Little Stress Would Be Too Much, Dur. FREE PRESS, Jan. 16, 1989,
at 3A. Had the police first sought a warrant, a neutral and detached magistrate could have prevent-
ed the search. The magistrate would have denied the warrant if-after reviewing all of the facts,
including the source of the erroneous tip-the magistrate concluded that either probable cause was
lacking or that the anticipated police conduct was unreasonable. See infra part III.A.
2. State v. Brown, 721 P.2d 1357, 1363 n.6 (Or. 1986).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Searches by government agents should normally be conducted with, rather
than without, pre-approved judicial warrants. The Fourth Amendment's
Warrant Clause provides an essential safeguard against government tyranny
and capriciousness.' The warrant requirement maintains the Fourth
Amendment's delicate balance between the liberty and privacy interests of
each citizen and the safety and security needs of the public. Additionally, the
warrant requirement is consistent with the original intent of the Framers of the
Constitution to limit the government's discretion to search and seize.4 For
more than a century the Supreme Court has stressed the importance of the
warrant requirement.5
Today, however, the Court seems more willing to disregard the Warrant
Clause and instead focus its decisions exclusively on an analysis of the reason-
ableness clause.6 During the past thirty years, the Court has increasingly creat-
ed various exceptions to the warrant requirement.' Indeed, instead of a general
warrant requirement with specific exceptions, one Justice recently submitted
3. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. The Framers did acquiesce, however, in limited types of warrantless searches that were
then permitted under the common law. At the time the Fourth Amendment was drafted, an official
could make a public arrest and conduct a search incident to arrest without a warrant. See infra
text accompanying notes 43-44. This article does not propose that either of these two exceptions
to the warrant requirement be modified or eliminated. The focus of this article is not on those
warrantless searches and seizures permitted when the Fourth Amendment was drafted, but on the
increasing amount and variety of warrantless conduct that has subsequently been permitted.
The first of these two exceptions, a warrantless public arrest, is not inconsistent with this
article's thesis: due to the actual-and not simply theoretical---exigency which is inherent in the
arrest situation, a government agent should be permitted to make a public arrest without a warrant.
See generally United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (allowing a warrantless felony arrest
in public).
While a thorough examination of the second exception, search incident to arrest, is beyond
the scope of this article, it is also generally consistent with this article's thesis: an officer should
generally be permitted to conduct this type of search without a warrant due to the danger that the
arrestee might harm the officer or another person with a concealed weapon or destroy evidence.
See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (permitting a warrantless search incident
to a lawful arrest but limited to the person and the area from which they could obtain a weapon or
destroy evidence).
The search incident to arrest doctrine is also an exception to the probable cause require-
ment. A convincing argument can be made that the exception to the probable cause requirement
should be limited to those situations where one of the exigent circumstances supporting the excep-
tion is actually present, and not just theoretically possible. See generally Tim A. Thomas, Anno-
tation, Constitutionality of Searching Premises Without Warrant as Incident to Valid Ar-
rest----Supreme Court Cases, 108 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1992) (discussing whether a warrantless search of
premises is constitutionally permissible as an incident to a valid arrest). In contrast, searches inci-
dent to arrest are being permitted without warrants even in situations where the arrestee can nei-
ther destroy evidence nor harm anyone. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 466 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("As the facts of this case make clear, the Court today substantially ex-
pands the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest by permitting the police officers to
search areas and containers the arrestee could not possibly reach at the time of the arrest.").
5. See infra text accompanying notes 67-93.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 94-107.
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that a warrant should only be required when a case-by-case analysis indicates
that it is necessary to satisfy the reasonableness requirement The Court has
also been increasingly willing to abandon the warrant requirement, as well as
other Fourth Amendment threshold requirements, by engaging in a "special
needs" analysis.9 These exceptions have become so numerous that the warrant
requirement has become eclipsed by its exceptions) ° Consequently, the Court
has, in many instances, sacrificed the vital safeguards provided by the warrant
requirement.
However, with current computer and electronic telecommunications tech-
nology, police officers can now swiftly obtain a warrant without leaving the
area of investigation. Miniaturization of computer hardware, cellular facsimi-
les, the direct transmission of electronic documents between cellular computer
modems, and other associated technologies, have changed the face of modem
communications. What was not feasible ten years ago is now viable due to
developments in computer and electronic telecommunications technology.
These developments should usher in a renewed commitment to the warrant
requirement.
Part I of this article identifies advancements in available computer and
electronic telecommunications technology, and suggests how this technology
can be used to satisfy the warrant requirement. Advances in technology not
only permit a renewed and robust commitment to the warrant requirement, but
also enable the Supreme Court to correct previous encroachments on Fourth
Amendment principles.
Part II examines the historical evidence in support of the warrant require-
ment and in opposition to government searches without pre-approved judicial
warrants." This Part first argues that the original intent of the Framers of
the Constitution favors a renewed and meaningful commitment to the warrant
requirement. Part II then considers key Supreme Court decisions regarding the
Warrant Clause over a one hundred year period. Finally, this Part argues that
8. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 584-85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 183-87.
10. Most of these exceptions were initially based on exigency, which applies when
government agents do not have the time or geographic ability to obtain a warrant due to the ur-
gency surrounding the search or seizure. See also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (ex-
plaining that burning fire creates exigency); United States v. McDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that exigent circumstances existed due to imminent threat of loss of evidence),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991); United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638 (1Oth Cir. 1984) (ex-
plaining that entry was justified because officers had a reasonable belief that an individual had
been shot); United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.) (permitting magnetometers in
airports by balancing the need for airline safety against the minimal intrusion upon individual
privacy), affd, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). See generally United
States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.) (defining exigency as "circumstances that
would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was nec-
essary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evi-
dence, the escape of a suspect, or some consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law en-
forcement efforts"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
11. The thesis of this article focuses on judicial warrants. Administrative warrants, such as
those used to inspect for compliance with building codes, are not addressed. For a discussion of
administrative warrants, see generally Bernard A. Nigro, Jr., Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Ad-
ministrative Proceedings, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 564 (1986).
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it is more consistent with enduring Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to re-
quire that searches be conducted with warrants.
Part III identifies several advantages that flow from government compli-
ance with the warrant requirement. This Part also acknowledges that, for the
identified advantages to emerge, the magistrate's check must be more than a
mere affirmative and spontaneous reflex to the agent's request to search.
Therefore, Part III argues that the warrant process must be strengthened to en-
sure that the magistrate provides a meaningful control on the government's
unchecked discretion. Specific methods are discussed for catalyzing the war-
rant process so as to make the magistrate's assessment more meaningful.
Part IV argues that Congress, state legislatures, and the courts should
implement substantive and procedural incentives to encourage the use of the
warrant process. Likewise, disincentives must be introduced to discourage
agents from engaging in warrantless searches or seizures. The incentives and
disincentives discussed involve changes to the following: an agent's liability
for conducting an unconstitutional search; the time available to a victim to
make a suppression motion; the burdens of production and persuasion appli-
cable in a suppression hearing; the prosecutor's ability to obtain immediate
appellate review of a trial court's suppression ruling; and the class of victims
who have standing to challenge a search.
Part V proposes alternatives to current exceptions to the warrant require-
ment, and warns against the creation of a new exception to the exclusionary
rule. Specifically, this Part examines existing exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement and argues that the exceptions should be eliminated or narrowed
due to the availability of electronic warrants. Second, Part V argues that com-
pliance by government agents with the warrant requirement eliminates the
need for either Congress or the courts to create a new "good faith" exception
to the exclusionary rule for searches or seizures conducted without warrants.
Noting that the existing Leon 2 "good faith" exception already permits the use
of unconstitutionally-obtained evidence against a criminal defendant if it has
been seized with a warrant, this section argues that an additional "good faith"
exception is not only unnecessary, but is also harmful because it abolishes any
significant control on the discretion of government agents to search and seize.
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPUTER AND ELECTRONIC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
Current technology includes portable and lightweight cellular facsimile
machines. This equipment can be used by an officer in the field or in a squad
car. 3 With a cellular facsimile machine, the officer can quickly, and without
12. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
13. One example of a cellular facsimile machine is the Mitsubishi F5 Access Cellular Fax
Machine available from Sprint Cellular. It is small (12.5" x 8" x 2.4"), lightweight (about 6.5
lbs.), and is powered by an AC adapter plugged into the car cigarette lighter. It can be wired
directly into the vehicle's electrical system for a permanent installation. The machine operates on
an existing cellular phone line and automatically differentiates between voice and data transmis-
sions. Production has already begun on a newer, smaller, more advanced model. Telephone inter-
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leaving the investigation area, transmit a written warrant application and affi-
davit to the magistrate. The magistrate can then transmit the approved warrant
back to the officer. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the proce-
dural rules in a number of states have been amended recently to permit fac-
simile transmission. 4 Reviewing courts have upheld the constitutionality of
warrants obtained through the facsimile procedure. 5 These machines are now
rather standard in the industry and are relatively inexpensive for government
agencies to purchase. Unlike cellular computers, cellular facsimile machines
do not require the purchase of computers.
Current technology also permits electronic transmission directly between
cellular computer modems. Many police vehicles are presently equipped with
laptop computers or motor data terminals. 6 Law enforcement officers can be
supplied with portable and lightweight palm computers or personal digital
assistants. 7 These computers can transmit both the warrant application and
view with Diane Mcllnay, Account Executive, Sprint Cellular (May 11, 1995).
14. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A) ("If the circumstances make it reasonable to dispense,
in whole or in part, with the written affidavit, a Federal magistrate judge may issue a warrant
based upon sworn testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means, including
facsimile transmission."); ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.015(a) (Supp. 1991) (permitting sworn affidavits
to be transmitted via facsimile machine); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526 (West Supp. 1995) (permit-
ting application for, and issuance of, facsimile warrants); COLO. R. CIuM. P. 41(c)(1)(iv)(3) (al-
lowing the judge to "act upon the transmitted papers as if they were originals"); DEL. J.P. Cr.
CRIM. P. 4.2(c) ("The Court may accept the filings of pleadings designated in this rule [including
search warrants] by facsimile transmission in conjunction with videophone appearance."); IDAHO
CRIM. R. 41 (allowing a warrant to be transmitted by facsimile from magistrate back to peace of-
ficer); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725 para. 5/108-4 (1992) ("The search warrant may be issued electroni-
cally or electromagnetically by use of a facsimile transmission machine and any such warrant shall
have the same validity as a written search warrant."); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 33.05 ("[A] facsimile
order or warrant issued by the court shall have the same force and effect as the original."); R.R.S.
NEB. § 29-814.03 (1994) subject to NEB. CT. R. Fax Machine Use Rule (1994) (permitting fac-
simile warrants when immediacy is required); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-35.4.2 (Supp.
1995) (allowing for facsimile transmission and requiring that original documents be filed with the
court within five business days).
15. See People v. Fournier, 793 P.2d 1176 (Colo. 1990) (upholding a facsimile application
and warrant where all magistrates were out of town at a judicial conference); People v. Paul, 511
N.W.2d 434, 435 n.2 (Mich. 1994) (Levin, J., dissenting) (discussing "widespread use of facsimile
equipment in recent years" and looking favorably upon facsimile warants); People v. Snyder, 449
N.W.2d 703 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding a warrant where officer called magistrate at home
and transmitted unsigned warrant documents to magistrate's home via facsimile, and magistrate
approved and returned warrant by facsimile to officer.); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A)
advisory committee's note on 1993 amendment ("[F]acsimile transmissions provide some method
of assuring the authenticity of the writing transmitted by the affiant."). For a general survey of
facsimile machine use in the judicial system, see MONICA R. LEE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION OF COURT DOCUMENTS: A FEASIBILITY STUDY 1990.
16. As an example, the North Carolina Highway Patrol and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Po-
lice Department (N.C.) presently use in-car computers for various tasks. Telephone interview with
Larry Blume, Systems Programmer, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (June 12, 1995). In
addition, throughout the area of North Carolina known as the "Research Triangle," which includes
Wake County, the city of Durham, the city of Raleigh, and the towns of Cary, Chapel Hill, and
Gamer, laptops and/or motor data terminals (MDTs) are being used. Elizabeth Wellington, Ma-
chines Help Cary Police Take Byte Out of Crime: In-Car Computers Ease Officers' Jobs, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 31, 1995, at BI.
17. A hand-held computer can be either a personal digital assistant (PDA), which is accessed
with a pen rather than a keyboard, or a palm computer, which is accessed via a keyboard. One
example of a currently available, suitable, portable, lightweight palm computer is the Hewlett
Packard HP 200 LX. It has the processor capability to run a graphics program which would allow
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the approved warrant electronically-directly from the officer's computer to
the magistrate's computer and then back again-through a cellular modem.
The confidentiality of these transmissions can be protected through the use of
existing encryption technology."8 If a paper copy of the issued warrant is de-
sired, a portable printer can be used. 9 Electronic copies of the application
and the warrant can be routinely and automatically retained, one on the
magistrate's hard drive and the other on the agent's computer. For security
and historical accuracy, the magistrate's hard drive could also be systematical-
ly copied and inventoried. Procedural rules in some states have already been
amended to permit use of such electronic transmission.20 Courts that have
addressed warrants obtained via electronic transmission suggest that there are
no constitutional impediments to their use.2' One unresolved detail that must
be addressed is the development of a method to authenticate one's electronic
signature.22 Such authentication is necessary to satisfy the requirement that
the affiant's information be provided under oath or affirmation.23 It is this
an officer to view and complete the warrant application on the screen, a modem to transmit the
application to a magistrate for approval and receive the approved warrant back, and a printer port
which could be used with a portable printer to produce a hard copy of the approved warrant. It
also has the capability to utilize a portable scanner to input a handwritten application. The phys-
ical dimensions of the HP 200 LX are 16 x 8.64 x 2.54 (cm). It weighs approximately II ounces.
Telephone interview with Lucy Honig, Product Manager, Hewlett Packard (Aug. 9, 1995).
18. Various software programs exist which allow for encryption of text prior to transmission
via facsimile or modem. Alternatively, existing hardware also can be used to scramble the output
of the cellular transmission. Encryption rearranges the order of the transmission signals into an
unintelligible format which prevents anyone who intercepts a transmission from understanding the
contents. A decryption device is used at the receiver to rearrange the transmission signals so they
may be understood. Technology would prevent sophisticated criminals from monitoring police re-
quests for warrants, denying them the opportunity to dispose of any incriminating evidence prior
to a search. See generally Cryptology, in 16 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 860 (15th ed.
1995) (discussing various methods to secure communications).
19. The Hewlett Packard HP 320 Portable Deskjet Printer is one example. It is available in
black/grey scale or color printing options, 300 dpi resolution, and it prints at about 3 pages per
minute. The unit easily fits into a briefcase. Its dimensions are 12"W x 9.5"D x 2.5"H. Telephone
interview with Lucy Honig, supra note 17.
20. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-39149(c) (1989) ("telephone, radio or other
means of electronic communication"); LA. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 162.1 (West Supp. 1995)
("may be communicated ... by telephone, radio, or other such electronic method of communica-
tion deemed appropriate by the judge"); OKLA. R. WSDCND W.D.R. 36 (1995) ("telephone or
other appropriate means"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-204 (1995). But see FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(c)(2)(A) advisory committee's note on 1993 amendment ("The Committee considered, but
rejected, amendments to the Rule which would have permitted other means of electronic transmis-
sion, such as the use of computer modems.").
21. See, e.g., Califomia v. McCraw, 276 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
warrant sent electronically from Washington to California is as effective as the original).
22. Software technology currently exists which allows the user to actually sign the computer
screen with a special pen (i.e. a screen signature). The signature is then added directly into the
electronic document. Another option is a scanner which would input the signature into the docu-
ment prior to transmission. Telephone interview with Lucy Honig, supra note 17.
23. This problem has already been resolved when a warrant is obtained via facsimile or
telephone transmission. Courts have upheld oaths taken over the phone, by a third party, or at a
later date. See, e.g., Mills v. Graves, 930 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding telephonic search
warrant valid even where oath was taken five days later); People v. Fournier, 793 P.2d 1176
(Colo. 1990) (explaining that facsimile warrant was valid where oath was taken by clerk of court
prior to facsimile transmission); People v. Paul, 511 N.W.2d 434, 449 n.2 (Mich. 1989) (Levin, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that a magistrate may "orally administer an oath or affirmation by tele-
phone"). Unlike oral telephone warrants, however, these additional steps are arguably unnecessary
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technology, permitting a police officer to apply for a warrant electronically via
a cellular modem on a small computer located within the squad car, that this
article prefers. The production and transmission of electronic documents
directly between computer modems would be quicker than the facsimile proce-
dure described above and would eliminate legibility problems. In addition, this
application is not as experimental as the miniaturized computers, which are
discussed next.
Ongoing miniaturization of computer hardware increasingly facilitates the
use of computer warrants. Computers have decreased in size from desktop to
laptop, laptop to notebook, and notebook to personal digital assistant. More-
over, a wearable computer, which can be clipped to one's belt, is now avail-
able.2" A wearable computer is a miniaturized version of an IBM-compatible
486 and, along with its battery, weighs less than three pounds.' The com-
puter is voice-activated and has no keyboard.26 It was designed for hand-free
operation, but can also be accessed with a small mouse." While the monitor
measures only one-half inch in diameter, it produces a display which appears
much larger.28 Police should not be required to possess wearable computers
until further study determines if this equipment can be used without interfering
with an officer's mobility.29 But the availability of this hardware today is an
encouraging sign that numerous possibilities for electronic warrants will be
available in the near future.
Today's technology frees the Supreme Court from the dilemma in which
it has been mired. The Court no longer must choose between the warrant re-
quirement, which protects liberty interests, and warrantless searches, which
permit the government to move swiftly in exigent circumstances. An effective
warrant process can be reclaimed and preserved, and the officer can proceed
quickly without leaving the area of investigation.
when a warrant is requested via facsimile transmission. The oath or affirmation requirement is
satisfied when the magistrate receives a facsimile copy of the affiant's signature formally attesting
to the truth of the statements in the warrant application.
24. The wearable computer was developed by and is available from InterVision Systems
Inc., Raleigh, N.C. It was designed to be used with an attached video camera by service techni-
cians in the field, and it has been purchased by the Army after being tested during war exercises.
David Ranii, The Ultimate in Computer Portability: Raleigh Firm Makes Wearable Computer,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 5, 1995, at DI. In addition, federal law enforcement
agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency, are
presently considering its surveillance applications. Telephone Interview with John Lontos, Co-
founder, InterVision Systems Inc. (Aug. 5, 1995).
25. It is likely that wearable computers will weigh even less in the future considering the
current version weighs half as much as the previous model. Ranii, supra note 24, at D6.
26. Id. at DI.
27. Id.
28. Id. The monitor is attached to the user's cap or helmet, and can be ignored without ob-
structing the user's regular vision. Id.
29. The price of the wearable computer-between $8,000 and $12,000-may also be an
obstacle to its current use. But the price is likely to be reduced as anticipated competitors enter the
market. The price has already been reduced from its original price of $20,000. Id. at D6.
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II. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. The Warrant Requirement Is Consistent with the Framers' Intent to Limit
Government Discretion to Search and Seize 0
The Framers' original intent when creating the Fourth Amendment of the
Bill of Rights is consistent with a renewed and meaningful commitment to the
general principle that a government agent must first obtain a warrant before
conducting a search or seizure. Even though the Framers implicitly approved
of certain types of warrantless searches,"' the Framers' overriding intent was
to limit the government's general discretion to search and seize.3"
While many legal historians have attempted to comprehend the mosaic of
what the Framers meant by the Amendment,3 they have reached dissimilar
conclusions. 4 These scholars generally agree that the Amendment was in-
tended as a means of controlling governmental intrusion into an individual's
privacy.35 Legal historians disagree, however, as to how the Framers foresaw
that the Amendment would accomplish this purpose. Some have concluded
that the Framers intended that the Amendment prohibit any search or seizure
conducted without a warrant. Others have concluded that the Framers intended
that the absence of a warrant be only one factor considered in determining
whether the search or seizure is reasonable and therefore constitutional. 6 This
30. The author gratefully acknowledges Lee Cumbie for his research, suggestions, and
contributions to this section.
31. See supra note 4.
32. There are many early writings warning of the danger that the government may usurp
power and intrude on individual liberties. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 79 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (warning against giving to "men disposed to usurp, a plausible
pretence for claiming that power"); 21 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 445-49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1881) (quoting Patrick
Henry's warning against the terrors of federal authority without a protective bill of rights); John
Adams, Petition of Lechmere: Adam's "Abstract of the Argument", reprinted in 2 LEGAL PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS 134, 142-44 (L. Kinven Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (condemning the
abuse of power that resulted from the use of general warrants and writs of assistance).
33. An in depth discussion of the historical events leading up to the Fourth Amendment is
beyond the scope of this article. For thorough attention to this history, see generally JACOB W.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTrTU-
TION (1937); JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETrS BAY, BETWEEN 1761-1772 (1865);
TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969).
34. Compare Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349 (1974) (generally viewing exceptions to the warrant requirement as granting too much
discretionary power to law enforcement officers) and LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 42-44 (advo-
cating that it clearly was not the Framers' intent to allow judicially created exceptions to the war-
rant requirement except in compelling circumstances) with TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 46-47
("[Those] who have viewed the fourth amendment primarily as a requirement that searches be
covered by warrants, have stood the amendment on its head. Such was not the history of the mat-
ter, such was not the original understanding.") and Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Consti-
tution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1179 (1991) ("We can now see the Fourth Amendment with fresh
eyes. Searches without warrants are not presumptively illegitimate. Rather... a jury could subse-
quently assess its reasonableness.").
35. See supra note 33.
36. See supra note 34; see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-83 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971).
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article suggests that the positions are at the same time both accurate and inac-
curate. Furthermore, this article contends that today the Framers' original
intent is best satisfied through the warrant requirement.
Historical certainty as to the Framers' precise meaning of the
Amendment's terms may never be obtained.37 Such a microscopic inquiry
may be counterproductive. As noted by Alexander Hamilton in his initial
opposition to the Bill of Rights: "[M]inute detail of particular rights is cer-
tainly far less applicable to a Constitution like that under consideration, which
is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation, than
to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and
private concerns.""
An historical inquiry into the Framers' general intent, their purpose in
creating the Amendment, and their desires as to what the Amendment was to
accomplish would be more productive than a detailed study of the
Amendment's specific terms. Only by understanding the dangers and threats to
individual liberty that the Framers were attempting to avoid, can one interpret
and apply the Fourth Amendment with genuine deference to the Framers'
original intent.
This article suggests that the Framers of the Constitution had a three-
tiered approach in mind when promulgating the Fourth Amendment. First, the
Framers implicitly approved of the status of the limited types of warrantless
searches permitted under the common law at the time. Arguably, this ap-
proval was based on the assumption that common law remedies, such as suits
for trespass and false imprisonment, would continue to prevent such warrant-
less searches from becoming onerous. Second, the Framers intended to require
that any extensions in search and seizure doctrine pass through a warrant
requirement. ' This would limit the types of warrantless searches to those al-
ready permitted under the then-existing common law. Third, clear limits would
be placed on the government's ability to obtain a warrant by requiring that
certain conditions be satisfied before a magistrate issues the warrant.4 The
overall effect of this three-tiered approach was to encapsulate and limit the
power of the government to invade the "right of the people to be secure in
37. The wording of the Fourth Amendment was altered from the form proposed by the Com-
mittee of Eleven and initially approved by the House of Representatives. Purportedly, Chairman
Benson of the committee charged with preparing the final draft, changed the text to conform with
an earlier version that he had proposed. The House had already soundly rejected Benson's pro-
posed version. Without comment, and presumably unaware of the change, the House then passed
the altered version. The Senate approved the altered version, and it was ratified by the States. This
revised version became the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 180-
83 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (setting out the Amendment's history); LASSON, supra note 33,
at 97-103 (referencing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS (I. Gales ed., 1834) to show this sequence of
events); see also Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the Meanings of 'Search' in the
Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sense, 73 IOWA L. REv. 541, 541-53 (1988) (illustrat-
ing the linguistic analysis of the Fourth Amendment and its confusing history).
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
39. See supra note 4 and infra notes 43-44.
40. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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their persons, houses, papers, and effects"42 from either a warrantless search
or a search conducted with a warrant.
The first of these three tiers-that the Framers approved of the limited
types of warrantless searches then permitted under the common law-is evi-
denced by the Framers' failure to explicitly respond in the Amendment to two
realities. At the time the Framers created the Fourth Amendment, the common
law permitted two types of warrantless searches and seizures: an official could
conduct a search incident to arrest without a warrant,43 and certain arrests
could be made without a warrant." Most of the original states generally
adopted the English common law as the law of the state unless specifically
preempted by state or federal law.45 Yet in drafting the Amendment, the
Framers did nothing to explicitly abrogate these common law warrantless
searches.' Therefore, it is unlikely the Framers intended the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause to preempt the common law doctrine. The
Framers would have expressly eliminated the common law doctrine permitting
warrantless searches if it were their intent to do so. It would be inconsistent
for the Framers to articulate explicitly the standards of a warrant requirement,
and simultaneously abrogate the longstanding common law doctrine permitting
warrantless searches through implication.4
Because of the system of checks and balances, the Framers arguably
acquiesced to these limited types of warrantless searches. Abuse of these war-
rantless searches had been deterred historically through actions such as tres-
pass and false imprisonment:' officials who conducted warrantless searches
were generally not entitled to immunity unless vindicated by finding the felon
or illegal goods;49 there was no "good faith" exception for mistakes;5' and
recovery for trespass could be substantial because it was not limited to actual
damages.' Presumably, the Framers felt that these safeguards provided an
42. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43. The first case challenging the ancient search doctrine in England was not until the late
nineteenth century. Dillon v. O'Brien, 16 Cox C.C. 245 (Ex. D. 1887) (rejecting the challenge and
affirming the doctrine's validity).
44. See generally LASSON, supra note 33 (discussing permissible warrantless arrests in colo-
nial times); TAYLOR, supra note 33 (same). One could also be arrested without a warrant "upon
hue and cry" when the officer was unable to find the felon. WILLIAM SHEPPARD, THE OFFICES OF
CONSTABLES, ch. 8, § 2, no.4 (1650).
45. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1917 (1995) ("Most of the States that ratified
the Fourth Amendment had enacted constitutional provisions or statutes generally incorporating
English common law .... "); see also N.J. CONST. of 1776, § 22, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2598 (Francis N. Thorpe ed., 1909); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. 35, reprint-
ed in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2635; ORDINANCES OF MAY 1776, ch. 5,
§ 6, reprinted in 9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA 127 (W. Hening ed., 1821).
46. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In addition, none of the variations of the Fourth Amend-
ment adopted in state constitutions expressly abrogated the common law warrantless search doc-
trine. See 3-5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 45.
47. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 33, at 27-29 (providing alternative analyses support-
ing the argument that the Framers did not intend to prohibit the limited types of warrantless
searches then permitted under the common law); Amar, supra note 34, at 1175-81 (same).
48. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW
582-84 (2d ed. 1903).
49. Id.
50. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 17 (1975); Akhil R.
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1486-87, 1506-07 (1987).
51. See Wilkes v. Halifax, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1382, 1401 (1769) (permitting substantial re-
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ample deterrent against abuse of the limited types of searches permitted with-
out a warrant. These warrantless searches had been permitted in the colonies,
and for several hundred years in England, without creating significant prob-
lems for the individual or the public. 2 The Framers did not see a need to
prohibit the limited types of warrantless searches then permitted under the
common law because there were relatively few professional police in colonial
times. 3
The Framers were keenly aware, however, of the inherent dangers arising
from a government with unbridled discretion to search and seize. In crafting
the Fourth Amendment, the Framers intended to deter the virtually limitless
searching which took place under general warrants and writs of assistance. The
inequities which resulted from abuse of the general warrant and the writs of
assistance are well documented54 and were a major impetus in the occurrence
of the American revolution.5
While these abusive searches were technically conducted with warrants,
the general warrant and the writs of assistance did not limit government dis-
cretion. The Framers were concerned that unless the warrantless system was
limited, it would lead to the type of abuse which occurred under general war-
rants and writs of assistance. This insight and anxiety led to the second and
third tiers of the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause. While they acquiesced
to the limited types of warrantless searches permitted under the common law,
the Framers intended that a warrant requirement--one with teeth-be imposed
upon any new type of search subsequently arising.
Under the second tier, a government agent would have to obtain a warrant
from a neutral magistrate before conducting a search or seizure.56 This re-
quirement placed a check on unregulated government intrusion into individual
liberty and privacy, regardless of the number of new types of searches arising
or the increasing number of government officials engaged in searching activi-
covery from Earl (Lord) Halifax, Secretary of State and Lord of the King's Privy Council, and
demonstrating the lack of immunity by even high ranking government officials); Wilkes v. Wood,
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
52. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 48.
53. See id. "IT]here is no professional police force. The only persons specially bound to
arrest malefactors are the sheriff, his bailiffs and servants and the bailiffs of those lords who have
the higher regalities." Id. at 582.
54. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Halifax, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1382, 1401 (1769); Entick v. Carrington,
19 Howell St. Tr. 1029 (1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763); 2 LEGAL PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 32, at 106-47.
55. See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 32, at 107 ("Then and there the child
Independence was born."). The General Warrant was authorized during the reign of Charles I1.
Chief Justice Scroggs upheld the warrant's validity after its statutory authorization expired, but he
was subsequently impeached by the House of Commons for having done so. The King v. Scroggs,
8 Cobbett St. Tr. 163, 192-93, 200 (1680); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029, 1071-72
(1765). In addition, two types of statutory warrants, the Writ of Assistance and the Special War-
rant (to search out seditious libel), were similar to general warrants in that they authorized uncon-
trolled government searches. Used in both England and the Colonies, their abuse is generally
credited with creating the impetus for the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 33. These statutory
warrants were consistently compared unfavorably to the common law stolen goods warrant for not
containing the same quality of safeguards. See supra note 54 and infra text accompanying notes
59-61.
56. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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ties. As noted by the Supreme Court approximately two hundred years later,
"The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our decisions
reflects the basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be
preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among the
different branches and levels of government."57
However, because the Framers recognized that the government could
become abusive in a system where searches are conducted with warrants, the
third tier placed limits on what the government was able to do with a war-
rant.5" To prevent abuse of the warrant process, the Framers placed particular
requirements in the Fourth Amendment which were modeled after the condi-
tions required to obtain a common law stolen goods warrant. A common law
stolen goods warrant required the victim of a theft to make an oath before a
Justice of the Peace, demonstrating probable cause that the stolen goods would
be found in a particular place.59 The Justice would then issue a warrant au-
thorizing the victim and a constable to search and seize the goods and bring
the goods and the suspected felon back before the Justice for disposition.'
Failure to find the goods left the oath-giver open to an action for damages.6t
Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant requires specificity, oath, probable
cause, and approval by a neutral and detached magistrate.62 The magistrate
limits oppressive government searches by refusing to issue a warrant if any of
the requirements are not satisfied or if the intended search is unreasonable.63
This requirement protects the individual from government abuse of warrant
power similar to that which had been common under English rule. '
Consequently, in the second and third tiers the Framers sought to limit
warrantless searches, and warrant searches, respectively. These tiers work
together to prevent capricious searches in all situations where a warrant is
required for a search. The historical evidence suggests that the warrant
requirement was seen as a double-edged sword which would have to be care-
fully utilized in order to preclude causing the very harm it was designed to
prevent. While the Framers endorsed an enhanced warrant requirement' as a
means of controlling government discretion, they were also keenly aware that
a toothless warrant requirement would lead to a more intrusive government.
Today, the Framers' original intent to limit government discretion to
search and seize can best be satisfied through a strengthened warrant require-
ment. The current exceptions to the warrant requirement allow for a plethora
57. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979) (quoting United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)).
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
59. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 18, 149r-52 (published posthumously, 1609-76).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
63. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (denying the government a search warrant, even
though probable cause was satisfied, to surgically remove evidence, a bullet, from an individual,
because the intended search was unreasonable).
64. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
65. For a discussion of specific methods to strengthen the warrant process, see infra part
II.B.
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of warrantless searches other than those historically permitted under the com-
mon law. Requiring a government agent to obtain a warrant before conducting
a search or seizure still allows the government to investigate, but only in a
controlled fashion. Modem technology facilitates timely searches, without
sacrificing the protection of a warrant.
B. The Warrant Requirement Is Consistent with the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment Precedents66
Despite the willingness of some current Justices to dispense with the
warrant requirement, the Supreme Court has underscored the importance of the
warrant requirement for more than one hundred years. It is more consistent
with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to require that searches be conducted
with warrants.67 It would further the Supreme Court's guiding role if the
Court were to eliminate or narrow some of the exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, and rearticulate an earnest commitment to
the principle that government agents must first obtain a warrant before con-
ducting a search or seizure.
Stare decisis requires that courts abide by decided cases and adhere to
precedent."t Because stare decisis makes the law more predictable, individual
citizens, the community, and government agents can more easily conduct
themselves in accordance with the law. Such consistency and predictability are
particularly important in criminal law where community safety, individual
privacy, and individual liberty interests are at stake.
As previously suggested, the Framers of the Constitution created the
Fourth Amendment to protect individuals from the arbitrary and capricious
behavior of the government. "[T]he forefathers, after consulting the lessons of
history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too per-
meating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater danger
to free people than the escape of some criminals from punishment." '69
When the courts do not adhere to precedent, they fail to guide police offi-
cers and other government agents. Consequently, such agents are left to decide
how to balance public safety against individual privacy interests and, in their
zeal to protect the public, they may search individuals without reason. It is
66. The author gratefully acknowledges Shannon Hall for her research, suggestions, and
contributions to this section.
67. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a search conducted without a
warrant is unreasonable. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Furthermore, the
Court has consistently held that unreasonable searches and seizures are forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). Consequently, except in narrow circumstances of absolute
necessity, warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 768 (1969).
68. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct 2791, 2808 (1992) ("[T]he very con-
cept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable."); Lewis F. Powell Jr., Stare Decisis and
Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 13, 16.
69. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
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important, therefore, that the Supreme Court follow precedent and fulfill its
guiding role.
Over the years, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the
warrant requirement. In 1877, the Supreme Court held that a government agent
must first obtain a warrant before searching mailed letters and packages.7"
The Court concluded that the warrant required to search or seize mail demands
the same particularity and probable cause required to search or seize papers
within one's house.7 Significantly, the Court did not question the postulate
that the government can search for such papers with a warrant in the home.
In the early 1900s, the Court emphasized that probable cause alone, with-
out a warrant, is generally not enough to search one's home.72 The Court
held that the "[b]elief, however well founded, that an Article sought is con-
cealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place
without a warrant."73 The Court emphasized that the judicial magistrate is
essential in the warrant process. Notably, the Supreme Court also has held that
the "informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue
warrants... are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others
who happen to make arrests."74
The Court continued to emphasize the necessity of magistrates and "ad-
herence to judicial processes '75 during the middle of the twentieth century.
The purpose of interposing a magistrate between the police officer and the
citizen was to ensure that a citizen's privacy and possessory interests were not
overtaken by overzealous police officers. The Supreme Court eloquently ex-
pressed this thought in Johnson v. United States:
76
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which is often not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.77
In several decisions the Court held that the "essential purpose of the
Fourth Amendment [is] to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into
[the citizen's] privacy."78 For example, in Jones v. United States,79 the Court
found that a search conducted at night and with probable cause was unconsti-
tutional because the warrant to search was limited to daytime hours. The Court
has consistently held that probable cause without a warrant is generally not
enough to search a home. 0 Noting the important role of the magistrate in the
70. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
71. Id. at 732.
72. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
73. Id.
74. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
75. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
76. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
77. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14.
78. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958).
79. 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
80. Jones, 357 U.S. at 498. "Were federal officers free to search without a warrant merely
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warrant process, the Court announced:
In a doubtful case, when the officer does not have clearly convincing
evidence of the immediate need to search, it is most important that
resort be had to a warrant, so that the evidence in the possession of
the police may be weighed by an independent judicial officer, whose
decision, not that of the police, may govern whether liberty or privacy
is to be invaded.8
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court took advantage of many oppor-
tunities to guide and lead, repeatedly holding that a warrant is generally re-
quired to search.82 In Rios v. United States, 3 the Court held that a warrant-
less search could not be justified as a search incident to arrest because proba-
ble cause for arrest did not exist when the police officers approached the peti-
tioner.84 Consequently, the police could not search without a warrant. In
Stoner v. California,85 the Court ruled that a hotel guest is entitled to the
same constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures that
the guest would have in his own home.86 The Court concluded that if the
search is conducted without a warrant, "[it] can survive constitutional inhibi-
tion only upon a showing that the surrounding facts brought it within one of
the exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant.
'87
The Court reasserted the constitutional significance of the magistrate's prede-
termination that probable cause is present in Beck v. Ohio.88 Finding a war-
rantless arrest unconstitutional, the Court stated that "the far less reliable
procedure [of] an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search [is] too
likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judg-
ment.' '89 In Katz v. United States,"° the Court held that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation from a public telephone
and a warrant is required to listen to that conversation.9 Without a warrant,
such a search is unconstitutional even if government agents have probable
cause to believe they will discover evidence of a crime and the officers use
the least intrusive means to obtain the evidence.92 Emphasizing the historical
importance of the warrant requirement, the Court stated:
upon probable cause to believe that certain articles were within a home, the provisions of the
Fourth Amendment would become empty phrases, and the protection it affords largely nullified."
Id.
81. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960).
82. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (holding that a landlord's
consent was not enough to justify a warrantless search); see also Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 32 (1925) ("[We have] always ... assumed, that one's house cannot lawfully be searched
without a search warrant .... ").
83. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
84. Rios, 364 U.S. at 261.
85. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
86. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490.
87. Id. at 486.
88. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
89. Beck, 379 U.S. at 96.
90. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
91. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
92. Id. at 356-57.
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The warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional
law for decades .... It is not an inconvenience to be somehow
"weighed" against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be,
an important working part of our machinery of government, operating
as a matter of course to check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly
overzealous executive officers" who are a part of any system of law
enforcement.93
For more than one hundred years, the Court has emphasized the impor-
tance of the warrant requirement. Recently, however, it has been increasingly
willing to dismiss the Warrant Clause and create additional exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Even without a warrant, police are free to make a pro-
tective sweep in a home after an arrest,94 search a foreign national's property
located outside the United States,95 search and seize curbside garbage,"
search privately owned open fields,97 and search some mobile homes.98 Sim-
ilarly, government agents without a warrant may search the entire passenger
compartment of a vehicle, and all closed containers therein," as well as open
and search an arrestee's possessions."° Government agents may avoid the
warrant requirement by obtaining the consent of a third-party to search,' or
they may obtain an individual's consent and search without a warrant, regard-
less of whether the individual truly understands the right to refuse."° Fur-
thermore, police who have not obtained a judicial warrant'0 3 may seize any-
thing seen within "plain view,"'" stop and frisk a citizen with only "reason-
able suspicion,"'' 5 conduct administrative searches,"° and conduct a search,
or seize items, when any of a vast variety of exigent circumstances are
present."3
93. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
94. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
95. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
96. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
97. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
98. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (permitting the warrantless search of a motor
home when the motor home comes within an extended version of the automobile exception).
99. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (extending the search incident to arrest doc-
trine).
100. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (permitting the opening and search of
an arrestee's items, pursuant to a standardized procedure, such as an inventory search).
101. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
102. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
103. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (addressing additional exceptions to the
warrant requirement under the Court's "special needs" analysis). But see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740 (1984) (rejecting an exception for the nighttime entry into a home to arrest for a civil
traffic offense); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (declining to create a broad exception
to cover searches for arson after a fire); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (resisting an
invitation to permit an automatic exception to the warrant requirement for the in-home arrest of all
felons); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (refusing to create a broad exception to the war-
rant requirement for prolonged searches of murder scenes).
104. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464 (1971).
105. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
106. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that warrants to conduct ad-
ministrative inspections do not need to be based upon "probable cause" but instead can be based
upon a "reasonable governmental interest" in conducting periodic, areawide inspections).
107. See infra part V.A.
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The Supreme Court must recommit itself to requiring that law enforce-
ment officers conduct searches with warrants. The Court satisfies stare decisis
when it interprets the Fourth Amendment consistent with precedent.' Lower
courts, prosecutors, the defense bar, and law enforcement personnel all benefit
from such consistent interpretation." 9
III. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
MUST BE RE-EMBRACED AND STRENGTHENED
The Supreme Court must earnestly articulate its commitment to the princi-
ple that government agents must first obtain a warrant before conducting a
search or seizure. Although considerable benefits can be obtained through the
use of warrants, the process must also be enhanced so that the magistrate's
assessment is meaningful. Unfortunately, the warrant process has at times
operated in such a way that some of its theoretical advantages have been illu-
sive." The magistrate's determinations of probable cause and reasonableness
must not merely be affirmative and spontaneous reflexes to a government
agent's request for a warrant. The magistrate must be more than a "rubber
stamp.""' The warrant process must be enhanced to effectively establish a
balance between the privacy and sanctity of the individual citizen (in places
such as the home) and the discretion of the government to invade, search, and
impound. This section first discusses several benefits that could result from
compliance with the warrant requirement. It then suggests specific methods to
strengthen the warrant process so that these benefits are actualized.
A. Advantages Flowing from Magistrates and the Warrant Process
The warrant requirement does not prevent legitimate government searches.
Rather, it serves as a check on the discretion of the police and other govern-
ment officials. It accomplishes this in two ways. First, the magistrate must
confirm that the officer has probable cause to believe that the area to be
searched contains-or that the item to be seized is--contraband or evidence of
a crime. " ' Second, the magistrate must also evaluate the intended police
conduct to determine if it complies with the reasonableness clause of the
108. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392 (1958) (recognizing that a long course of adju-
dication in the Supreme Court carries impressive authority); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665
(1944) (noting that continuity of decisions on constitutional questions is desirable).
109. See generally Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting Our Children and the Fourth
Amendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 836-37 (1992) (discussing the harm that results from the
Court's lack of guidance when it succumbs to the temptation to issue politically popular, result-
oriented decisions without regard to established Fourth Amendment precedent).
110. See Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use,
Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 442 (1990) (arguing that issuing magistrates should base their decisions upon objective crite-
ria rather than simply deferring to the requesting agent's conclusions).
11. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) (stating that the probable cause decision
must be made by a neutral and detached magistrate "[and that] the courts must ... insist that the
magistrate ... perform his 'neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp
for the police").
112. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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Fourth Amendment: the desired search or seizure must be reasonable in light
of all attending circumstances." '
The quintessential advantage of the warrant process is that a magistrate is
in a better position than the criminal investigator to determine reasonableness
and probable cause without bias," 4 haste,"' or competitiveness." 6 The
Supreme Court has invariably acknowledged this advantage." A magistrate
is assumed to have no bias or partiality between the individual citizen, whose
liberty interest may be encroached upon, and the government agent, who seeks
to uncover criminal activity. "' In contrast, the agent has a personal role in
the ongoing criminal investigation, which may generate intense emotion and
some animosity. "' An unbiased and impartial magistrate is customarily in a
better position to determine reasonableness and probable cause than an officer
who is immersed in what may unfold into an intense and emotional criminal
investigation. There are at least five additional advantages.
The first advantage is that the warrant process benefits the innocent, law-
abiding citizen because it provides a check on a government agent's actions
before the agent conducts an unconstitutional search or seizure. The warrant
requirement is preventive rather than remedial. If the magistrate determines
that a proposed search or seizure is unreasonable or not supported by probable
cause, the warrant is denied and the search or seizure never occurs. 2 ' The
citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy has not been violated, and the
citizen is not even aware of the government's intended breach. The warrant
requirement balances individual privacy and liberty interests against intended
law enforcement efforts. In the process, the warrant requirement protects the
law-abiding citizen from overzealous government officials. In balancing indi-
vidual privacy concerns and public safety, attention is focused on the privacy
interests of the innocent individual. This is done without sacrificing reasonable
law enforcement efforts.
In contrast, when a judge reviews a warrantless search or seizure after the
113. This safeguard allows the magistrate to deny a warrant for a search that is excessively
intrusive, highly repugnant, or otherwise unreasonable, even if the officer has probable cause to
believe the search will yield contraband or evidence. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
114. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) ("ITlhe Amendment does not place an
unduly oppressive weight on law enforcement officers but merely interposes an orderly procedure
under the aegis of judicial impartiality that is necessary to attain the beneficent purposes intend-
ed.").
115. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110. "[T]he informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates
empowered to issue warrants ... are to be preferred ... ." Id. (quoting United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)).
116. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 (preferring a "neutral and detached magistrate instead of... the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime").
117. See, e.g., Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
118. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
119. See Cynthia L. Cordes & Thomas W. Dougherty, A Review and an Integration of Re-
search on Job Burnout, 18 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 621 (1993).
120. But see United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1230-31 (7th Cir.) (permitting the police
to circumvent the magistrate's denial and obtain a warrant from another magistrate based on the
same facts), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1030 (1990). While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the permissibility of such "magistrate shopping," it is the author's position that the Court should
prohibit or discourage such conduct. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
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fact, during a suppression hearing, it is too late for preventive measures. In-
stead, the judge's only option is remedial: suppression can be granted, depriv-
ing the prosecution of the use of incriminating evidence and benefiting the
guilty defendant. 2 ' It is this belief-that exclusion serves as a windfall to
the guilty defendant-that has led to much of the public opposition to the
exclusionary rule.'22 Exclusion attempts to balance individual privacy and
liberty interests against intended law enforcement efforts; in the process the
defendant gains a windfall.
The second advantage stems from the magistrate's opportunity to regularly
participate in continuing education regarding developments in search and sei-
zure law. Similar opportunities are typically unavailable to law enforcement
officers. Continuing education is critical in this context, because, unlike many
other areas of the law, courts are constantly reexamining and reinterpreting the
Fourth Amendment. 23 The magistrate is in a better position to remain up to
date on developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; thus, the
magistrate's determinations of probable cause and reasonableness are arguably
more accurate than such assessments made by police officers.
Third, magistrates' determinations of probable cause and reasonableness
are more consistent due to continuing education'24 and the fewer number of
decision-makers involved. Each magistrate reviews several officers' conclu-
sions of what constitutes probable cause and of what is reasonable.'25 Be-
cause the officers differ among themselves in their conclusions, each magis-
trate brings consistency to determinations of probable cause and reasonable-
ness. Consequently, because fewer individuals are making such determinations,
together with superior training, the sum of all magistrate determinations are
more consistent than the sum of all determinations by law enforcement offi-
cers.
The fourth advantage is that the warrant process generates a contempora-
neous and complete record for subsequent review. The warrant application
states what basis the government agent had before the search for determining
probable cause.'26 In addition, the magistrate's warrant outlines the permissi-
ble scope of the search.'27 These provide the courts with the actual limita-
121. While the exclusion of evidence after a warrantless search immediately benefits the
guilty defendant, exclusion is also beneficial in that it often deters future unconstitutional searches
and seizures by government agents. See Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1187 (1995) ("The
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of
Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect.").
122. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Are Truth and Justice the American Way? Hits, Runs, Trial
Error: How Courts Let Legal Games Hide the Truth, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1995, at Cl; Jim
McGee, War on Crime Expands U.S. Prosecutors' Powers; Aggressive Tactics Put Fairness at
Issue, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at Al.
123. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to
"the ... continuing ... explosion in Fourth Amendment litigation").
124. See infra Part Ill.B, recommending additional magistrate training and continuing educa-
tion.
125. See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE
SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES (1984).
126. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-303 (1986) (requiring that a statement of probable
cause and written allegations of fact, supported by affidavit, be included within the application);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-244 (1983) (similar requirements to those in Colorado).
127. The Fourth Amendment requires particularity as to the place to be searched and the
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tions imposed at the outset of the search and the facts declared by the officer
as the basis for the search. This record eliminates the courts' need to make a
factual determination on the basis of conflicting and after-the-fact versions of
what occurred or was intended. No such record exists when a search occurs
without a warrant.
The fifth advantage of the warrant process is that it allows the officer to
preserve evidence that would otherwise be lost in a suppression hearing if the
officer conducted a warrantless search or seizure based on less than probable
cause. This is because the magistrate alerts the officer that there is less than
probable cause, giving the officer opportunity to gather more evidence. In
contrast, if the officer conducted a warrantless search based on the initial
evidence which did not constitute probable cause, the evidence would be ex-
cluded during a suppression hearing.'
B. The Warrant Process Must Be Fortified So That the Magistrate's
Determination of Probable Cause and Reasonableness Provides Its
Intended Benefits
The warrant process must be fortified if its benefits are to be genuine and
not merely illusory. Three suggestions---one general and two specific-will be
proposed for reinvigorating the warrant process so that the magistrate's check
is meaningful.
First, a magistrate's entry-level job requirements, personality traits, initial
training, and required continuing education must all be scrutinized. The goal
of each requirement must be to increase the magistrate's accuracy and consis-
tency, and to ensure that erroneous determinations of probable cause and rea-
sonableness are minimized. While magistrate determinations are more consis-
tent than those of law enforcement officers, there is still inconsistency among
magistrates.'29 More stringent entry-level requirements, as well as additional
magistrate training and continuing education, should result in more consistent
determinations among magistrates. Such selection, training, and education
requirements must also result in more accurate determinations, since consisten-
cy is only advantageous if the magistrate's determinations are accurate. When
the warrant process results in determinations that are both more accurate and
more consistent, fewer innocent citizens will have their privacy or possessory
interests violated by unconstitutional searches and seizures. In addition to
persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Each state has also explicitly provided
instructions as to the information it deems necessary to meet the Fourth Amendment requirements.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-304 (1986) (requiring a designation sufficient to establish the
location of the premises, vehicles, or persons to be searched and a description of the items consti-
tuting the object authorized to be seized); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-246 (1983) (similar to require-
ments in Colorado).
128. This same advantage has been articulated when police seek arrest warrants:
[An] incentive for police to obtain a[n] [arrest] warrant is that they may desire to present
their evidence to a magistrate so as to be sure that they have probable cause. If probable
cause is lacking, the police will then have an opportunity to gather more evidence rather
than make an illegal arrest that would result in suppression of any evidence seized.
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 455 n.22 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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being well-educated, a magistrate must not lack the courage to deny warrants
when appropriate. While this personality trait may be difficult to assess, per-
sonality profile tests,' 30 selection interviews, and professional references can
help determine if a magistrate candidate has the requisite confidence and forti-
tude to deny warrants that are either unreasonable or not supported by proba-
ble cause.
This first suggestion can be implemented by either the Supreme Court or
the various legislative bodies. The Supreme Court can take advantage of its
review power and take the lead in establishing rigorous uniform standards for
magistrates. In an effort to increase consistency and accuracy among magis-
trates, the Court can elaborate on the professional requirements set out for
magistrates in Shadwick v. City of Tampa. 3' Shadwick only imposes two re-
quirements: first, the magistrate must be "neutral and detached"; and second,
the magistrate "must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists
for the requested arrest or search."'32 The Court should explain what selec-
tion, performance, and continuing education standards are necessary to satisfy
this second Shadwick requirement.
As an alternative, Congress and the state legislatures can act independent-
ly, and establish more rigorous standards for magistrate selection, perfor-
mance, and continuing education. Some states presently have rigorous stan-
dards.'33 On the other hand, without uniform and base-level criteria, some
jurisdictions will continue to have lax standards for magistrates.'34
Second, to enhance the warrant process and make the magistrate's assess-
ment more accurate, the magistrate should be exposed to potential liability for
flagrant assessment errors. This approach would punish the magistrate more
severely than the public for an unconstitutional search. Currently, in contrast,
when evidence is seized through an unconstitutional search, the court's limited
means of redressing the injury is to exclude the evidence at trial. 5 Dimin-
ished public safety is an unintended consequence that results from the exclu-
sion of incriminating evidence.'36 Consequently, the public, rather than the
130. Commonly utilized personality profile assessment tools include the Minnesota-Multipha-
sic Personality Inventory (MMPI), which appraises abnormal personality traits, and the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), which ascertains normal personality characteristics.
131. 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
132. Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 350.
133. See, e.g., ALA. R. J. ADMIN., Rule 18 (forbidding a magistrate from issuing a search
warrant unless licensed to practice law in Alabama.); ALASKA R. ADMIN., Rule 19.2(b)(5)
("[Deputy magistrates must) have received training from a training judge or training judge's
designee, prior to appointment as a deputy magistrate, for each judicial duty which the appointee
will be certified to perform."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-108 (1994) ("Every magistrate appointed
pursuant to this section shall be licensed to practice law in Colorado; except that county judges
who are not lawyers may be appointed to serve as magistrates ... to hear detention and bond
matters.").
134. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. RULES, Rule 20 ("Minimum qualifications for magistrates shall
include: (a) United States' Citizenship, (b) Physical residence in the county of appointment after
appointment unless physical residence is waived by the appointing and confirming authorities.").
135. When an officer searches with a warrant, and the officer has an objective, good-faith
belief that the warrant is valid, not even this remedy (i.e., exclusion) is available to the court. See
infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
136. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). "Each time the exclusionary rule is
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magistrate, presently pays the price for the magistrate's blatant assessment
errors. If liable for such errors, however, magistrates would be more careful in
reviewing warrant applications. Arguably, the magistrate's extra care would
result in greater accuracy. If magistrates are more accurate, there will be fewer
unconstitutional searches necessitating exclusion. Hence, the public will be less
burdened.
Magistrates, however, are presently not subject to liability for assessment
errors. A state or local magistrate is granted absolute immunity from §
1983 '3 claims when acting within the scope of the magistrate's official du-
ties. 3 Likewise, a federal magistrate is granted absolute immunity"9 from
claims arising under the judicially created counterpart to § 1983."4 Conse-
quently, a magistrate is presently immune from civil liability for issuing a
warrant that violates an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 4'
Instead, under this second suggestion, a magistrate would only be entitled
to qualified immunity and would have greater motivation to accurately deter-
mine probable cause. The magistrate would only be immune from liability for
an incorrect determination if a reasonably well trained magistrate in the same
position could have made the same mistake and could have concluded that
probable cause was demonstrated. 2 On the other hand, if the magistrate did
not have an objectively reasonable belief that there was probable cause, then
the victim of the unconstitutional search or seizure could seek compensatory
damages from the magistrate."" Moreover, the victim would be entitled to
applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Rele-
vant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflect-
ed." Id.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute, which creates a Fourteenth Amendment damages
action, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id.
138. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967). See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITrrTIONAL TORTS 233-41 (1995)
(noting absolute immunity for judicial conduct, and discussing exceptions to the doctrine). In
contrast, law enforcement officers are only granted qualified immunity from § 1983 claims when
acting within the scope of their official duties. See infra note 156.
139. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-09 (1978).
140. The judicially created counterpart to § 1983 imposes liability on federal agents. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
141. For a thorough discussion of immunity and intricate aspects of § 1983 actions, see 1
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION
1983 (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1995).
142. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (applying this standard in a Bivens-type
action against an FBI agent who conducted a warrantless search of the plaintiff's home); Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (applying this standard in a § 1983 action against a police offi-
cer who arrested the plaintiff with less than probable cause).
143. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (approving recovery of money damages from federal
agents who violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
254-57 (1978) (asserting that damages in a § 1983 action should parallel common law damages
where tort interests parallel the constitutional interest protected).
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punitive damages if the magistrate violated the individual's Fourth Amend-
ment rights with deliberate indifference or reckless disregard.'" Exposing
magistrates to this potential liability would make the warrant process more
meaningful. Additional methods, such as fines, suspensions, dismissal, and
other professional sanctions, should also be considered for making magistrate
assessments more accurate.
Third, to enhance the warrant process and discourage "magistrate shop-
ping,"'45 government agents should have a reduced level of immunity from §
1983'" civil liability (or its judicially recognized counterpart) 47 when they
unearth a second magistrate who will issue a warrant after a first magistrate
has already denied the application based on the same showing of probable
cause. While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this practice," some
lower courts permit officers to circumvent the warrant requirement in this
way.'" To discourage this practice, government agents should have a re-
duced level of immunity from civil liability when they engage in "magistrate
shopping." Their immunity from liability should be reduced by creating a pre-
sumption that an officer who has already been denied a warrant by one magis-
trate-but then secures one from another magistrate based on the same show-
ing of probable cause-is lacking an objectively reasonable belief as to the
sufficiency of probable cause.
As one alternative to this third recommendation, the Supreme Court could
candidly address and prohibit this practice. Unless the officer is presenting
additional evidence to the magistrate to demonstrate probable cause,' 50 there
is no reasonable justification for permitting an officer to secure a warrant from
a second magistrate after a first magistrate has already denied the application.
Arguably, the Court's tolerance of this practice demeans the entire magistrate
system. 5 '
As another alternative, this third recommendation could be expanded and
144. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (reformatory guard, named as a defendant in a §
1983 action, could be held liable for punitive damages).
145. See United States v. Czuprynski, 8 F.3d 1113, 1118 (6th Cir. 1993) (referring to the
practice of seeking a warrant from a second magistrate after a first magistrate has denied the ap-
plication based on the same showing of probable cause as "judge-shopping"); State v. Oakes, 598
A.2d 119, 122 (Vt. 1991) (referring to the practice of seeking a warrant from a second magistrate
after a first magistrate has denied the application based on the same showing of probable cause as
"magistrate shopping").
146. See supra note 137.
147. See supra note 140.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (making only oblique refer-
ences to the undesirability of "magistrate shopping"); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th
Cir.) (refusing to accept the opportunity to make a direct ruling on this issue), cert. denied, 497
U.S. 1030 (1990).
149. See supra note 120.
150. While the practice should be discouraged or prohibited when the officer presents the
same evidence of probable cause to both magistrates, this article encourages the practice when the
officer approaches the second magistrate only after the officer's additional investigation has devel-
oped additional evidence to demonstrate probable cause. For a discussion of the advantages that
result when the officer has an opportunity to further investigate and develop probable cause, see
supra note 128 and accompanying text.
151. See generally Charles L. Cantrell, Search Warrants: A View of the Process, 14 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing the repercussions of this practice).
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made more far-reaching. Whenever an officer obtains a warrant after engaging
in "magistrate shopping," the resulting search should be treated as if it had
been conducted without the benefit of a warrant. None of the incentives nor-
mally available when a warrant is used would then be available to the officer,
and all of the disincentives associated with a warrantless search would apply.
IV. INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE GOVERNMENT AGENTS TO USE THE
WARRANT PROCESS AND DISINCENTIVES TO DISCOURAGE WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Congress, state legislatures, and the courts should give government inves-
tigators incentives to use the warrant process and disincentives to engage in
warrantless searches and seizures. While this article contends that, as a general
rule, a government agent must obtain a warrant before conducting a search or
seizure, some ambiguous situations will remain-particularly when vague
exigent circumstances arise' 52-where an agent must be permitted to choose
between a warrant or warrantless search. Five incentives and disincentives, to
encourage the use of warrants, will be discussed.
As the first incentive, a government agent should be given greater immu-
nity from civil liability for violating an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
if the agent acts pursuant to a judicial warrant. An officer who conducts an
unconstitutional search or seizure is subject to civil liability'53 under either §
1983 's or its judicially recognized counterpart.'55 Presently, law enforce-
ment officers are only entitled to qualified immunity from suits brought
against them.'56 Consequently, a law enforcement agent can now be held civ-
illy liable for an unconstitutional search or seizure even when acting pursuant
to a search warrant. The magistrate's determination does not necessarily insu-
late the officer. The test is whether a reasonably well trained officer in the
defendant officer's position would have known that probable cause was lack-
ing.
57
To achieve this first incentive, the agent's immunity from § 1983 civil
liability and its judicially recognized counterpart should be increased by creat-
ing a presumption in the agent's favor when the agent acts pursuant to a
search warrant. When the officer proceeds on the basis of a warrant that has
been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, the officer should be entitled
to a presumption that the officer's belief regarding the sufficiency of probable
152. See infra part V.A.
153. In addition to liability under § 1983 and its judicially recognized Bivens-type counter-
part, government agents who conduct unconstitutional searches or seizures may also be liable
under state tort law, state statutes, or other federal statutes. While these additional areas of liability
will not be expressly addressed, this article recommends that the incentive of increased immunity
be made available in any civil action against an officer when the officer acts pursuant to a judicial
warrant.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
155. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 473, 508-09 (1978).
156. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) ("For executive officials in gener-
al ... our cases make plain that qualified immunity represents the norm [in a Bivens-type ac-
tionl.").
157. See supra note 142.
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cause is objectively reasonable. While a plaintiff could offer rebuttal evidence,
the defendant would have the benefit of the presumption.
As a second incentive for government agents to use warrants, the burden
of production and persuasion should be placed on the defendant if a warrant
has been obtained to show that a search or seizure is unconstitutional. While
many states currently place these burdens on the defendant,' some states
place the burden of production and persuasion on the government even when
the officer conducts the search pursuant to a warrant."9 As an incentive, this
article instead recommends that these burdens uniformly be placed on the
defendant whenever a warrant is used. On the other hand, if the officer con-
ducts a warrantless search or seizure, the burden is now placed, and should
remain, on the prosecution to prove that the warrantless search is constitution-
al." To discourage warrantless activity, the state should have to prove that
the search was reasonable, the search was based on probable cause, and one of
the exceptions to the Warrant Clause justified the warrantless search.
A third inducement for government agents to use warrants involves limita-
tions on the time available to the defendant to move for suppression. Present-
ly, some states require a defendant to make a suppression motion prior to trial
or lose the claim. 6' Other states allow a defendant to make a suppression
motion during the trial. 62 This article recommends that the defendant should
be required to either challenge the constitutionality of the seized evidence
before trial or forfeit the right to the motion when an officer conducts the
search with a warrant. This incentive would provide several benefits to the
prosecution, including reducing the prosecutor's uncertainty regarding the
witnesses to be called and the evidence to be adduced at trial. In addition, this
incentive could provide the prosecutor with an opportunity to immediately
appeal an adverse ruling. In contrast, if the officer conducts a warrantless
search, the defendant should be permitted to challenge the search anytime
prior to, or during, trial.
158. See, e.g., People v. Hoskins, 461 N.E.2d 941, 942 (I11.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 840
(1984); State v. Milliom, 794 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Mo. 1990).
159. See, e.g., People v. Crow, 789 P.2d 1104 (Colo. 1990); State v. Slaughter, 315 S.E.2d
865 (Ga. 1984); Brooks v. State, 497 N.E.2d 210 (Ind. 1986); State v. Heald, 314 A.2d 820 (Me.
1973); Canning v. State, 226 So. 2d 747 (Miss. 1969). See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Stan-
dards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1975) (discussing ap-
proaches to determining preliminary questions of fact).
160. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974).
161. See United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974);
State v. Neese, 616 P.2d 959 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Brogdon, 426 So. 2d 158 (La. 1983);
State v. Baker, 409 A.2d 216 (Me. 1979); State v. Madsen, 414 N.W.2d 280 (Neb. 1987); State v.
Neset, 462 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1990). See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 12, 41 (requiring motions to
suppress evidence be raised prior to trial).
162. See State v. Boose, 202 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1972); Shanks v. Commonwealth, 504
S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1974); State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359 (Neb. 1992); State v. Ortega, 836 P.2d
639 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Whitnel v. State, 564 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Some
jurisdictions predicate this right on meeting certain conditions. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
975(b), -976(b) (1994). The North Carolina statutes as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme
Court allow the defendant to make such a motion during trial when the prosecution seeks to ad-
duce evidence from a warrantless search, but denies the defendant the right if the prosecution
gives at least 20 working days notice before trial of the intent to introduce such seized evidence at
trial. State v. Hill, 240 S.E.2d 794, 803 (N.C. 1978).
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A fourth incentive to use warrants is to permit the prosecution to make an
interlocutory appeal of all suppression rulings favorable to the defense when-
ever the suppressed evidence was acquired with a warrant. On the other hand,
the corresponding disincentive to government agents that should result from
not using warrants is that the prosecution should forfeit the right to an inter-
locutory appeal. As noted above, when a search is conducted pursuant to a
warrant, the defendant should be required to raise relevant suppression motions
prior to trial. If the court rules against the state, the state should then be per-
mitted to make an interlocutory appeal. The trial could then be stayed until the
issue is resolved. The state would then have the advantage, if the suppression
order is overturned, of using the previously excluded evidence at trial. The
availability to the prosecution of immediate appellate review encourages gov-
ernment use of warrants. In contrast, when a government agent does not use a
warrant, the prosecution should lose the right to appeal suppression rulings fa-
vorable to the defense. As noted, when a warrantless search occurs, the defen-
dant should be permitted to challenge the search anytime prior to, or during,
trial. Moreover, if the court rules against the state, the state should not be
permitted to make an immediate appeal. Consequently, the state would lose
any advantage that would result from using the excluded evidence at trial.
While some states presently deny the prosecution immediate appellate review
from suppression rulings favorable to the defense,'63 this article recommends
that the government uniformly be denied immediate review when the warrant
process is not used.
As a fifth inducement for government agents to use warrants, the category
of victims who have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search
should be broadened when no warrant is used. Over the years, the Supreme
Court has narrowed the class of individuals who have standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a search." 4 An individual who is legitimately on the
premises searched no longer has automatic standing to challenge the
search. 65 Additionally, an individual who is charged with criminal posses-
sion no longer has automatic standing simply because the individual legally
possesses the item searched." Presently, standing is only granted to an indi-
vidual who has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item searched.'67
To encourage the use of warrants, only the present limited category of
individuals recognized in Rakas 6e should continue to have standing to chal-
lenge a search or seizure conducted with a warrant. However, when the police
163. See, e.g., State v. Parks, 415 So. 2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1982) (denying interlocutory ap-
peal). But see, e.g., State v. Perbix, 331 N.W.2d 14, 17 (N.D. 1983) (allowing interlocutory ap-
peal).
164. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980) ("We simply decline to use possession
of a seized good as a substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched."); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978) (reject-
ing automatic standing because it "creates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amend-
ment rights").
165. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142.
166. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
167. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
168. Id.
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choose not to use a warrant, the class of individuals permitted to challenge the
search or seizure should be broadened. Logically, anyone against whom seized
evidence will be used should have standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the search or seizure. Standing could be granted to this broader class of
individuals when government agents choose to act without warrants to discour-
age warrantless activity. By expanding the category of victims who have
standing to challenge warrantless searches, prosecutors will be induced to
persuade government agents to obtain warrants before searching, and thus re-
duce the number of potential suppression hearings at which they will have to
defend.
V. THERE SHOULD BE FEWER EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
AND No ADDITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. Due to Technological Advances, the Exigent Circumstances Exception to
the Warrant Requirement Should Be Narrowed, and Other Exceptions
Should Be Studied, Narrowed, and Eliminated
The Supreme Court should eliminate or narrow some of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement and permit fewer warrantless searches and seizures
because of the safeguards that warrants provide and the historical basis sup-
porting their use. This is currently possible given advances in computer and
telecommunications technology. Furthermore, future technological advances
will enable the subsequent elimination or narrowing of additional exceptions to
the warrant requirement.
Perhaps the exigent circumstances exception69 is foremost among the
exceptions affected by new technology. Under the exigent circumstances ex-
ception, an officer may conduct a search without a warrant if the officer has
probable cause to believe that the person or item to be searched will be
gone," the evidence will be destroyed, 7' or someone will be put in dan-
ger '7 if the officer takes the time to obtain a warrant before searching. In
addition to this freestanding exigent circumstances exception, most of the other
exceptions to the warrant requirement were initially based on exigency. 7'
Given the prior difficulty of obtaining a warrant and the attending exigent
circumstances, the Supreme Court was compelled, in many situations, to sacri-
fice the vital safeguards provided by the warrant requirement.
Advances in electronic and telecommunications technology, however, have
eliminated many of the temporal and geographic hurdles which previously
169. See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967) (explaining that
exigent circumstances do not require a warrant).
170. United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1119 (1991).
171. United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1512 (6th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 858 (1988).
172. United States v. Perez, 440 F. Supp. 272, 287 (N.D. Ohio 1977), affd, 571 F.2d 584
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 998 (1978); People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (Cal. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
173. See supra note 10; see also infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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prolonged the time needed to obtain a warrant. Consequently, trial courts must
give greater scrutiny when government agents invoke the exigent circum-
stances exception. A warrantless search' or seizure should only be permit-
ted when the circumstances of the case are such that an officer would not even
be able to seek an electronic warrant. While many courts have already refused
to permit the exigent circumstances exception in situations where the officer
could have obtained a telephone warrant,' 71 courts must probe further. To
justify a warrantless search on the basis of exigency, the government must
show that the agent could not have obtained an electronic warrant in time to
avoid the anticipated exigency.
Additional judicial scrutiny of exigent warrantless searches provides an
added benefit. While government agents should not be permitted to deliberate-
ly create exigent circumstances to circumvent the warrant requirement, courts
hesitate to scrutinize defense claims that the police intentionally manufactured
an exigency to circumvent the warrant requirement. 76 In addition, the
174. Arguably, an exigency that justifies a warrantless seizure should not automatically justify
a warrantless search. If the item (e.g., a suitcase) to be searched can be seized while the police
obtain a warrant to search it, then the police should refrain from searching the seized item until
the search warrant is obtained:
In our view, when no exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search,
the Warrant Clause places the line at the point where the property to be searched comes
under the exclusive dominion of police authority. Respondents were therefore entitled to
the protection of the Warrant Clause with the evaluation of a neutral magistrate, before
their privacy interests in the contents of the footlocker were invaded.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1977).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 56 F.3d 265, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("They could have
secured the bedroom and telephoned a magistrate for a search warrant .... "); United States v.
Patino, 830 F.2d 1413, 1416-17 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding no exigency existed because a telephone
warrant could have been obtained in the 30 minute period), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989);
United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[C]ourts must also consider
the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant by telephone in determining whether exigent
circumstances exist."); United States v. Baker, 520 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (ex-
plaining that one hour and fifteen minutes was "abundant" time to obtain a telephone warrant,
therefore no exigency existed). But see, e.g., United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th
Cir.) (permitting a warrantless search after concluding that 30 minutes was not enough time to
obtain a telephone warrant), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 155 (1993); United States v. Cuaron, 700
F.2d 582, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that 20 to 30 minutes was not enough time to obtain a
telephone warrant).
This article does not encourage the use of telephone warrants. The application for, and
issuance of, a telephone warrant lacks the safeguards which are present when either a computer
modem or facsimile is used. While this procedure frees the officer of the temporal and geographic
hurdles of submitting a warrant application, it does not have the advantage of providing a contem-
poraneous and complete record of the warrant application. The telephonic application can be re-
corded by the magistrate, but the risk is present that the recording will not be accurately tran-
scribed. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1993) (noting that the magistrate issued a
search warrant on the basis of a telephone application which was not recorded, and that neither the
officer nor the magistrate made notes of the conversation). Additionally, unless the officer pro-
ceeds on the basis of the magistrate's oral authorization, the officer must still use valuable time to
obtain the issued warrant. Even if the officer is permitted to proceed on the basis of an oral war-
rant, applications made by telephone are slower than those submitted by facsimile or modem.
With a telephone warrant, the requesting officer must completely read the application over the
telephone before the magistrate's assessment can begin.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d
1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Scheffer, 463 F.2d 567, 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. 409 U.S. 984 (1972).
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Supreme Court has not explicitly prohibited the practice. Until the Court does
so, this troublesome practice would be diminished if the exception only ap-
plied when the circumstances of the case were such that an officer was not
able to seek an electronic warrant. Because computer and facsimile warrants
eliminate many of the temporal and geographic hurdles to obtaining a warrant,
it becomes more difficult for criminal investigators to intentionally create the
type of exigent circumstances that would permit them to proceed without a
warrant.
The exigent circumstances exception is not the sole existing exception
which could presently be narrowed due to technological advances. The
Supreme Court should use its review power to thoroughly consider all other
exceptions and determine which should be narrowed or eliminated in light of
advances in computer and telecommunications technology. The automobile
exception, and exceptions arising under the Court's "special needs" analy-
sis,' are among the exceptions the Court should review.
The automobile exception allows a government agent to search an auto-
mobile without a warrant as long as the agent has probable cause to believe
that the vehicle contains evidence relating to criminal activity.'78 This in-
terpretation of the automobile exception deletes the warrant requirement, by-
passes the magistrate, and allows a government agent to search a vehicle based
on the agent's own determination of probable cause. The agent can search the
vehicle even where there is no danger that the automobile will be moved.
While the automobile exception was originally permitted because of the inher-
ent mobility of-and encompassing exigency surrounding-the automo-
bile,'79 the exception is now based on the reasoning that one has a reduced
expectation of privacy in the automobile.'8 ° Thus, the police may conduct a
warrantless search of a vehicle even if it is incapable of being moved. 8'
Arguably, one's expectation of privacy in the automobile is as great as, or
greater than, it is in many other items of personal property. Given the mobility
of American society, the percentage of the population engaged in commuting,
and the amount of time people spend in automobiles, it seems unrealistic to
conclude that an individual's automobile should be subject to a reduced expec-
tation of privacy. Indeed, one Justice's comment can be interpreted as suggest-
ing that in order to circumvent constitutional requirements, the Court has at
times insincerely concluded that one has a lesser, or no, expectation of priva-
cy: "Our intricate body of law regarding 'reasonable expectation of privacy'
has been developed largely as a means of creating these exceptions, enabling a
search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment 'search' and therefore not
subject to the general warrant requirement.' 82
The Court should not permit the warrantless search of an automobile
177. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
178. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
179. Id. at 146.
180. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).
181. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 n.10 (1970) (permitting the warrantless search of
an automobile after the owner had been arrested and the vehicle taken to the police station).
182. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 636 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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unless it can be justified on the basis of a true exigency rather than a theoreti-
cal reduced expectation of privacy. Perhaps the balance between the
government's investigative powers and individual privacy and liberty interests
would be better maintained if the automobile exception as it now exists were
eliminated. Instead, taking advantage of up-to-date computer and telecommuni-
cations technology, the preferred method of searching an automobile would be
for the police to comply with the warrant requirement. A warrantless automo-
bile search would then be unconstitutional unless it satisfied the stricter exi-
gent circumstances exception proposed above. There would be no separate and
independent automobile exception.
The Court is also increasingly creating exceptions to the warrant require-
ment through its "special needs" analysis.'83 The Court applies this analysis
when it concludes that government agents have "special needs" beyond crimi-
nal law enforcement. Under this analysis, the Court has not only suspended
the warrant requirement, but it has increasingly been willing to dispense with
one or both of the other Fourth Amendment threshold requirements of proba-
ble cause and individualized suspicion." 4 Recently, the Court used this "spe-
cial needs" analysis to permit public school officials to test student athletes for
drug usage without a warrant, without probable cause, and without any indi-
vidualized suspicion.'85
While a useful analysis of each "special needs" exception is beyond the
scope of this article, the Court must consider these exceptions to determine
which can be narrowed or eliminated in light of advances in computer and
telecommunications technology. Many of these "special needs" exceptions
seem to be created out of desperation rather than concern for Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine. While they are permitted because of the government's interest
in something other than criminal law enforcement, the Supreme Court has not
hesitated to permit the government to use the fruits of the search to convict
the search victim of a crime. 86 Ultimately, and regrettably, the "special
needs" exceptions may permanently realign traditional Fourth Amendment
183. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (per-
mitting suspicionless and warrantless urine testing of employees); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 720-25 (1987) (allowing public employers to conduct warrantless searches of employees'
desks and offices); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (allowing the warrantless
search of a child's possessions within school on the basis of reasonable suspicion); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (permitting the temporary suspicionless seizure of
motorists, without a warrant, at permanent checkpoints removed from the border); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (allowing warrantless and suspicionless border
searches).
184. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990) (holding that
sobriety checkpoints are constitutional without probable cause, individualized suspicion, or a war-
rant); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666-67 (1989) (allowing
warrantless and suspicionless drug testing).
185. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
186. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 650-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that a government agency
conducting suspicionless and warrantless searches of its employees "appear[s] to invite criminal
prosecutors to obtain the blood and urine samples drawn by the [agency] and use them as the
basis of criminal investigations and trials" against its employees, notwithstanding that the govern-
ment is only permitted to draw these samples because it claims to be conducting these searches on
the basis of a special need other than law enforcement).
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interests with minimal regard for the individual." 7
B. A New "Good Faith" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Eliminates a
Crucial Check on the Unbridled Discretion of Government Agents, and
Should Not Be Created
Under existing law, evidence obtained by government agents through a
search or seizure conducted in the preferred manner-with a warrant-is al-
ready admissible in court against a criminal defendant. 8 The present Leon
"good faith" exception permits the use of evidence against a criminal defen-
dant in either state or federal court, even if it is obtained pursuant to a consti-
tutionally defective warrant. 9 The existing "good faith" exception permits
use of the evidence as long as the officer has an objective, good-faith belief
that the warrant is valid, the officer acts within the scope of the warrant, and
the issuing magistrate is neutral and detached.'
Notwithstanding the existing "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule, however, many commentators have been anticipating an additional "good
faith" exception--one that also permits the use of unconstitutionally seized
evidence when an officer elects not to use the warrant process. 9' One exam-
ple of such an exception has been advanced in Congress as part of the Repub-
lican party's "Contract with America."'92 The Exclusionary Rule Reform Act
of 1995,' if enacted and upheld by the Supreme Court, 94 would permit
187. See generally Andrea Lewis, Comment, Drug Testing: Can Privacy Interests Be Pro-
tected Under the "Special Needs" Doctrine?, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1013, 1033 (1990) (criticizing
the "special needs" doctrine for essentially making balancing the norm rather than the exception).
188. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 919 n.20, 920, 923.
191. See, Ronald J. Bacigal, An Alternative Approach to the Good Faith Controversy, 37
MERCER L. REV. 957, 976 (1986) ("The flexibility inherent in a totality of the circumstances test
allows the Court to attach some unspecified weight to police motivation, instead of being forced
to Leon's all-or-nothing decision in good faith."); Craig M. Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception"
Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287, 303 (1985) (noting that "the primary
focus of attention should be on clarifying the rules rather than on making them increasingly un-
clear by focusing attention on penalties and exceptions"); Elizabeth P. Marsh, On Rollercoasters,
Submarines, and Judicial Shipwrecks: Acoustic Separation and the Good Faith Exception to the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 941, 1016 ("A good faith exception
similar to the mistake defenses in criminal law would restore partially the balance between the
conduct rule and the decisional rule.").
192. The "Contract with America," as explained by Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.),
Speaker of the House, is "a planning model [setting forth the Party's] vision, strategies, projects
and tactics." Newt Gingrich, 1995 Summer Meeting, Republican National Committee, Phila., Pa.
(July 14, 1995).
193. Introduced on January 25, 1995, the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995 requires:
Evidence which is obtained as a result of a search or seizure shall not be excluded...
on the ground that the search or seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment...
if the search or seizure was carried out in circumstances justifying an objectively reason-
able belief that it was in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. The fact that evidence
was obtained pursuant to and within the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evi-
dence of the existence of such circumstances.
Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995, H.R. REP. No. 104-17, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1995).
194. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court is the
"ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
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prosecutors to use unconstitutionally seized evidence in federal court, even if
no warrant was used, as long as the officer had an objectively reasonable
belief that the search or seizure was constitutional.
An additional "good faith" exception is not necessary when the warrant
process is followed and, while enactment of a new exception may result in
political gain to its sponsors,'95 such an exception is likely to produce a mul-
titude of unintended new harms. Perhaps most insufferable among these harms
is that the new exception would abolish any significant check-either before
or after-on the uninhibited discretion of government agents when they search
and seize evidence. This check would be absent regardless of how reasonable
a citizen's expectation of privacy in the area searched or the item seized.
Presently, in contrast, there is a check on the officer's actions either prior to
the search or afterwards: if the search is conducted with a warrant, a magis-
trate screens the officer's actions in advance;'9if the search is conducted
without a warrant, a judge reviews the officer's actions afterwards during a
suppression hearing.'97 Under an additional "good faith" exception, all mean-
ingful review would be abolished. Unlike the existing Leon "good faith" ex-
ception, the proposed exception abolishes the need for prior review by a mag-
istrate, and because it essentially discontinues the suppression of unconstitu-
tional evidence, the proposed exception also eliminates any meaningful subse-
quent judicial review.
Regrettably, an additional "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule-one that arises when an officer elects not to use the warrant pro-
cess-confers upon government agents virtually unbridled discretion to in-
trude, search, and seize evidence. In contrast, the warrant process and present
"good faith" exception more fittingly balance and satisfy relevant Fourth
Amendment liberty, privacy, and security interests. When government agents
follow the warrant requirement, a citizen's liberty and privacy interests can be
protected and effective law enforcement measures can be secured. The magis-
trate will customarily serve as a check on government discretion and-when
the magistrate errs---evidence seized unconstitutionally, but in good faith, will
(1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."); see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2491 (1995) ("Were we to accept the Justice
Department's objection ... we would be surrendering to the Executive Branch our role in enforc-
ing the constitutional limits on race-based official action. We may not do so.").
195. See Congress' Get Tough Act Is a Real 'Crime', USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 1990, at A12
("Like its predecessors... the 1990 crime bill ... won't do much to protect us from crime. At
best, it will only help its perpetrators get re-elected."); Debra J. Saunders, Crime: What Congress
Thinks of You, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 13, 1994, at A23 ("President Clinton put the heat on Congress
to pass a version of the Senate $22 billion omnibus crime bill, and quickly .... Clinton won't
blow this opportunity to... look effective and curry favor with a crime-wary electorate.").
196. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
197. A defendant may also be entitled to both forms of review: even when a magistrate has
reviewed the search warrant request in advance, a defendant can obtain subsequent judicial review
at a suppression hearing. However, in this situation the judge does not make a de novo determina-
tion of probable cause but merely determines whether there was a substantial basis for the magis-
trate to find probable cause, and the judge gives great discretion to the magistrate's initial determi-
nation. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Even if the magistrate incorrectly issues a
constitutionally defective warrant, the judge will not suppress the seized evidence if the officer
acted in objective, good-faith reliance upon the warrant. See supra notes 188-90.
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be used in court against a criminal defendant. Use of the warrant process,
together with the existing Leon "good faith" exception, eliminates the need for
either Congress or the courts to create a new "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule.
CONCLUSION
Today's advanced computer, facsimile, and cellular technology permits the
Supreme Court to reaffirm a meaningful commitment to the warrant require-
ment. Due to the availability of portable and lightweight cellular facsimile
machines, the ability to transmit electronic documents directly between cellular
computer modems, and the continual miniaturization of computer hardware, an
officer can now quickly-and without leaving the investigation scene-obtain
a warrant. The officer can electronically transmit a written but wireless war-
rant application and affidavit to the magistrate. The magistrate can then trans-
mit the approved warrant back to the officer in the same fashion. Because
investigators can now quickly obtain a warrant without leaving the area of
investigation, the Court has the ability to respond to exigent circumstances and
declare a renewed commitment to the warrant requirement.
The warrant requirement is consistent with the Framers' original intent in
crafting the Fourth Amendment. The Framers endorsed a three-tiered approach
to deterring capricious searches and seizures. First, they agreed to permit some
types of warrantless searches. They were comfortable with these warrantless
searches because of their belief that existing common law remedies would
continue to prevent such warrantless searches from becoming threatening.
Second, the Framers desired to prohibit any new types of search unless they
were conducted pursuant to a warrant. Third, to prevent the new warrant re-
quirement from becoming meaningless, the Framers intended that it be de-
manding enough to deter capricious government searches. By limiting the
circumstances under which a warrant could be issued, the Framers sought to
protect citizens from the type of warrant abuse similar to that recently suffered
through the use of general warrants and writs of assistance under English rule.
The warrant requirement is also harmonious with over one hundred years
of Supreme Court precedent. Recently, however, the Court has displayed an
increased willingness to ignore the Warrant Clause and focus exclusively on
the reasonableness clause through both its traditional analysis and the Court's
"special needs" analysis. This has resulted in an increase in the creation of
new exceptions to the warrant requirement. This trend must cease, and the
Court must re-embrace the warrant requirement.
While the warrant requirement should be embraced because it is compati-
ble with the Framers' original intent and over one hundred years of Supreme
Court precedent, the requirement should also be championed because it pro-
duces several advantages. Its quintessential advantage is that it allows thresh-
old decisions regarding the intrusion into a citizen's liberty and privacy to be
made in an orderly, deliberate, and impartial manner. Additional advantages of
the warrant process include the following: rather than award the guilty defen-
dant a windfall, the warrant process protects the innocent, law-abiding citizen;
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magistrate determinations of reasonableness and probable cause are more
accurate, since the magistrate has greater opportunity to stay abreast of contin-
uing developments regarding search and seizure law; due to continuing magis-
trate education and because fewer decision-makers are involved, a magistrate's
determinations of probable cause and reasonableness are more consistent; it
eliminates the need for courts to make uncertain factual determinations during
subsequent review because the warrant process generates a contemporaneous
and complete record of the government's basis for searching and of the scope
of search initially authorized; and the warrant process allows the officer to
preserve evidence that would otherwise be excluded due to a premature search,
since the officer can gather more facts and strengthen the showing of probable
cause if a magistrate has denied the officer's initial request.
The warrant process must also be improved to ensure that the magistrate's
review provides a genuine check on the government's unrestrained discretion
to search and seize evidence. The assessment must be meaningful, and not
merely the spontaneous and routine approval of a police officer's application
for a warrant. First, the Supreme Court must define what is constitutionally re-
quired-professionally and personally-for one to become and remain a mag-
istrate. The Court must be more rigorous than it was in Shadwick98 in artic-
ulating the entry-level, initial training, and continuing education requirements
for a magistrate. Each requirement must increase the accuracy and consistency
of the magistrate's assessment. If the Court is unwilling to establish rigorous
uniform standards for magistrates, Congress and the state legislatures should
establish the needed standards.
A second suggestion for enhancing the warrant process is to make a mag-
istrate liable for flagrant assessment errors. A magistrate should no longer be
absolutely immune from § 1983 claims or Bivens-type'9 claims. Instead, a
magistrate should only be entitled to qualified immunity. In order to minimize
potential liability, magistrates will then be more accurate in their determina-
tions of reasonableness and probable cause. Third, to reinforce the warrant
process, government agents must have a reduced level of immunity from civil
liability when they seek and find a second magistrate who will issue a warrant
after a first magistrate has already denied the application based on the same
showing of probable cause. This practice of "magistrate shopping" mocks the
warrant requirement.
While this article has sought to demonstrate why the warrant requirement
must be the norm rather than the exception, some uncertain situations will
remain where an officer must be allowed to choose between using a warrant
or conducting a warrantless search. To encourage government agents to use
the warrant process when these ambiguous situations arise, Congress, state
legislatures, and the courts must implement the following incentives and
disincentives: agents must be given greater immunity from civil liability when
they conduct a search pursuant to a judicial warrant; the burden must be
placed on the defendant to show that a search or seizure was unconstitutional
198. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
199. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
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when the officer conducts the search pursuant to a warrant; when a warrant is
used, the defendant must be deemed to forfeit the right to a suppression hear-
ing unless the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the seized evidence
prior to the commencement of trial; when a trial court suppresses evidence
seized pursuant to a warrant, the trial must be stayed and the prosecution
given an opportunity for immediate appellate review, thereby giving the gov-
ernment an opportunity to use the excluded evidence at trial; and, when a
government agent conducts a warrantless search, the class of victims who have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search must be expanded.
In addition to articulating a new commitment to the warrant requirement,
the Supreme Court must eliminate or narrow some of its previously created
exceptions that are no longer necessary due to current technology. Foremost
among these is the exigent circumstances exception. This exception must be
narrowed, since today's advanced technology eliminates much of the time and
many of the geographic hurdles which previously delayed obtaining a warrant.
The exigent circumstances exception should be modified so that it only per-
mits a warrantless search if an officer is unable to obtain a facsimile or com-
puter warrant via cellular modem before searching. A second exception, the
automobile exception, should be eliminated entirely. The Court should only
permit the search of an automobile without a warrant if the stricter exigent
circumstances test has been satisfied. The exigency must be such that the
officer does not even have the time to obtain an electronic warrant prior to
searching the vehicle. In addition to these two exceptions, the Court should
diligently use its review process to determine which additional excep-
tions-arising under either the Court's traditional analysis or its "special
needs" analysis-should be narrowed or eliminated due to advances in tele-
communications technology.
While existing exceptions to the warrant requirement should be narrowed
or eliminated, no further changes should be made to the exclusionary rule.
Neither Congress nor the courts should create a new "good faith" exception to
the rule. A new exception would eliminate a crucial check on the uncontrolled
discretion of government agents. Moreover, a new exception serves no purpose
when the warrant process is used since evidence obtained by government
agents with a warrant is already admissible in court under existing law, even if
the warrant is constitutionally defective.
The Court no longer has to choose between the warrant requirement and
warrantless searches because of advances in telecommunications technology.
Today's technology promotes a superior balance between the government's
need to swiftly investigate during exigent circumstances, and an individual's
privacy and liberty interests. Due to today's advanced telecommunications
technology, the Supreme Court has the opportunity, without sacrificing public
safety, to reclaim and preserve the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
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ORIGINS OF A FLAT TAX
STEVEN A. BANK*
The push toward radical reform of our federal system of graduated in-
come tax rates hit the political scene like a sonic boom during 1995. No less
than eight proposals were circulated or formally submitted by members of
Congress, including plans by Senators Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Arlen Spec-
ter (R-Pa.), which were made the centerpieces of their respective campaigns
for the Republican nomination in the 1996 presidential elections.' Further-
more, presidential candidates such as former Tennessee Governor Lamar Alex-
ander,2 political commentator Pat Buchanan,' Senator Bob Dole (R-Kan.),4
* Associate, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas. B.A., University of Pennsylvania,
1991; J.D., University of Chicago, 1994. This article was written in part while the author was a
law clerk for the Honorable Jesse E. Eschbach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit. The author wishes to express thanks to Michael McConnell and Larry Lessig for
their encouragement and comments. The views discussed herein do not necessarily represent the
views of Hughes & Luce or its clients.
1. Tax reform plans already introduced in Congress include the following: The Freedom
and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (submitted by
Rep. Richard Armey (R-Tex.) on July 19, 1995) and its companion S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (submitted by Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) on July 19, 1995); H.R. 1780, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995) (submitted by Mark Souder (R-Ind.) on June 7, 1995) and its companion S. 488,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (submitted by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) on Mar. 2, 1995); Crane
Tithe Tax Act of 1995, H.R. 214, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (submitted by Rep. Philip Crane
(R-111.) on Jan. 4, 1995) and its companion the Flat Tax Act of 1993, S. 188, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (submitted by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) on Jan. 26, 1993); USA Tax Act of 1995,
S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (submitted by Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) on Apr. 25, 1995).
See JOINT COMMrIrEE ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., 1ST SEss., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSALS TO REPLACE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (Joint Comm. Print 1995); JOINT COMMITTEE
ON TAXATION, Description and Analysis of Proposals to Replace the Federal Income Tax, 82
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 29, at 30-38 (June 15, 1995).
Plans that have been announced but not yet introduced include a "flat" tax proposal by
House Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.), in which the majority of the country would
pay a flat tax while the richest would pay graduated rates. See Lucinda Harper, Gephardt Outlines
Tax-Reform Plan Cutting Deductibles, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1995, at A2. Other announced plans
include various sales tax proposals by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), House Ways and Means
Chairman Bill Archer (R-Tex.), Representative Dan Schaefer (R-Colo.), and Representative Billy
Tauzin (D-La.). Jonathan Peterson, Chorus Builds for Radical Remake of U.S. Tax Policy, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1995, at Al; see also Amy Kaslow, Radical Tax Reforms Gain New Attention,
CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Apr. 12, 1995, at 1; Stephen Moore, Ax the Tax, NAT'L REV., Apr. 17,
1995, at 38, 38.
States are also getting involved. Flat tax plans have been proposed in South Carolina, Ar-
kansas, and California. Clarifying California, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1995, at A18; John Heilprin,
S.C. Senate Endorses Legislation for Flat Tax, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), May 18,
1995, at A8; James Jefferson, Rep. Reopens Plan for Ark. Flat Tax, COM. APPEAL (Memphis,
Tenn.), July 28, 1995, at BI0.
2. U.S. GOP Candidate Alexander Backs Flat Tax, REUTERS, May 12, 1995. But see Rena
Pederson, Clarifying the Flat Tax, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 21, 1996, at 23 (reporting that
Alexander recently called one flat tax plan a "nutty idea").
3. Marcia Stepanek, Republicans Flat Excited About New Tax Proposals, S.F. EXAMINER,
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and publisher Malcolm S. "Steve" Forbes, Jr., as well as leaders in both the
House and Senate,' expressed support for these proposals and their underlying
theories during the 1996 campaign. These reform plans, advertised as revenue-
neutral, suggest either replacing the current graduated income tax rate structure
with a "flat" or proportionate rate, or abolishing the income tax altogether in
favor of a national consumption or sales tax. The devil, however, is in the
details. 6 Consequently, House Majority Leader Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) and
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole tabbed Jack Kemp to lead a GOP commis-
sion to investigate the possibility of overhauling the tax system.' Regardless
of which, if any, proposal survives the political process, tax reform is sure to
be on the public agenda in 1996.
While the public has echoed the radical sentiments expressed by tax re-
formers, a basic loyalty to graduated rates remains. In a Wall Street Journal
poll, two-thirds of respondents said that the current system was "unfair."8
Likewise, a Newsweek poll found that only 27% of respondents favored the
current system in which rates range from 15% to 39%.9 Much of this dissatis-
faction, however, represents a plea for simplification rather than support for
the proposed alternatives. 0 Opinion surveys and focus groups reveal that "the
Apr. 17, 1995, at All.
4. Id.
5. Enthusiasm Growing for Income Tax Reform, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 9, 1995, at A3
(discussing House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt's plan to announce his proposal); John
Harwood, Presidential Hopeful Forbes Talks Up Flat Tax, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1996, at 38; Lisa
Holton, The Flat Tax; What Is It? Who Gains? Will It Fly?, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at
41; Peterson, supra note 1, at Al; B.J. Phillips, Flat-Tax Fever, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 29, 1995, at
15. Representative Robert K. Doman (R-Cal.), a long shot Republican presidential candidate, and
Massachusetts Governor William Weld, a rumored candidate, also publicly proclaimed their sup-
port for the flat tax. Amy Bayer, Dornan Joins GOP Presidential Race, Vows to Fight Moral De-
cay, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 14, 1995, at A6; Publisher Forbes May Seek GOP Presiden-
tial Nomination, PALM BEACH POST, July 9, 1995, at A14; Doris S. Wong, Weld Backs Flat-Rate
U.S. Income Tax, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 1995, at 46.
6. See Edwin Chen, Details Divide GOP's Flat-Tax Boosters, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1995,
at A14.
7. Gerald F. Seib, Flat to Flatter Goes Tax Debate for Republicans, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12,
1995, at A16. A report from the commission was released on January 17, 1996. See Cal Thomas,
Flat Tax: It's a Good Alternative to Our Confusing System, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 18,
1996, at 19A. There are also reports that President Clinton has directed the National Economic
Council to evaluate the options for tax reform. Douglas Stanglin et al., Taxing Debate, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., July 10, 1995, at 14, 14.
Unfortunately, the Kemp Commission Report offered few details. Its basic prescription for
reform is some type of flat rate tax which allows full deductibility of the payroll tax and requires
a two-thirds super-majority vote in Congress to increase the rate. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX REFORM, UNLEASHING AMERICA'S POTENTIAL
(1996).
8. Ronald G. Shafer, Tax Overhaul? Yes. Flat Tax? Not So Fast, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28,
1995, at A l.
9. Poll: Majority Favors Flat-Tax Proposal, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1995, at A2.
10. See Keep it Simple .... INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, June 8, 1995, at A6; Make Taxes Simpler,
Not Flat, WIS. ST. J., Aug. 6, 1995, at B3; Henry G. Mogensen, All Would Gain from Tax Re-
form, WIS. ST. J., Apr. 29, 1995, at A7; Time for Reform; Tortuous Tax System Needs Simplifi-
cation, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 6, 1995, at A12; see also Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity,
Reform, and the Illusion of Tax Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 319 (1994) (argu-
ing that most tax reform proposals claim to simplify the tax code because this makes good press,
but few come close to this goal).
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long-held notion that the tax code should be 'progressive,' requiring the rich to
pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes than the poor ... remains
firmly rooted in the minds of many middle-income taxpayers."" Thus, many
resist reform when they realize that it involves a significant departure from our
current system of graduated rates.'
Indeed, graduated rates have become entrenched in our notion of what
constitutes a "fair" system of taxation. It is common to hear people suggest
the somewhat oxymoronic solution of a "flat" tax which contains more than
one tax rate. 3 As popular columnist William Safire wrote, "[m]ost of us ac-
cept as 'fair' this principle: The poor should pay nothing, the middlers some-
thing, the rich the highest percentage."' 4 Given this "political logic of pro-
gressive taxation,"' 5 Representative Sam M. Gibbons (D-Fla.), the ranking
11. Clay Chandler, Will the Republicans Trip over Tax Reform? Strategists Say a Crusade
Could Backfire, Painting GOP as Pawns of Corporations, Rich, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1995, at
HI.
12. In several Wall Street Journal and NBC News polls, a majority of people favored
retaining graduated rates despite their eagerness for radical reform. The Flat Tax Is Losing Its
Appeal Among U.S. Voters, Poll Finds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1996, at R2 (stating that 54% sup-
ported a graduated tax while only 39% preferred a flat tax); see also Christina Duff & Gerald F.
Seib, Panel Shaping GOP's Tax Plan Recommends Single Low Rate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996,
at A6 (stating that 54% supported a graduated income tax system, while 41% supported a flat tax);
Gerald Seib, Forbes Boomlet: A Rogue Force Stalks the Field, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1995, at A20.
The results in a Newsweek poll and a poll by Time and CNN, however, showed that more respon-
dents favored some form of flat rate taxation. Flatter Is Better, Both Parties Agree Tax System
Too Complicated, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 7, 1995, at B6; Poll: Majority Favors Flat-Tax
Proposal, supra note 9, at A2. With the majority of plans billing themselves as "flat," while still
providing deductions and graduated rates, the Newsweek poll and the poll by Time and CNN may
be misleading. See Reformers Really Want a Flat Tax with Wrinkles, PALM BEACH POST, July 15,
1995, at A14. Many respondents may be simply unfamiliar with the choices. See Chandler, supra
note 11, at HI ("Nearly seven in 10 respondents to a February CBS News/New York Times sur-
vey said they had never 'heard or read anything' about the flat tax."). At a minimum, the numbers
indicate substantial support for change without substantial support for moving away from graduat-
ed rates.
13. See A Flat Tax That America Might Buy, Bus. WK., June 12, 1995, at 110, 110 ("We
favor a modified flat tax that would flatten the rate structure into two or three rates and preserve
deductions for home mortgage interest contributions."); Phillips, supra note 5, at 15; William
Safire, Flat Tax Plan, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 24, 1995, at B5 (arguing for a plan in which after a
$15,000 exemption, earnings up to $150,000 would be taxed at a rate of 25% and anything over
that would be taxed at 30%); Talking Straight About Taxes, Another Debate on Tax Reform Is
Welcome, but Let's Not Pretend This Will Be Easy, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 26, 1995, at B1O [herein-
after Talking Straight About Taxes].
14. Safire, supra note 13, at B5. This is a reasonable reflection of the American attitude
toward graduated rates. See Michael Kinsley, The Flat Tax Society, NEW YORKER, May 1, 1995,
at 7, 8 (arguing that the wealthy should pay a disproportionate share of the taxes since they re-
ceive a disproportionate share of society's benefits); Letters to the Editor, The Rich Should Pay
Plenty, WASH. POST, July 22, 1995, at A20.
Reaction to the Christian Coalition's endorsement of the flat tax illustrates the moral princi-
ples which many believe should underlie the tax system. One commentator wrote that "[wihen
you recall that Christ's ministry was designed to uplift the poor and bring social justice to the
world, it makes you wonder why the flat tax is being called 'Christian."' Yardley Rosemar, Chris-
tian Coalition's Contract: But Does Jesus Favor a Flat Tax?, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.),
May 26, 1995, at A15. A similar story is revealed by three Tennessee bishops' criticisms of sales
taxes. "Tennessee takes in most of its revenue through sales taxes, and the bishops are worried
that's too much of a burden on their poor. 'Jesus is on our side,' the clerics argue." Higher Au-
thorities, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1995, at A12.
15. Should America Keep Its 'Progressive' Tax System?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, July 24,
1995, at BI ("The political logic of progressive taxation has kept multiple rates in the U.S. tax
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Democrat on the House Ways and Means Committee, declared that "'[a]ny
new tax system, should result in the same tax burden on each income group as
the current tax system imposes.""' 6 Thus, both the Domenici-Nunn "USA
tax," which taxes income of all kinds but creates a deduction for anything a
person saves, 7 and the Gephardt "flat tax," which retains five different
rates," have been hailed because they allow for "steeply graduated marginal
tax rates."' 9 According to a Washington Post editorial, the ability to tax high
incomes at a higher rate than low ones "is consistent with a well-established
American tradition of fairness."2
This conception that graduated, and hence progressive, rates are inherently
fair is not confined to the popular press and political commentators. Academ-
ics often uncritically accept the historical supposition that the ratification of
the Sixteenth Amendment2' in 1913 sanctified the marriage between the prin-
ciples of fairness and graduated rates and approved an explicitly redistributive
rationale for the income tax.22 Akhil Amar wrote that "[tihe popular legisla-
tive history of ratification [of the Sixteenth Amendment] reveals not merely an
endorsement of an income tax simpliciter, but popular approval of a predict-
ably progressive-that is, a redistributive-income tax."23 Because the first
post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax included graduated rates, the assump-
tion is that the progression principle was also ratified in 1913.2"
system for decades,").
16. David E. Rosenbaum, Chairman Proposes Redefining Tax Code, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1995, at A22. Representative Gephardt's "flat" tax proposal, which provides for rates of 10%,
20%, 26%, 32%, and 34%, is an example of the attempt to preserve the graduated structure. See
Harper, supra note I, at A2.
17. David Wessel, Nunn-Domenici 'USA Tax' Puts Levy on Consumption to Encourage Sav-
ing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1995, at A2.
18. Thomas Oliphant, Gephardt's Version of Flat Tax Is Fairer to Middle Class, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 11, 1995, at 13.
19. Wessel, supra note 17, at A2; see Robert Kuttner, Dueling Tax Plans: One Adds Up,
The Other Doesn't, BUS. WK., May 15, 1995, at 28; Tax Fairness, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1995, at
A20; Murray Weidenbaum, Postcard-Size or Not, America Needs a New Tax Plan, CHRISTIAN
Sci. MONITOR, May 18, 1995, at 19.
20. Tax Fairness, supra note 19, at A20. Tommy Denton, in his blunt fashion, noted that
"all taxpayers should bear an equitable-and thus progressive-proportion of the burden necessary
to support the common good, including and especially the awesomely wealthy. Fair's fair."
Tommy Denton, Let's Be Fair, BALTIMORE SuN, July 19, 1995, at AI5.
21. The Sixteenth Amendment states, "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states,
and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
22. See Marc Linder, I Like Ike: Bringing Back Eisenhower-Era Progressive Taxation, 67
TAX NOTES 833, 834 (1995) ("Bringing back Eisenhower-era progressive taxation ... would also
fulfill the other traditional purpose of the income tax by reducing the market's increasingly un-
equal distribution of income through redistribution."); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax
Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 459, 461 (1993) ("Advocates of changing the tax system to encourage economic growth do
not seem to view the tax system as a vehicle to collect adequate revenues fairly or to soften the
harsh distributional results that capitalism sometimes produces."). Some recognize that this was
not the theory enacted in 1913, but imply that it should have been. See, e.g., ROBERT STANLEY,
DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-
1913 (1993).
23. Akhil R. Amar, Comment, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97
YALE L.J. 281, 291-92 & n.45 (1987) (critiquing Richard Epstein's argument that redistributive
legislation offends deeply rooted Constitutional principles).
24. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Move-
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The history of income taxation in this country before and immediately
after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, however, reveals a struggle
of more than fifty years to replace a regressive tax system with a proportional,
not progressive, one. Each income tax proposal was just one component of a
larger tariff or revenue bill. During the three significant periods of discussion
for the income tax-1861-1872, 1893-1895, and 1909-1913-the justification
for income taxes, and their progressive structures, was to balance out the re-
gressive effects of other aspects of the federal revenue system and to require
the wealthy to contribute their proportionate share.25 The only experiment
with a graduated income tax prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, which was
enacted to counterbalance the heavy effects of consumption taxes during the
Civil War, was promptly discarded when those effects appeared to dissipate.26
When attention later became focused on the inequity of the wealthy's equal
rather than proportionately larger tax contribution, an income tax enacted in
1894 contained a flat rate similar in form to many of the recent proposals.27
Thus, the Sixteenth Amendment's failure to address progressive rates in its
approval of an income tax "without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration,"2 was not because progres-
sion was implicit within an income tax. Indeed, a motion on the floor of Con-
gress to amend the proposed Sixteenth Amendment to allow for graduated
rates was withdrawn by its sponsor, Senator Joseph W. Bailey (D-Tex.),
because it would not have passed and he did not want the measure of opposi-
tion recorded.29
Thus, when Congress employed graduated rates in the first post-Amend-
ment income tax measure in 1913, it was not to enact a progressive overall
revenue system. These rates were politically and popularly intertwined with
the tariff reduction bill within which they were contained. Under what contem-
porary economist Edwin R.A. Seligman called the "special compensatory
theory,"3 ° the Democrats who controlled the bill in both Houses supported the
slightly graduated rates as a measure to equalize the overall regressive effects
of the tariffs and internal excise taxes which provided the federal government
with the bulk of its revenues. Operating within the patchwork quilt of federal
taxation, graduated income tax rates were seen as a temporary measure neces-
sitated by inequality elsewhere in the fabric. A transition was beginning from
a system which taxed people based upon their "necessity to consume" to a
system which taxed them based upon their "ability to pay." Strongly in favor
of free trade, the Democrats hoped for a period when the income tax would
ment: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 465 (1987) ("In 1913, the general public,
economists, and politicians argued about the exact schedule of rates and exemptions, but the idea
of graduated or progressive rates was accepted with surprising ease and generally has remained
unquestioned ever since.") (footnote omitted).
25. See discussion infra part II.
26. See discussion infra part II.B.
27. See discussion infra part II.C.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
29. 44 CONG. REC. 4120 (1909).
30. EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 30-31 (2d ed. 1914).
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become the primary source of federal revenues. At that time, Democrats de-
clared they would cast their support for the enactment of a flat rate income tax
as the only just and equal form of taxation. Only the Insurgent Republicans, a
small faction of the party composed mainly of politicians from the West and
Midwest, and the few members of the Progressive Party in Congress supported
the principle that the wealthy should pay at a higher rate simply because of
their swollen fortunes.
Despite this history, the latter view has endured. "Ability to pay" has
become associated with the philosopher's notion of "equality of sacrifice"
rather than the politician's description of a shift from taxation measured by the
"need to consume" to taxation measured by the "ability to pay"--a shift from
near absolute equality of payment to proportional equality of payment."' This
article examines the historical underpinnings and assumptions leading up to the
adoption of the graduated income tax in 1913 to disclose the fallacy that Con-
gress intended to enact even a mildly progressive federal revenue system.
Considering the system as a whole, the Revenue Act of 1913, much like its
predecessors, was a political compromise which resulted in the adoption of a
flat rate principle in federal taxation.
Section I explains the conceptual background and terminology of the
federal revenue system. The historical argument, which begins in section II,
examines the short-lived income taxes enacted during the Civil War and in
1894. Section III explores the political background and congressional debates
surrounding the inclusion of a graduated rate structure in the Sixteenth
Amendment and the Act of 1913. Finally, the article concludes that history
supports the adoption of a flat tax principle, but not in the form suggested by
many of the current proposals.
I. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY
Distributions of tax burdens can exist in a variety of manners as a per-
centage of an individual's overall income. Generally, the terms proportionate,
progressive, and regressive refer to these burdens.32 The proportionate tax is
perhaps the easiest to understand conceptually. Each dollar of taxable income
under a proportionate or "flat" tax is taxed at the same rate. Thus, a person
who earns $1 must pay $.10 under a 10% flat rate system of taxation while a
person who earns $100 must pay $10, one hundred times the contribution of
the lower-income individual. Wealthier individuals pay higher absolute
31. See McMahon, supra note 22, at 464 ("If equity in the tax rates requires an attempt to
approximate equal sacrifice or to measure 'ability to pay' across broad ranges of incomes, rates
should be far more progressive than the current rate schedule.").
32. -Seligman described a fourth manner of apportioning the burdens of taxation called the
degressive tax, where a tax is progressive to a certain level and then proportionate thereafter.
SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 30. Of course, this describes all progressive taxation which does not
define its upper rate by an infinite number. According to Seligman, the term "degressive taxation"
is reserved for systems where a low proportional rate is seen as the normal one and lesser incomes
receive an even lower rate. Id. Perhaps because of this philosophical uncertainty or the reality of
high rates, this term is not often cited in popular literature on the subject. But see Komhauser,
supra note 24, at 471 (using the term "degressive tax").
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amounts to the government, but not because their dollars are treated differently
than those of other taxpayers.
In a progressive tax system, the percentage of tax paid to the government
increases with income. Under our current regime, this is accomplished through
graduated marginal rates. Using the above example, the individual who earns
$1 pays nothing, while those earning $50 and $100 might pay $5, or 10% of
income, and $20, or 20%, respectively. Progressive taxation, however, can be
accomplished without graduated marginal rates. For example, a proportionate
rate of taxation coupled with an exemption results in progressive taxation.33
An exemption of $1 would relieve the earner of $1 from paying any tax at all.
Individuals earning $50 and $100 would pay tax on only $49 and $99 of their
respective incomes. Since the dollar removed from the $50 earner's income is
a greater percentage of his income than the dollar removed from the $100
earner's income, the progressive effect is intensified. Combining a proportion-
ate rate with a flat rebate or grant to all taxpayers achieves the same result.34
The regressive form of taxation has been said to be so unpopular "that the
term itself has become colored."35 Under this system, individuals pay a lower
percentage of their incomes in taxes as they become wealthier. For this reason,
the consumption taxes of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were
thought to be regressive. This does not mean, however, that the absolute
amount paid cannot rise with income. One percent of $100 is still a higher
absolute number than 50% of $1. Thus, even under regressive rates, wealthier
individuals may contribute more to the government than lower-income taxpay-
ers.
Some of the continuing loyalty to graduated rates can be attributed to
confusion over the terminology and the practical application of current propos-
als. Critics disparage the flat rate tax plans for their apparent lack of progres-
sion and dismiss consumption or sales tax alternatives due to their supposedly
regressive effects.36 Putting aside the normative question of what constitutes
the proper distribution of tax burdens, neither criticism is fair or accurate in
light of the proposals currently circulating.
For instance, all of the current flat tax proposals are progressive in the
sense that each contains a generous exemption." Some proposals even con-
33. See WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION 4 (1953); ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, Low TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX
25 (1983).
34. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1908 (1987).
35. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 33, at 3.
36. See, e.g., Edwin Chen, Administration Opposes Consumption Based Tax Plan, L.A.
TIMES, June 8, 1995, at Al 8; Dan Schaefer, Beyond Repair, Sales Tax Best 'Reform' for Unftxable
Income Tax Code, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 21, 1995, at A98; Talking Straight About Taxes,
supra note 13, at BI0; Tax Reform Pitfalls, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 27, 1995, at B6;
Weidenbaum, supra note 19, at 19. As will be discussed in the conclusion, most of the flat tax
plans, through their exemption of all investment income and capital gains, amount to consumption
tax plans, effectively blurring the distinction between the two.
37. See Louis S. Richman, The Flat Tax, FORTUNE, June 12, 1995, at 36. Under Senator
Specter's plan, "Four-person households with incomes below $25,500 would pay no tax at all."
Stepanek, supra note 3, at All. Under Representative Armey's plan, individuals would get a
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tain multiple rates to the extent that charitable, religious, and educational orga-
nizations retain their tax exemptions. 8 Studies estimate that because of tax
avoidance schemes, the present effective tax rate paid by the top 5% income
group is only 17.4%, rather than the nearly 40% top marginal rate imposed by
statute. 9 Thus, Representative Armey's proposal, a phased-in 17% tax rate on
earned income over and above a standard deduction of $24,700 for a married
couple filing jointly plus an additional standard deduction of $5,000 for each
dependent, coupled with a proposed elimination of deductions, should be con-
sidered no less progressive than the current system. Critics respond that certain
deductions actually promote progressivity by targeting lower-income individu-
als or by encouraging income redistribution.' Senator Specter's plan to insti-
tute a 20% tax rate on earned income above $16,500 plus an additional $4,500
for each dependent, however, partially addresses this concern because it pre-
serves the deduction for up to $100,000 of home mortgages and the deduction
for charitable contributions. 4' Flat rate proposals, therefore, are not only pro-
gressive, but potentially as progressive as the current system. In effect, the
existence of a flat rate is meaningless as a measure of a proposal's
progressivity.
42
Consumption or sales tax plans are equally undeserving of the criticism
directed toward them. Critics contend that sales taxes are regressive because
the money paid constitutes a larger percentage of a poor person's income than
of a wealthier person's income. This logic assumes, however, that the poor
and wealthy spend their money in the same way. Since we know that this is
not true, legislators could construct a sales tax as progressive as any other
form of taxation. For example, Senator Lugar's plan exempts from the tax
food and medicine and a minimum number of purchases by the poor.43 Sena-
tors Nunn and Domenici go one step further in their tax plan by explicitly
personal allowance of $10,700, married joint-filers would get $21,400, and there would be an
extra $5,000 deduction for each dependent child. Jackie Calmes, Flat-Tax Plan Is Revised by Rep.
Armey to Reduce Projected Loss of Revenue, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1995, at A14. Thus, a family
of four earning $50,000 would pay about 6% in taxes while a family earning $200,000 would pay
about 14%. Id. Professors Blum & Kalven describe this "inescapable" increment of progression as
"keyed to at least a minimum subsistence standard of living," and thus discuss "whether any add-
ed degree of progression" can be justified. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 33, at 4. However, given
the expansive exemptions proposed, with a family of four not paying taxes at all until its income
reaches $36,800, it is hard to ignore this exemption as an independent basis for progression. See
Robert S. Stein, Is a Major Tax Overhaul Ahead?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Apr. 13, 1995, at Al.
38. Hearings on Flat Tax Proposals Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess. (May 18, 1995) (statement of Michael J. Graetz, Professor, Yale Law School), available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, CURNWS
File [hereinafter Hearings].
39. Bradley D. Belt, Flat, Flatter, Flattest: Singing from the Same Tax 'Hymnal', CHRISTIAN
SC. MONITOR, May 12, 1995, at 19 (citing a recent study by Jonathan Gruber of MIT, published
in a Progressive Policy Institute report).
40. See Holton, supra note 5, at 41.
41. Gerald F. Seib, GOP Sen. Specter, Advocating Flat Tax, Religious Tolerance, Seeks
Presidency, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1995, at A14.
42. Cf Scott Shepard, Flat Tax Fever; 'Dream Bill' Catches Fire, Draws Flack, PALM
BEACH POST, Apr. 15, 1995, at AI0 ("I've never thought a steeply graduated tax code was pro-
gressive-or even fair, for that matter. The progressivity of the (flat) tax code is in exempting the
poor from income tax rates.") (quoting Jack Kemp).
43. Stein, supra note 37, at Al.
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allowing for graduated rates ranging from 19% to 40%." A rebate or credit
which would simulate the flat tax's exemption for a base level of consumption
may even accompany a consumption tax.
Thus, even if one measures "fairness" by the progressivity of the tax, it is
not a function of the graduation of the rates. A flat tax can be highly progres-
sive if enough people are completely exempt from paying a tax, while a grad-
uated rate tax can become regressive if the bulk of the deductions favor the
wealthy. A common mistake is to debate the merits of a plan based upon its
ability to achieve a particular distribution of tax burdens, without considering
the grounds for preferring that distribution. Legislators should determine how
to allocate the tax burdens and then decide the simplest and most efficient
method of accomplishing this result.
We must, therefore, evaluate the theories for deciding whether the tax
system should be progressive, proportionate, or regressive. Philosophers and
political commentators have expounded on the proper distribution of tax bur-
dens since taxation began. Although universally rejected by theorists, the
"pseudo-democratic contention of strict dollar for dollar equality died hard," in
the minds of the public during the nineteenth century.45 Absolute equality of
payment was inherent within poll taxes, stamp taxes, and many forms of con-
sumption taxes. Philosophers, however, scoffed at the morality of this type of
distribution. Instead, philosophers primarily discussed four theories between
1861 and 1913 as bases for the distribution of the tax burdens: (1) the sacri-
fice theory; (2) the benefit theory; (3) the redistributive theory; and (4) the
compensatory theory.
From the beginning, philosophers were drawn to the sacrifice theory. "The
most pronounced early support for progressive taxation, as well as '[t]he larg-
est part of the intellectual history of progression theory has been the develop-
ment of the sacrifice doctrine."'" John Stuart Mill, in Political Economy,
stated,"'The true principle of taxation"' is that each person "'shall feel neither
more nor less inconvenience from his share of the payment than every other
person experiences from his."' 47 Mill premised his argument upon the notion
that certain goods were necessities while others were luxuries.' Everyone
first devoted their income to necessities until achieving a certain point of satia-
tion, whereupon they could spend their remaining income on luxuries. 9 Since
taxes are presumably drawn off the top of a person's income, a head tax takes
away from a poor person's necessities while merely cutting back a rich
person's luxuries. Thus, the rich person must pay more to feel the same sacri-
fice as the poor person. The difficulty with this argument is its practical im-
44. Wessel, supra note 17, at A2.
45. JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 8 (1985).
46. Jay M. Howard, When Two Tax Theories Collide: A Look at the History and Future of
Progressive and Proportionate Personal Income Taxation, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 43, 63 (1992) (al-
teration in original) (quoting Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progres-
sive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 456 (1952)).
47. STEPHEN F. WESTON, PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN TAXATION 187-88 (1903) (quoting 5
JOHN S. MILL, POLITICAL ECONOMY, ch. 2, § 2 (N.Y., D. Appleton & Co. 1888)).
48. Id. at 188-89.
49. Id.
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plementation. As Edwin R.A. Seligman conceded, "Equality of sacrifice, in-
deed, we can never attain absolutely or exactly, because of the diversity of
individual wants and desires."5 In order to combat this difficulty, philoso-
phers often translated the negative conception of "equality of sacrifice" into
the positive indicia of taxation based upon "ability to pay." Sometimes called
the "faculty theory," one receives an exemption for income presumed neces-
sary to satisfy basic individual needs." Thus, under this theory, only the
"clear" income is taxed. Beyond that, the principle that "ability increases in a
greater ratio than income" warrants a progressive rate. 2 While politicians
often cited the phrase "ability to pay" to justify the transition from a consump-
tion-based tax system, it did not always coincide with the philosophers' use of
this term.53 For example, politicians often justified property taxes because
they taxed based upon the "ability to pay,"54 yet they were more proportional
than progressive.
The benefit theory, although sometimes scoffed at by intellectuals, had
political appeal in the Gilded Age. Under the benefit theory, "[flor every
'benefit' there must be a corresponding tax."55 No exemption is defensible
under this theory, since even an individual without property needs protection
of his or her person.56 Theoretically, this suggests a proportionate tax since
under a fair and impartial government, the benefit of protection does not nec-
essarily increase geometrically with respect to income.57 Under the political
circumstances of the day, when the public perceived that special laws and
government favors resulted in huge fortunes being amassed in large monopo-
lies and heavily protected industries, the benefit theory supported at least a
temporary progression in the system. Today, libertarians and free market advo-
cates sometimes invoke the benefit theory because of its analogy to bargained-
for consideration in a contractual exchange.
The redistributive rationale is premised on the assumption that progression
redistributes income to benefit society's welfare. This can operate in a theoret-
ical or practical sense. On a theoretical level, a small increase of money in a
poor person's pocket increases his or her welfare more than that same amount
in a wealthy person's pocket.59 On a practical level, politicians have long
50. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 32. Seligman thought this problem could be overcome by
recognizing that marginal utility theory supports some level progression in the system. Id. at 32-
33. This argument is not necessarily true even in the abstract. See Should America Keep Its
'Progressive' Tax System?, supra note 15, at BI.
51. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 31.
52. WESTON, supra note 47, at 241.
53. Stephen Weston, a student of Seligman, who later became president of Antioch College
in Ohio, noted that many confuse the benefit and ability theories and thus advocate proportional
taxation under the guise of the "ability to pay" concept. Id. at 226 & n.2.
54. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 25.
55. WESTON, supra note 47, at 247.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 226.
58. For a discussion of this modem development, see Komhauser, supra note 24, at 491.
Liberal scholars still invoke the traditional notion of the benefit theory to justify progressive rates.
See Kinsley, supra note 14, at 8.
59. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 46, at 477 (agreeing with this intuitive notion, while
ultimately rejecting a redistributive rationale for progression).
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recognized that an extreme disparity in income can lead both to excess power
and the arbitrary exercise thereof on the part of the wealthy. In turn, the poor
become resentful and threaten radical action against a nation's basic institu-
tions.' Thus, some measure of redistribution of wealth operates in a real
sense to reduce that excess power, and in a symbolic sense to defuse the
poor's anger with respect to both wealth and the wealthy.6'
Modern observers have paid little attention to the fourth rationale for
distributing the benefits of taxation, the compensatory theory. Despite the wide
acceptance of the compensatory theory's notion that some degree of progres-
sion is necessary to compensate "for the regressivity of other taxes in our
overall tax system," Professors Walter Blum and Harry Kalven decided to
forego discussion of it, concluding that "it does not involve the adoption of the
principle [of progression] itself."'62 But as Jerold Waltman explained, the the-
ory was of central importance to early supporters of the graduated income tax:
One of the key supporting arguments for progression in income taxes,
especially in the early years, was that it helped to offset the regres-
sive character of other taxes, especially the customs duties. Customs
duties had the double effect of taxing consumers through higher
prices and enriching American manufacturers. A graduated income
tax, therefore, would redress this inequity.63
Seligman called this the "special compensatory theory" to distinguish it from
the general compensatory theory.'M General compensatory theory combined
the redistributive and benefit rationales to reason that "'taxation ought to
counterbalance the inequalities consecrated by custom and by law ' ' '"M where-
by "the legal conditions of society naturally favor the rich. ' 'T Under the spe-
cial compensatory theory, one form of taxation is made progressive to counter-
balance the regressive effects of another specific form of taxation. Thus,
Seligman explained:
When indirect taxes exist, they often, it is said, act regressively and
hit the poor harder than the rich. The direct tax, with its progressive
scale, is designed to act as an engine of reparation. In order to attain
equal treatment the regressive indirect taxes must be counterbalanced
by the progressive direct tax.6'
Under the special compensatory theory, therefore, the graduated income tax
may be only an example of "ostensible progression," advocated by those
60. See STANLEY, supra note 22, at 234. The populist movement is an example of the view
that the government and the rich conspire against the poor in times of great disparity causing the
poor to become desparate and threaten violence. See Barbara B. Woodhouse, Who Owns the
Child?, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1023-24 (1992).
61. Robert Stanley argued that the income tax between 1861 and 1913 was primarily to
address the anger of the poor. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 234.
62. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 33, at 5 & n.10.
63. JEROLD L. WALTMAN, POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE U.S. INCOME TAX 10 (1985).
64. EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 146 (2d ed.
1908).
65. Id. at 144 (quoting French writer Villiaumd) (citation omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 146.
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willing to accept progression in one area in order to achieve the overall goal
of proportionate taxation.' s Although not a mathematically precise counter-
weight, a graduated income tax "is a crude way of accomplishing some kind
of proportionality overall."69 This article argues that under the compensatory
theory the United States was striving toward the overall goal of a flat or pro-
portionate tax system during the period before and immediately after the
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.
II. THE HISTORY OF INCOME TAx
A. Early Efforts at an Income Tax
Over the last fifty years, income and payroll taxes have accounted for the
majority of federal revenues." This, however, was not always the case. In the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States relied on high tar-
iffs and excise taxes as its principle source of revenues.7 This reliance was
so great that by the 1850s, the federal tax system was dependent on import
duties for 92% of its overall revenues.72 The tariff schedules, publicly justi-
fied as protection for domestic industries and privately as rewards for special
interests,73 included manufactured goods, raw materials, consumer products,
and luxury items, and covered industries in every part of the country.74 The
import duties on food, clothing, and shelter items, however, brought in the
bulk of the tariff revenues. 5 Implicit in the notion that such indirect taxes
need not be apportioned among the states was the expectation that the duties
would be passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices.76 Given the
finite limit on an individual's ability to consume, a general understanding
existed that the poor spent a greater percentage of their incomes on such
goods than the wealthy.77 Since domestic manufacturers were the beneficia-
ries of the duties, the regressive effect was exacerbated. Although this effect
may have been minimized in some respects by the reliance on property taxes
68. Id. at 146-47.
69. CHARLES 0. GALVIN & BoRis I. BITTKER, THE INCOME TAx: How PROGRESSIVE
SHOULD IT BE? 22 (1969).
70. Professor Sheldon Pollack recently testified before the Senate Finance Committee that
the income tax accounted for 45% of federal receipts from all taxes in 1950, jumping to nearly
73% in 1985, with a projected $739 billion in 1995. Hearings, supra note 38 (testimony of
Sheldon Pollack); see SIDNEY RATNER ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 518
(1979) (concluding that income and payroll taxes added up to about 70% of total tax revenues in
the late 1970s).
71. Pete V. Domenici, The UnAmerican Spirit of the Federal Income Tax, 31 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 273, 275 (1994); Jay Starkman, Is a Consumption Tax the Answer? ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Apr. 26, 1995, at AI5. In 1914, the federal income tax accounted for a mere 9.7% of the total re-
ceipts of the federal government. Hearings, supra note 38 (testimony of Sheldon Pollack).
72. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 25.
73. Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 285, 289-90 (1986).
74. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 25-26.
75. Id. at 26.
76. Id. at 25. John D. Buenker concluded that "virtually the entire cost of [customs duties]
was added on to the eventual price paid by the consumer." BUENKER, supra note 45, at 31.
77. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 31-32; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 26.
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at the state and local level,"8 it still energized the national debate over how to
allocate the hardships of federal taxation.
Initially, the income tax was a method for reaching the pockets of people
who escaped taxation altogether. Legislators made the first proposal for a
federal income tax toward the end of the War of 1812, after war expenditures
had produced a national debt of $100 million.7 9 When the war began, the na-
tional government doubled the customs duties it had been using to raise the
majority of its revenue." As the drop in trade caused these sums to dwindle,
Thomas Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Dallas, turned to
internal revenues from excise and property taxes, and eventually, to proposals
for income and inheritance taxes." In light of the relative tax burdens, Dallas
may have been motivated by a desire to impose some of the costs of financing
the war on the nation's manufacturers and financiers. 2 Although the latter
push came too late to secure passage, 3 some believe the country only
escaped income taxation "by a close margin."" Instead, Congress adopted a
high protective tariff in 1816.5
A crude version of a state income tax already existed prior to the Civil
War. Several states imposed "faculty" taxes on income from professions,
trades, and employments during the colonial period "as an adjunct to the prop-
erty tax."' The advent of professions and income derived from sources other
than real property made the property tax incomplete. "Since most colonial
revenue was derived from imposts on real and personal property, the faculty
tax was designed to reach 'those persons who derived their income from other
sources. '87 Most states abandoned or ignored these attempts soon after the
turn of the century.8 After the Panic of 1837, however, many states found
themselves mired in financial difficulties. Presidents Andrew Jackson and
Martin Van Buren had withdrawn funds from federal improvement projects, 9
78. RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 517.
79. JOHN F. WITrE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 67
(1985).
80. Id.
81. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 2-3; WrrrE, supra note 79, at 67. Henry Carter Adams
reported that the normal income from customs duties was about fourteen million dollars, but the
actual income for the years 1812 to 1816 fell far short of this despite the doubling of rates. HEN-
RY C. ADAMS, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1816, at 69 (N.Y., Burt Franklin 1884).
82. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 3.
83. Id.
84. RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (1954).
85. In the Tariff Act of April 27, 1816, the average duty was raised to 20%. BENDER'S FED-
ERAL REVENUE LAW 352 (1917); WIrrE, supra note 79, at 67. While these first duties were mod-
erate by late nineteenth century standards, a twenty-year stretch of increasingly protectionist enact-
ments followed. PERCY ASHLEY, MODERN TARIFF HISTORY 142 (3d ed. 1920).
86. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 397-99 (discussing the faculty taxes in Vermont, Connecti-
cut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Delaware, Maryland, and
Pennsylvania). John D. Buenker reported that "[a]n estimated one-third of the states partially fi-
nanced the costs of the Revolutionary War through some variation of the faculty tax." BUENKER,
supra note 45, at 2.
87. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 1.
88. See SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 388-400.
89. Id. at 400.
90. WrrrE, supra note 79, at 400 n.2.
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and efforts to have Congress assume some of the states' increasing indebted-
ness were unsuccessful.9 As a result, six states turned to some form of in-
come taxation.92 Not all of the push, however, should be attributed to a desire
to make up for the lost revenues. Underlying many of the laws was a desire to
equalize the tax burdens in the wake of the development of "paper" wealth
and salaried workers.93
Two states, Pennsylvania and Maryland, attempted to raise revenue by
imposing a tax on salaries and a lesser tax upon incomes and profits derived
from professions, faculties, and employments.94 As revenue raisers, however,
the income tax was an abject failure for both states. In 1843, Pennsylvania's
income tax raised $1,386 out of a total taxation revenue in the state of
$910,000. 9" Maryland's tax fared no better, and in 1850, after collecting no
income tax in the previous year, the law was gutted of all its force.96
The four southern states which instituted a form of income tax during that
period (Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, and Florida) may have had differ-
ent motivations. According to Seligman, the income tax in these states was
partly "a concession to the demand for more equal taxation." '97 In some of the
states, such as Alabama, cotton factors, merchants, and the professional classes
had escaped the brunt of taxation which was borne primarily by large planta-
tion owners. 98 Thus, in 1843, Alabama imposed a tax of $.25 on every $100
of income from auctioneers, factors, cotton brokers, and commission bro-
kers." The following year, Alabama added a tax of .5% on the incomes of
professionals such as lawyers, doctors, government officials, bankers, profes-
sors, and employees of mercantile houses."° By contrast, North Carolina's
income tax was primarily directed at the failure to tax so-called "unearned
income." Passed in 1849 with a statement in the preamble that "there are
many wealthy citizens of this state who derive very considerable revenues
from moneys which produce interest, dividends and profits, and who do not
contribute a due proportion to the public exigencies of the same," the act
imposed a 3% tax on all interest and investment income.' Virginia strad-
dled the fence between these two approaches. In 1843, it imposed a tax on
three separate classes of receipts: income from employment, fees from profes-
sions, and interest or profit from investment. 2 By 1853, Virginia graduated
the tax on income and fees up to 1% on amounts over $1,000, while that
91. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 400.
92. WITrE, supra note 79, at 400 n.2.
93. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 25.
94. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 400-01. Maryland exempted income derived from taxed
property. Id. at 401. This indicates that Maryland wanted to balance the tax burdens.
95. Id. at 400.
96. Id. at 401.
97. Id. at 402.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 404.
100. Id. at 404-05. Florida's tax was quite similar to Alabama's. See id. at 405.
101. Id. at 403-04. The law contained an exemption for investment income below $60 and
also imposed a $3 annual tax on all professionals after their fifth year of practice provided their
income exceeded $500. Id. at 404.
102. Id. at 402-03.
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portion of the tax on investment applied to income from public securities
climbed from 2.5% to 3.5%."' Apparently, the experiment with graduation
was not successful or was no longer needed. Thus, in 1861 before the war
began, Virginia replaced the graduated rate structure with a proportional tax of
1% on the amount in excess of $500."'° Virginia's tax earned an appreciable
amount of income during this period." 5 In general, however, most pre-Civil
War state income taxes proved to be utter failures. Inadequate administration
and lack of enforcement resulted in repeal or pitifully small revenues. The
failure to properly administer and enforce the taxes, however, should not ob-
scure the attempt to employ the income tax as a means of compensating for
the inequality in state tax burdens.
B. Civil War and Reconstruction
Despite its inauspicious beginnings in this country, Congress not only
adopted the first federal income tax at the onset of the Civil War,"° but
adopted one with explicitly graduated rates. Initially, Congress attempted to
generate revenue without resorting to an income tax. Abraham Lincoln as-
sumed the presidency in March of 1861 carrying a debt of almost $75 million,
which was likely to increase under the weight of the war.0 7 Salmon Chase,
Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury, proposed deficit reduction measures in-
cluding a combination of Treasury notes, stepped-up sales of public lands, and
increased tariffs and excise taxes.'0 8 The House Ways and Means Committee
also prepared two bills designed to raise revenues from foreign and domestic
sources."9 The first imposed duties on tea, coffee, and sugar."' The second
levied taxes on whisky, beer, porter, carriages, promissory notes, bank bills,
and imposed a license tax."' Controversy soon developed, however, because
the impact of the bills, especially on the price of such basic commodities as
tea, coffee, and sugar, fell disproportionately on the poorer classes." 2 This
effect only exacerbated the burden on consumers who, prior to the Civil War,
had borne almost the entire weight of taxation derived from customs duties
and excise taxes." 3 Since Congress would likely cut the rates in the two
103. Id. at 403.
104. Id. at 407.
105. Id. at 406.
106. WrrrE, supra note 79, at 67.
107. Id.
108. Id. On July 17 and August 5, 1861, Congress passed loan acts which empowered the
"Secretary to borrow $250 million in three-year, 7.3 per cent Treasury notes, or in twenty-year
bonds not exceeding 7 per cent." SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 64
(1980). Lawrence Friedman suggested that part of the initial preference for methods other than
direct taxation was the concern for encroaching on state sovereignty more than it already had.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 564 (2d ed. 1985).




113. Daniel L. Simmons, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: An Overview, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV.
151, 152.
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bills, the Ways and Means Committee decided to also submit a plan for direct
taxation.' 4
On July 23, 1861, Thaddeus Stevens, the Republican chair of the Commit-
tee, described as "powerful," "domineering," and "dictatorial," proposed a $30
million direct tax on land, with each state's share to be apportioned by popula-
tion." '5 This evoked another round of controversy. Farmers would bear the
brunt of this tax,' 6 as consumers bore the brunt of the excise taxes and cus-
toms duties. Those with large holdings of stock, however, would be virtually
exempt from taxation." 7 Thus, the House initially recommitted the bill with




When the Committee was unable to accomplish this in a constitutional man-
ner, the bill was again recommitted with instructions to reduce the direct tax
portion and to add an income tax."' Justin S. Morrill, a Vermont Republican
and chair of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Taxation, returned to the
floor of the House on July 29 with a new bill combining an income tax with a
direct tax reduced by one-third from Stevens' original proposal. 20 Morrill
argued for a tax which imposed an equality different from that imposed by the
consumption taxes or apportioned by direct taxes (which both focused on
equality of payment): a tax "not upon each man an equal amount, but a tax
proportionate to his ability to pay."' 2'
In the meantime, Republican Senator James F. Simmons, a Rhode Island
manufacturer, proposed adding an income tax provision to the tariff bill which
was passed in the House on July 18 and introduced in the Senate on July
25. '22 As in the House, the impetus for the income tax was not to shift the
tax burden entirely, just to distribute it more equally. Simmons attempted to
minimize the impact of the increase in customs duties by discussing them in
the context of the previous forty years' rates, but the effect was still a dou-
bling of the rates in just four years.'23 Thus, the income tax was designed to
balance the burden on consumption. Republican Senator William Pitt
Fessenden of Maine concurred in this decision, announcing that "I am inclined
very much to favor the idea of a tax upon incomes for the reason that, taking
both measures together, I believe the burdens will be more equalized on all
114. RATNER, supra note 108, at 64.
115. PAUL, supra note 84, at 8-9; RATNER, supra note 108, at 64; WrrrE, supra note 79, at
67.
116. See RATNER, supra note 108, at 64.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 64-65.
120. Id. at 65; see CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 323 (1861) (statement of Rep.
Thomas R. Horton) (R-N.Y.).
121. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1194 (1862).
122. RATNER, supra note 108, at 66; see CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 254 (1861).
123. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 254 (1861). According to Senator Simmons, the
rates during the last forty years ranged from 14.5% to 38%. Id. Thus, the proposed rate in the
tariff bill of 31 7/8% did not appear so high. Id. In 1857, however, the rate was 16% on the entire
schedule (taking into account both dutiable and free goods) and in the Act of 1860 the rate was
increased to 21 7/8%. Id. The actual increase in rates was both swift and substantial.
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classes of the community, more especially on those who are able to bear
them.' 24
On July 29, 1861, both the House and Senate passed bills combining an
income tax with other revenue-raising measures.'25 The House measure pro-
posed a tax of 3% on incomes above $600 while the Senate proposed a tax of
5% on incomes above $1000.26 A compromise returned by the Conference
Committee preserved all of the changes proposed by the Senate in the tariff
and direct tax rates.'27 Accompanying these measures was a 3% tax on in-
comes exceeding $800, which the Committee raised to 5% on income derived
from property owned by United States citizens residing abroad. 2 ' Addition-
ally, Congress taxed income from Treasury notes or other U.S. securities at
1.5% in order to spur the purchase of war bonds.'29 Finally, Congress al-
lowed a deduction for national, state, or local taxes imposed on property from
which income is derived. 3 ' Thus, the first income tax was essentially a flat
rate tax designed to equalize the burdens imposed by the other revenue raising
measures with which it was passed.
Passage of a bill permitting the use of an income tax, however, did not
translate into the actual assessment of an income tax. Chase succeeded in
frustrating the bill through delay. He made no effort to assess or collect any
taxes and he made every effort to persuade Congress of the wisdom of this
strategy. 3' This tactic would not work for long. The financial burdens of the
war were mounting by 1862.32 In January of 1862, banks throughout the
country suspended specie payment and the government followed suit, virtually
curtailing private and public credit.'33 Ignoring Chase's modest request that
$50 million be raised through new internal taxes, Congress passed a resolution
on January 21, 1862, calling for the imposition of a tax which, when com-
bined with the tariff, would raise at least $150 million. 34
In response to this congressional resolution, the House Ways and Means
Committee submitted a bill on March 3, 1862 which provided for revenue
through a combination of internal taxes, income taxes, and an inheritance
tax. " The bill taxed incomes exceeding $600 at 3%, which was similar to
the 1861 tax except for the lowered exemption.'36 In introducing the bill,
Justin Morrill stated that the provision for an income tax, though perhaps "the
least defensible," was necessary to prevent salaried workers from escaping
124. Id. at 255 (emphasis added); RATNER, supra note 108, at 66.
125. WrITE, supra note 79, at 68.
126. Id.
127. RATNER, supra note 108, at 66-67.
128. Id. at 67.
129. Id.
130. J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-
1861, at 1042 (1938).
131. RATNER, supra note 108, at 70; Paul C. Roberts & Lawrence M. Stratton Jr., The Roots
of the Income Tax, NAT'L REV., Apr. 17, 1995, at 42.
132. WRITE, supra note 79, at 68.
133. RATNER, supra note 108, at 68-69.
134. Id. at 69.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 72.
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taxation altogether.'37 While the Committee was concerned about the possi-
bility that the income tax would subject some forms of income to double taxa-
tion, Thaddeus Stevens closed his comments by noting that
the committee thought it would be manifestly unjust to allow the
large money operators and wealthy merchants, whose incomes might
reach hundreds of thousands of dollars, to escape from their due
proportion of the burden. They hope they have succeeded in ex-
cluding from the tax the articles and subjects of gain and profit which
are taxed in another form.
38
After the bill passed the House and was sent to the Senate, 39 the Senate
Finance Committee left the flat rate income tax unchanged, but struck the
direct tax provision of the bill."4 Senator Fessenden was the lone member of
the Finance Committee to vote to retain that provision and, confessed, "I am
afraid the majority against me will be about as large in the Senate as it was in
the committee."'' After the Senate voted to strike the direct tax, Simmons
proposed that the income tax rates be raised and made graduated to make up
for the lost income.42 With no objection to this amendment, Fessenden in-
troduced it before the full Senate. 43 The amendment as passed by the Senate
proposed a 3% tax on incomes between $600 and $10,000, a 5% tax on in-
comes between $10,000 and $50,000, and a 7.5% tax on the excess over
$50,000.'" A conference committee resolved the differences between the
Senate and House versions by eliminating the highest rate, but preserving the
principle of graduated rates introduced by the Senate.'45 Rather than elimi-
nating the direct tax as the Senate had proposed, the Committee chose to
suspend it for two years."
Sidney Ratner suggested that the graduated income tax rate structure
introduced in the 1862 act "was not adopted for its own sake but as a byprod-
uct of the increase in the rates."' 4 7 John Witte expanded upon this sentiment,
stating that "progressivity was introduced not out of concern for equity, but
rather to increase revenues."'" Although there was discussion of the need for
revenue, the concept of equity was underlying. When told that the final bill
removed the direct tax and retained the graduated income tax rates passed in
the Senate, Representative Alexander Hamilton Rice (R-Mass.), "protest[ed]
against that kind of injustice" flowing from such a "discrimination."'49 Ac-
137. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1196 (1862).
138. Id. at 1577.
139. Id. The margin of victory was an overwhelming 125 to 14. Id.
140. RATNER, supra note 108, at 72.
141. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2350 (1862).
142. Id. at 2486.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2891 (statement of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens) (R-Pa.); see Act of July 1, 1862, ch.
119, 12 Stat. 432, 473, repealed by Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 172, 13 Stat. 223, 303.
146. RATNER, supra note 108, at 73. Congress repealed the direct tax in 1864. Id.
147. Id. at 72.
148. WIrTE, supra note 79, at 69.
149. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2891 (1862).
[Vol. 73:2
ORIGINS OF A FLAT TAX
cording to Rice, replacing the direct tax with the graduated rates exempted the
property-owning farmers from taxation altogether, while increasing the burden
on the owners of income-producing industry. 5 Rice stated, "I am at a loss
to know upon what principle of justice one class of industry should be taxed
five per cent. upon its industry and another class of industry exempted from
such taxation."'' Stevens responded that "we resisted the suspension of the
direct tax after the present year as long as we could without losing the bill,
and I did not think it proper to lose the bill rather than suspend that direct
tax.
,, 152
Concluding that equity was an afterthought concedes too much and ig-
nores aspects of the debates. Removal of the direct tax affected provisions
other than the income tax. Consumption taxes assumed their share of the bur-
den.'53 Senator Zachariah Chandler (R-Mich.) criticized the bill because he
believed that if it imposed a 3% tax on consumption, it should equally impose
a 3% tax on income. Chandler stated:
You tax the day laborer moderately on his consumption, three per
cent., a very small item indeed; and you tax the man of wealth the
same way, and if you tax him in the same ratio for his income, he
feels the satisfaction of knowing that this is a reasonable burden, a
burden which he ought to bear, and thus you induce men rather to en-
large than to diminish their incomes under the feeling of justice,
equity, and propriety.'54
Senator Simmons stood up to justify the graduated rates, explaining that "the
consumption of this country has twenty-five per cent. put on it by this
bill."'55 He continued, "[t]he poor people pay as much, and rather more, gen-
erally, than rich men on their consumption."'56 Thus, he saw the graduation
in the income tax as a counterbalance to equivalent rises in the tax on con-
sumption. Citing the example of sugar, he stated, "We put three quarters of a
cent on sugar last March a year ago, and now it is two and a half cents. The
taxes have been increased in consequence of the rebellion. I find no trouble in
my own mind in levying this income tax.""'5 Similarly, Timothy Otis Howe,
the radical Republican Senator from Wisconsin,' responded to the argument
that the agricultural sector was now exempt from taxation by pointing out that




153. PAUL, supra note 84, at 10.
154. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2486 (1862).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. The price of sugar during the war was particularly volatile. The wholesale price of
sugar rose from 9 cents a pound in 1861 to 23.5 cents a pound in 1864. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO
1970, pt. 1, at 209 (1975) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS].
158. RATNER, supra note 108, at 72.
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tion is not limited to the eastern cities; it is regulated by the number of indi-
viduals."'59
Adoption of the progressive principle occurred against the backdrop of the
other taxes in the bill-taxes which imposed a much heavier burden on the
poorer classes. Although war expenses had increased considerably by 1864,
the lower rate for income from treasury securities in the 1862 Act allowed
Congress to finance much of its efforts through private creditors. 6" By 1863,
due to the efforts of the Confederate navy and to the benefits of rate
manipulation, 6' Congress received ten times more income from the sale of
federal securities than from tariffs. 162 Thus, when Justin Morrill reported a
bill to the House on April 14, 1864, which eliminated the 1862 Act's progres-
sive rates and proposed a 5% tax on all incomes above $600,163 some sug-
gest he was acting out of deference to the nation's wealthy private credi-
tors.
64
At the same time, however, prices were rising, primarily because of the
internal revenue measures in the 1862 Act.165 In fact, prices rose an average
of 117% during the war, while money wages rose only 43%." Moreover,
the proposed bill sought to double many of the internal revenue rates while
increasing the general ad valorem tax from 3% to 5%.67 Thus, with the
compensatory rationale for graduated rates still viable, Augustus Frank, a
Republican railroad director from upstate New York, 6" proposed an amend-
ment to the bill providing for a 5% tax on incomes above $600, a 7.5% tax on
incomes between $10,000 and $25,000, and a 10% tax on incomes over
$25,000.'" Frank argued that these graduated rates, rather than upsetting the
private creditors, would actually please them: "the larger the tax we pay at this
time the safer we are and the better will be the securities of the Govern-
ment."' 70 Frank's proposal, however, sparked a debate over the propriety of
graduated rates.
Thaddeus Stevens, while supporting the 1862 Act's rates as a political
compromise, lashed out at Frank's amendment.' 7' Stevens argued:
It seems to me that it is a strange way to punish men because they
are rich. I do not know but there ought to be an indictment against
every man who ventures to go above $600 in income .... If any
159. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2350 (1862).
160. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 31.
161. PAUL, supra note 84, at 11; RATNER, supra note 108, at 82.
162. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 31.
163. RATNER, supra note 108, at 82.
164. See STANLEY, supra note 22, at 33.
165. Id. The consumer price index, with a value of 100 assigned to the year 1860, rose on all
items from 101 in 1861 to 113 in 1862, and to 139 in 1863. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note
157, at 212.
166. ASHLEY, supra note 85, at 181.
167. RATNER, supra note 108, at 82 n.9.
168. Id. at 83.
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man dare go above a certain amount, more than I am worth or any
other member, then we should take it all."''
Others argued for levying a flat tax at a higher rate rather than preserving the
inequality which spurred the wealthy to evade the 1862 tax and resent the war
effort.1
7 3
Several members of Congress advanced theories in favor of the graduated
rates. Representative Rufus P. Spalding (R-Ohio) invoked a form of the sacri-
fice theory in favor of Frank's amendment, arguing that the $600 exemption
would allow everyone to pay for necessities, leaving the tax to operate only on
the purchase of luxuries. 174 The sacrifice theory's weakness, however, was
exposed by Representative John A. Griswold (R-N.Y.), who asked Spalding
"[are there not] a vast number of men who are richer on an income of $1,000
than others who have eight or ten thousand?"'
75
Perhaps more compelling was the use of the compensatory theory. Repre-
sentative Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts 76 responded to Stevens by deny-
ing that it was a punishment to ask the wealthy to pay their fair share, asking
Stevens whether he thought "that the poor should pay the taxes for the
rich?""' Iowa Republican J.B. Grinnell concurred and further proposed that
the 10% tax be broadened to apply to incomes of $10,000.7' Although
Grinnell's wartime justification for the rates is sometimes used by observers to
dismiss the whole episode,' the principle he actually relied upon was a "pa-
triotic" version of the compensatory theory. Grinnell stated:
I say, that a man who has an income of over ten thousand dollars
should be required to live out of that income in time of war, and not
be able to lay aside more than ninety per cent. of his income and to
pay only ten per cent. of it to the Government, is only reasonable.
They do not contribute to the Government a proportion anything like
that paid by those who are worth a less sum of money who have
gone into our Army.
172. Id. For similar expressions in the House, see id. at 1877, 1940 (statements of Rep.
Hubbard (R-Conn.) and Rep. Justin Morrill (R-Vt.), respectively).
173. See id. at 1876, 1877 (statements of Rep. Justin Morrill (R-Vt.) and Rep. John Griswold
(D-N.Y.) with Rep. Hubbard (R-Conn.), respectively). Representative Hubbard argued that a flat
rate of 8% on all incomes exceeding $600 would be preferable to a graduated system. Id. at 1877.
The returns of the 1862 Act fell far short of the $85,456,000 projected by Chase, amounting in-
stead to only $37,640,000. RATNER, supra note 108, at 82.
174. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1877 (1864); RATNER, supra note 108, at 84.
175. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1877 (1864).
176. RATNER, supra note 108, at 83.
177. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1876 (1864).
178. Id.
179. See PAUL, supra note 84, at 714; Frank W. Hackett, The Constitutionality of the Gradu-
ated Income Tax Law, 25 YALE L.J. 428, 442 (1916); Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The
One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437, 442 (1995); Roberts & Stratton, supra note
131, at 38. In the debates over later income tax proposals, opponents often argued that the exigen-
cy of war justified the Civil War experience. See, e.g., 50 CONG. REC. 3839 (1913) (statement of
Sen. Lodge) (R-Mass.); 26 CONG. REC. 1599-1600 (statement of Rep. Ray) (R-N.Y.), 1730 (state-
ment of Rep. Grosvenor) (R-Ohio), 6694 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (R-Ohio) (1894).
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... To equalize burdens and mete equal justice is the purpose of
my amendment.'80
Although Grinnell was referring in part to consumption taxes, implicit in his
argument was that the poor's personal contribution to the defense of the Union
had gone unmatched by many of the wealthy.' 8 ' Thus, "in view of the cer-
tain tariff increases and impending direct tax debate," Frank's amendment
passed the House and was sent to the Senate.1
2
The Senate revived the debate over graduated rates. As in the House,
however, "supporters tended to portray the tax as a balance wheel in the con-
text of a predominantly regressive system, while opponents located inequities
in the income tax law itself."'' 3 Initially, Senator Fessenden announced on
May 27, 1864 that the Senate Finance Committee had modified the House bill,
striking out the 10% rate and leaving it at 7.5% on all incomes exceeding
$10,000.84 Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, while arguing
that even the highest rate should be preserved, offered this defense of progres-
sion:
[B]y the terms of this bill the poor man often pays as much tax as the
rich man. He pays upon all the articles which he consumes. A man in
this country worth $5,000, who is living comfortably and who has an
income perhaps of six hundred or one thousand dollars a year, has as
many mouths to feed, as many members in his family to clothe and
to shoe and to furnish with all the necessaries of life, as the man who
has an income of $500,000 a year; and he pays just as much tax on
his sugar and his tea and his meats and everything which he buys.
That is not equal; that is, it is not according to the property of the
individual. To make this up to some extent we propose by this bill to
put a tax upon income.'5
When Republican Senator John Sherman of Ohio protested that graduated
rates imposed a "different rule of taxation" on the wealthy, Trumbull asked "if
he does not regard it as applying a different rule of taxation when the poor
man pays just as high taxes on all articles he consumes under this bill as a
rich man."'86
Some attacked the principle of progression altogether, arguing that a flat
or proportionate rate even as high as 10% would be preferable to the proposed
"discrimination" in the rates.'87 Senator Solomon Foot (R-Vt.) pointed out
180. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1876-77 (1864).
181. For example, Garrett Davis of Kentucky, a soldier during the war, asked, "Will any gen-
tleman point to me a single millionaire or a man in the United States whose income is above
$25,000 that has gone to the field?" Id. at 2515.
182. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 33.
183. Id. at 34.
184. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2513 (1864).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2514.
187. Id. (statements of Sen. Sherman (R-Ohio), Sen. Foot (R-Vt.), and Sen. Johnson (D-Md.)).
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that such a uniform rate would tax people according to their "ability to
pay."' 8 Foot further stated:
Under such a rule the man of large estate, having a large income,
pays a larger tax or impost than the man of less estate and less tax-
able income, just in the exact proportion that his assessed income is
larger than that of the man of less estate. In this case the burden falls
upon the two in the exact proportion to the relative amount of their
respective incomes. We ought to ask no more or no less.'8 9
Senator Reverdy Johnson, a moderate Democrat from Maryland explained that
"the question now is not whether [a wealthy man] is to pay more income tax
because he is rich, but whether he is to pay a great deal more by increasing
the rate by which you tax the income of the poor man."'" Thus, while
Trumbull's argument supported a proportional income tax of some kind, it did
not necessarily require a graduated one.
Radical Republican Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, although
nominally aligned with Trumbull against Fessenden's proposed amendment,
attempted to rebuild the case on different grounds. Sumner cited the sacrifice
rationale espoused by French economist J.B. Say to justify the House bill's
steeply graduated rates.' 9' According to Sumner, Say, in reliance in part up-
on the works of Adam Smith, wrote, "If a person had to pay 200f. more in
taxes upon every addition of 1,000f. to his revenue, still he would multiply his
enjoyments in a larger ratio than his sacrifices."'
9 2
The end result in favor of graduation, though, appeared to be reached
under something closer to the compensatory rationale. Initially, Fessenden's
amendment for lower graduated rates passed, despite Kentucky Unionist
Garrett Davis' fervent support of Sumner's argument.'93 The next day,
however, a proposal to levy the highest tariff rates of the war passed in the
House."' Furthermore, during the interval in the Senate, Radical Republican
James W. Grimes of Iowa "succeeded in getting the Senate to suspend indefi-
nitely the operation of the direct tax" slated to be collected in 1865 under the
House bill.'95 These two developments served both to increase the burden on
poor consumers and ease the burden on wealthy landowners. It also created a
definite shortfall in the revenue bill. Thus, on June 6, 1864, the Senate re-
versed gears and approved, first, an amendment by Senator James F. Wilson
of Iowa for a 7.5% tax on all incomes over $5,000 and second, an amendment
188. Id.
189. Id. (statement of Sen. Foot).
190. Id.
191. See id. at 2514-15.
192. Id. at 2515.
193. See id. The amendment to the House bill was passed 22 to 15 with 12 senators absent.
Id. Sumner joined the majority, recognizing that "such a tax would probably produce comparative-
ly little, and I am sure in certain quarters would be odious." Id. at 2513, 2515.
194. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 34; see CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2751 (1864).
The bill raised the average rate on dutiable commodities from the 37.2% level imposed in 1862 to
47.02%. RATNER, supra note 108, at 88.
195. RATNER, supra note 108, at 85.
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by Senator Grimes for a 10% tax on all incomes over $15,000.' Although
Grimes attributed this development to the impact made on the Senators by
Sumner's May 27 speech,'97 this conclusion seems doubtful given the
Senate's rejection of the higher graduated rates at that time. Rather, it was
more likely Wilson's two rationales-to make up for lost revenues and to
broaden the tax burdens-that swayed the Senate. 9 Even Grimes relied in
part upon a general compensatory rationale in responding to Missouri Unionist
Senator John B. Henderson's criticism of his proposal. In this repect, Grimes
stated, "If there is any class of men that the distinction ought to be made in
favor of and not against it is the very class of men we have discriminated
against [in other ways].""' The bill was sent to the Committee of the Con-
ference where it emerged with an even more steeply graduated rate of 10% on
incomes above $10,000. 00
Although the 1864 Act produced the highest revenue collections from
income taxes during the War,2°' the Treasury continued to struggle. 2 Sec-
retary Chase failed to properly market the government bonds and, somewhat
unexpectedly, Lincoln accepted his resignation. 3 After appointing former
Senate Finance Committee chair William Pitt Fessenden as the new Treasury
Secretary, things picked up a bit.20 4 Fessenden, however, recommended in a
report issued in December 1864 that more revenue was necessary to continue
prosecuting the war effort. 5 Thus, on February 9, 1865, Justin Morrill intro-
duced a bill to amend the 1864 Act by increasing the tax from 7.5% to 10%
on incomes over $3,000. °" The House rejected Illinois Democrat Lewis W.
Ross' proposal for a radically progressive income tax, which set the highest
rate at 20% on incomes over $20,000. It settled instead on a moderate solution
offered by Kentucky Unionist Robert Mallory which raised the tax to 10% on
incomes over $5,000.207 With minor modifications, Congress adopted this
proposal in the final version of this amendment to the 1864 Act.20 8 The Act
was later challenged before the Supreme Court in Springer v. United
196. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2759 (1864).
197. Id. at 2760.
198. Id. at 2759.
199. Id. at 2760.
200. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 281 (repealed 1933); RATNER, supra note
108, at 85. A few days later, after Secretary Chase realized that an unanticipated shortfall would
develop over bounties promised to aid in the recruitment and retention of soldiers, Congress
passed the Emergency Income Tax Act of July 4, 1864. RATNER, supra note 108, at 89. This Act
imposed a special flat income tax of 5% on all incomes over $600, assessed on income which
accrued in 1863 and as an addition to the 1862 rates. Id.; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 35.
201. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 36.
202. PAUL, supra note 84, at 14.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. RATNER, supra note 108, at 96.
206. Id. at 97.
207. Id. at 97-98.
208. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 479; CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
1293 (1865).
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States,"9 but its provisions were upheld without discussing the Act's gradu-
ated feature.2 '
By 1866, with the war over, the political compromise that previously had
supported a graduated income tax began to unravel."' Although the country
was left with an enormous debt and significant reconstruction expenses, the
war tax system as a whole became a "fearful weight."2 ' Frederick A. Pike
of Maine remarked in a House floor debate that they had received "petitions
from struggling manufacturers ... from all quarters of the land, asking for
relief."2 ' Political economist David Wells, the recently appointed Special
Commissioner of the Revenue, issued a report in 1866 which found that high
prices were the chief cause of postwar stagnation.2 4 Hence, Wells' report
recommended to Treasury Secretary Hugh R. McCulloch that they lower these
prices by effecting a wholesale reduction in national taxation, beginning with
internal revenues and tariffs.2 5 The graduated income tax, although now de-
rided by many, was still not ready for modification.
When Justin Morrill attempted, as he had in 1864, to introduce an income
tax bill which eliminated the graduated income tax and imposed a flat 5% rate
on incomes over $1,000, his measure was soundly defeated.!' 6 Representative
Pike noted that until achievement of a reduction in prices, such a measure
must wait:
Every laboring man in the country pays a tax upon what he eats,
drinks, and wears. And until we come to the point of relieving the
great body of people in the country from onerous taxes upon
everyday's consumption it is a question whether or not the men who
are able to pay should not pay this increased proportion of their in-
come to the General Government.2 7
Pike instead proposed a tax of 5% on incomes exceeding $1,000 and 10% on
incomes exceeding $5,000.28 Morrill, a fierce abolitionist and a founder of
the Republican Party,219 responded to this logic by invoking the mantra of
209. 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
210. The Court held that the tax was more akin to a duty or an excise than a direct tax such
as property or capitation tax. Springer, 102 U.S. at 602. Thus, the tax was properly not appor-
tioned. See id.
211. PAUL, supra note 84, at 23.
212. Id.
213. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2783 (1866). Pike was specifically referring to the
"many small and weak manufacturers of the country," who were hurt by tariffs on raw materials.
Id.
214. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 44.
215. Id. The wholesale price index, with a value of 100 assigned to the years 1910-14, indi-
cated a value of 193 in 1864 and 185 in 1865, after a pre-war low of 89 in 1861. HISTORICAL
STATISTICS, supra note 157, at 201. Perhaps even more revealing, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York's cost-of-living index, with a value of 100 assigned to the year 1913, had climbed from
63 in 1861, to 102 in 1865, to 103 in 1866, and to 102 in 1867. Id. at 212. Burgess's cost-of-
living index revealed a similar pattern on the same scale, with a 61.2 in 1861, up to a 108.1 in
1865. Id.
216. RATNER, supra note 108, at 113.
217. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2783 (1866).
218. RATNER, supra note 108, at 113.
219. Id. at 65.
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racial equality, the subject of much attention in recent months: "In this country
we neither create nor tolerate any distinction of rank, race, or color, and
should not tolerate anything else than entire equality in our taxation.""22 He
went too far, however, when he compared the defense of a steeply graduated
tax proposed by Representative Ross to "the same ground that the highway-
man defends his acts."22' Morrill's comparison attracted the ire of a number
of representatives,"' and although Morrill admitted that he may have ex-
pressed himself "a little too strongly," he argued that because "[o]ur urgent
necessities during the war hav[e] ceased, I think we ought to relieve ourselves
at the earliest moment from such a tax." '223 Despite having allies in this
view,224 they generally misunderstood that the majority view, as opposed to
Ross' radicalism, was not that the wealthy should endure an inequality, but
rather that they should not receive an exemption. To the extent that an in-
equality existed, it compensated for the inequality of other forms of taxation
which resulted from the "necessities" of war and caused higher prices. Repre-
sentative Ithamar C. Sloan, a Wisconsin Republican who later served as the
dean of the law department at the University of Wisconsin, pointed out
Morrill's inability, or lack of political desire, to see the bigger picture:
Now, throughout consideration of this bill the chairman of the Com-
mittee of Ways and Means [Morrill] has resisted strenuously all prop-
ositions to relieve from taxation many articles the tax upon which is
oppressive and burdensome to the industry of the country. The tax
upon those articles tends to depress and check the business and enter-
prise of the country.225
Sidney Ratner likewise concluded, "The House majority felt that the poorer
classes bore many small but burdensome taxes which ought to be reduced or
removed before the more wealthy classes received relief."'226 After the House
passed Pike's proposal,"' it sent the Bill to the Senate, which adopted it
without much debate or modification. In fact, the Senate's sole modification
was to lower the exemption to $600.22s
Because the final act declared the income tax payable every year until and
including 1870,229 Morrill needed only to bide his time. Indeed, his argument
did not fall upon deaf ears, for less than a year later Congress swung around
to Morrill's position. Sensing this change, Morrill again presented, on Febru-
220. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2783 (1866).
221. Id. Ross's views on the progressive income tax, largely based on a sacrifice or
redistributive rationale, were not widely shared. As in 1865, Ross proposed a graduated tax with a
high rate of 25% on incomes in excess of $60,000. Id.
222. See id. at 2784 (statements of Rep. Spalding (R-Ohio), Rep. Sloan (R-Wis.), and Rep.
Paine (R-Wis.)).
223. Id.
224. See id. (statement of Rep. Price) (R-Iowa), and at 2785 (statements of Rep. Davis (R-
N.Y.) and Rep. Hale (R-N.Y.)).
225. Id. at 2784.
226. RATNER, supra note 108, at 113.
227. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2786 (1866).
228. See RATNER, supra note 108, at 114.
229. Id.
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ary 13, 1867, a revenue bill to the House which proposed the imposition of a
flat, rather than graduated, tax of 5% on incomes over $1,00.230 In present-
ing this proposal, Morrill argued:
Few nations tolerate an income tax at all, and there is no nation
which has any other than a uniform rate. The Treasury needs money;
but on a question of taxation justice must be dealt out with an even
hand, and the rule of perfect equality should be immovable as the
poles."'
By this time, the reductions in internal taxes in 1866 and in the proposed bill,
coupled with the first of many years of federal budget surpluses,232 made the
graduated income tax ripe for Morrill's attack. Thus, the House defeated, by a
vote of 73 to 26, Illinois Republican Representative Jehu Baker's233 proposal
to amend the bill to add 10% tax on incomes over $6,000.234 As Pennsylva-
nia Representative George F. Miller explained, "The tax upon incomes for the
last two years has yielded more revenue to the Government than the tax upon
anything else .... [M]en [in the great cities] have made very fair and honest
returns of their incomes, and from that source has come an enormous sum for
our Treasury.""2 5 The inaccuracy of Miller's statement does not detract from
its reflection of his desire to justify the end of graduation by suggesting the
end of the need to compensate for regressive taxes. 236 In any event, repealing
the graduation feature while retaining the income tax itself was a recognition
of the high consumer prices. 237 As a political matter, however, and much like
the state income taxes which followed the same pattern,23 s Congress could
230. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1218 (1867).
231. Id.
232. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 346. The bill proposed to reduce the excise taxes
on 51 goods, including such necessaries as "clothing," "salt," and "sugar," for a total savings of
$36,730,500 after some additional across-the-board cuts. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1218
(1867) (statement of Rep. Morrill) (R-Vt.).
233. RATNER, supra note 108, at 115.
234. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1482-83 (1867). The House also rejected two some-
what more moderate graduated income tax proposals from Rep. Ralph Hill (R-Ind.) and Rep. Pike
(R-Me.). Id. at 1483.
235. Id.
236. Paul reports that 1866 was indeed the income tax's greatest year in terms of revenue
production, totalling $73 million. PAUL, supra note 84, at 29. The income tax, which paid only
10% of total expenditures in 1862, amounted to 25% in 1864 and 1865. Id. However, it still paled
in comparison with the "$180 million in customs receipts and $236 million from other internal
revenue sources." Id. Perhaps searching for another rationale, future President James A. Garfield
of Ohio argued for a flat tax on constitutional grounds instead. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1482 (1867). This rationale, unlike the compensatory theory, was openly contested. See id. at
1483 (statement of Rep. Hill) (R-Ind.).
237. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York's cost-of-living index was still at 102 in 1867,
but dropped to 91 in 1870. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 157, at 212.
238. Income taxes in several states, including Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas,
were graduated for a brief period during or after the Civil War. See SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at
406-14. In all such cases, the rates were eventually made proportional again or the tax was aban-
doned completely. See id. For example, Virginia and North Carolina both imposed a graduated tax
in 1866, but the states returned to a flat tax in 1870 and 1869 respectively. See id. Seligman sug-
gested that this trend occurred in the South because
[plractically none of [the southern statesl had developed the system of the general prop-
erty tax as it was found in the North, and it was felt to be entirely out of the question to
expect that the burdens of the impending conflict should be bome entirely by owners of
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no longer justify the graduation in the income tax by suggesting that the
wealthy were almost completely exempt from taxation.239
As 1870, the date set for the expiration of the income tax, approached,
anti-income tax sentiment grew. The New York Tribune succinctly stated on
February 5, 1869, that "'[the [i]ncome [t]ax is the most odious, vexatious,
inquisitorial, and unequal of all our taxes." 2  Congress started receiving pe-
titions in opposition to the renewal of the tax in early 1870 from such diverse
sources as the Boards of Trade of Buffalo and Cleveland, the California legis-
lature, and the Union League Club of New York City.2 4 In addition, citizens
of New York City and Philadelphia organized anti-income tax associations,
and papers from San Francisco, California to Erie, Pennsylvania voiced their
opposition.2 42 The advent of the first period of economic prosperity since the
war"3 added to the movement against the income tax. Wholesale prices,
which had been falling in small increments each year since 1864, experienced
a drop between 1869 and 1870 which was more than double the decline from
the previous year.2" Sugar, for example, which had been 16 cents/lb. in
1868 and 1869, fell to 13.5 cents/lb. in 1870.245 Wheat, which had been
$2.541 a bushel in 1868, decreased to only $1.373 a bushel in 1870.2 At
the same time, the gross national debt had been reduced by more than $300
million since 1866 and the per capita debt dropped more than 18%.47 The
continued high taxes, coupled with the general prosperity, thus allowed the
government to amass budget surpluses which were used to draw down the na-
tional debt.2" While public sentiment supported this for awhile, the tide had
turned so that, according to Senator John Sherman, the new slogan was "[s]top
paying the national debt and throw off taxes."249
real estate and slaves.
Id. at 406.
239. This was certainly more than just a mere battle of conscience, though, as Randolph Paul
noted: the banking and manufacturing interests fought vigorously against the merchants and im-
porters for the reduction of the income tax. PAUL, supra note 84, at 27. Indeed, the Radical Re-
publicans won significant majorities in both houses of Congress in the 1866 elections, and the
price for some of their social causes was an alliance with the industrial sector on economic issues.
RATNER, supra note 108, at 114-15. As is sometimes true, however, the political strength of a
lobby rises with the popular force of its position. See WrrrE, supra note 79, at 285-88. In this
case, Congress could respond to the "plight of the wealthy" only when the war ended and the
burden on the masses was lifted.
240. RATNER, supra note 108, at 122 (quoting the New York Tribune, Feb. 5, 1869).
241. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 45.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 54.
244. See HisToRIcAL STATISTICS, supra note 157, at 201.
245. Id. at 209.
246. Id. Of course, much of this immediate price decline was due more to the post-war policy
of monetary contraction, an attempt to make paper dollars convertible one-for-one into specie
instead of the fifty cent premium on gold over the paper dollar, rather than the reduction in con-
sumption taxes. RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 355. This economic reality does not negate the
compensatory theory rhetoric or its vision of the understanding of equality in taxation.
247. See RATNER, supra note 108, at 123 ("The total gross debt was reduced from $2,755
million in 1866 to $2,430 million in 1870, and the per capita debt was lowered from $77 in 1866
to $63 in 1870.").
248. See id.
249. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 4714 (1870). Senator Henry W. Corbett (R-Or.),
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Despite this political and economic groundswell, an interesting alliance
developed to temporarily forestall the complete repeal of the income tax. Do-
mestic manufacturers and agricultural producers, flush with the recent econom-
ic prosperity, sought a return to explicitly protective tariffs.25 ° Thus, early in
1870, the Ways and Means Committee submitted a tariff bill which made
reductions almost exclusively in "purely revenue articles," while effecting a
significant increase in duties on "protected articles." '' Debate over the bill,
however, was deadlocked."2 Although "the proposed tariff bill pretended" to
"satisfy the pressure for reduction in taxes," it was not enough." 3 A bill was
introduced to lower internal taxes while maintaining the income tax essentially
at its prior level. 4 Apparently, the pro-tariff forces aligned with the pro-in-
come tax forces to effectuate this move. According to Robert Stanley's study
of the roll call votes in Congress on the two issues, 94 of the 154 voting dele-
gates, or two-thirds of those voting, supported both the income tax bill and the
tariff bill."5 Stanley argues this refutes the progressive model that pits the
urban, Northeastern Republicans against the rural agrarians on these is-
sues.256 According to Stanley, this is proof of the "centrist" designs of the
establishment." 7 The results, however, are not surprising in a Congress oper-
ating under notions of equality informed by the compensatory theory.
A call to reduce taxes, just as in a demand to raise them, could be accom-
plished through an infinite number of variations involving excise taxes, tariffs,
and income taxes. Congress was wary of tipping the scale too far in one direc-
tion. Thus, Representative Austin Blair (R-Mich.) reminded Congress that
"every dollar which we take off this income tax, which applies to the rich men
of the country, must be laid upon the poorer men of the country. 25 ' Repre-
sentative Eugene M. Wilson (D-Minn.), echoing this sentiment, argued that for
every dollar lost because the income tax was reduced, "we are prevented from
arguing a proposition with which many contemporary politicians might agree, asked:
Why should we attempt to pay off the entire debt within our generation? The system of
Alexander Hamilton, to pay off a debt within the generation by which it was created,
may have been wise in those days, when our income was very limited and population
small; but with a country increasing so rapidly in population as ours, with people com-
ing from all portions of the globe, settling in the United States and taking up our public
lands, given them as a gratuity, and who will eventually, by reason of taking these
lands, become comparatively wealthy, why not provide for those people paying a portion
of the tax necessary to discharge the debt?
Id. at 4718.
250. See STANLEY, supra note 22, at 45-46.
251. RATNER, supra note 108, at 123-24. Duties often distinguished between "purely revenue
articles," for which there was no significant domestic competition and the principal reason for
imposing a duty was to raise revenue, and "protected articles," which were designed to raise the
costs of a foreign good, so as to protect the domestic manufacturers of the same good from out-
side competition. Id.; see also BENDER'S FEDERAL REVENUE LAW 356 (Matthew Bender & Co.,
1917).
252. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 46.
253. RATNER, supra note 108, at 124.
254. Id.
255. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 51.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 51-53. Stanley uses this term in a pejorative sense to describe all efforts to
preserve the status quo.
258. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3994 (1870).
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seeking lower tariff duties." '259 Perhaps recognizing this zero-sum game, pro-
tariff domestic manufacturers viewed the maintenance of some form of income
tax as preferable to the continued existence of heavy internal duties on their
products.2' This frustrated Democrat Stevenson Archer of Maryland, who
decided to oppose the income tax "[b]ecause it is to be kept up for the benefit
of manufacturers and high tariff men, who control large bodies of voters,
maintaining this burden in order to remove more special taxes from their
shoulders."26'
After the House passed an income tax of 3% on incomes in excess of
$2,000 as a companion to the tariff bill, a similar discussion was held in the
Senate. 262 Senator John Sherman of Ohio, chair of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, led the tariff/income tax alliance against the other internal tax forces.
Recognizing the popular demand for a reduction of taxes, he noted, "The real
question is, what taxes ought to be repealed [and] which among them bear
most upon the industry of our people?" 263 Sherman advocated retaining the
tariff and the income tax, while Congress focused its attention on reducing
internal taxes.2' Although the internal taxes and the customs duties both im-
pacted consumption, Sherman distinguished them, arguing that the customs
duties "are indirect.""26 In this respect, Sherman stated, "They are mainly
upon articles of luxury or consumption, so well distributed that the taxes fall
fairly and in just proportion to ability to pay.., they are as well distributed
as any taxation on consumption can be."2" He argued that because any tax
on consumption "is in its nature an unequal tax," an income tax was necessary
to compensate for the unequal burden. 267 Some countered Sherman's asser-
tion by noting that the income tax instituted its own inequality even with a flat
rate as it contained an exemption for those earning less than $1,000.2"
Sherman responded with a clear invocation of the compensatory theory's log-
ic:
You may, therefore, properly exempt the great mass of the people,
but solely on the ground that their tax on the articles consumed by
them is more than any income tax that could possibly be laid on the
rich.
Take the ordinary consumption of tea, sugar, and coffee .... If
the ordinary quantity of these three articles is consumed, the duty on
them alone for a man whose income is derived from his daily labor is
more than the highest income tax that has ever been levied in the
United States; and therefore this exemption in favor of the great mass
259. Id. at 4023.
260. See id. (statement of Rep. Wilson) (D-Minn.).
261. Id. at 4033.
262. See id. at 4063-64.
263. Id. app. at 377.
264. Id. app. at 377-78.
265. Id. app. at 377.
266. Id.
267. Id. app. at 379.
268. See id. at 4714 (statement of Sen. Henry Winslow Corbett) (R-Or.).
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of the people of $1,000... is exempted on the ground that they
already, in other ways, pay a larger tax. 6
Sherman's threat to either restore the so-called "special taxes" and "gross
receipts taxes," or strike out those sections of the tariff bill which repealed
revenue tariffs if the income tax was not renewed, perhaps ultimately per-
suaded some members of Congress. Thus, pro-tariff and anti-special tax forces
compromised with income tax supporters to retain the income tax, albeit at the
low rate of 2% and with a short lifespan of only two years.27'
Despite this minor setback, income tax opponents continued their attempt
to repeal the tax during the years 1871 and 1872. They voiced the criticisms
which had been circulating for a decade: It was inquisitorial because it invad-
ed a man's private finances; it encouraged perjury; it was a war tax which had
outlived its usefulness; it was too expensive to collect; it was unnecessary
because of surpluses; it was unconstitutional because it was unapportioned;
and it was discriminatory and unequal. 2 Income tax supporters attempted to
demonstrate that these criticisms could be levied on any form of tax, but to no
avail. As John Rice of Kentucky admitted, "[T]he question of revenue reform
and reduction of taxation is engrossing more of the attention of the people
than any other with which this Congress has to deal. ' 273 This time, however,
the argument that the popular clamor was for a reduction in consumption
taxes, not a reduction in income taxes, went unheeded.274
The economy further improved during the early 1870s. The business fail-
ure rate dropped to between one-quarter and one-third of its rate during the
panic year of 1857 and stood at its lowest point until after World War 1.7
As a consequence, budget surpluses remained high. In fact, from 1870 to
1872, the surpluses were around $100 million, five times higher than the high-
est antebellum figure in 1836.276 With prices on noncompeting goods contin-
uing their free-fall,277 the pressure to equalize the burdens of the regressive
consumption taxes no longer carried much weight. Sherman felt that these
days of giddy prosperity would soon pass, at which time the public would
again demand a compensatory income tax:
It will not do to say that each person consumes in proportion to his
means. This is not true. Every one must see that the consumption of
the rich does not bear the same relation to the consumption of the
poor as the income of the one does to the wages of the other.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 4716.
271. RATNER, supra note 108, at 126-27.
272. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1735 (1872) (statement of Rep. Rice) (D-
Ky.) (cataloging the criticisms of income tax opponents); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 720
(1871) (statement of Sen. John Scott) (R-Pa.).
273. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1734 (1872).
274. See id. at 1737.
275. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 54.
276. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 284 n.105 (citing HISTORICAL STATISTIcs, supra note 157, at
Series Y 254-57).
277. See id. at 201. The consumer price index dropped from 141 in 1870 to 135 in 1872. Id.
at 212.
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As wealth accumulates, this injustice in the fundamental basis of
our system will be felt and forced upon the attention of Congress.
Then an income tax, carefully adjusted, with proper discriminations
between income from property and income from personal services,
and freed from the espionage of our present law, will become a part
of our system.27
Certainly, generous "contributions" to political campaigns during the 1872
campaign, later exposed in the Credit Mobilier scandal, helped grease the
skids on the income tax's exit.279 But these elements, just as the arguments
against the income tax, were present before. The conditions under which the
income tax was allowed to expire are what is significant. During the political
campaign, pro-tariff supporters secured a "consumer-oriented" tariff bill which
further reduced revenue tariffs and even dropped protective tariffs 10%, lead-
ing to the campaign promise of a "free breakfast table.""s Coupled with the
falling prices and rising wages, Congress perceived (or at least hoped that the
public perceived) that it no longer needed to balance out the regressive effects
of the tariff and other consumption taxes. While this may not have been pre-
cisely true, it illustrates that the income tax, and its graduation, was a function
of the need to portray a flat or proportionate distribution of overall tax bur-
dens, not a progressive one. Some radical supporters of the income tax wanted
to equalize incomes rather than just rates. Some opponents failed to compre-
hend how the income tax compensated for the regressive consumption taxes.
On balance, however, the graduated income tax during the Civil War and
Reconstruction was viewed as part of a flat-tax based revenue scheme."'
When the obscene inequity of the exclusive reliance on tariff taxes became
less noticeable, the system appeared to be flat once again and the need for the
income tax as a counterweight had passed.
C. The Income Tax of 1894
The income tax issue continued to simmer during the 1870s and
1880s,"2 but a number of influences converged to make it a reality in 1894.
278. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1708 (1872).
279. RATNER, supra note 108, at 135.
280. Id.; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 55; see also BENDER'S FEDERAL REvENUE LAW, supra
note 85, at 356 ("Duties were removed from revenue producers, and political influences growing
out of the war were able to maintain the high protective policy."). One author noted:
Whilst apparently a concession to Free Trade, the new Act really strengthened the posi-
tion of Protection; its authors had gratified the general desire for a reduction of taxation,
but they had done this particularly in regard to internal duties and what may be called
'breakfast-table taxes'; and consequently, as in 1870, they had made the country still
more dependent for Federal revenue upon the purely protective duties.
ASHLEY, supra note 85, at 188.
281. Indeed, the income tax was not unique as a compensatory tool. Sherman pointed out,
"During the war, these [customs) duties were increased to counterbalance the internal taxes levied
upon domestic industry." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1709 (1872).
282. WIrE, supra note 79, at 70. Fourteen different income tax bills were introduced into
Congress between 1873 and 1879. FRIEDMAN, supra note 108, at 565. Tennessee Representative
Benton McMillin introduced bills to reinstitute an income tax from 1879 through the early 1890s.
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Great fortunes were amassed during the high prosperity and high protectionism
of the 1880s." 3 This focused attention back to the inequities of the tariff sys-
tem during the election of Democrat and former President Grover Cleveland in
1892.84 Coupled with popular unrest and economic dislocation engendered
by the panic and depression of 1893,25 conditions justified another attempt
at an income tax. Although the income tax adopted rested upon compensatory
theory, the tax itself was flat, rather than graduated.286
The high protective tariffs enacted at the end of Reconstruction essentially
remained intact through the beginning of the 1890s.287 The sustained period
of economic growth during the 1880s strengthened this practice, which was
justified on the ground that it benefitted industry and raised wages.288 Not
only did this prosperity create annual surpluses of over $100 million, 29 but it
also permitted the cost-of-living to remain relatively low during the period.2'
The tariff began to show signs of weakness, however, during the 1888 election
campaign. Grover Cleveland, searching for an issue to galvanize supporters
after an uninspiring first term, broke with precedent and concentrated solely on
the tariff issue in his State of the Union address of December 6, 1887.29! In
an attempt to appeal both to farmers desiring to sell in free markets abroad
and manufacturers looking to buy cheaper supplies, Cleveland called for gen-
eral reductions in the protective tariff and free raw materials.292 According to
Cleveland's biographer Allan Nevins, the speech, which newspapers through-
out the country reprinted, "'was read as no Presidential messages since
Lincoln's had been.' 293 Frank Taussig, a noted historian of the tariff, com-
mented that Cleveland's message made the tariff question "more distinctly a
party matter than it had been at any time since the Civil War." '294 Although
Cleveland eventually lost his re-election bid to Republican Benjamin Harrison
in 1888,295 the tariff question did not fade from the political scene. In 1890,
the Republicans secured passage of the McKinley Tariff Act, "an out and out
protective measure" designed as a monument to the "American System" of
industrial development based upon strong protectionism. 29
RATNER, supra note 108, at 172.
283. WITrE, supra note 79, at 70.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. FRIEDMAN, supra note 108, at 565.
287. See BENDER'S FEDERAL REVENUE LAW, supra note 85, at 356; RATNER ET AL., supra
note 70, at 389.
288. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 493.
289. WITrE, supra note 79, at 70.
290. HISToRICAL STATISTICS, supra note 157, at 212.
291. SPEECHES OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 263 (Janet Podell & Steven Anzovin eds.,
1988); STANLEY, supra note 22, at 110.
292. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 110. For a discussion of the farmer's shifting interest in the
tariff, see SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 494.
293. SPEECHES OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS, supra note 291, at 263.
294. F.W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 253 (8th ed. 1967). Ac-
cording to Percy Ashley, Cleveland "declared uncompromisingly in favour of a very considerable
reduction of duties." ASHLEY, supra note 85, at 196.
295. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 110.
296. BENDER'S FEDERAL REVENUE LAW, supra note 85, at 356. The phrase, "American Sys-
tem," was popularized by Henry Clay in the first half of the nineteenth century. JOHN K.
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With passage of the McKinley Act, the Republicans erected a lightning
rod for a storm of protest against the advantages of accumulated wealth. Dur-
ing the late 1880s and early 1890s, Populism spread as a principally agrarian
political entity geared toward "restor[ing] the economic individualism, the
political democracy, and the morality of personal responsibility that existed in
earlier America." '297 The movement was not an assault against the accumula-
tion of wealth per se, but against the improper advantages assumed by the
wealthy. Similar concerns had prompted the passage of the Interstate Com-
merce Act in 1887, which prohibited railway price-fixing, and the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act in 1890, which declared contracts and combinations in restraint
of trade illegal.298 For the farmer, however, the very real consequences of the
steady decline in agricultural prices after the Civil War overshadowed these
broad concerns.2  The wholesale price index for farm products fell from 133
in 1867 to 71 in 1890."o The farmers themselves attributed this decline to
issues of monetary policy,3"' although they felt that the protectionist tariff
exacerbated their plight. In fact, the farmers had initially supported protection-
ism as a boon to their success in domestic markets, but increasingly saw it as
inconsistent with American agriculture's movement into the export market:
farmers bought supplies and goods in a protected market while selling in a
predominantly free market. When coupled with their belief that the tariff bene-
fitted the manufacturers who were propping up the gold standard on Wall
Street, the McKinley Tariff Act was an unwelcome sight." 2
Given this hostility, President Harrison was on the defensive during his
first State of the Union address after the passage of the McKinley Act, claim-
ing objections to the Act were based upon "misinformation."3 °3 The Demo-
GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS IN PERSPECTIVE: A CRITICAL HISTORY 157 (1987).
297. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and
the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 136 (1994). For a general discussion of the Populist movement,
see LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE PoPULIST MOMENT IN AMERICA (1976).
298. GALBRAITH, supra note 296, at 161-62. Railroads were particularly subject to criticism
for their facilitation of the growth of wealth. See Hobbs, supra note 179, at 442-43. Families such
as the Goulds and Vanderbilts amassed part of their fortunes as a result of this industry. Id. This
entire movement was also intimately connected to the push for tariff reform, since many viewed
the tariff as protecting trusts from competition. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation
and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 75 n.82 (1990).
299. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 267.
300. Id.
301. Id.; SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 494. The principal difficulty, according to the Populists,
was the long-held notion that paper dollars must be supported by some underlying specie such as
gold or silver. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 353. Price fluctuations in those commodities,
rather than the decision of a central government body such as the Federal Reserve Board today,
regulated the money supply and the value of money itself. See id. As a response to this perceived
problem, farmers helped create the "Greenback" party, referring to the color of paper notes issued
during the Civil War which were not backed by specie. See GOODWYN, supra note 297, at 11.
Democrats, including William Jennings Bryan, sought a change from the de facto gold standard to
allow silver coinage or at least a truly bimetallic standard because of the greater quantity of the
latter mineral. Id. at 439-42; see also RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 358-61. Advocacy of the
silver standard helped propel the Democrats to victory in 1892. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 495.
302. See SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 494.
303. Benjamin Harrison (Dec. 3, 1889), in 2 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 1668 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1967) [hereinafter UNION MESSAGES].
[Vol. 73:2
ORIGINS OF A FLAT TAX
cratic victory in 1892, returning Cleveland to the White House, was seen by
many as a mandate for tariff reform." 4
Soon after Cleveland's election, the country was thrown into another
panic, sparked by the failure of a major railroad company and a drop in the
Treasury's gold reserves in April 1893.305 The ensuing depression was "one
of the longest and most severe in history. ' ' 3 6 Gross national product dropped
10% and unemployment rates were as high as 20% with four million
jobless. 37 Deflation in the agricultural sector intensified, and farms fore-
closed at rates as high as 75% in some western counties. 3'a The 1890 trea-
sury surplus of $105 million became a deficit of $70 million in 1894, due in
part to the increase in government spending on aid and public works pro-
grams.' These efforts, however, were insufficient. Labor strife, which had
become more prominent during the late 1880s and early 1890s, intensified in
tone and force."' During the spring and summer of 1894, violence erupted
in Pennsylvania, Buffalo, and Cleveland, and culminated in the Pullman strike
of June and July 1894. This strike in turn led to a series of bloody confronta-
tions between workers and law enforcement officials.3" ' "Coxey's Army," a
band of destitute and discontented citizens led by Populist Jacob Coxey of
Ohio, symbolized the tension of the times. The "Army," seeking work relief
and demanding inflationary monetary policy, took over the grass outside the
Capitol building in Washington D.C.3 2
With this inauspicious beginning to his presidency, Cleveland set out to
make good on his promise for tariff reform.3 3 During the fall of 1893, the
House Ways and Means Committee began to explore the issue. Representative
304. ASHLEY, supra note 85, at 213 ("The causes of the change in public opinion are not very
clear; the new tariff had not been sufficiently long in force for any definite opinion to be formed
as to its effects; but no one could allege that the issue had not been clearly set before the coun-
try."); PAUL, supra note 84, at 34; PAUL C. ROBERTS, NAT'L REV., Apr. 17, 1995, at 9;
SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 495. In Harrison's State of the Union message after his defeat, he
conceded, "The result of the recent election must be accepted as having introduced a new policy.
We must assume that the present tariff, constructed upon the lines of protection, is to be repealed
and that there is to be substituted for it a tariff law constructed solely with reference to revenue
.. " Benjamin Harrison (Dec. 6, 1892), in 2 UNION MESSAGES, supra note 303, at 1711-12.
305. RATNER El AL., supra note 70, at 360-61; STANLEY, supra note 22, at Ill n.22.
306. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 111.
307. Id.; Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child
As Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1024 n.123 (1992).
308. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 111; Woodhouse, supra note 307, at 1024 n.123.
309. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 24. Private relief efforts were, of course, significant. During
the winter of 1893-94, relief referrals increased by 50% over the previous year. "In Chicago three
times as much cash relief was distributed." STANLEY, supra note 22, at 111.
310. Some of the more infamous incidents of labor unrest occurring after the Civil War in-
cluded the July 1877 national railroad strikes, the May 1886 strike and Haymarket riot in Chicago,
and the 1892 Homestead, Pennsylvania iron and steel strike at the Carnegie Steel Works. RATNER
ET AL., supra note 70, at 317; Gilbert C. Fite, Election of 1896, in THE COMING TO POWER 225,
227 (Arthur Schlesinger ed., 1971).
311. RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 317; Fite, supra note 310, at 227; Woodhouse, supra
note 307, at 1024 n.120.
312. Fite, supra note 310, at 227; Woodhouse, supra note 307, at 1024.
313. Democratic Senator Patrick Walsh of Georgia later declared that the Wilson Tariff Bill
was "the partial fulfilment [sic] of the contest inaugurated by President Cleveland in his tariff-
reform message to Congress in 1887." 26 CONG. REC. 5381 (1894).
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William Jennings Bryan, a Populist leader from Nebraska, approached Chair-
man William L. Wilson (D-W.V.) with the possibility of attaching an income
tax provision to the tariff bill. The income tax had become popular with farm-
ers in Nebraska and elsewhere who were heavily burdened by a real property
tax which effectively exempted wealthy professionals and investors." 4 A
study which found that the federal system of indirect taxes claimed 70% to
90% of the poor's income, while taking only 3% to 10% of the wealthy's
income, also influenced Bryan."5 To correct these inequities Bryan sought to
include an income tax with the proposed tariff reductions." 6
Wilson, who was initially receptive to Bryan's idea, appointed Tennessee
Democrat Benton McMillin to chair the Internal Revenue Subcommittee re-
sponsible for overseeing the income tax.3 However, after receiving Bryan's
proposal, which imposed a graduated tax on all incomes in excess of $2,500,
Wilson and the Cleveland administration argued for separating the income tax
measures from tariff reform so as not to jeopardize the latter."' The Decem-
ber 1893 report of Treasury Secretary John G. Carlisle, outlining the
Administration's position, called for free raw materials, reduced rates on ne-
cessities, and only a small tax on "legacies and successions."3 9 On Decem-
ber 4, 1893, Cleveland reiterated this position in his first State of the Union
314. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 495. Lawrence Friedman came to a similar conclusion:
It was hard enough to assess land and houses fairly; at least real estate was visible, and
there were records of title. Chattels were easy to hide, and intangibles most furtive of
all. The general property tax essentially reduced itself to a tax on land and buildings. A
rich taxpayer could easily evade taxes on invisible assets.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 108, at 567. Seligman argued that this failure of the general property tax to
balance out the regressive effects of national consumption taxes, spurred the income tax move-
ment:
In theory the system of state and local taxation is calculated to reach the respective
abilities of the property-owners; but in practice, as has repeatedly been pointed out, the
general property tax has broken down completely; and, especially so far as personal
property is concerned, the wealthier classes stand from under. Everywhere we meet the
growing complaint that great wealth does not bear its share of the public burden. If,
then, the tariff, as it actually exists, imposes too large a share of the burden on the ex-
penditure of the poorer classes, and if the state and local revenue systems do not suc-
ceed in reaching the abilities of the more well-to-do classes, the argument becomes
exceedingly strong in favor of some form of tax which will redress the inequality.
It is this argument which, as we have seen, was really at the bottom of the move-
ment for the income tax in 1894 ....
SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 640.
315. Louis W. KOENIG, BRYAN: A POLITIcAL BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN
130 (1971). This study is most likely the one performed by Thomas G. Shearman entitled, "The
Owners of Wealth," in FORUM, Nov. 1889, at 262-73. See BUENKER, supra note 45, at 32.
316. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 113.
317. KOENIG, supra note 315, at 130; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 113; see also RATNER,
supra note 108, at 172. Ratner suggests that Bryan may have been inspired to move for an income
tax by a May 8, 1893 letter from a friend, C.H. Jones, editor of the St. Louis Republic, advocating
a graduated income tax as "the most effective weapon for use against the Plutocratic policy." Id.
The letter goes on, however, to suggest the need to increase revenues to pay Civil War pensions
through some other method than tariffs or internal revenue measures. Id. at 173; STANLEY, supra
note 22, at 113 n.29. This implies a rationale closer to compensatory than redistributive.
318. RATNER, supra note 108, at 173; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 113.
319. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 112.
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message, adding only "a small tax upon incomes derived from certain corpo-
rate investments. 3 0
Without mentioning an income tax, Wilson introduced the tariff bill to the
House on January 8, 1894. Nonetheless, Bryan and McMillin, who convened a
Democratic caucus to appeal the decision of the Ways and Means Committee,
managed to secure approval to introduce an income tax amendment.
32
Wilson, in turn, set out to make the tax more palatable, and negotiated with
Bryan and McMillin for removal of the tax's graduated feature.322 On Janu-
ary 29, 1894, McMillin introduced an income tax amendment to Wilson's
tariff bill which proposed a 2% tax on all incomes in excess of $4,000.323
The resulting debate over income tax had a different tenor than during the
Civil War. Although the tax was still based on the compensatory theory, the
debate was directed more toward the lack of contribution from the wealthy
and less toward the undue burden on the poor. For example, Representative
McMillin noted that, while Congress had abandoned the income tax after the
Civil War, tariff taxation "has gone steadily on, increasing from day to day
and from year to year. 3 24 The nearly $8 per day raised from every man,
woman, and child in the United States to support the government comes "al-
most exclusively from consumption." '325 Thus, according to McMillin,
"[w]ant, not wealth, pays the taxes. 326
Democrats blamed the pro-tariff forces' "bait and switch" tactics during
Reconstruction for this inequity. Representative John J. McDannold (D-Ill.), in
proclaiming his support for an income tax, cried,
[w]e removed the tax upon the strictly revenue articles of coffee and
tea under the shallow cry of a 'free breakfast table,' while we in-
creased the tax upon the table itself, the cloth which covered it, the
plates, the cups, the spoons, the knives and forks, the napkins, and
everything that went to make up that 'untaxed breakfast table.'323
As McMillin explained, "There is $500,000 in the hands of one man that is
not taxed any more than the $20,000 in the hands of the other. Is this right? Is
this justice?""32 The general sentiment of the pro-income tax forces was that
the system of tariff taxation had allowed the wealthy to escape their fair share
of taxation.329 To the prolonged applause of the House, McMillin announced:
320. Grover Cleveland, in 2 UNION MESSAGES, supra note 303, at 1761.
321. KOENIG, supra note 315, at 130-31; PAUL, supra note 84, at 34; RATNER, supra note
108, at 172-73; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 114-15; see SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 496-97.
322. KOENIG, supra note 315, at 132.
323. 26 CONG. REC. 1594 (1894); id. app. at 411-13 (Jan. 29, 1894) (statement of Rep.
Benton McMillin) (D-Tenn.).
324. Id. app. at 413.
325. Id.
326. id.
327. Id. at 1617.
328. Id. app. at 415.
329. See id. app. at 413 (Rep. McMillin); id. at 1609 (Rep. Osee Hall) (D-Minn.); id. at 1616
(Rep. John J. McDannold) (D-111.); id. at 1617-18, 1620 (Rep. John Sharp Williams) (D-Miss.); id.
at 1656 (Rep. William Jennings Bryan) (Populist-Neb.); id. at 1664 (Rep. John Davis) (Populist-
Kan.); id. at 1731 (Rep. Hernando de Soto Money) (D-Miss.); id. at 1733 (Rep. Constantine B.
Kilgore) (D-Tex.); id. at 1755 (Rep. Edward Lane) (D-ll.).
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"I would be the most reluctant to use the power of government to tax wealth
unjustly. But I am also unwilling to let wealth escape all governmental taxa-
tion. '
The inequity of the tariff system seemed self-evident to a society inundat-
ed with evidence as to the accumulation of wealth. "'[T]he publication of lists
of millionaires was becoming a new journalistic sport.' Significantly, both the
liberal Democratic New York World, published by Joseph Pulitzer, and the
conservative Republican New York Tribune published lists of millionaires in
the 1890s, complete with the sources of their incomes."33' Many members of
Congress were keenly aware of this concentration of wealth. Populist Senator
William Allen of Nebraska read into the Congressional Record a list of New
York millionaires and their annual untaxed income.332 William Jennings Bry-
an quoted an essay by a member of the Census Department which concluded
that 9% of the families owned 71% of the wealth.333 South Carolina Repre-
sentative William Talbert quoted Senator Daniel Voorhees' 1890 estimate that
capitalists owned over 80% of the wealth.334 The recounting of one tale told
by Voorhees made clear the implications of this concentration of wealth:
"When darkness settled over Egypt and she lost her place among the great
nations of the earth, 3 per cent of her population owned 97 per cent of her
wealth. When Babylon went down, 2 per cent of her population owned all the
wealth. 333
Income tax supporters portrayed the exclusive reliance on a consumption
tax as a cause of this concentration of wealth. In this respect, McMillin stated:
"The taxes having continually increased upon consumption, and no corre-
sponding increase having been placed upon accumulation, we see such colos-
sal fortunes amassed as were never concentrated in any other age or in any
other country of the world. '3 6 Representative Uriel S. Hall of Missouri, be-
lieved by some to be the father of the income tax, 31 7 demonstrated the tariff
tax's twofold benefit to the rich in a real-world context:
[T]here was in 1889 $63,000,000, or about $1 per capita, taken from
the consumers of wool and woolen goods, cotton and cotton goods,
and iron and steel goods for the purpose of revenue for the United
330. Id. app. at 413.
331. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 28.
332. 26 CONG. REC. 6712 (1894). The incomes ranged from $1.75 million for Louis C. Tif-
fany to $7.6 million for John D. Rockefeller. Id.
333. Id. at 1657. George Holmes, a member of the Census Department, published an article
entitled, "The Concentration of Wealth," in the December 1893 edition of the Political Science
Quarterly which demonstrated the vast accumulations of wealth in the few and suggested that pro-
gressive income taxation be used to keep the concentration to a minimum. RATNER, supra note
108, at 189-90. The methods and results of such studies are open to criticism. See Michael Novak,
The Inequality Myth: What Wealth Gap?, WALL ST. J., July 11, 1995, at A16. Holmes's conclu-
sion that 9% of the population owned 71% of the wealth can be favorably compared with the
strongest recent estimate that 1% of the population owns 40% of the wealth in America today. Id.
(citing Keith Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S. Called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995).
334. 26 CONG. REC. 1674 (1894).
335. Id.
336. Id. app. at 415.
337. PAUL, supra note 84, at 37; Kornhauser, supra note 297, at 139 n.85 (citing ROY G.
BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 15 n.22 (1940)).
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States Government by the tariff tax. I believe that it will be safe to
say that in order to secure this revenue of $63,000,000 that it cost the
people of the United States $450,000,000, the balance, $387,000,000,
being paid as a bounty by the people to the monopoly manufacturing
establishments under this protective tariff system. In other words, for
every dollar placed in the Treasury of the United States there was $7
put in the pockets of the protected manufacturers on account of the
tariff tax ....338
What riled supporters of the income tax the most, however, was that the
wealthy were unwilling to temper their greed and pay a proportionate share of
the tax burden. Democrat John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, a consistent
supporter of the income tax from 1894 through 1913, exclaimed that,
[t]hese tax-fattened paupers, the owners of the industries which can
not stand alone, the industries which the charity of the nation (by
their own claim at any rate, true or false) maintains and sustains,
these men grown rich by taxing all consumers for their private bene-
fit, have the unparalleled audacity to object to being themselves taxed
for the public benefit.
39
Opponents responded that the income tax was a tax upon thrift, not upon
unfair accumulation. 4" Moreover, they claimed that the wealthy as a group
were not opposed to the measure. W. Bourne Cockran, a Tammany Democrat
and unofficial spokesman for the wealthy,34' reported that,
no word of opposition to this measure ... has ever been expressed
by any rich man in the United States. On the contrary, I know that
some of the wealthiest men in this country support it. I know that Mr.
Gould in an interview favored it, and I am told by the gentleman
from Missouri that Mr. Carnegie favors it.342
338. 26 CONG. REC. 1612 (1894).
339. Id. at 1620.
340. See id. app. at 467 (Rep. W. Bourne Cockran) (D-N.Y.); id. at 1599-1600 (Rep. George
Washington Ray) (R-N.Y.); id. at 1650 (Rep. Joseph H. Walker) (R-Mass.); id. app. at 207 (Rep.
Robert Adams, Jr.) (R-Pa.). Cockran responded to the adherents of the benefit theory that "[tlhis is
not a tax upon the men who have enjoyed any special benefit from the Government; it is a tax
upon the men who have made the best use of the benefits which are common to all." Id. app. at
465.
341. The Tammany political machine in New York responded to the wishes of wealthy New
York merchants and importers who favored low tariffs, but opposed taxes on the profits from
those tariffs. RATNER, supra note 108, at 178. At the same time, the movement professed concem
for the plight of the poor. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 118.
342. 26 CONG. REC. app. 465 (1894). Cockran was responding to a flap created when Ward
McAllister, the self-proclaimed leader of a group of wealthy individuals known as the "Four Hun-
dred," wrote a letter to the New York World on January 7, 1894, in which he and the group
threatened to leave the country if a 2% income tax was imposed. Bryan issued the famous retort,
"I have never known [a man] so mean that I would be willing to say of him that his patriotism
was less than two per cent deep. [Laughter and applause]." Id. at 1658.
It is quite ironic that, according to one investment analyst, a Japanese entrepreneur recently
remarked that he would be tempted to relocate to the United States if current efforts to adopt a flat
tax are successful. See Sam Nakagama, Flat Tax Would Attract Foreign Investment and Spur the
Dollar, EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, July 21, 1995, at 2. The crucial difference in attitude is proba-
bly attributable to the fact that present efforts suggest the possibility that investment income will
be completely exempt from taxation. By contrast, tax reform in 1894 was designed to bring in-
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The actions of the rich, however, belied Cockran's statements. According to
Hall, the doors to the Ways and Means Committee had been "almost battered
down by representatives of the manufacturing interests of the country...
[b]ecause they know that their wealth comes from taxation. 343
Rather than seeking a redistribution of wealth, supporters sought an in-
come tax that was designed, like a "handmaid of tariff reform," to compensate
for the tariff's regressive effects.3" The first step was to recognize that the
proposed bill utilized a variety of methods of taxation to reach a variety of
classes of people. Thus, Bryan pointed out the fatal mistake made by Repre-
sentative Cockran in his speech:
You who listened to his speech would have thought that the income
tax was the only Federal tax proposed; you would have supposed that
it was the object of this bill to collect the entire revenue from an
income tax. The gentleman forgets that the pending tariff bill will
collect upon imports more than one hundred and twenty millions of
dollars-nearly ten times as much as we propose to collect from the
individual income tax. Everybody knows that a tax upon consumption
is an unequal tax, and that the poor man by means of it pays far out
of proportion to the income which he enjoys.3"5
Supporters of the income tax intended that it only "supplement" 3 the tariff
tax so as to "put some little of the burden on the wealth of this country.""
According to McMillin, "that system which gathers the taxes from divers[e]
sources and which places some of its burdens upon every form of wealth, not
taxing any unjustly, will be considered in the end the fairest and most just that
can be devised by our people."3 Likewise, Uriel Hall noted that, if Con-
gress rejected the income tax, it would be declaring its willingness to lay the
burdens of the tariff upon the poor, but not "to lay a feather's weight upon the
great wealth of this country .... an argument in favor of demagogery and
socialism, without righteousness for its warp and woof, and it will come back
and curse us in the future."
3 9
vestment income within the realm of taxation when it previously had gone untaxed. See 26 CoNG.
REC. 3397 (1894) (statement of Indiana Senator Daniel Voorhees, who introduced the bill in the
Senate, on the theory that a propensity exists for income arising from the wealthy man's bonds
and other investments to escape taxation altogether).
343. 26 CONG. REC. 1611 (1894).
344. Id. app. at 183 (Rep. Andrew J. Hunter) (D-Ill.) (quoting the Honorable Scott Wike).
345. Id. at 1656.
346. Id. app. at 415.
347. Id. at 1610.
348. Id. app. at 415.
349. ld. at 1609. Stanley suggests that this and other statements by Hall indicate that income
tax supporters were motivated by a desire to acquiesce to the masses and thus avoid radical
change. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 117. In the context of the debates, however, Hall's statement
was a response to the opponents' charges that suggested the income tax was a friend of socialism.
In the next sentence after the above-quoted passage, Hall said, "We are called demagogues and
socialists, because we advocate this measure." 26 CONG. REc. 1609 (1894). This is not to discount
the conservative tendency of most members of Congress. To suggest, though, that this rhetorical
turn undercuts the honesty of Hall's support for the income tax is to ignore the tricks of debating
and to give short shrift to the genuine pursuit of equality based upon a proportionate system of
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In Congress, opponents of the income tax protested that the tax's exemp-
tion of the majority of the population instituted another inequality.35 Under a
compensatory theory, however, these apparent inequalities did not disrupt the
overall proportionality. Hall explained, "The rule of proportionality is applica-
ble only to the whole tax system and it may be necessary to have several
partial inequalities in order to establish that final equality."35' Since the poor
"contribute more than their share to the maintenance of the state" through
consumption taxes, an exemption was necessary. 52 In light of the substantial
consumption tax imposed by the tariff, taxing incomes $4,000 or less, there-
fore, amounted to a form of "double taxation." '353 One Representative even
suggested that a graduated income tax was necessary because the exemption
alone would not compensate the poor for their burden under the regressive
tariff tax.354 Democrats argued that, as long as we assume that "the duties on
articles of common consumption are productive," it is desirable to exempt
altogether smaller incomes from the tax."'
Although some suggested that the exemption was itself a form of gradua-
tion,... more explicit graduation was rejected. With prices at their lowest lev-
els since before the Civil War,357 it was difficult to argue under the compen-
satory theory that the tariff taxes required a graduated tax. As Sherman pre-
dicted in 1870, the economic crisis of the 1890s focused people's attention on
the inherent inequality of the regressive consumption tax system. There was
not the same fervor for a graduated tax, however, as there had been under the
rampant inflation during the war. The general impression was that an income
tax with a healthy exemption was all that was required to counterbalance the
regression in the system. This is not to say, though, that a graduated income
tax was not advocated at all. For example, Representatives Lafe Pence from
Colorado and Joseph C. Sibley from Pennsylvania both introduced amend-
taxation.
350. Cockran, in a rhetorical twist bom out of his Tammany leanings, argued, "I oppose this
bill because I will not consent by any act of mine to place the humblest or the poorest of my
fellow-citizens on a political plane one shade lower than that occupied by the richest and the
proudest." 26 CONG. REC. app. 465 (1894); see also STANLEY, supra note 22, at 118.
351. 26 CONG. REC. 1612 (1894) (citation omitted).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1791.
354. Representative Lane reached this conclusion through the following logic:
All exemptions of incomes under $4,000 are assumed to be consumable incomes and
will be used in the support of families. This being so, and the Wilson bill providing for
a tariff tax of $130,000,000, which is a tax on consumption, the $4,000 exempted will
be liable for its just proportion of the tariff duties under the Wilson bill, which still aver-
ages 30 per cent. So even under the income tax, wealth does not yet bear its fair propor-
tion of taxation. We should have a graduated income tax that would yield yearly nearly
$100,000,000 and not $30,000,000, as is provided in the bill which we are about to pass.
Id. at 1755.
355. Id. at 1612 (citation omitted).
356. Id. at 1611. Responding to charges that he was not in favor of the principal of a graduat-
ed tax, Hall stated, "I believe that this tax is a graduated income tax. If a man has $5,000 a year
he pays a tax on $1,000, or $20; if he has an income of $10,000 he pays on $6,000, or $120; and
the gentleman will see that that is a graduated tax." Id.
357. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the cost-of-living index was at 61
in 1860, 103 in 1866, and back down to 73 in 1894. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 157, at
212 (Series E 183-186).
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ments to graduate the income tax. 5 Others also spoke in support of a gradu-
ated tax in various forms. Income tax supporters balked, however, when they
saw that the proposals were intended to redistribute rather than compensate.
Hall asked of Sibley "whether he believes it is a safe principle of national
legislation for us to declare that we will use the taxing power not for purposes
of revenue, but for the purpose of preventing men from accumulating
wealth?" '359 In the end, all amendments proposing a graduated income tax
were defeated handily and the motion to adopt the income tax as an amend-
ment to the tariff bill passed 175 to 56.3"
When the tariff bill itself was put up to a vote, advocates of the income
tax based their support on the compensatory theory. Wilson defended the
income tax against charges of class legislation "by declaring that the income
tax was simply an honest first effort to balance the weight of taxation so that
it would not be carried exclusively by the poor consumers of the country who
had hitherto borne it all. '36' Thus, support for both the tariff bill, with its
attempt to reduce the burdens on the poor, and for the income tax, with its
attempt to impose some burdens on the rich, was consistent with the desire to
nudge the country further towards a proportionate system of taxation. Not
surprisingly, Stanley found in his analysis of the roll call votes that support for
these two measures "went hand in hand. 3 62 The income tax proponents had
simply switched allies from the pro-tariff forces in the 1870s to the tariff
reform forces of the 1890s. Hence, both the consumption tax, and the tariff, or
internal tax, were now susceptible to attack." In both cases, however, the
House perceived the income tax as a critical part of the overall makeup of the
federal revenue system.
When debate in the Senate commenced in March 1894, opponents of the
income tax quickly sought to rebut the notion that the income tax was needed
to counterbalance the effects of the tariff. Nevertheless, the force of the com-
pensatory theory's logic prevailed. On April 2, 1894, Senator Daniel Voorhees
358. Pence proposed a tax which went up to 5% on incomes exceeding $100,000. 26 CONG.
REC. 1730 (1894). Sibley proposed a substitute for Pence's amendment which raised the exemp-
tion to $10,000 and imposed a upper rate of 10% on incomes above $200,000. Id. For expressions
of support, see id. at 1656, 1664, 1731, 1733, 1755; id. app. at 183 (Rep. Andrew J. Hunter) (D-
Ill.).
359. Id. at 1730.
360. Pence's motion was defeated 112 to 66. Id. at 1739; RATNER, supra note 108, at 179-80.
361. RATNER, supra note 108, at 180.
362. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 129.
363. See Scott A. Taylor, Corporate Integration in the Federal Income Tax: Lessons from the
Past and a Proposal for the Future, 10 VA. TAX REv. 237, 268 (1990). Given the fact that the
pro-free-trade Democrats secured simultaneous control of the Presidency and Congress in 1892 for
the first time since the Civil War, it was not surprising that income tax paired with tariff reform
this time around. See V.0. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 170 (5th ed. 1964).
Seligman reported that members of Congress initially looked to the prospect of increasing internal
taxes to compensate for the reduction in revenues from tariff reform. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at
505-06. That, however, would have left Democrats without the considerable benefit of an alliance
with income tax supporters. This did not mean, however, that the Democratic supporters of the
income tax did so only for revenue purposes. Quite the contrary, "correcting inequalities in the tax
system" was their true goal. Id. at 506.
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of Indiana began his introduction of the bill in the Senate in much the same
manner as the bill had left the House. He explained:
On all the wants and necessaries of life the man of wealth, with a
heavy income, pays less rates of tariff tax under existing laws than
the laboring man or laboring woman.... His bonds, his accumulated
riches of all kinds, and all incomes arising from them, are exempt
from all Government burdens, remaining not only undiminished and
unmolested amidst darkened homes and flagrant distress, but growing
fatter, stronger, and more defiant as the days and the years go by.3"
Voorhees asked, "What is there in our system of government, or in the demo-
cratic principles on which it is founded, that exempts the rich from contribut-
ing to its support according to their means?" '365 As in the House, oppo-
nents of the income tax argued the inequality of the tax's exemption. New
York Senator David B. Hill, the governor of New York from 1885 to 1891
and the chief power in the New York Democratic machine,3" argued, "If in-
comes are properly taxable, then all incomes should be taxed, of whatever
amount, taxed proportionally, without favoritism to any individual or
class." '367 Hill argued further that a consumption tax is "the least injurious
point of taxation" since consumption taxes are "self-assessed."3" Finally, in
an attempt to turn the compensatory theory against the income tax, Hill ap-
plied it to reach a different conclusion than that reached by income tax sup-
porters. Hill reasoned that at the state and local level it was the poor, not the
rich, who were escaping their due share of taxation.
[T]he poor man who owns no real estate or personal property pays
nothing directly toward State, county, or municipal taxation ... if it
were not for custom-house taxation, [the poor] would pay not a far-
thing toward the support of the Government which protects him and
under which he enjoys the blessings and privileges of a free and
independent citizen. It is through this much-abused system of tariff
taxation ... that we are enabled to equalize somewhat the burdens of
government.
369
In a similar fashion, Senator Sherman, still active twenty-five years after his
service during the Civil War, attempted to justify his rejection of the income
tax.370 Sherman focused on the state's ability to levy an income tax, rather
than its use of a property tax. Thus, he did "not deny that on general princi-
ples of equality and justice the incomes of the rich should contribute their full
364. 26 CONG. REC. 3397 (1894).
365. Id. at 3398.
366. RATNER, supra note 108, at 185.
367. 26 CONG. REC. 3559 (1894).
368. Id. at 3565.
369. Id.
370. Many members of Congress in both the House and Senate eagerly quoted Sherman's
famous defenses of the income tax after the Civil War to support their arguments and to take jabs
at one of the Senate's fiercest supporters of the tariff. See id. at 1612, 1618, 1791, 5381; id. app.
at 183. What likely accounts for Sherman's change of heart is that the tariff fell in disfavor during
the interim.
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share of taxes." '' Absent a national crisis requiring an increase in revenue,
however, Sherman suggested that the states, rather than the federal govern-
ment, should institute an income tax to equalize these burdens.372
The fallacy in these arguments was easily exposed. As Seligman later
explained, "In theory the system of state and local taxation is calculated to
reach the respective abilities of the property-owners; but in practice, as has
repeatedly been pointed out, the general property tax has broken down com-
pletely; and, especially so far as personal property is concerned ....
Moreover, state income taxes, championed by Sherman as the best solution,
were far from realistic. With a few exceptions, most Civil War income taxes
in the states were "allowed to lapse after the close of the war," not to be
revived until after 1895."' 4 Moreover, "because of the historically poor re-
cord of income tax administration by a number of states,'375 few advocated
state income taxes. Given these realities, and the notion that the real evil was
the tariff,37 6 the Senate was unwilling to dispense with the compensatory
theory as support for the income tax. Georgia Democrat Patrick Walsh added
to these doubts, noting that the poor already contributed their fair share to
state and local governments through indirect taxes.37 Thus, at the conclusion
of the Senate debates, the Senate accepted the income tax provision, although
the tariff plan was practically amended to death.
3 7
1
Like the House, the Senate refused to adopt the proposals to graduate the
tax. Populist Senators William A. Peffer of Kansas and James H. Kyle of
South Dakota each proposed a graduated income tax. Peffer suggested an
income tax ranging from 1% on incomes over $2,000 to 5% on incomes over
$100,000.1
7 9 Neither Peffer nor Kyle's suggestion received much consider-
ation, however. Peffer's motion was tabled by the overwhelming vote of 45 to
5, with only Populists opposing the motion to table. s0 Stanley suggests that
371. Id. at 6694.
372. Id.
373. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 640.
374. Id. at 414.
375. CLARA PENNIMAN, STATE INCOME TAXATION 6 (1980).
376. Sherman stated, "The pretext for this measure is that some faults are found in the Mc-
Kinley act." 26 CONG. REC. 6694 (1894).
377. Id. at 5382. This was a reference to the common suggestion that all taxes, save the in-
come tax, were easily shifted to someone else, usually the poor, through their eventual inclusion
in the price. Thus, a farmer or merchant's prices reflected his property taxes. See EDwIN R.A.
SELIGMAN, ON THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION (1899); Herbert Hovenkamp, The
First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1006-07 (1990) (collecting cita-
tions). In the House, Representative McDannold noted, "This is the lesson that the people have
learned of the incidence of taxation. They want a tax that will stay put. [Laughter.]" 26 CONG.
REC. 1616 (1894).
378. Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556-57 (1894). In a display of
special interest politics which would astonish even modem politicians, the Senate made no less
than 634 amendments to the tariff portion of the bill, raising rates on many items. To show his
displeasure, President Cleveland permitted it to become law without signing it. KOENIG, supra
note 315, at 132-33; RATNER, supra note 108, at 189. By foregoing the veto, Cleveland prevented
the McKinley Tariff Act from remaining in place. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 136.
379. See 26 CONG. REC. app. 666 (1894) (Rep. William A. Peffer) (Populist-Kan.); id. at
6689 (Rep. James H. Kyle) (lndep.-S.D.).
380. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 131.
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the rejection of a graduated tax indicates that Democrats thought the income
tax a rhetorical ploy.3" Taking a more neutral tone, Blum and Kalven con-
clude that graduation was rejected in 1894 because it had not won "widespread
public acceptance" after the Civil War experiment." 2 Neither of these analy-
ses, however, is accurate. Instead, the rejection of a graduated income tax is
best understood by considering the economic conditions at the time. This
perceived change in economic conditions from 1864 to 1894 led most Demo-
crats to believe that a flat income tax compensated for the burdens of the tariff
during this sustained period of deflation. Hence, the income tax was principal-
ly designed to reach a class of the population which was virtually escaping
taxation altogether. It elevated the overall tax rates of those who, under the
consumption tax system, had paid a much lower percentage of their incomes
to the government than the poor. Seligman, in discussing the 1894 Act, re-
minded his readers of this fact with regard to the income tax's relatively large
exemption:
It must indeed not be forgotten that we should look at the income tax
as a branch of the whole revenue system. Much may accordingly be
said in mitigation of this seeming injustice. As we pointed out above,
the burden of taxation-that is, of the tariff and the local property
tax-is borne primarily by the lower middle class, more especially by
the farmers. Even though $4,000 be not a minimum of subsistence, it
nevertheless represents in large part the income of a class which is on
the whole unfairly treated at present.38 3
It is revealing that Stanley provides no evidence that income tax supporters,
other than the Populists, signalled a commitment to explicit wealth redistribu-




382. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 33, at 12.
383. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 524. While Seligman concluded that the exemption was
indeed too high, he pointed out that the exemption in England was even higher. Id.
384. See Joseph Bankman, The Politics of the Income Tax, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1684, 1689
(1994) (reviewing Stanley's Dimensions of Law) ("Stanley presents no evidence, however, to
suggest that the public perceived the income tax to be anything other than it was .... It seems
unlikely that the masses saw redistribution of wealth as an intended purpose or probable effect of
the tax."). Thus, Stanley's frequent complaint that the 1894 Act, and the acts which preceded and
followed it, contributed only minimally to revenues, is a bit off the mark. See STANLEY, supra
note 22, at 134. The tax was not a revenue measure per se. In fact, coupled with the original re-
ductions in the tariff, the measure could not have been expected to increase overall revenues much
at all. However, when viewed as an attempt to require those 85,000 people with incomes over
$4,000 to begin paying a more proportionate share of the burden, it elevates in significance. See
26 CONG. REc. 3398 (1894) (Sen. Daniel Voorhees) (D-Ind.) (citing an estimate of the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue on the number of individuals with incomes above $4,000 out of the
65,000,000 then in the U.S.). In fact, according to Stanley's estimate, under the 1894 Act, .13% of
the population was supposed to account for 3.97% of the government's overall revenues. See
STANLEY, supra note 22, at 133 (Table 3-7) (Stanley cites an even lower percentage of the popu-
lation, only .1%, rather than the .13% one arrives at using Senator Voorhees's numbers). If we
assume that everyone contributes an equal amount under a consumption tax (which errs in
Stanley's favor since many argued that the poor's goods were taxed more heavily and that the
poor had larger families), then those 85,000 had their tax burdens increased substantially. As
Bankman notes, "[DJue to high exemption levels, the taxes were quite progressive and were large
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Moreover, it is hard to imagine, especially when given the relative popu-
larity of the compensatory theory, that the flat income tax was just a rhetorical
ploy. Indeed, employing the income tax as a counterweight for the regressive
effects of the tariff appeared to coincide with proponents' understanding of the
income tax's role in the federal revenue system. According to Stanley, the
Atlanta Constitution, for example, argued in June 1893 that the income tax "is
in direct contrast with most of our tariff taxes which fall heavier on the poor
than the rich, the taxes on necessaries being proportionately much heavier than
those on luxuries;" the paper aptly noted that the income tax "is like a border
to a carpet,... it completes the equipment.""3 5 Similarly, Representative
Kyle read an article on the floor of Congress from the Chicago Times of April
18, 1894, which reported that "[it is characteristic that the attack upon the
income tax was coupled with an attack upon free trade." '386 The New York
World, and a host of other papers, agreed with this analysis. The World argued
that "the humbler classes have at last discovered the secret of the extortion,
and they demand a readjustment of burdens, adapting the share of each more
nearly to the benefits received and the ability to pay." '387
After having been prominent during the country's last debates, the com-
pensatory theory was also undergoing a revival of sorts in academia.8 In
fact, Columbia's Edwin R.A. Seligman, said to be "the most imposing intellec-
tual edifice in favor of graduated taxation,""3 9 wrote many of his most prom-
inent works during this period.3" In June 1893, as the country edged closer
to an income tax, Seligman wrote an article in the Political Science Quarterly
on "The Theory of Progressive Taxation" in which he argued that a graduated
income tax would "help round out the existing tax system in the direction of
greater justice."39' As he later said, the progressive income tax acts as "an
engine of reparation" in the overall system.392 Seligman was not alone in his
recognition of the value of this theory. An 1891 essay contest sponsored by
the journal Public Opinion revealed the compensatory theory's currency in the
enough, relative to other taxes, to alter the distribution of the aggregate tax burden." Bankman,
supra, at 1689-90.
385. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 120 (citation omitted).
386. 26 CONG. REC. 6689 (1894) (Rep. Kyle) (citation omitted). Thus, according to Kyle, the
Times predicted that the income tax in the United States "will be even more popular than in Eng-
land, because under our system of raising the bulk of our revenues by tariff duties the inequalities
of taxation are more glaring." Id.
387. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 120 (citation omitted).
388. Id. at 121.
389. Id. at 126. Herbert Hovenkamp has called Seligman, "the most prominent public finance
economist of his day," and "[t]he Progressive Era economist with the greatest explicit influence on
judicial policymaking." Hovenkamp, supra note 377, at 1004.
390. Joseph Dorfman, Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman, in DICIONARY OF AMERICAN BIoG-
RAPHY 606, 607 (Robert L. Schuyler & Edward T. James eds., 1958).
391. Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Theory of Progressive Taxation, 8 POL. ScI. Q. 220, 222
(1893), quoted in STANLEY, supra note 22, at 127. It is often said, quite correctly, that Seligman
subscribed to a justification of progression for its own sake based upon what he called the "facul-
ty" theory, a variant of the sacrifice theory, which found that, on balance, people valued luxuries
more than comforts, and comforts more than necessities. Taxation should thus be graduated to
take into account this logic. See SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 638; Hovenkamp, supra note 377, at
1005.
392. SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at 708.
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field. The top two essays each utilized the compensatory theory in fashioning
a plan for tax reform. The first prize winner, a 19-year old Wharton student,
argued that "the nearest approach to equality will result from a coordination of
the systems of federal, state, and local taxation, in order by this compensatory
method to minimize injustice."'3 93 On the question of the progression princi-
ple, he noted that "the American people would not easily be reconciled to any
other than a proportional income tax with an exemption of the smaller in-
comes." '394 The second prize winner, a 29-year old author and journalist, ar-
gued for a graduated income tax "as an offset to the disadvantages of the poor
from all taxation measured by consumption. ' '
Despite its sound basis in economic theory, the 1894 income tax law was
defeated by constitutional law principles. Although the tax was scheduled to
take effect on January 1, 1895 and continue until January 1, 1900,396 it was
never implemented. Almost immediately after its scheduled start, two share-
holder suits were filed in federal court in New York to prevent their respective
corporations from paying the tax.397 The case, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and
Trust Co., was argued by some of the most prominent corporate lawyers of the
day, including William D. Guthrie, Clarence A. Seward, and Joseph H.
Choate.398 Pollack involved a replay of many of the same issues discussed
during the enactment of the income tax in Congress. Guthrie claimed that the
Act was unconstitutional in one of two ways: If it was a direct tax, it was not
apportioned among the states, and if it was an indirect tax like a duty, impost
or excise, it was not uniform because of many discriminations, including the
exemption for incomes less than $4,000.'3 Assistant Attorney General Ed-
ward B. Whitney grounded his defense of the Act upon the compensatory
theory:
It is impossible to construe this law and discuss its constitutionality or
application without understanding its underlying principle. This prin-
ciple is one of compensation. Certain principles of taxation are well
settled, and almost universally recognized: first, that taxes on con-
sumption bear unduly hard upon the poor and upon what is called by
the economists the lower middle class, financially speaking, because
the comparatively poor consume all or nearly all of their income; sec-
ond, that the fairest method of equalizing taxation is by an income
tax with an exemption of all incomes below a certain amount....
This exemption approximately represents the incomes which, prior to
393. Walter E. Weyl, in EQUITABLE TAXATION 28 (T.Y. Crowell & Co. 1892).
394. Id. at 29.
395. Robert Luce, in EQUITABLE TAXATION, supra note 393, at 44.
396. RATNER, supra note 108, at 191.
397. The cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court under the name Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). As originally filed, the other case was Hyde v.
Continental Trust Co. See WITTE, supra note 79, at 73 n.14.
398. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 16. Guthrie, called the "lion of Wall Street," raised the mon-
ey for the lawsuit among his clients and found a willing litigant in Charles Pollock. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 108, at 566.
399. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 448. In addition to the explicit discrimination between individuals
above and below $4,000, individuals only paid on the excess over $4,000 while corporations paid
a tax on the whole amount. Id.
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the establishment of the income tax, bore more than their fair share of
taxation.'
Thus, Whitney continued,
[tihe whole attack on the justice of this minimum feature is based
upon a fundamental fallacy; upon the notion that the income tax
stands alone instead of forming a part of a general fiscal system, the
different parts of which are set to balance each other in approxima-
tion to that equality which in its perfection is "a baseless dream."''
Similarly, James C. Carter, attorney for the Continental Trust Company, which
was the only private party defending the income tax, argued that the Act's
"object was to redress in some degree the flagrant inequality by which the
great mass of the people were made to furnish nearly all the revenue, and
leave the very wealthy classes to furnish very little of it in comparison with
their means."'"42 It was clear that the compensatory theory inundated the legal
understanding of equality in taxation in these arguments.
Despite the Attorney General's observation that the plaintiffs' "main reli-
ance" was upon the Act's lack of uniform application, °3 the Court by a 6-2
vote' held the Act unconstitutional on the ground that it was an unappor-
tioned direct tax."°5 On rehearing, the Court made clear that the ability of an
income tax to reduce the burden on consumption was not properly the concern
of the judiciary.' Thus, despite the vigorous dissent of four justices, ' as
400. Id. at 475-76 (argument of Mr. Whitney).
401. Id. at 476 (argument of Mr. Whitney) (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595
(1884)).
402. Id. at 517 (argument of Mr. Carter).
403. Id. at 504.
404. Justice Howell Jackson was absent from this first decision. BUENKER, supra note 45, at
19.
405. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 572. Article I of the Constitution provides, "No Capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed
to be taken." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The rule of apportionment, a compromise borne in part out
of the divide between small and large states and in part out of the question of how to count
slaves, requires that direct taxes such as poll or property taxes be apportioned between the states
according to each state's population. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 594. In this manner, large and
powerful states are prevented from imposing all the taxes on the smaller states. Indirect taxes,
though, like the carriage tax in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 171 (1796), were not sub-
ject to the rule of apportionment as part of the state's compromise in ceding the right to tax di-
rectly. Today, the concept of apportionment in taxation arises most frequently in the related matter
of state taxation of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 1331, 1337 (1995).
406. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 634 (1895). Justice Field, in his
concurrence to the original opinion, had compared the $4,000 exemption to an "arbitrary discrimi-
nation" against Catholics and Jews. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 596 (Field, J., concurring). In perhaps a
fit of self-interest, Field also had taken a shot at the Act's authorization of a tax upon the salaries
of federal judges. Id. at 604.
407. The dissenting justices were Harlan, Jackson, Brown, and White. Jackson wrote that the
decision had the effect of "relieving the citizens having the greater ability, while the burdens of
taxation are made to fall most heavily and oppressively upon those having the least ability."
Pollock, 158 U.S. at 705 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Harlan, in perhaps the most impassioned of the
dissents, wrote:
[U]ndue and disproportioned burdens are placed upon the many, while the few, safely
entrenched behind the rule of apportionment among the states on the basis of numbers,
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well as seemingly controlling authority in five prior cases,"5 the Court struck
down the income tax on May 20, 1895. In a letter to his sons four days later,
dissenting Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote that Pollock "will become as
hateful with the American people as the Dred Scott case was when it was de-
cided .... [It will] make the freeman of America the slaves of accumulated
wealth."'
The enactment and demise of the 1894 Act reveals a solidification of the
compensatory theory. The perceived need to compensate for consumption
taxes, ever-present since the end of Reconstruction, was magnified when the
apparent improprieties of the wealthy combined with the Panic of 1893 to
highlight the lopsided distribution of the tax burden. Unlike the Civil War
taxes, which were graduated to compensate for the high prices induced by the
tariff and other consumption taxes, the 1894 Act was a flat tax designed to
ensure that the wealthy suffered their proportionate share of the burden. While
there is much discussion about the causes for the income tax's repeal in
Pollock,4 what is clear is that, despite the invitation of the plaintiffs' attor-
neys, the case did not question Congress's authority to balance the burdens of
taxation through a progressive income tax.
III. THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE ACT OF 1913
A combination of factors led to the re-emergence of the income tax as a
desirable method of taxation in the decade-and-a-half after Pollock. Starting
around 1897, there was a gradual but significant increase in the cost-of-living
to the highest levels since the Civil War, an increase for which the tariff re-
ceived the primary blame. A second factor was the Panic of 1907, after which
the tariff-reform Democrats, pro-income tax Progressives, and Insurgent Re-
publicans ascended to positions of control and influence. The result was the
enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment and the graduated income tax in the
Underwood/Simmons Tariff Act of 1913. Much like the Civil War income
taxes, the progressive rates were a response to the perception that the tariff
was burdening the poor, in the form of higher prices, with more than their fair
share of taxes. Thus, consistent with the country's tradition, the income tax in
the Act of 1913 was used to achieve the goal of a flat or proportionate rate tax
system.
are permitted to evade their share of responsibility for the support of the government
ordained for the protection of the rights of all.
Id. at 685 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
408. Justice White cited five cases for the proposition that the phrase "direct taxes" in the
Constitution was intended to refer only to land: Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 171
(1796) (carriage tax); Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1868) (insurance
company receipts tax); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869) (bank notes tax);
Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874) (inheritance tax); and Springer v. United States,
102 U.S. 586 (1880), which held that a Civil War income tax was not a direct tax and therefore
did not need to be apportioned. See Pollock, 158 U.S. at 711.
409. Komhauser, supra note 297, at 141 (citing David G. Farrelly, Justice Harlan's Dissent in
the Pollock Case, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 180 (1950)).
410. See, e.g., BUENKER, supra note 45, at 18-22; FRIEDMAN, supra note 108, at 566-67;
RATNER, supra note 108, at 193; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 138.
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Although deflation characterized the period before the 1894 Act, the na-
tion saw the beginning of sharp price increases at the end of the century. It is
estimated that prices increased nearly 33% between 1897 and 1913, an average
of 2.3% annually.4 ' The rise was more dramatic for necessities. Staples such
as lard, linseed oil, flour, and butter increased in price from 45% to 184%.4I2
As a result, the cost-of-living index rose from 73 in 1894 to 102 in 1912, its
highest level since the Civil War.4 3 More important than any actual rise in
the cost-of-living, though, was the fact that Congress saw the need to respond.
The Senate Select Committee on Wages and Prices of Commodities, chaired
by staunch Republican Standpatter Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts,
wrote that "retail prices in the United States in the spring of 1910 were for
many articles at the highest point recorded for many years."'414 The House
Ways and Means Committee acknowledged even more dramatic concern in
1913, stating that "probably the most striking economic change since 1897 has
been the tremendous increase in the cost of living-a situation which has at-
tracted the anxious attention of economists the world over."4 5
Compounding this problem was the failure of wages to keep pace with the
rise in the cost-of-living. Union wages, for example, increased by 14% from
1898 to 1907, while the cost of living rose by between 20% and 25% in the
same period. One study concluded that "the purchasing power of wages in-
creased only about sixteen percent while prices rose 36.8 percent. '416 The
Senate Select Committee found that "wages have not advanced as rapidly as
have prices and practically all labor difficulties which have been the subject of
mediation in the United States during the past few years have had as their
basis the advanced cost of living."4 7
Many blamed this inflation on the reinstitution of highly protective tariffs
after the 1896 elections. Although tariff reform could not have been responsi-
ble for the Panic of 1893, Republicans seized on the Panic's lingering effects
as a consequence of the declared retreat from protectionism." 8 In this man-
411. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 33.
412. Id. at 33-34.
413. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 157, at 212. Other indexes showed a similar rise.
According to Burgess's index, the cost-of-living rose from 63.9 in 1897 to 100 in 1913; according
to Douglas's index, it rose from 97 in 1894 to 137 in 1913; and according to Rees's index, it rose
from 83 in 1897 to 99 in 1913. Id.
414. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 34 (quoting the Senate Select Committee on Wages and
Prices, chaired by Standpat Republican Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts) (citation omitted).
415. Id. With the House Ways and Means Committee under Democratic control by 1913, it is
likely that the more dramatic rhetoric was motivated by partisan interests. See George E. Mowry,
Election of 1912, in THE COMING TO POWER 264, 292 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. et al. eds.,
1971).
416. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 34; HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 157, at 212 (Series
E 183-186). Although Albert Rees disproved the commonly held belief that wages remained stag-
nant between 1890 and 1914, it is clear that the rise in wages which did occur failed to increase
workers' purchasing power appreciably. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 309 (citing ALBERT
REES, REAL WAGES IN MANUFACTURING, 1890-1914 (Princeton 1961)).
417. S. REP. No. 912, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 28 (1910), The number of strikes had
indeed increased during the period, although the success rate had dropped from 50% to 36%.
There were 3,100 strikes between 1911 and 1915, while there were only 530 strikes during the
much longer period between 1881 and 1895. RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 317.
418. ASHLEY, supra note 85, at 219; KEY, supra note 363, at 170-71.
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ner, the Republicans regained control of both houses of Congress during the
midterm elections of 1894, and, with the election of William McKinley, took
back the Presidency in 1896. 419 The Republicans viewed their victory as a
"mandate for a high protective tariff."42 As such, McKinley made good on
his promise to erect a protective tariff in 1897 with the passage of the "strong-
ly restrictive" Dingley Tariff Act.42 ' The resulting high tariff rates came back
to haunt Republicans, however, when prices began their ascent. Democrats,
who capitalized on the perception that the protective tariff was to blame for
high prices, called for, in their 1912 platform, "downward revision of tariff
duties on grounds that existing rates made 'the rich richer and the poor poor-
er,' and accounted for 'the high cost of living' that plagued American fami-
lies." '422 Although protectionists attempted to turn the blame against the poor
and dismiss their woes as "the cost of high living," '423 the weight of the
blame fell on the tariff.4 24 Moreover, despite Republican denials, leaders in
both parties "agreed that the electorate's association of the rising cost of living
with Republican insistence upon a high protective tariff was the single most
important political issue of the day. 425
This long-term discontent leaped to the forefront of the public's mind
after the Panic of 1907.426 This panic, which was triggered initially by the
419. Fite, supra note 310, at 225, 256.
420. RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 390.
421. BENDER'S FEDERAL REVENUE LAW, supra note 85, at 357; KEY, supra note 363, at 174.
The Act instituted an average rate on dutiable goods, 52%, which was the second-highest in
American history. RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 390.
422. LEROY ASHBY, WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN: CHAMPION OF DEMOCRACY 138 (1987);
BUENKER, supra note 45, at 35.
423. John Buenker attributes this phrase to James J. Hill. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 35.
Lodge's Committee similarly attempted to evade this link, contending "that 'the tariff seems to
have been no national factor in causing the advance in prices during the past decade,' blaming it
on the desire to 'keep up with the changing styles in clothing and shoes."' Id. (quoting the Lodge
Committee) (citation omitted). Obviously, it is difficult to win over allies to protectionism by in-
sulting their spending habits.
424. Economic historians Paul Studenski and Herman Krooss note, "Rightly or wrongly, the
urban population blamed the tariff for the current rise in prices." See BUENKER, supra note 45, at
37-38 (citing PAUL STUDENSKI & HERMAN E. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 270-71 (1963)).
425. Id. at 37.
426. Stanley dismissed the long-term discontent and focused exclusively on the action taken
after the Panic of 1907. Noting the cyclical nature of the bills introduced and articles written on
the income tax, he argued that the primary impetus behind the Sixteenth Amendment and the
Revenue Act of 1913 was the desire to quell the depression's ensuing social instability. STANLEY,
supra note 22, at 183. While I agree with Stanley that this refutes the traditional understanding
that the Amendment was exclusively the result of a Progressive movement after Pollock, I think it
ascribes too much force to the Panic itself. Stanley himself admits that President Theodore Roo-
sevelt expressed his support for an income and inheritance tax in 1906, well before any sign of
instability. Id. at 186. The American Federation of Labor Convention in 1906 also called for an
income tax as a way to more equitably share the burdens of taxation, and the Democrats had
called for an income tax in their party platform in every year but 1904, when they instead
strengthened their antitrust provisions. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 42, 45. Furthermore, while the
continuing high cost of living was still a source of tension in 1913, the nation's overall return to
prosperity and drop in unemployment hardly resembles the conditions of the violent Pullman
strikes in 1894. See Mowry, supra note 415, at 264. The Panic was important for its effect of
sharply focusing attention on the inequality of the tax system which had been a nagging undercur-
rent since the 1890s.
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failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company and the Trust Company of Amer-
ica, extended through 1909.427 During this period, relief applications in-
creased five-fold in some cities and the manufacturing and construction indus-
tries severely cut back their labor forces.428 Perhaps the greatest impact of
the Panic, though, was its function as a vehicle for reform. The Aldrich-
Vreeland Act of 1908 and the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 were proposed
because of concern for the system's inability to provide adequate capital mar-
kets due to monetary inelasticity-a principal worry of the Populists during
the 1890s. 429 The tariff reform area underwent similar changes, as both par-
ties pledged support for tariff reform in the 1908 elections, and the Republi-
cans promised to hold a special session of Congress on the subject during the
next term.430 Moreover, presidential candidates William Jennings Bryan and
William Howard Taft expressed their support for an income tax, with the
eventual victor, Taft, declaring in his acceptance speech that it was both con-
stitutionally permissible and potentially desirable to have an income tax in
conditions of urgent need.43' The issues of tariff reform and the income tax
were once again inextricably linked.
On March 4, 1909, Taft formally called a special session of Congress
dedicated to the issue of tariff reform.4 32 Later termed "one of the most con-
tentious and significant special sessions in the history of the national Legisla-
ture," it illustrated the political breakdown which had arisen from the income
tax's seeming unavailability as a method of compensation for the tariff.
433
Republicans ostensibly dominated both houses of Congress,434 but a rift was
growing in their ranks. Regular Republicans, or "Standpatters," followed the
traditional party line of high protectionism. A small group of Republicans in
Congress, however, were straying from this stance. Known as "Insurgent"
Republicans, these primarily Western Representatives and Senators believed in
427. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 184.
428. Id. at 185.
429. GOODWYN, supra note 297, at 518-19. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act authorized groups of
banks threatened by depositor panic to issue a form of emergency currency backed by certain
types of their loan and investment assets. It also provided for the establishment of a National
Monetary Commission to study and recommend more permanent changes, which eventually in-
cluded the Federal Reserve Act. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 366.
430. Republicans offered tariff "revision" without promising reductions, while the Democrats
explicitly promised tariff reductions. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 185-86. See BLAKEY & BLAKEY,
supra note 337, at 23-24. Representative James, a Kentucky Democrat, later offered his explana-
tion for the Republicans' promise of a special session rather than immediate action:
The reason the Republican party would not reform the tariff before the election was they
knew if they did reform it in the interests of the people, the corruption fund, which they
were so used to receiving, would be denied them by the favored few with whom they
were in partnership. They knew if the legislation was in the interests of monopolies, as it
now is, the people would rebuke them, so they put it off until after the election.
44 CONG. REC. 4399 (1909).
431. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 54; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 186-87. For Taft, even this
minimal concession was a break from most Republicans and had not been a part of the party
platform. See Hobbs, supra note 179, at 453.
432. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 190.
433. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 57.
434. In the 61st Congress, Republicans held a 214-175 majority in the House and 60-32 ma-
jority in the Senate. Id. at 58.
[Vol. 73:2
ORIGINS OF A FLAT TAX
a more popularly-centered focus of government, free of special perks and
favors for big business. On the tariff, Insurgents sought a more "scientifically"
drawn tariff policy which pinpointed protection for "legitimate" industries."',
Although the Insurgents did not endorse a tariff for revenue only, they were
allied with the Democrats in their support of an income tax on grounds of "tax
,,436equity.
Given this changing political landscape, Republicans could not avoid the
income tax issue when House Ways and Means Chair Sereno Payne of New
York introduced a tariff bill coupled with an inheritance tax.41' Democratic
Senator Joseph W. Bailey of Texas, who was faced with tariff bills which
failed to meaningfully address the cost of living issue and an inheritance tax
which duplicated state programs but satisfied no one, introduced an amend-
ment to the tariff bill proposing a flat income tax of 3% on incomes above
$5,000."38 It was, "in the main, the same as the law of 1894." 4" Bailey im-
plied that nothing short of an income tax could serve to compensate for the
tariff, and openly contested the judiciary's power to strike down the tax. In
this regard, Bailey admitted that he was not attempting to conform the amend-
ment to the Court's Pollack's decision, but instead was offering an amendment
that distinctly, and directly, challenged that decision."' Two days later the
Democratic caucus adopted Bailey's proposal as a party measure."' In re-
sponse, the Insurgents proffered an income tax bill introduced by Albert
Cummins of Iowa. Cummins proposed a graduated tax ranging from 2% on
incomes not exceeding $10,000 to 6% on those exceeding $100,000."2 When
twenty-one Republicans announced their support for the Cummins bill, a ma-
jority of the Senate had now registered its support for some form of an income
tax." 3 Forced to confront the issue, Republican Norris Brown submitted a
proposal for a Constitutional amendment granting Congress the power to col-
lect taxes on incomes and inheritances. Brown declared he was "in full accord
with the proposition of laying some of the burdens of taxation upon the in-
comes of the country," but was against flouting the Supreme Court's authority
with the futile gesture of submitting a virtual reproduction of the 1894
435. See id. at 67. The call for a scientific tariff was a typical reform measure designed to
remove some of the lobbyist's influence from the revenue arena. Instead of determining rates
based on conjecture or political pressure, the rates would be objectively based upon data con-
cerning the relative costs of production. Thus, cheap labor abroad would be compensated for by a
tariff equal to the difference between foreign and domestic labor costs in a particular industry. See
id. at 359; Komhauser, supra note 297, at 75 n.82; Tarullo, supra note 73, at 292-93. One sus-
pects that a politician's notion of a "scientifically targeted" tariff often translated into one which
"protects my industries rather than yours."
436. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 90.
437. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 191-92.
438. See SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 592 (citing 44 CONG. REC. 1351 (1909)).
439. 44 CONG. REC. 1351 (1909); see STANLEY, supra note 22, at 192-93. The inheritance tax
had not even satisfied Regular Republicans, since Senate Finance Committee Chair Nelson Aldrich
(R-R.I.) eliminated the tax from his version of the tariff bill submitted by the House. BUENKER,
supra note 45, at 100.
440. 44CONG. REC. 1351 (1909).
441. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 100.
442. 44 CONG. REC. 1420 (1909).
443. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 101.
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Act.' Even if the Court were to reverse itself on this occasion, Brown
asked, "how long will that decision stand?"" 5
The ensuing debate over these measures illustrate Congress's acceptance
of the compensatory theory. On May 4, Insurgent William Borah of Idaho
stood to defend Cummins' proposal. Arguing that the issue could safely be
resubmitted to the Court, Borah declared that the Framers did not intend "that
all taxes of this Government should be placed upon the backs of those who
toil, upon consumption, while the accumulated wealth of the Nation should
stand exempt."' Regular Republican Elihu Root, corporate counsel to such
financial giants as Jay Gould, Thomas Fortune Ryan, and E.H. Harriman, took
great pains to explain that the states had already adequately compensated for
the tariff's regressive effects:" 7
It is not a fact that in this Republic property does not now bear a
very great proportion of the burden of taxation.... [Tihe property in
the United States upon which the ad valorem taxes for the support of
the Government, county, municipal, and other local governments,
were levied amounted at a true value to $97,810,000,000; that ad
valorem taxes were levied upon that property at the rate of seventy-
four one-hundredths of 1 per cent; that is, in round numbers, three-
fourths of I per cent; and that would amount in round numbers to the
equivalent of an income tax of 15 per cent upon all property in the
United States.4a
Of course, much like Bourne Cockran's attempt in 1894, Root's argument was
open to attack. Borah asked him, "[W]ho at last pays the large portion of the
real estate tax in this country, the real-estate owner or the renter?"' 9 More
importantly, however, income tax opponents were once again accepting most
supporters' understanding of a just and equitable tax system based on flat or
proportional rate taxation.
Sensing the strength of the pro-income tax position, the Democrats and
Insurgents aligned to create the Bailey-Cummins bill, a compromise which
proposed to ignore Pollock and enact a flat 2% tax on individual and corporate
incomes exceeding $5,000.50 Nelson Aldrich, the GOP's powerful leader in
444. 44 CONG. REC. 1568 (1909). Brown is called a "halfway Insurgent" by Sidney Ratner,
although he does not define the term. He is probably "halfway" there because of his underlying
support for an income tax as a supplement to the tariff, since most Regular Republicans, especial-
ly Nelson Aldrich, believed the tariff alone could provide sufficient revenue. RATNER, supra note
108, at 298; see BUENKER, supra note 45, at 83, 100.
445. 44 CONG. REC. 1568 (1909).
446. Id. at 1701.
447. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 60.
448. 44 CONG. REc. 1701 (1909).
449. Id. Borah is referencing the shifting incidence of taxation to which the income tax was
allegedly not subject. See supra note 22. Another weakness in Root's conclusion is that he does
not compare his figures with those for consumption taxes. Even if the wealthy were already sub-
ject to a 23% effective tax on their incomes, the consumption tax was historically thought by
some to take 70 to 90% of the poor's income while extracting only 3 to 10% of the wealthy's
income. See KOENIG, supra note 315, at 130. Thus, the property tax could not have served as a
complete compensation.
450. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 101; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 195.
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the Senate, succeeded in delaying the bill's introduction until the tariff issues
had been resolved.4 ' In the meantime, Regular Republicans, in search of a
solution, approached President Taft. As Standpatter Henry Cabot Lodge ex-
plained, "they had the votes" to pass the Bailey-Cummins bill and directly
challenge the Court's interpretation in Pollock."2 Thus, Republican leaders
adopted a compromise: a proposed amendment to the Constitution, much like
Norris Brown's, but one which replaced the inheritance tax with a corporation
excise tax. The compromise allowed Regular Republicans to forestall the
income tax, permanently they hoped, while providing a source of revenue to
replace income lost through the tariff revisions.4" After succeeding in delay-
ing a vote on the Bailey-Cummins bill, Aldrich managed to overcome the
Democrat-Insurgent alliance's resistance and force consideration of both the
amendment and corporation tax. 54
Some suggest that the success of the compromise indicates that the in-
come tax alliance was never on firm grounds.455 Rather than illustrating a
lack of "true" support for the income tax, though, the compromise demonstrat-
ed that the income tax's support was a function of the makeup of the entire
revenue system. The tariff issue had dominated the 1908 election and Con-
gress could not return from the special session without resolving it. Since
Aldrich still had the votes and influence to control the tariff schedules, many
income tax supporters acceded to the proposed solution. '56 Thus, the success
of the compromise reflected the reality that this special session was focused on
the burdens placed on the poor due to the tariff, rather than the lack of contri-
bution from the rich due to the absence of the income tax. Furthermore, sup-
porters of the compromise did not perceive that the corporation tax abandoned
the goal of proportionate taxation under the compensatory theory.457 As
Borah pointed out:
[It] has been somewhat extensively assumed, that this is another
means of placing a tax upon the wealth of the country; that by this
process of singling out corporations we will reach the wealth of the
land rather than to place a tax upon consumers, or that great body of
American citizenship which now bears its undue proportion of the
taxes of the country.4"'
451. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 102; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 195.
452. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 194-95.
453. See id. at 199-200 (arguing that the possibility that the compromise served any other
purpose than to delay the income tax, such as to raise revenues, was small given the total reve-
nues raised from the measure).
454. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 105; RATNER, supra note 108, at 300; STANLEY, supra note
22, at 195.
455. See STANLEY, supra note 22, at 196. Stanley argues that if the Democrat-Insurgent alli-
ance had enough votes to pass the income tax measure and to force the Regular Republicans to
meet with Taft, it should have had enough votes to avoid the compromise altogether. Id. This
assumes that support for the income tax was independent of the goal of tariff reform.
456. Id. at 195.
457. Sidney Ratner suggests that Taft's selection of a corporation excise tax after previously
espousing an inheritance tax demonstrates that his support of an income tax amendment was a
sham designed to hinder the Democrat-Insurgent alliance. RATNER, supra note 108, at 288, 291.
But see Komhauser, supra note 297, at 54 (arguing that Taft genuinely supported the corporation
excise tax as a method of corporate regulation).
458. 44 CONG. REC. 3985 (1909). Borah went on to note that "the interested American people
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Even if, as Borah contended, this position was a "thin guise" for truly shifting
the burden back on consumers,459 it illustrates the resonance of the compen-
satory theory.' Aldrich had always maintained that no additional revenues
were needed besides the tariff, but had his view prevailed, Republicans would
have had little need to justify the corporation tax as a method of equalizing
the burdens of taxation.' As Marjorie Kornhauser has stated, rhetoric "must
reflect deeply and widely held views or else it will lack the power it needs to
persuade." 2 Supporters' reliance on the compensatory theory to justify the
compromise demonstrates acceptance of flat or proportional rate taxation as
the most just distribution of the burdens of taxation. During the debate in the
House, one Republican admitted that for the wealthy, "an income tax must
bear a proportionately great share of the government taxes." 3 Finally, sup-
port of a constitutional amendment was consistent with the goal of securing an
income tax. In this respect, the Democratic platform in 1908 had called for the
submission of a constitutional amendment to ensure the presence of "an in-
come tax as part of our revenue system."' Even William Jennings Bryan
had conceded in a speech in 1908 that the President should push for an in-
come tax amendment "since it seemed improbable that Congress could design
a tax which would be acceptable to the Court." 5 To a supporter of the in-
come tax, a defeat at the hands of the Court was no better than a defeat at the
hands of the state legislatures.
Debate over the wording of the amendment, although minimal, demon-
strated that graduated rates were not seen as essential to achieve the goals of
an income tax. On July 5, Bailey proposed that the amendment allow for
ratification by popular convention and explicitly permit Congress to "grade"
any income tax. '  This latter consideration was prompted by Justice
Brewer's dissent in Knowlton v. Moore,' in which the Court approved a
graduated inheritance tax emerging from the Spanish-American War's revenue
acts.' Bailey noted that if Brewer's view prevailed, and Congress was with-
are looking on, thinking that we are trying to get a tax upon wealth" with the corporation tax mea-
sure. Id. at 3986.
459. Id. at 3985.
460. Income tax supporters charged that the corporation tax was a "subterfuge" to defeat the
income tax. Id. at 3929.
461. Aldrich essentially admitted that his support for the corporation tax was contrary to his
views, declaring, "I shall vote for a corporation tax as a means to defeat the income tax." Id. He
argued that it would be better to reduce expenses if the tariff did not meet needed revenues. This
view, however, was not in the majority as indicated by the support for the income tax measures.
462. Kornhauser, supra note 297, at 138.
463. 44 CONG. REC. 4399-40 (1909) (Rep. Keifer) (R-Ohio).
464. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 591.
465. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 55.
466. 44 CONG. REC. 4108 (1909). The proposal for submission to popular conventions, as
opposed to the state legislatures, was an attempt to assure passage was not affected by "local
issues" or "change" in the representatives' opinions since the last election. Id. This proposal was
defeated 46-30 in a vote which mirrored the vote on the substitution of the corporation tax for the
income tax. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 131.
467. 178 U.S. 41, 110 (1900) (Brewer, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
468. 44 CONG. REc. 4108 (1909). The Court held that concerns about the progressive feature
of the tax was a legislative rather than judicial question. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 109. Brewer's
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out power to grade an inheritance tax, it would also be without power, even
under the amendment, to grade an income tax.' Senator Anselm J.
McLaurin, a Democrat from Mississippi, proposed instead to remove the direct
tax clauses from the Constitution altogether. He noted that this would "elimi-
nate from the Constitution every cause of contention over the question of the
authority of Congress to levy an income tax, except as to the power of Con-
gress to grade an income tax."47 It was clear that Bailey did not have the
support in Congress to explicitly authorize a graduation of the income tax, and
he withdrew the proposal, stating, "I am satisfied that this amendment will be
voted down; and voting it down would warrant the Supreme Court in hereafter
saying that a proposition to authorize Congress to levy a graduated income tax
was rejected."47' At a minimum, the resistance to Bailey's proposal suggests
that Congress believed an income tax could exist in a meaningful sense with-
out graduated rates. If redistribution of wealth had been the goal, there should
have been at least some defense of graduation by income tax supporters. Thus,
it is difficult to support the notion that the states thought they were ratifying
"a predictably progressive-that is, a redistributive-income tax" when pre-
sented with the Sixteenth Amendment. 2
dissent in Knowlton followed from his dissent in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S.
283, 300-01 (1898), in which the Court held that Illinois' graduated inheritance tax was constitu-
tional. Brewer dissented on the ground that the Constitution would not permit such arbitrary dis-
crimination. Id. at 303 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
An inheritance tax was often viewed differently than a tax on property or income since the
former was a tax on the right of succession, a right of legislative creation, while the latter was a
tax on property rights more akin to "natural" rights. Id. at 288. Thus, a graduated tax was not
susceptible to attack under the Due Process Clause. Recognizing this, the petitioner in Magoun
attempted to argue the case under the Equal Protection Clause. But, as one commentator noted:
The phrase "equal protection of the laws" is so evidently intended to be indefinite that
the court has never attempted to fix its meaning. They have often declared, however,
that almost no classification of persons for purposes of taxation can be held to interfere
with this provision of the Constitution, so long as all within a class are treated alike.
Only a discrimination obviously based on grounds wholly foreign to the proper ends of
government could be held unconstitutional.
Case Comment, Illinois Inheritance Tax, 12 HARV. L. REv. 127, 128 (1898).
In Wisconsin, for example, an inheritance tax was supported on explicitly redistributive
grounds while an income tax was justified as distributing the burdens of taxation more equally.
See Joseph A. Ranney, Law and the Progressive Era, Part 2: The Transformation of Wisconsin's
Tax System, 1897-1925, WIS. LAW., Aug. 1994, at 22, 23 & n.16. Despite this difference in rheto-
ric, inheritance taxes were often flat, and were generally not steeply progressive. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 108, at 570. Where a progressive inheritance tax was invalidated by a state supreme court, it
was usually on the basis that a classification, while permissible, was arbitrary and unreasonable
when made purely on a quantitative basis. See In re Cope's Estate, 43 A. 79, 81 (Pa. 1899);
Judson A. Crane, Progressive Income Taxes and Constitutional Uniformity of Taxation, 2 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 44, 47 (1935).
An inheritance tax is also viewed differently on the moral ground that earned income may
be kept while unearned income is available for redistribution. See Kornhauser, supra note 297, at
142; see also James K. Glassman, The Rich Already Pay Plenty, WASH. POST, July II, 1995, at
A17 (arguing that a flat tax is fair to the rich, but conceding that he would "be in favor of hiking
estate taxes to minimize the luck of birth" in creating wealth).
469. 44 CONG. REC. 4108 (1909).
470. Id. at 4109.
471. Id. at 4120.
472. Amar, supra note 23, at 291. The Senate truly "agreed" on the wording of the proposed
amendment, approving it 77-0 with fifteen abstentions. Certainly the goals differed, with Demo-
crats and Insurgents voting for it "because they believed in it as the fairest form of taxation, the
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From the history of ratification, it appears that the Sixteenth Amendment
was more a response to the tariff than a call to redistribute wealth.47 On Au-
gust 5, 1909, Congress passed the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act. Although it was
intended to be a concession to the demand for tariff reduction, the Act main-
tained the high rate structure of 1897."' It "brought no essential change in
our tariff system," with "no downward revision of any serious conse-
quence."475 This failure to respond to the public outcry over the tariff was
fatal to the Republican Party. As Representative Adam M. Byrd, a Mississippi
Democrat, warned during the debate over the compromise proposal in the
House, consumers could not possibly be helped by either the Amendment or
the corporation tax "unless the tax burden imposed by the tariff is decreased in
proportion to the amount of revenue derived by the income and corporation
taxes." 76 Thus, the tariff again assumed heightened significance during the
elections of 1910 and the ensuing ratification process.47 7 Consider that two-
thirds of the states had not even considered the proposed amendment before
1910 and its elections.47 These elections not only ushered in significant vic-
tories for Democrats and Insurgents, based primarily on the issue of the tariff,
but also succeeded in further dividing the Republican party.47 9 Democrats
gained control of the governorship and both houses of Congress in New York,
Ohio, Indiana, and Maine. Democrats also captured one house of the legisla-
ture and the governor's seat in both Connecticut and New Jersey, the latter
electing Woodrow Wilson. Moreover, for the first time since 1890, Democrats
gained control of the U.S. House of Representatives. The New York Times'
post-election headline read, "the Democratic Party carried the Union yester-
day."' 0 Then, in the election of 1912, not only did Woodrow Wilson beat
Standpatters because it was part of the 'deal' Aldrich had agreed to and because they hoped to de-
feat ratification in the future." BUENKER, supra note 45, at 131, (quoting THOMAS R. Ross, JONA-
THAN PRENTISS DOLLIVER 259-60 (1958)). The House was similarly in favor, voting 318 to 14 to
approve the resolution. RATNER, supra note 108, at 302. Many income tax supporters no doubt
felt as Representative Ollie M. James (D-Ky.) felt when he declared, "I shall vote, Mr. Speaker, to
submit this constitutional amendment to the States; but when I do so, I do not concede, nor does
the Democratic Party concede, that Congress has not now the power to impose such a tax." 44
CONG. REC. 4398 (1909). Representative Charles L. Bartlett (D-Ga.) expressed similar feelings,
declaring his intent to vote for the resolution "because in no other way am I permitted to show my
approval of this method of taxation." Id. at 4410.
473. For a state-by-state discussion of the ratification of the amendment, see BUENKER, supra
note 45, at 143-58. Of course, discerning intent from the ratification of an amendment is nearly
impossible in light of the many political entities involved. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Constitu-
tional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1, 11 (1992).
However, the rhetoric during the process is especially revealing of the key issues.
474. BENDER'S FEDERAL REVENUE LAW, supra note 85, at 358; RATNER, supra note 70, at
390; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 199. Although it did little to mitigate the hostile attitude toward
the tariff, the average ad valorem duty on dutiable goods went down to 42% from a high of 52%
under the Dingley Tariff Act of 1897. Id.
475. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 199 (citation omitted).
476. 44 CONG. REC. 4417 (1909).
477. ASHLEY, supra note 85, at 252-53.
478. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 147.
479. Id. at 148-49; Mowry, supra note 415, at 269. In an effort to purge the party of Insur-
gents and Progressives, Taft had campaigned against the more radical members of his party up for
re-election. Failing miserably, Taft assured himself of a sizeable group of enemies in the future.
See KEY, supra note 363, at 178; Mowry, supra note 415, at 267.
480. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 148-49; Mowry, supra note 415, at 271.
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out Taft and Roosevelt for the Presidency, but the Democrats also secured a
seventy-three seat edge in the House and a six seat margin in the Senate. '
"[M]ost analysts found the major cause of this political upheaval to be the
widespread desire of voters to 'punish the Republican Party' for its belief,
rational or irrational, that the high protective tariff was responsible for the
escalating cost of living and for the construction of trusts." 2 Perhaps in
light of this fact, almost one-half of Wilson's acceptance speech at the nomi-
nating convention "was devoted to an analysis of the protective tariff as a
breeder of special privileges and special favors." 3 Similarly, in one of
Taft's last messages to Congress after his defeat, he admitted that "a new
Congress has been elected on a platform of a tariff for revenue only rather
than a protective tariff." 4  Thus, as a reaction to the tariff, the election re-
turned to power individuals, whether Democrat, Republican, Insurgent, or
Progressive, who were willing to work toward removing some of the burden
on the poor and distributing it to the wealthy. John Buenker observed that
"[t]he nation's voters had rendered as clear a judgment as the vagaries of the
American political process permit against the party that they associated with
the high cost of living and with favoritism toward the organized and the afflu-
ent, conditions that a federal income tax was purportedly designed to counter-
act."" 5  Ratification, achieved when Delaware voted to accept the amend-
ment on February 3, 1913, signalled a commitment to change the Nation's
overall revenue policy, not just its use of the income tax. 6 Supporters
481. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 152; Mowry, supra note 415, at 292. Progressives and some
Insurgents, flush with their recent victories in state and federal elections, had attempted to win the
Republican nomination away from Taft with Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette as their choice
for nominee. Unsuccessful, they drafted Theodore Roosevelt as their candidate and formed the
Bull Moose Party. JOHN A. GABLE, THE BULL MOOSE YEARS: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE
PROGRESSIVE PARTY 12 (1978); WITE, supra note 79, at 76. After 1912, Progressives in major
offices included one governor, two senators, and 16 representatives. Mowry, supra note 415, at
293. Most significantly, however, was that Roosevelt outdistanced Taft for second, pulling in 88
electoral college votes to Taft's 11. GABLE, supra, at 131. Such impressive first-time performances
led the chair of the Progressive Party, Senator Joseph Dixon of Montana, to predict that the Re-
publicans had become a third party. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 153.
482. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 149; STANLEY, supra note 22, at 219. The Nation reported
that Maine's Republican congressmen who had voted for Payne-Aldrich were "savagely heckled
by the most direct and awkward questions" relating to the tariffs effect on prices. BUENKER,
supra note 45, at 149.
483. Mowry, supra note 415, at 290.
484. William H. Taft (Dec. 6, 1912), in 3 UNION MESSAGES, supra note 303, at 2515.
485. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 154. The historic connection between the tariff and the in-
come tax under the compensatory theory explains why the income tax itself was not a major issue,
yet the election helped to spur ratification. But see STANLEY, supra note 22, at 216 (suggesting
that the income tax's lack of publicity during the election proves the amendment's merely symbol-
ic function).
486. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 225. Philander C. Knox, Taft's Secretary of State, formally
certified the Sixteenth Amendment's adoption on February 25, 1913. RATNER, supra note 108, at
324; Roberts & Stratton, supra note 131, at 42-43. It is a bit of a red herring to imply that the
time it took to ratify the amendment is a meaningful gauge of support. See STANLEY, supra note
22, at 237. The four-year delay is as much due to the infrequent meetings of the legislatures as
anything else. Few legislatures were in session in 1909 after Congress passed its resolution for a
constitutional amendment. The most critical year was 1911, since all but four of the states' legisla-
tures had scheduled a session during that year. Emerging from that year lacking only eight states,
ratification was again delayed since few states were in session in 1912. Moreover, New Mexico
had only been recently admitted and some states, such as New York and Georgia, voted on the
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claimed that "the way is now open to relieve the overladen shoulders of the
poor and take the tax burdens off the necessaries of life." 7 The New York
Evening Post predicted that "the prospect of many millions of new revenue
should give the tariff-makers a much freer hand in so readjusting duties as to
produce the greatest possible benefit to the consumer." 8 Perhaps heeding
this advice, newly-elected President Wilson called for the twin reforms of
tariff reduction and an income tax during his inaugural address in March,
1913.' 9 Within a month, during an emergency session of Congress called to
enact Wilson's reforms, House Ways and Means Chair Oscar Underwood (D-
Ala.) introduced a tariff reform bill containing an income tax section providing
for explicitly graduated rates. Drafted by Cordell Hull of Tennessee, the pro-
posed income tax contained a "normal" rate of 1% on incomes between
$4,000 and $20,000, with "surcharges" of 1% on incomes between $20,000
and $50,000, 2% on incomes between $50,000 and $100,000, and 3% on
incomes greater than $100,000.' 9 Hull and Underwood originally had want-
ed to introduce a flat tax to ensure judicial approval, but pressure from other
Democrats, including future Vice-President John Nance Garner of Texas,
forced the Democratic leadership to incorporate the surcharges in the rates.49'
The ensuing debates indicate a battle between the dominant majority es-
pousing a proportionate overall tax burden under the compensatory theory, and
the small minority of Progressives and Insurgents advocating a progressive
overall tax burden under the redistributive rationale. A fundamental misunder-
standing of the context and underlying theories in these debates has led ob-
servers to suggest that the principle of progression had become accepted by
this point. Sidney Ratner, for example, concluded that "unlike debates in pre-
vious years, [the 1913 Act] involved no dispute concerning the desirability of
an income tax or even the principle of progression. The climate of public and
congressional opinion had changed remarkably since 1894 and 1909."
Blum and Kalven, perhaps relying upon Ratner, found a similar paucity of
issue more than once. See id. at 211 (table charting the chronology of ratification); BUENKER,
supra note 45, at 143-54; RATNER, supra note 108, at 306. Thus, the amendment was actually
ratified after two years of meaningful consideration by the states, a swift response by most mea-
sures.
487. STANLEY, supra note 22, at 226.
488. Id. (quoting 46 LITERARY DIGEST 325-36 (1913)).
489. PAUL, supra note 84, at 101; WITrE, supra note 79, at 76.
490. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 368; RATNER, supra note 108, at 326; WITTE, supra note
79, at 76-77. Today, the use of a "surtax" or "surcharge" in place of an explicit rate is often dis-
dained because it tends to hide the increase in payments. See Martin J. McMahon, Renewing Pro-
gressive Taxation, 60 TAx NoTES 109, 115 n.27 (1993). In 1913, however, the surcharge was
designed to ease the administrative burden involved in collecting income taxes "at the source," or
before money was paid to an individual. Although "stoppage at the source" prevented the problem
of self-assessment, and thus improved collections, it created its own difficulties since a company
had no way of determining a shareholder's rate bracket before making a dividend distribution.
Thus, only the "normal" tax was subject to stoppage at the source, while the surcharges were
collected under the traditional system of self-assessment. See WALTMAN, supra note 63, at 29.
491. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 361; PAUL, supra note 84, at 102; RATNER, supra note 108,
at 325; WrrrE, supra note 79, at 76. Adolph Sabath, a Chicago Democrat, had introduced a gradu-
ated income tax proposal on April 7th, 1913, which never emerged from Committee. 50 CONG.
REc. 87 (1913).
492. RATNER, supra note 108, at 327.
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conflict, stating, "Whatever the reasons, it seems that between 1894 and 1913
the deadline for sharp political debate over the progression principle had
somehow passed."'4 93 Ironically, these analyses of the debates have it exactly
backwards. Progressive income taxation in 1913 can only be understood in the
context of Congress's desire to compensate for a regressive tariff which was
perceived to have manifested itself in higher prices. It was not the principle of
progression which had become accepted by this point, but the principle of flat
or proportionate taxation.
The Democrats began the debates under a united front. With evidence of
the Republican party's disintegration all around them, Democrats hoped to
prevent factionalism from interfering with their first opportunity in two de-
cades to control both Congress and the Presidency. This was not an insubstan-
tial risk. In the Senate their margin was slim, allowing little room for cross-
over votes. Democrats had a significant majority in the House, but a large
number in their ranks were first-termers. Thus, the Democrats chose to iron
out all decisions regarding both the tariff and the income tax in a party caucus
in which each member pledged to support the party's decisions on the
floor.494 With the battle lines thus drawn, three positions emerged. Insurgents
and Progressives favored significantly graduated rates, often on explicitly
redistributive grounds. Regular Republicans, forced to concede that some form
of income tax would be adopted, but unwilling to connect it to the tariff, at-
tempted to push for lower exemptions and proportionate taxation so as to
prevent it from becoming "class legislation." Finally, Democrats favored a
moderately graduated income tax to compensate for the regressivity of con-
sumption taxes. Once free trade could be established, however, and consump-
tion taxes reduced to a bare minimum, the Democrats were in favor of flat or
proportionate income taxation.
Soon after the bill was introduced in the House, the Progressives revealed
their strategy. Ira C. Copley, a newspaper publisher from Illinois, and one of
19 Progressives in the House, proposed an amendment for steeply graduated
surcharges ranging from 1% on incomes between $10,000 and $15,000 to 68%
on incomes exceeding $1 million.495 Copley left little doubt that his underly-
493. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 33, at 12.
494. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 359; see RATNER, supra note 108, at 325, 328. Representa-
tive Rayburn applauded the unity of the Democrats:
This bill was submitted to the Democratic caucus, and there every Democrat had a
chance to have his say and to offer his amendment to the bill. We settled our party
differences in that caucus and have come into this House and before the country with a
united front, and this seems to pain our Republican brethren keenly, for they know that
every amendment that they offer will be met with a solid Democratic majority and sent
to the scrap heap, where it will justly repose.
50 CONG. REc. 1249 (1913) (Rep. Samuel T. Rayburn) (D-Tex.). Senator Williams observed:
This is the first tariff bill in the history of this country where the bill was submitted to a
full and free and fair discussion of every one of the dominant party in a free and fair
caucus, where every man could be heard and where they merely obeyed the will of the
party.
Id. at 3810 (statement of Sen. Williams).
495. 50 CONG. REc. 1246 (1913); RATNER, supra note 108, at 328 n.15.
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ing motivation was to reduce the wealth "that is a menace to the institutions of
this country":
I have introduced this amendment for several reasons, the principal
one being that I believe it to be the best way of equalizing the oppor-
tunities which society in this country offers to certain men in securing
more than their fair share of the benefits derived from the labors of
other men.496
Recognizing that his amendment would produce more revenue than the federal
government could possibly use, Copley suggested that it be returned to the
states "to be used by them in lightening the burdens of taxation of the
poor." 97 Others followed Copley's lead, albeit with somewhat less radical
proposals. Melville C. Kelly, a Pennsylvania Progressive, proposed to increase
the bill's top effective rate from 4% to 9% on incomes exceeding
$100,000." 98 Kansas Insurgent Victor Murdock and Washington Progressive
Jacob Falconer each offered the same amendment as Kelly, but with smaller
increases to 7% and 6% top effective rates respectively.4' Although these
proposals were markedly less drastic than Copley's, they were clearly cut from
the same cloth. As Representative Murdock explained in introducing his pro-
posal, "[T]he great problem remains .... [T]he very rich of this country suc-
ceed in doing one thing. They continue to grow richer."5" Representative
Falconer concurred, explaining that "a man can not legitimately spend
$100,000 a year." '' Each of those proposals, however, was rejected without
the taking of any roll-call votes.
The approach of the Standpatters was opposite that of the Progressives.
Rather than seeking to raise the top rate, the Standpatters moved to lower the
bottom rate. Since they did not concede that the tariff was a tax, Regular
Republicans viewed the income tax as the poor's only contribution to the
government. Thus, Frederick H. Gillett, a Republican lawyer from Massachu-
setts, proposed to amend the bill by lowering the exemption limit to $1,000 so
as to tax those with incomes between $1,000 and $4,000 at 1/2%.2 Accord-
ing to Gillett, an income tax would permit "the great mass of the people" to
"have a little feeling in their pockets as to whether the Government was eco-
nomical or extravagant.""5 3 Representative Foster, among several Democrats
"bitterly opposed" to Gillett's proposed amendment,5" immediately contested
this logic:
496. 50 CONG. REc. 1246 (1913).
497. Id.
498. Id. at 1251. Kelly was much less obvious than his Progressive colleague. He declared, "I
would not think of attempting to outlaw all the forces which make for inequality of wealth in this
nation." Id.
499. id. at 1252 (Rep. Victor Murdock) (Kan.); id. at 1257 (Rep. Jacob Falconer) (Wash.).
500. Id. at 1252.
501. Id. at 1257.
502. Id. at 1247; RATNER, supra note 108, at 328.
503. 50 CONG. REc. 1247 (1913).
504. Id. at 1249 (Rep. Hiram R. Fowler) (D-1ll.); see also id. at 1247 (Rayburn); id. at 1250
(Rep. Alexander M. Palmer) (D-Pa.).
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The man of family, whose income is small, has usually paid a con-
sumption tax in the way of a tariff, and has contributed his fair share
of taxes to the Government, and now, if his small income is again
taxed, it is more than he should be expected to bear at this time. 5
Representative Clyde H. Tavenner (D-Il1.), responding to the charge of "the
standpatters and protectionists" that the exemption is "class legislation," ar-
gued that "the present system of taxing the necessaries of life while permitting
wealth to go untaxed is class legislation of the grossest sort."5" Thus,
Gillett's proposed amendment was also defeated.
For Democrats, a graduated income tax above a certain amount, and tariff
reform on necessities, would together further their goal of proportionate taxa-
tion. Tavenner explained that
the income tax is part of the Democratic plan to reduce the ever-
increasing cost of living in this country. It means the carrying out of
the program promised in the pre-election campaign last fall, namely,
to take some of the tax off the necessaries of life, such as sugar,
woolens, cottons, beef, and lumber, and to make up for the loss of
revenue thus sustained by the Government by placing a tax upon
incomes. 7
Democrat Alexander M. Palmer of Pennsylvania succinctly stated that the rates
had to be graduated as long as the consumption tax was still regressive: "The
present consumption taxes bear most heavily upon the poor; it is right that the
income tax should bear most heavily upon the rich."50 8
Eventually, however, Democrats expected that the tariff tax would be
removed altogether. Representative William Murray, an Oklahoma Democrat,
predicted that "we are just entering upon a policy for the support of this Gov-
ernment which, in a very few years, will be the only method of taxation for
the support of the American Republic, and the days for protective-tariff favor-
itism will be over. [Applause on the Democratic side]." 5" At this time, Dem-
ocrats agreed, men would be taxed "in accordance with their ability to pay
instead of because of their necessity to eat and to wear clothing."50 Because
the system of property taxation was woefully inadequate to accomplish this
goal, an income tax was necessary, as "the fairest and cheapest of all taxes, in
order to secure to the largest extent equality of tax burdens, an adjustable
system of revenue, and in all respects a modernized fiscal system." '' Under
that system, everyone would pay in proportion to his or her respective in-
comes.
505. Id. at 1249.
506. Id. at 1253.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 1250; BUENKER, supra note 45, at 366.
509. 50 CONG. REC. 1252 (1913); see id. at 1248 (Rep. Samuel Raybum) (D-Tex.) ("[Wlhen
the time comes that money to defray the expenses of the Government can be raised from the
income tax and other legitimate sources of direct taxation, that the tariff should be entirely re-
moved and that free trade should come in its stead.").
510. Id. at 1254 (Rep. Clyde Tavenner) (D-Ill.).
511. Id. at 1253; BtENKER, supra note 45, at 369.
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In the Senate, Progressives and Insurgents again attempted to increase the
graduation of the rates so as to achieve truly progressive, rather than propor-
tional, taxation.5 2 William Borah of Idaho proposed to raise the top effective
rate to 4% on incomes over $100,000.1 3 Joseph Bristow of Kansas proposed
to graduate the rates 1% for each $10,000 increase in income to a maximum
effective rate of 11 %.54 Wisconsin's Robert La Follette, a Progressive Party
candidate for President in 1924, also proposed a top effective rate of 11%, but
suggested /2% steps from $10,000 to $40,000.5 ' Finally, Miles Poindexter of
Washington proposed to extend the graduation to 10% on incomes exceeding
$500,000, and 20% on incomes exceeding $1 million." 6 While each of these
proposals was rejected by nearly identical votes,5 7 the attempt to persuade
the other senators to accept a somewhat higher graduation was made with
greater effect than in the House. This effect did not seem to be premised,
however, on any concession toward adopting the goal of overall progression in
the tax system. Although several Progressives and Insurgents did argue for
explicit progression under rationales other than compensation, their arguments
were fiercely opposed. Senator Poindexter argued that great wealth must be
taxed at a high rate under both the benefit and sacrifice theories-that the
wealth was accumulated through "special privileges" and government benefits,
and that "luxuries should be taxed more heavily than necessities; that super-
fluity should bear a heavier portion of the burdens of the Government than
mere sufficiency." 5  Senator John D. Works, a California Insurgent, boldly
asserted that this great wealth had become "a positive burden to them rather
than a benefit," suggesting that more steeply graduated rates would be "doing
them a favor rather than an injury."5 9 Senator La Follette, pointing out that
most people accepted a graduated inheritance tax, asked, "instead of awaiting
the opportunity to reach after death that great accumulation of wealth which
the Senator has admitted is a menace, why not diminish it by a system of
taxation that is constitutional, legitimate and proper?""5 This latter argument
512. A few changes were made to the House bill by the Senate Finance Committee before
introducing it on the floor for consideration by the entire chamber. The exemption was reduced to
$3,000 for single persons while allowing $4,000 for married couples. The committee, after "coun-
trywide protest," also exempted mutual life insurance companies from taxation. See BUENKER,
supra note 45, at 370; RATNER, supra note 108, at 329.
513. 50 CONG. REC. 3771 (1913).
514. Id. at 3805.
515. Id. at 3819; see KEY, supra note 363, at 172 (Table 7.1).
516. 50 CONG. REC. 3835 (1913).
517. Borah's amendment was defeated 47-17. Id. at 3773. Bristow's was defeated 46-16. Id.
at 3818. La Follette's was defeated 43-17. Id. at 3830. Poindexter's was defeated 41-12. Id. at
3836.
518. Id. at 3835, 4613.
519. Id. at 3812.
520. Id. at 3821. La Follette conveniently ignores that this same distinction was made in his
own state of Wisconsin, which is credited as one of the models for the 1913 income tax provi-
sions. Joseph Ranney, in surveying the debate in Wisconsin over the two measures, noted that
[mlany supporters of property tax reform and of an income tax viewed their causes
primarily as a means of distributing the obligation to support the government fairly
among all classes of people. Supporters of the inheritance tax went a step further, and
explicitly promoted their tax as a means of redistributing wealth from the rich to the
remainder of the population.
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finally provoked a heated response from Senator John Sharp Williams of Mis-
sissippi, appointed by the caucus to be one of two Democratic defenders of the
income tax section in the Senate. 2
No honest man can make war upon great fortunes per se. The Demo-
cratic Party never has done it; and when the Democratic Party begins
to do it, it will cease to be the Democratic Party and become the
socialistic party of the United States; or, better expressed, the com-
munistic party, or quasi communistic party, of the United States ... I
am not going to attempt to make this tariff bill a great panacea for all
the inequalities of fortune existing in this country; nor would it do
any good if we did, because we would be doctoring the symptoms
and not the cause of the disease. 22
If there was any doubt as to Williams' rejection of the redistributive rationale,
he resolved them by declaring, "The object of taxation is not to leave men
with equal incomes after you have taxed them." '523
Progressives and Insurgents did make headway on their quest for steeper
graduation, however, when they expressed their sentiments in terms of the
compensatory theory. Senator La Follette, in introducing his proposed amend-
ment, commented on the experience of Wisconsin and its income tax law
enacted only two years earlier. He recounted the stories of individuals who
had sworn that their income from personal property such as investments was
no more than $5,000, when later investigation revealed incomes between
$300,000 and $1 million.524 Senator Borah remarked that this supported an
argument he had voiced earlier, namely that "in order to reach proportionately
the large incomes it is absolutely necessary that an almost exaggerated rate be
put upon them because they do escape taxation." '525 This was a justification
for graduated rates to which Williams had expressed his agreement:
Ranney, supra note 468, at 22. For a discussion of the possible causes for this distinction, see
supra note 20.
521. The other was William Hughes of New Jersey, the leader of a group opposed to manda-
tory adherence to measures emerging from the caucus. RATNER, supra note 108, at 330. Williams
was often thought of as a conservative Southern Democrat. See KOENIG, supra note 315, at 415
(grouping Williams with a number of southern Democrats who were against Bryan and in favor of
Wilson); RATNER, supra note 108, at 331. However, his credentials on the income tax were im-
pressive. According to Williams, he voted for the income tax in 1894 and introduced a joint reso-
lution proposing an amendment to the Constitution to permit an income tax during each of his
subsequent years in the House. 50 CONG. REc. 3821 (1913).
522. 50 CONG. REC. 3821 (1913). Williams issued a similar response to Senator Bristow's
proposed amendment: "The motive behind the amendment offered by the Senator from Kansas is
not revenue. It is a punitive, vindictive motive. It is to punish and take from those who have large
incomes, not because the Government needs the money, but because the Government has the
power to do it." Id. at 3806.
523. Id. at 3807.
524. Id. at 3820.
525. Id. The previous day, Borah had remarked:
[WIe ought to bear in mind that which is proven to be well founded in experience, and
that is that the man with a small income always pays more completely upon his income
than the man with a large income .... Therefore, if we are going to reach proportion-
ately the men with large incomes, it seems to me we must raise the grade of taxation
more than is here specified.
Id. at 3771.
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So this is a graded income tax, and it does attempt to equalize things
with a view to correcting what the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Borah]
referred to yesterday, and which is absolutely true-the greater oppor-
tunity of men of greater income, whose incomes are generally drawn
from bonds, stocks, bills receivable, and various things of that sort, to
hide their incomes, as compared with the ordinary man, whose
property is in a visible shape and form, and whose income is known
to all his neighbors.526
Williams explained:
During times of peace, you have a slight tax upon incomes, graduated
not with a view of punishing those who have large incomes, but with
a view of equalizing the taxes, because of the greater opportunities
that people of large incomes have to escape taxation than people of
small incomes have.52
Thus, La Follette pleaded with Democrats to "take this provision of the bill
and the amendment which I have offered back to their committee room and
give it consideration, to the end that these enormous incomes may be com-
pelled at last to pay the tax they have heretofore evaded.
' '5 28
La Follette's arguments did not fall upon deaf ears. The strength of the
Democratic caucus in the Senate had been weakened from the beginning when
six senators, led by William Hughes, announced they were opposed to being
bound to support the measure as drafted. 29 One of these upstarts, Senator
James K. Vardaman (D-Miss.), precipitated a mini-revolt by voting for La
Follette's proposed amendment. Three Democrats announced the next day that
they had withheld their votes on La Follette's amendment in the expectation
that the Finance Committee would agree to raise its rates." The Democratic
caucus reconvened and reached a compromise which added three brackets so
that the rates rose to 3% on incomes over $75,000, 4% on incomes over
$100,000, 5% on incomes over $250,000, and a top rate of 6% on incomes
over $500,000. 3 This was clearly not a victory for explicit progression,
however, as the rates were much lower than those advocated by the Progres-
sives and Insurgents, or even the radical Democrats. Furthermore, later propos-
als by Bristow, La Follette, and Poindexter to increase the rate of graduation
on redistributive grounds were soundly defeated.5"
526. Id. at 3807.
527. Id. at 3806.
528. Id. at 3821.
529. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 371; RATNER, supra note 108, at 330 n.24.
530. The three were Senators Eugene Reed of New Hampshire, William Thompson of Kansas,
and Henry Ashurst of Arizona. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 374; RATNER, supra note 108, at 332
n.3 1.
531. See CONG. REC. 4611 (1913) (Sen. Joseph Little Bristow) (R-N.Y.) (explaining the Sen-
ate Finance Committee's amendments to the bill); RATNER, supra note 108, at 332; WrrE, supra
note 79, at 78.
532. 50 CONG. REc. 4611 (1913) (Sen. Bristow); id. at 4612 (Sen. La Follette); id. at 4613
(Sen. Poindexter).
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Meanwhile, Regular Republicans proceeded much as they had in the
House. Although they believed that a protective tariff created rather than re-
duced income, they conceded defeat on this point.533 On the question of the
income tax, they clearly "prefer[red] that all pay proportionately and that no
class be introduced."5"4 Absent that, they sought a lower exemption because
of the "danger to the Republic" '535 when Government is only supported by a
few. Michigan Senator Charles E. Townsend pleaded, "Increase the rate if you
wish on the larger incomes, but make the class of men who pay the tax as
large as you can."536 He proposed to lower the effective rate to /% on all
incomes regardless of how small.537 Porter McCumber of North Dakota and
Elihu Root of New York both proposed to lower the exemption to $1,000,
McCumber starting at the minuscule rate of one-tenth of 1%.538 In all cases,
however, these proposals were rejected. As Senator Borah explained, "So long
as we have the mixed system of indirect taxation and the direct tax," we need
not be concerned about those below the exemption not paying their fair
share.
539
Ultimately, the view which prevailed supported the overall goal of flat or
proportionate income taxation. This understanding is best illustrated by an
exchange between Regular Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, Progressive Wil-
liam Borah, and Democrat John Sharp Williams. Lodge argued that a high
exemption was "vicious in principle" since it meant that not everyone paid his
share of taxes.5"° Thus, Lodge argued, "I would not set a class apart and say
they are to be pillaged, their property is to be confiscated."54' Borah, using
quotations from Seligman's The Income Tax to bolster his point, argued that
"so long as we raise seven-eighths of our revenue by another method and only
one-eighth by direct taxation, it can not be said that any man is escaping taxa-
tion." '542 Thus, Borah concluded, "When we shall adopt a system of direct
taxation, exclusively and alone, I will join the Senator from Massachusetts in
putting the exemptions down to a very low figure." '543 Williams then entered
the fray to resolve what he termed "a purely academical discussion." 5" He
explained in no uncertain terms that when the country no longer relied upon
consumption taxes for its revenue, the government would embark upon flat or
proportional income taxation with no exemption at all:
There may be great merit in the argument of the Senator from Massa-
chusetts some of these days, but not now. The reason why there is
not great merit in it now is because while it taxes these people with
533. Id at 3811 (Sen. Townsend) (R-Mich.).
534. Id. at 3801 (Sen. Lawrence Y. Sherman) (R-111.); see id. at 3810 (Sen. Townsend); id. at
3834 (Sen. Porter McCumber) (R-N.D.).
535. Id. at 3810 (Sen. Townsend).
536. Id. at 3811.
537. Id. at 4067.
538. Id. at 3834 (Sen. Porter McCumber) (R-N.D.); id. at 4067-68 (Sen. Elihu Root) (R-N.Y.).
539. Id. at 3835.
540. Id. at 3839.
541. Id. at 3840.
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indirect taxes of various sorts these things should be left for some
day, when the good day comes-the golden day-when there will be
no taxes upon consumption at all except upon whisky and tobacco
and wine and beer and things that are considered harmful, and no
import duties at all except countervailing duties to offset them, and
when everybody will pay in proportion to his income.545
Lest anyone misunderstand what he meant by that final phrase, Williams
offered an example of the relative tax burdens under a proportionate income
tax of 1%:
It might then be well to reduce the exemption or to do away with it,
so that a man with $5,000 would pay his $50, or whatever it was, and
the man with $500 would pay his $5, and the man with $50 would
pay his 5 cents, and the man who got but 5 cents would pay his 1
cent, and call it the people's pence, like Peter's pence, and let every-
body pay his share."
Thus, when Democrats used the term "ability to pay," they were not referring
to an equality of sacrifice sometimes used to justify steeply graduated rates.
Instead, they were discussing the expected transition from a system where
consumption taxes accounted for all the revenues to one where taxes rose
proportionately, not progressively, according to income."
When the Underwood/Simmons Tariff Act went into effect on October 3,
1913, the Democrats were true to their word in pushing for gradual but signifi-
cant reductions in the customs duties. Average rates were reduced from 40%
to 28% with ad valorem rates lowered from 18.5% to 9.7%.5" Similarly, the
income tax compensated for the consumption taxes which remained, but did
not attempt to change the distribution of wealth. As John Buenker concluded,
"the original income tax was designed to promote tax equity and to produce
additional revenues to allow for tariff reduction, not to redistribute wealth or
income."" Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court, in Brushaber v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co.,55 upheld the tax without being asked to decide
whether a redistributive tax scheme was constitutional.55" '
545. Id. As Williams had previously explained to Borah, the Democrats had not already done
this because "you can not all at once remove all taxes upon consumption" where a "false and
artificial fiscal system exists." Id. at 3808.
546. Id. Although the lowest figure in Williams's example amounts to a 20% rate, his refer-
ence to a "Peter's pence" indicates an intention to refer to the smallest monetary denomination
feasible under that income. The phrase, derived from the notion of giving to the Church, is de-
signed to indicate that each person should contribute what he or she is able.
547. Id. at 3772 (Sen. Williams) ("The time may come, and I hope will come some day, when
all taxes for the Government will be raised by taxing the citizens in proportion to their ability to
pay.").
548. BENDER'S FEDERAL REVENUE LAW, supra note 85, at 397.
549. BUENKER, supra note 45, at 396-97.
550. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
551. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24-25. The Court merely decided, based on the country's prior
experience with progressive income and inheritance tax rates, that it did not "transcend the con-
ception of all taxation" so as "to be a mere arbitrary abuse of power which must be treated as
wanting in due process." Id. at 25. At least one commentator criticized the decision. See Frank W.
Hackett, The Constitutionality of the Graduated Income Tax Law, 25 YALE L.J. 427 (1916).
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Although the 1913 Act instituted only mildly progressive income tax rates,
it was still a significantly "progressive" reform. It was a step toward remedy-
ing an imbalance in taxation which had favored the wealthy. The period be-
tween the Civil War and the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment was
highlighted by a change in the form of wealth from real property, such as land
and buildings, to intangible wealth, such as stocks and bonds. Combined with
the advent of protectionism as a national policy, the poor began to view them-
selves as increasingly burdened by taxation while the growing fortunes of the
rich largely escaped the supposedly compensatory measure of property taxa-
tion. This inequity sparked pro-income tax movements during periods of eco-
nomic crisis. The resort to an income tax, however, was not designed to ad-
dress the concentration of wealth itself, or even to protect the nation from
instability in protest against the concentration of wealth. Instead, the income
tax, with its progressive features, was adopted "to redress the inequity of taxa-
tion which was the predominant feature of the American fiscal system as a
whole." '52 Thus, the history of income taxation in this country before and
immediately after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment describes an
essentially successful transformation from a regressive consumption tax-based
system to a proportional or flat tax-based system.
IV. TRANSLATING 1913 INTO TODAY'S DEBATE
An understanding that the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified against the
backdrop of a half-century's push toward proportionate taxation is extremely
instructive for modem efforts to reform the tax system. In one sense, it under-
mines the notion that there is authority under the Sixteenth Amendment for an
explicitly redistributive tax system, and leads to the question of why "progres-
sion today is immune from constitutional attack."5"3 In a broader and more
practical sense, however, the history is instructive for the lessons it provides.
The current debate has directed little attention toward the overall tax burden in
American society. 54 It may be that, unwittingly, we have remained faithful
Hackett relied to some extent, however, upon In re Cope's Estate, 43 A. 79 (Pa. 1899), a state
inheritance tax case. It is not difficult to understand how the Court concluded that the progression
was not completely arbitrary given Congress's compensatory rationale. On the other hand, it might
have been a closer call if Congress had adopted Representative Copley's proposed 68% top rate
based upon an explicitly redistributive rationale.
552. SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 676.
553. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 33, at 10. Blum and Kalven's statement is as true now as
it was when written in 1952. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MI-
AMI L. REV. 21, 23 (1986) (reviewing Richard Epstein's Takings and suggesting that the Sixteenth
Amendment "prevents a responsible court from demanding that Congress not increase the levels of
progressivity in future years"); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 281 n.10 (1986)
(reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985)) (contending that the Sixteenth Amendment sanctioned progressivity in the tax
system).
554. The attention directed toward the effects of other taxes in the system has come only
recently and from relatively obscure sources. See Mark Adkins, Letter to the Editor, Superrich Al-
ready Enjoy Comprehensive Federal Flat Tax, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Aug. 4, 1995, at B8; Norman J.
Omstein, Congress Inside Out Taxing Thoughts on Reform: It's Not Just About Income, ROLL
CALL, Aug. 7, 1995, available on LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS file. Few politicians have
recognized this aspect of the debate.
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to the original understanding of an equitable overall tax system based on flat
or proportional rates. It also may be, however, that current proposals' empha-
sis on taxation of consumption, rather than savings and investment income, is
a recipe for a repeat of the conditions leading up to the adoption of the Six-
teenth Amendment. This is surely avoidable, but it has not received the focus
it deserves to this point. Ultimately, no matter how consistent the theory of a
flat tax is with our early history of taxation, the current debate should not be
divorced from the considerations underlying that early history of taxation,
including the existence of multiple points of taxation and sources of wealth.
In 1913, customs duties supplied 47% of federal tax revenues, excise
taxes supplied 46%, and income taxes provided only 2%."' Thus, consump-
tion taxes accounted for over 90% of total federal revenues. Currently, less
than 5% of federal revenues come from excise taxes, and revenue from cus-
toms duties is minuscule.556 While there have been some recent efforts by
both Bush and Clinton to tap into these sources, their overall effect has been
negligible.557 Even when state and local taxes are included in the mix, con-
sumption taxes still account for only 17% of all government revenues.558
This does not mean, however, that income taxes are the only form of taxation
which need concern us.
Federal revenue sources in addition to the income tax, excise tax, and
customs duties include the corporate income tax, estate and gift taxes, "mis-
cellaneous receipts," and the all-important payroll taxes for social security and
medicare.55 9 First established in 1935 as part of the Social Security Act, pay-
roll taxes now account for an increasing percentage of an individual's income
and have been politically insulated from attack. The social security tax rate of
3% in 1950 has increased over five-fold to the 15.3% rate we have today."W
Since payroll taxes are assuredly not progressive, they can alter the overall
character of the federal revenue system.56" ' The generous exemptions pro-
posed by many flat tax plans appear to provide a means of compensating for
this regression, but, as yet, no one has attempted to explicitly justify the exis-
tence or size of the exemptions on these grounds.
Thus, if our concern is fairness, any attempt to achieve flat or proportion-
ate taxation must take into account these other revenue sources.562 Over the
555. RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 516, 518.
556. Hearings, supra note 38 (statement of Michael I. Graetz, Professor of Law, Yale Univer-
sity). In 1976, around 6% of federal revenues came from excise taxes and less than 1% came from
customs duties. RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 516.
557. See John Lee, "Death and Taxes" and Hypocrisy, 60 TAx NOTEs 1393, 1399 (1993).
558. Hearings, supra note 38.
559. Scott Bums, U.S. System Taxes Our Patience, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 9, 1995, at
12H.
560. Gene Steuerle, Can Flat Taxes Be Progressive?, 68 TAx NOTES 887 (1995).
561. RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 517; Gene Steuerle, Postwar Changes in the Overall
Tax System, 54 TAx NOTES 1163, 1164 (1992) [hereinafter Steuerle, Postwar Changes]; Gene
Steuerle, The Debate over Tax Progressivity, 47 TAX NOTES 865, 866 (1990); see also Bums,
supra note 559, at 12H. Payroll taxes take 15.3% of an individual's wages. Id.
562. 1 qualify this statement because there are certainly economic reasons why income taxes
may be more worrisome than other taxes due to their visibility, influence on economic decisions,
and other factors.
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years, several studies have concluded that our overall tax system, including all
government revenues, is proportionate. Blum and Kalven cite a 1948 study
which found that the overall tax system was proportionate, with only a mild
element of progression at the upper end.563 More recent studies have come to
similar conclusions."6 These studies suggest that the progression in our in-
come taxes compensates for regression elsewhere, just as it did in 1913. Social
security taxes are certainly one possible target of compensation, since they are
considered "ultra-regressive" given their proportional levy up to a $61,200
ceiling of income.56
We should not be quick, though, to write off tax reform based on esti-
mates of the current distribution of tax burdens. The estimates' usefulness
depends upon our assumptions regarding the direction of a particular tax bur-
den, and our understanding of the appropriate tax universe against which to
measure an income tax's effects. Payroll taxes, for instance, ostensibly fund
progressive redistributive programs. Perhaps these taxes should be subtracted
from the mix altogether in calculating the overall tax burden."6 Furthermore,
state sales taxes, which have traditionally been thought to inject a significant
degree of regressivity into the overall system, 67 have recently been to be
looked at more favorably. General sales taxes often exempt consumption
goods and thus have a more progressive effect, according to some studies."6
It may also be useful to consider state and local taxes separately. State and
local governments used to rely almost exclusively on property taxation and
each unit of government-federal, state, or local-was seen as occupying its
own sphere of taxation. It was often said that the federal government agreed to
apportion its direct taxation as part of its deal with the states to acquire exclu-
sive rights for control of customs duties, a major source of indirect taxa-
tion." In such a compartmentalized tax universe, it was appropriate to con-
sider all units of government together in determining the overall tax burden.
Today, however, most states have adopted some form of income tax, and it
may be valuable to consider whether each governmental unit should be evalu-
ated separately in determining the proper distribution of tax burdens.57 Thus,
563. BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 33, at 5 n.1 I (citing R.A. Musgrave et al., Distribution of
Tax Payments by Income Groups: A Case Study for 1948, 4 NAT'L TAx J. 1, 28 (1951)). Another
study cited by Blum and Kalven, however, found that the tax system was "highly progressive"
during the same year. Id. at 5 n.12 (citing Rufus S. Tucker, Distribution of Tax Burdens in 1948,
4 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 283 (1951)).
564. DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 139-41 (1986) (citing a study by
Joseph Pechman); see Allen D. Manvel, The Pre-Reform Pattern of Tax Burdens for U.S. Fami-
lies, 35 TAx NOTES 805, 807 (1987).
565. BRADFORD, supra note 564, at 141; Jacob Weisberg, Flat-Tax Fever, N.Y. MAG., May 1,
1995, at 22.
566. Andrew J. Hoerner, Economists Examine Whether Progressivity Has Regressed, 56 TAX
NOTES 1520 (1992); Steurele, supra note 560, at 888 ("Even a tax with declining rates-for in-
stance, the U.S. social security tax that eventually imposes a zero rate on earnings above a maxi-
mum tax base-can be progressives if on net there is redistribution to lower-income individuals.").
567. See e.g., Manvel, supra note 564, at 807.
568. Hoerner, supra note 566, at 1522.
569. See, e.g., 26 CONG. REC. 6694 (1894) (Sen. Sherman).
570. PENNIMAN, supra note 375, at 8-9; RATNER ET AL., supra note 70, at 517; Steuerle,
Postwar Changes, supra note 561, at 1164. Dan R. Bucks, executive director of the Multistate
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more study is required on the overall distribution of tax burdens in our tax
system. We may have a proportionate system by accident rather than design.
An explicit recognition of this goal might allow us to pursue more efficient
methods of achieving it.
Even if a flat or proportionate income tax should be a part of the overall
mix of revenue sources, its viability still depends upon what is taxed. Most of
the recent proposals, which are essentially variants on the "consumption" tax
theme, exempt savings and investment income entirely.57" ' Some suggest that
such a tax system rewards the rich over the poor and thus "fail[s] the 'sniff
test' of fairness for those who do not receive that sort of income. '  As dis-
cussed earlier, the exemption of the rich through the nontaxation of investment
income was a significant impetus to reform in both 1894 and 1913. Wealthy
individuals were able to live off their investments and contribute almost noth-
ing toward the expense of the government. It is little wonder that opponents of
the current tax reform plans are conjuring up images of the Gilded Age in an
attempt to demonstrate the plans' favoritism toward the rich. One commentator
warns that the status quo's complexity is "a reasonable cost to retrieve the
financial destiny of the nation from the voracious greed of the robber barons.
Since Teddy Roosevelt, those policies have generally produced unparalleled
economic vitality and a more equitable distribution of that prosperity for the
American people." '73 Richard Gephardt argues that his five-rate income tax
Tax Commission, warned that state income tax systems are so dependent upon the national in-
come tax that efforts to abolish or abandon the national tax would require similar action at the
state level. MTC Urges Congress to Consider Impact of Tax Reform on States, DAILY REPORT
FOR ExEcunrvEs, July 31, 1995, at G146. Thus, it may be impossible to separate state and federal
tax systems in considering the overall distribution of tax burdens under present and future plans.
571. Susan Dentzer, Trial Balloons on Tax Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 31,
1995, at 43. Michael Graetz pointed out in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance
that although flat tax proposals characterize themselves as "income" taxes, they are generally
"wage" taxes which only tax the amount people consume and not the amount they save. Hearings,
supra note 38.
The exemption for investment and savings income is designed to bolster the U.S.'s anemic
savings rate. While "economists disagree as to whether in fact an income tax does discourage
saving," and "a consumption-based tax would not necessarily eliminate all distortions in favor of
consumption," politicians have latched on to tax reform as a solution to the perceived problem.
JOINT COMMITEE ON TAXATION, supra note 1, at 5.
572. John Godfrey, Flat Tax Backers Stress Simplicity, but Devil Remains in the Details, 67
TAX NOTES 167, 168 (1995) (quoting University of Michigan economist Joel Slemrod). Some of
the more vocal opponents to the flat tax have highlighted this problem in writing to area newspa-
pers. See S.E. Clarke, Exploding Myths of Flat-Tax Proposals, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1995, at D6;
Austin M. Wright, Flat Tax Proposal Another Giveaway to the Wealthy, CIN. ENQUIRER, Aug. 7,
1995, at Al 1; see also Tony Barga, Flat Tax Sets Up the Middle Class, CIN. ENQUIRER, July 26,
1995, at A9 (arguing that if double taxation of investment income is a problem, the solution is to
eliminate taxation at the corporate level and make sure "we tax all income when it reaches the
pocket of a human being").
Even graduated consumption tax proposals such as the Domenici-Nunn USA tax do not
solve this real or perceived inequity. Joseph lsenbergh explains that, no matter how steeply gradu-
ated the rates, a graduated tax on consumed incomes would never reach the unconsumed income.
Since we value wealth even before it is consumed, this creates the appearance that the wealthy are
evading taxes altogether, especially, as Isenbergh graphically illustrates, "when the wealth takes
the form of ancestral manors and old master paintings that produce a stream of imputed income."
Joseph lsenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAX L. REV. 283, 349, 354 (1990).
573. Tommy Denton, Let's Be Fair, BALTIMORE SUN, July 19, 1995, at 15A.
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proposal "is an effort to defend working families and the middle class against
the greatest, most regressive redistribution of income since the days of the
Robber Barons-the Armey 17 percent flat tax.""'  Several commentators
predict that the exemption of investment income from taxation will be the
political undoing of the various proposals.575 The potential rejection of this
provision of current proposals, however, does not mean that the concept of a
flat income tax is impossible. A "pure, unamended" flat tax applies to all
income, including investment income.576 Moreover, some observers recom-
mend combining a value-added tax with a broad-based income tax to encour-
age savings and investment while maintaining the kind of vertical equity that a
flat or proportionate tax system is geared to provide. 77 Coupling a consump-
tion tax with healthy rebates for lower-income individuals could also conceiv-
ably preserve an exemption for investment income.
Moving toward a goal of flat or proportionate taxation in our revenue
system should not be confused with rejecting the notion of progressivity itself.
Robert Eisner proposes a tax system which would include investment income
and expand credits and subsidies for earned income, health care, education,
research, and owner-occupied housing, resulting in what he calls "a really
progressive 'flat tax."'578 Others, perhaps more genuinely concerned with the
reputed gains in efficiency from radical reform, advocate a flat tax with pro-
gressive credits for lower-income individuals.579 The point is that the tax sys-
tem should have little to do with the welfare system or the safety net enacted
during the New Deal. Taxes should redistribute money from the private sector
574. Letter to the Editor, The Rich Should Pay Plenty, WASH. POST, July 22, 1995, at A20
(responding to James Glassman, The Rich Already Pay Plenty, WASH. POST, July 11, 1995, at
A17).
575. See Robert Kuttner, Dueling Tax Plans: One Adds Up, the Other Doesn't, Bus. WK.,
May 15, 1995, at 28; What Should Be Taxed Will Be the Key Issue, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1995, at
Al. The public's disgruntlement with the evasion of taxes by the wealthy was not limited to the
turn of the century. Michael Graetz testified that he "remember[ed] well the outrage generated in
1969 by Treasury Secretary Joe Barr's revelation that 154 people that year had more than
$200,000 in adjusted gross income and paid no taxes, the beating taken by Mrs. Dodge, in particu-
lar, who had $1 million of tax-exempt interest and no tax liability." Graetz also recalled "the ex-
pressions of outrage generated in 1986 when the laborers on General Electric's assembly line paid
more taxes than the company." Hearings, supra note 38.
576. Editorial, Reformers Really Want a Flat Tax with Wrinkles, PALM BEACH POST, July 15,
1995, at 14A; Howard Gleckrnan, Tax Reform Is Coming, Sure. But What Kind?, Bus. WK., June
12, 1995, at 84.
577. Supporters of this idea include Yale Law professor Michael Graetz, former Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady, and former Senators Danforth and Boren. See Hearings, supra note 38;
Edward J. McCaffrey, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEx. L. REV.
1145, 1148 (1992). Isenbergh advocates a similar approach designed to achieve progressivity, but
his approach is easily modified to approximate proportionate taxation and his commitment to
progressive rates is merely a concession to the political popularity of the concept. Isenbergh, supra
note 572, at 350. Ironically, this solution essentially replicates the hybrid consumption-income tax
system instituted in 1913.
Vertical equity represents the notion that taxpayers with larger amounts of income should
contribute larger amounts of tax. Jay M. Howard, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 43 (1992). These amounts
could be proportionately or progressively larger depending upon the goals of the overall tax sys-
tem.
.578. Robert Eisner, Make Taxes Fair, Not Flat, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1995, at A20.
579. See Bankman and Griffith, supra note 34, at 1966; Howard J. Gensler, The Secret His-
tory of the U.S. Flat Tax, 56 TAx NOTES 1657 (1992).
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to the public sector, "the government can then spend the money as progres-
sively as it wants." ' As Charles Galvin points out, many "institutional ar-
rangements" in our society redistribute wealth much more effectively than the
tax system."8 '
CONCLUSION
John Sharp Williams declared in 1913 that advocates of a tax system
geared toward progression and redistribution "are always considering some-
thing in a tax besides the tax; something in a tax besides the revenue.
'5 82
This observation still holds true today. The current system is encrusted with
the conflicting social goals of generations of policymakers. Moreover, the total
tax burden has been affected in ways which may be contrary to the announced
intentions of Congressional enactments. Proponents of radical tax reform
should now strive to ensure, as their intellectual forefathers did from the Civil
War through the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, that the tax system
does not introduce its own inequities into the system while raising sufficient
revenue to operate the government. That goal is difficult enough.
580. Should America Keep Its "Progressive" Tax System?, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, July 24,
1995, at B I (quoting economist Arthur Laffer).
581. Charles 0. Galvin, Would Haig-Simons Plus a Flat Tax Be the Best U.S. Tax System?,
60 TAX NOTES 540 (1993).
582. 50 CONG. REC. 3821 (1913).
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REDRAFTING U.C.C. SECTION 2-207:
AN ECONOMIC PRESCRIPTION FOR THE
BATTLE OF THE FORMS
DANIEL T. OSTAS*
FRANK P. DARRt
Perhaps more criticism has been leveled against section 2-207 than any
other provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. The section addresses
contract scenarios in which commercial parties have failed to bargain effec-
tively. In the typical case, both the offeror and offeree used standardized forms
to memorialize their agreement, yet neither read the other's form. When con-
tractual problems materialize, the parties discover that the terms on the two
forms conflict. Section 2-207 attempts to answer three questions. First, does
the exchange of conflicting forms constitute a binding contract? Second, if a
binding contract exists, what are its enforceable terms? Third, if the exchange
of forms does not establish a contract, but the parties nonetheless perform,
what are the terms of the contract established by conduct? Unfortunately,
judicial interpretations of section 2-207 vary widely, making the answers to
these questions far from clear.2
* Assistant Professor, University of Maryland.
t Associate Professor, Ohio State University.
1. For a representative sampling of the literature, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg,
Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of Section 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV.
1217 (1982); John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the 'Battle of the Forms': Solutions, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 1307 (1986) [hereinafter Murray Chaosl; Gregory M. Travalio, Clearing the Air After the
Battle: Reconciling Fairness and Efficiency in a Formal Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-207, 33
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 327 (1983). The Business Lawyer devoted a recent symposium issue to the
current efforts to redraft § 2-207. Contributions include: Henry D. Gabriel, The Battle of the
Forms: A Comparison of the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods, the
Common Law, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 Bus. LAW. 1053 (1994); Daniel A. Levin
& Ellen B. Rubert, Beyond U.C.C. Section 2-207: Should Professor Murray's Proposed Revision
Be Adopted?, 11 J.L. & COM. 175 (1992); Thomas J. McCarthy, An Introduction: The Commer-
cial Irrelevancy of the 'Battle of the Forms', 49 Bus. LAW. 1019 (1994); Mark E. Roszkowski &
John D. Wladis, Revised U.C.C. Section 2-207: Analysis and Recommendations, 49 Bus. LAW.
1065 (1994); John D. Wladis, U.C.C. Section 2-207: The Drafting History, 49 Bus. LAW. 1029
(1994).
For a useful appendix summarizing all known proposals for redrafting § 2-207, see Mark
E. Roszkowski, Ending the Battle of the Forms: A Proposed Revision of U.C.C. Section 2-207, 26
UCC L.J. 144, 164-71 (1993). Articles cited in Professor Roszkowski's appendix include: John E.
Murray, A Proposed Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 J.L. & COM.
337 (1986); Corneill A. Stephens, On Ending the Battle of the Forms: Problems with Solutions,
80 KY. L.J. 815 (1992) [sic]; and Charles M. Thatcher, Sales Contract Formation and Con-
tent-An Annotated Apology for a Proposed Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207,
32 S.D. L. REV. 181 (1987).
2. Professors White and Summers devote 21 pages of their treatise to problems generated
by § 2-207. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 28-49 (3d
ed. 1988). Their review of applicable case law reveals a variety of inconsistent interpretations and
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Current efforts to redraft Article 2 include reforms to section 2-207.3 This
article addresses the redrafting effort. It begins with a brief review of the
problems associated with the battle of the forms. Next, it identifies and applies
three central tenets associated with the economic analysis of the law: respect
for individual autonomy, reduction of transaction costs, and provision of legal
stability. Armed with these economic insights, the article next turns to the pro-
posed section 2-207, and suggests ways to improve the final product. The
article emphasizes the need to uphold the clear intent of the parties, but when
that intent is not clear, the courts should draw upon the Article 2 gap-filling
provisions, including the customary business practices that the parties are
presumed to understand. The article concludes with proposed language for a
new section- 2-207.
I. THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS: CURRENT STATUTORY TREATMENT
A. The Mirror Image Rule
The common law of contracts took shape in the simpler days of the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.4 The formation rules in particular
were based on quaint notions of agreement. For example, if two farmers dick-
ered over the sale of a horse, the principals negotiated the terms of the con-
tract face to face. The buyer checked the horse's teeth, inquired into its lin-
eage, and haggled over the sales price. If the seller and buyer reached a meet-
ing of the minds, a contract was formed. If the offer and the acceptance con-
flicted, however, there was no agreement. Under the rubric of the "mirror
image rule,"5 the common law demanded strict evidence of contractual
agreement before imposing a binding transfer on the parties.6
Much of modem contract law involves a strikingly different social setting.
Industrialization, mass marketing, and the creation of large and sometimes
market-dominating firms led to the prevalence of standardized forms.7 Today,
the typical commercial sales agreement involves corporate agents exchanging
forms, complete with unread and unexamined boilerplate.' The purchasing
problems associated with the section. Id.
3. A Drafting Committee was created by the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code, with the approval of the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute. The Drafting Committee began work in 1991 and has
produced a series of draft revisions. The most current official draft of § 2-207 is dated December
20, 1994. See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
4. Professor Horwitz observes that "the entire conceptual apparatus of modem contract
doctrine-rules dealing with offer and acceptance, the evidentiary function of consideration, and
especially canons of interpretation" were firmly in place by the early nineteenth century. MORTON
J. HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 160-61 (1977).
5. Under the "mirror image rule," a reply that purports to be an acceptance but that varies
the offer's terms is not an acceptance, but a counteroffer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 58, 59 rep.'s note regarding cmt. a; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 29.
6. Professors Baird and Weisberg argue that the mirror image rule was seldom applied so
rigidly as to allow parties to welsh. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 1, at 1233-36.
7. Professor Slawson estimates standard forms are used in up to 99% of all contracts. W.
David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971).
8. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
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agent fills in a few blanks on her purchase order, then signs and mails the
document. The sales agent notes the quantity, price, and subject matter reflect-
ed on the order form and responds with a confirming memo, invoice, or other
acknowledgment form reflecting these central terms. The problem, of course,
is that the boilerplate on the purchase order may conflict with that found on
the acknowledgment. The respective corporate agents nonetheless assume that
the uninspected forms constitute a contract, staple the two forms together, and
toss them in a filing cabinet. The forms are removed and inspected only if a
conflict arises.
Under the mirror image rule, the exchange of conflicting forms does not
establish a contract. Prior to performance, either party is free to back out of
the deal.9 If the parties nonetheless perform, that is, if the goods are shipped
and received, then the conduct of the parties forms a contract.'" The purport-
ed "acceptance" form is interpreted as a counteroffer which the buyer accepts
by his or her actions."
The mirror image rule can be criticized on two fronts. First, by refusing to
recognize a contract upon the exchange of forms, the law provides a perverse
incentive for parties to "welsh" on bona fide agreements.'2 Both agents ini-
tially assume that the exchange of forms creates a contract. If market condi-
tions change, and one party decides to renege on the agreement, that party can
assert the mirror image rule and refuse to follow through with the deal. Sec-
ond, the mirror image rule gives an unwarranted preference to the terms con-
tained in the acceptance/counteroffer.' 3 Since taking delivery is interpreted as
"accepting" the unread terms of the seller's acknowledgment, the acknowledg-
ment controls, and the purchase order becomes irrelevant. Though the drafters
of section 2-207 sought to correct these shortcomings, 4 the results have been
less than stellar.
AM. Soc. REV. 55, 56-58 (1963); see also Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice
and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1 (surveying current contract practices and practitioners' opinions
on elimination of the legal sanctions for breach, the role of the law in practitioners' behavior, and
the proper treatment of frustration).
9. See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915) (buyer took
advantage of the mirror image rule when market price fell); Cram v. Long, 142 N.W. 267 (Wis.
1913) (mirror image rule provided an excuse even though differences in offer and reply were
relatively minor).
10. See JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 113 (1974).
11. Id.
12. Professors White and Summers note that the primary purpose of § 2-207 was to change
the mirror image rule so as to hold the bad faith welsher to the deal. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 2, at 28-29.
13. This is commonly referred to as the "last shot" rule. The party who sends the last form
has an advantage. See JAMES BROOK, SALES AND LEASES: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 56
(1994).
14. For a thorough discussion of the drafting history of § 2-207, see Wladis, supra note 1;
see also Murray Chaos, supra note 1, at 1311-22 (discussing § 2-207 in light of the overall pur-
poses of U.C.C. Article 2).
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B. Finding a Contract on the Exchange of Forms: Section 2-207(1)
Section 2-207(1) provides that an executory contract can indeed be formed
on the exchange of conflicting forms. It states:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written con-
firmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an accep-
tance even though it states terms additional to or different from those
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made condi-
tional on assent to the additional or different terms. 5
The subsection explicitly addresses the welsher problem. Once the parties have
exchanged forms that purport to establish an agreement, a contract is formed,
and neither party may renege. This is true even if the acceptance contains
additional or different terms.
The subsection works in concert with sections 2-204 and 2-206. Section
2-204 provides that a contract "may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement.' 6 Section 2-206 states that an offer "shall be construed as invit-
ing acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circum-
stances."'" When section 2-207 is read with sections 2-204 and 2-206, an ex-
change of conflicting boilerplate suffices to show agreement (Section 2-204),
and a conflicting acknowledgment can be a reasonable means of accepting an
offer (Section 2-206). These three agreement provisions follow the basic
themes of Article 2: emphasis on the factual bargains of the parties, good
faith, and the relevance of general commercial understandings. 8
The difficulty with section 2-207(1) lies in distinguishing a "definite ex-
pression of acceptance" from an "expressly conditional acceptance."' 9 The
subsection provides that an "expression of acceptance" serves as an "accep-
tance" even if it contains "different" or "additional" terms, unless the respond-
ing party makes its expression of acceptance "expressly conditional."2 But
what does it mean to make an acceptance expressly conditional? Will a suffi-
ciently large discrepancy between offer and acceptance suffice? What if the
expressly conditional language is lost in a tangle of fine print? Must the
15. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (West 1994).
16. Section 2-204 provides:
(1) A contract for the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a
contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for the sale may be found even
though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
U.C.C. § 2-204 (West 1994).
17. Section 2-206 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any
manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances ....
U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(a) (West 1994).
18. See Murray Chaos, supra note 1, at 1311-19.
19. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 1, at 1224-26.
20. U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
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expressly conditional language be conspicuous; and if so, how conspicuous?2"
Unfortunately, current law provides uncertain answers. Any redraft of section
2-207 must find a way to address this shortcoming.
C. Determining the Terms of the Contract: Section 2-207(2)
Once a court determines that an exchange of forms establishes a contract,
it then must determine the terms of that contract. As quoted below, section 2-
207(2) provides the statutory guidance. The subsection explains that when a
term is reflected in the responding party's form, but absent in the initial form,
the term enters the contract as a so called "additional term."
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the con-
tract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits the acceptance to the terms
of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice
of them is received.
22
Unfortunately, section 2-207(2) contains at least two major difficulties.
First, the subsection gives a strong preference to offerors. Section 2-207(2)(b)
distinguishes between "material" and "immaterial" additions. Immaterial addi-
tions, therefore, can surreptitiously enter a contract through an unexamined
acceptance form while material additions cannot. For a material addition to
attach, the offeror must expressly consent. By definition, parties care much
more about material additions than about immaterial ones; hence, it is much
safer to be an offeror than an offeree. To compound matters, terms reflected in
an offer that are not contradicted in the acceptance would seem to summarily
enter a contract.23 In other words, if the offer spells out an additional material
term, such as a warranty provision, it becomes a term of the contract, but the
same uncontradicted warranty provision in the acceptance does not.
This preference afforded to offerors creates an incentive to be the first
party to send a confirming memorandum or standardized form. In many situa-
tions, however, it is unclear which party constitutes the true offeror. For exam-
ple, if a corporation has a standing offer to sell to its repeat customers, then
the purchase order may be considered an acceptance. Alternatively, if the
parties discussed a sale informally and reached an agreement, section 2-207
suggests that the first party to send a confirming memorandum becomes the
offeror. Surely, justice demands more than a casual inquiry into which corpo-
rate agent mails its form first.
21. See discussion infra notes 58-61.
22. U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
23. Professors White and Summers consider whether silence in an acceptance can ever over-
ride an express provision contained in the offer, and conclude that it cannot. WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 2, at 36.
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A second problem with section 2-207(2) arises from its silence regarding
"differing" terms. When conflicting boilerplate addresses the same issue differ-
ently, should the courts cancel both terms, should they follow the offer, or
should the acceptance control? Section 2-207(1), seeking to remedy the weak-
nesses of the mirror image rule, made possible the creation of a contract de-
spite "different" terms.2" Section 2-207(2) addresses "additional" terms, but
is silent regarding "different" or conflicting terms. Section 2-207(3) applies
only when the writings of the parties do not constitute an agreement; hence, it
provides no guidance with regard to differing terms when the forms establish a
contract.25
Courts have not been consistent in their response to this statutory gap.26
Professors White and Summers identify three widely divergent paths followed
by various courts in assessing the effects of differing terms.2 ' First, some
courts seem to preserve portions of the mirror image rule. A differing form is
viewed as either a "counteroffer" or as a "proposal to modify" that is accepted
by the other party upon shipment or the taking of delivery." Under this "last
hit" rule, the advantage rests with the party who sends the last form. Second,
and in stark contrast to the "last hit" rule, other courts seem to honor the first
form. Here, the rationale is that since the U.C.C. does not explicitly provide a
means for a differing term to modify an offer, such differing terms cannot
enter the agreement.29 Hence, under this "first hit" interpretation, the offer
controls. Finally, other courts have reasoned that when terms conflict, the
courts should cancel both terms and supply a judicial gap filler derived from
the general provisions of Article 2."' Determining which rule will be fol-
lowed, therefore, seems to depend more on the skill of the advocates and the
identity of the judge than on the language of the U.C.C.3"
D. Opting Out of the Battle: Section 2-207(3)
The final subsection addresses scenarios in which the exchange of forms
or other writings are insufficient to establish a contract. Section 2-207(3)
states:
24. See supra text accompanying note 15.
25. See infra text accompanying note 32.
26. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 33-35.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 33 (citing Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (lst Cir. 1962)).
29. Id. at 34 (citing, among other cases, Reaction Molding Techs., Inc. v. General Elec. Co.,
588 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1984)).
30. Id. (citing Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984)).
31. In our view, the best interpretation of the current law on "differing terms" begins with a
careful separation of contract formation from contract content issues. If no executory contract is
created on the exchange of forms, but the parties nonetheless perform, then the gap filler approach
of § 2-207(3) controls. See infra text accompanying note 60. By contrast, if the exchange of forms
establishes an executory contract under § 2-207(1), then, under current law, the terms of the offer
control. The point, however, is that alternative statutory constructions are not only possible, but
followed in many courts. Interestingly, Professors White and Summers disagree on the preferred
approach. White prefers the gap filler solution. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 34. Summers
would create a preference in favor of the offer, the "first shot" rule. Id. at 34-35.
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Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract
is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of
the contract do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the
writings agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated
under any other provisions of this Act. 2
This provision becomes operable when the exchange of forms cannot reason-
ably be construed as forming a contract pursuant to section 2-207(1), but the
parties nonetheless behave (by delivery and acceptance of goods) as though
they have a contract.
Sometimes, express conflicts in the writings are inadvertent. For example,
the parties informally agree on a sale, and each sends a confirming memo.
One memo calls for a price twice that of the other. Notwithstanding the diver-
gence on this central term, the seller delivers and the buyer takes delivery.
Section 2-207(1) arguably would not create a contract because the memos do
not state a "definite and seasonable expression of acceptance." But the conduct
of the parties will salvage the contract, with the courts providing a reasonable
price in accord with other provisions of Article 2."
More commonly, section 2-207(3) becomes operable due to the design of
one or both of the parties. Lawyers who draft form contracts are fully aware
of the problems and pitfalls introduced by thirty years of judicial development.
As a consequence, most commercial forms contain a clause stating that the
terms contained in that particular form must control the agreement and no oth-
ers.34 In addition, these clauses typically state that performance by the other
party will be construed as an acceptance of all the terms contained in the
expressly conditional form.
If pursuant to section 2-207(1) the court determines that such a clause
renders an agreement "expressly conditional," then no contract is established
on the initial exchange of writings. If the parties nonetheless perform, then a
statutory interpretation issue arises.35 Under an expansive reading of section
2-207(3), one could argue that the "writings of the contract do not otherwise
establish a contract"; hence, the terms of the contract "consist of those terms
on which the writings agree, together with any supplementary terms" incorpo-
rated by Article 2. Alternatively, under a narrow reading, one could argue that
these facts do not raise a section 2-207(3) issue at all. There simply was an
offer, or perhaps a counteroffer, that was accepted in accord with its
terms-through performance. Although we prefer the more expansive reading,
the point is that both interpretations carry favor with the courts, again leading
to inconsistent results and unnecessary litigation.
In conclusion, each of the three subsections of section 2-207 has created
some confusion. Perhaps section 2-207(1) fairs best. Although it reflects an
32. U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
33. U.C.C. § 2-305 provides judicial authority to impose a price term omitted by the parties.
34. See McCarthy, supra note 1, at 1022.
35. Professor Murray refers to this recurring fact pattern as the "counter-offer riddle."
Murray Chaos, supra note 1, at 1322-26, 1343-54.
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admirable attempt to keep the bad faith welsher in the deal, it provides little
guidance on how to distinguish a "definite and seasonable expression of ac-
ceptance" from an acceptance "expressly made conditional." Section 2-207(2)
appears to be a dismal failure on at least three fronts. First, it replaces the
mirror image rule's preference for offerees with a preference for offerors.
Second, the statutory gap with reference to "different" terms has led to incon-
sistent judicial results. 36 Third, section 2-207(2) provides scant guidance for
the courts to distinguish immaterial terms from material terms. Finally, section
2-207(3) has failed to provide a clear answer to the expressly conditional
"counter-offer riddle" addressed above. Any redraft of section 2-207 must find
a way to address these shortcomings.
II. AN ECONOMIC PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM
The economic approach to law can help guide current reforms of section
2-207. 37 At the heart of the inquiry are three basic tenets: respect for individ-
ual autonomy, reducing transaction costs, and providing legal stability. 8
These tenets provide a useful guide for solving the classic formation and terms
questions presented by a battle of forms.
A. Respect for Individual Autonomy
The economic approach to contract law begins with the proposition that
all mutually understood agreements between competent individuals should be
summarily enforced. Expressed under the rubric of "freedom of contract," this
governmental respect for individual autonomy has been a guiding tenet of
economic theory since the days of Adam Smith.39 It continues to guide the
economic approach to contract law.
It is useful to divide the notion of freedom of contract into two parts:
freedom to contract and freedom from contract. ' Freedom to contract recog-
nizes the truism that individuals do not agree to contractual exchanges unless
each believes that the exchange will make him or her better off. Individuals
have idiosyncratic knowledge about the details of a particular exchange un-
available to governmental authorities. Hence, any attempt by government to
impose external limits on the substance of a private exchange must overcome
36. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
37. By "economic" approach we refer to that body of literature usually traced to Ronald
Coase's seminal essay and expounded by Judge Posner. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); R.H. Coase, The Problems of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960); see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACr
LAW (1979); READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1989).
38. See generally Daniel T. Ostas & Burt A. Leete, Economic Analysis of Law as a Guide to
Post Communist Legal Reforms: The Case of Hungarian Contract Law, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 355
(1995) (developing and applying the three tenets in a comparative law setting); Daniel T. Ostas &
Frank P. Darr, Understanding Commercial Impracticability: Tempering Efficiency with Community
Fairness Norms, 27 RTrrGERS L.J. (forthcoming 1996) (applying the three tenets to the doctrine of
commercial impracticability).
39. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 185-87 (1954).
40. See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & COM. 193 (1982).
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a strong burden." Freedom from contract, by contrast, stands for the proposi-
tion that individuals should not be forced, absent prior consent, to transfer
property rights, or other entitlements. By insisting that each trading partner
obtain the informed consent of the other, each must take into account the idio-
syncratic knowledge of the other. Thus, forced transfers imposed by the courts
frustrate the information flow process, distort market prices, and lead to the
inefficient allocation, distribution, and use of property rights. 2
The "battle of the forms" reflects the tensions between the twin concerns
of freedom to and freedom from contract. Allowing a party to welsh on a bona
fide exchange erodes the principle of freedom to contract; yet, imposing
unbargained for terms on a party violates the notion of freedom from contract.
Section 2-207 strives to balance these competing concerns. It states that a
"seasonable expression of acceptance or written confirmation" forms a binding
contract. It then struggles to determine the terms of that contract.
To an economist, only subjectively understood agreements satisfy the
notion of a mutually beneficial exchange.43 Ideally, the autonomy inquiry is a
subjective one-what did the parties understand to be their agreement? Lack-
ing divine insight, however, this subjective inquiry ultimately becomes objec-
tive. The courts ask not what the parties were thinking, but rather, whether
there is sufficient objective evidence to infer a subjective agreement."
Objective evidence of subjective intent originates from two sources. First,
negotiated terms agreed to by the parties and those contained on each form
give objective evidence as to those terms.45 Second, conduct of the parties,
41. Id. at 524. The burden, of course, is not insurmountable. For example, economic rea-
soning supports governmental intervention in cases of unconscionability and commercial impracti-
cability. See generally Daniel T. Ostas, Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An Economic
Model and an Empirical Test, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 535 (1991) (using economic theory to predict
unconscionability outcomes); Ostas & Darr, supra note 38 (justifying governmental intervention
for commercial impracticability on economic grounds). Governmental "intervention" is also need-
ed to fill in the omissions in contracts. Omissions occur for a variety of reasons. For example, an
omission may result from the calculated desire of a party in the weaker bargaining position to
enter the bargain without a particular clause with the hope or expectation that the problem will not
occur. E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860, 872-73
(1968).
42. See generally Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV.
519, 519-30 (1945) (defending the doctrine of freedom of contract as a means to economize on
idiosyncratic and widely dispersed information).
43. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 37, at 5.
44. Many contract doctrines serve this evidentiary inquiry. For example, doctrines that re-
quire a writing, insist upon an exchange of consideration, or inquire into the presence of fraud or
duress, all seek to "objectify" an inherently subjective inquiry. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contract, 86 COLuM. L. REV. 269, 272-74 (1986); see also Morris R. Cohen, The Basis
of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933) (discussing the interplay between objective and subjec-
tive inquiries into consent). The inevitable slippage in these evidentiary surrogates leads to both
over-enforcement and under-enforcement of contractual language. Over-enforcement occurs when
the courts impose a contract absent true individual consent. Under-enforcement results from a
judicial unwillingness to impose transfers that were indeed consensual. The battle of the forms
must respond to this tension. If it follows an economic logic, it will seek to minimize the sum of
over-enforcement and under-enforcement costs.
45. One must recognize that contractual terms may be inextricably integrated in the minds of
the parties. The seller is willing to sell at price X, but only if its boilerplate warranty disclaimer is
upheld. The buyer may be willing to pay X, but only if a standard warranty of merchantability
applies. Hence, the apparent agreement on price becomes illusory, and holding the parties to that
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trade practice, industry custom, and past dealings all play a role in determining
intent. For example, each party is presumptively aware of the customary terms
associated with their transaction. Each party knows or should know that a sale
of goods typically includes a warranty of merchantability. Each knows or
should know whether their industry typically submits contractual disputes to
arbitration. They presumably are aware of the industry custom regarding the
effect of acts of God. If they have dealt with one another in the past, they are
aware of how they have resolved any prior disputes. Such shared customs and
experiences facilitate communication and provide evidence of mutual, albeit
tacit, understandings.' In the context of the battle of the forms, therefore,
evidence of industry custom and past dealing may provide better evidence of
mutual understandings than the fine print within the unexamined boilerplate on
the conflicting forms.
In short, the principle of autonomy suggests a preferred emphasis on the
negotiated terms and commonly implied terms based on usage of trade, indus-
try practices, past dealings, and customary gap fillers provided by Article 2.
The parties presumptively transact within this context, and it provides a ready
basis for meaningful agreements. In this light, the key question becomes: do
the incongruent forms give sufficient objective evidence to warrant a judicial
inference that the parties have subjectively agreed to vary from trade customs?
Of course, due deference to individual autonomy demands that parties be
empowered to specifically tailor their own contracts. Custom must not become
a straightjacket. But autonomy also demands sufficient evidence of both
parties' consent to such tailoring.
B. Reducing Transaction Costs
Our second economic tenet provides that contract law should do more
than passively enforce private transactions; it should proactively4' seek to
make transactions less costly for the parties.' It is important to recognize the
sound business reasons for firms to use standardized forms. Standardized
forms reduce bargaining costs by relieving firms of the burden of individually
negotiating and drafting contract provisions regulating relatively routine
transactions.49 Such forms also reduce agency costs by limiting the contractu-
express price can no longer be justified on the mere grounds that the forms do not conflict on that
term. Since the principle of autonomy is no guide, the court should determine the price with an
eye toward creating a precedent that encourages future parties to bargain more effectively. See
infra text accompanying notes 47-54.
46. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 885-97 (1992).
47. Contract law reduces transaction costs in three ways: (1) by summarily enforcing express
contractual agreements it provides a disincentive for breach; (2) by providing standard customary
terms it removes the necessity to bargain over all the details of a particular exchange; and (3)
through the laws of fraud, undue influence, duress, and unconscionability it discourages mislead-
ing conduct in contract negotiations. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 37, at 4. All three concerns
are motivated by battle of the forms.
48. Transaction costs include the costs of bargaining, performing, and enforcing contractual
matters. Ostas & Leete, supra note 38, at 366. Enforcement costs, including the costs of litigation,
are discussed under our third tenet-providing legal stability.
49. Advances in technology continue to reduce these costs by replacing standard forms with
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al discretion of subordinants within a firm's hierarchy, and facilitate central-
ized control by harmonizing contracts through that firm's national or interna-
tional business activities. Any resolution of the battle of the forms problem,
therefore, should respect the efficiency of standardized forms.
Current law, however, fails to take advantage of standardized forms. In
some situations the seller's form will control, while in other cases the buyer's
form will control. Thus, the current 2-207 creates a perverse incentive to care-
fully read and consider the fine print on each and every invoice or purchase
order received. Someone within the corporate hierarchy should then be autho-
rized to negotiate these terms. Such a rule increases costs and erodes the con-
tractual harmony within an individual firm. For example, a seller may use a
warranty disclaimer in all its forms. In transactions where the seller is deemed
the offeror the disclaimer enters; when deemed the offeree it does not enter.
Hence, the uniformity gains of form contracting erode.
The solution is to rethink the role of forms and the terms emerging from
conflicting forms. Transaction-cost reasoning suggests that the preferred ap-
proach is to deemphasize the boilerplate language in favor of customary terms
as derived from the past dealings of the parties, common trade practices, and
standard gap-filling terms provided by the U.C.C. An emphasis on customs
facilitates communication in accord with the principle of autonomy" and re-
duces bargaining costs by preserving the efficiency gains of standard forms.
Gap fillers would provide a baseline understanding which boilerplate could not
alter. Opportunism through surreptitiously entering an uncustomary or surpris-
ing term in unexamined boilerplate would not be rewarded. Once the parties
form a contract under section 2-207(1), it would include terms agreed upon,
terms reflected on both forms, and terms supplied by the Article 2 gap fill-
ers.5 There would be no need to scrutinize each other's forms, and the uni-
formity in a firm's sales activity would be enhanced. The rule would negate
the incentive to be the offeror.
Transaction-cost logic also provides insights into the substance of custom-
ary terms. Many customs, or gap fillers, involve the allocation of risk. For
example, an implied warranty in the sale of goods assigns the risk of faulty
workmanship to the seller rather than the buyer. Liability for goods damaged
during shipping is customarily assigned to the common carrier. In each case, it
is in the interest of all parties that contractual risks be allocated to the party
who can absorb them more efficiently.52 Hence, reliance on custom not only
"electronic data interchanges." McCarthy, supra note 1, at 1024.
50. See supra text accompanying note 45-46.
51. Relational interests developed over a period of time often create enforceable legal obliga-
tions. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980) (dealing with the roots
of contract, its role in projecting exchange into the future, and the normative aspects of contracts).
While a sales contract, standing alone, is hardly the prototypical relational contract, the courts will
look to the parties' history to determine the materiality of an additional term. See, e.g., St. Charles
Cable TV v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 820, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 895 F.2d 1410
(2d Cir. 1989). Thus, context and history of the transaction serve important roles in limiting the
parties' negotiating costs.
52. See POSNER, supra note 37, at 85.
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facilitates communication and preserves the efficiency gains associated with
form contracting, it also tends to reduce performance costs."3
Of course, parties must be permitted to individually craft their contract to
vary from custom. Although a seller usually is more efficient in taking precau-
tions that assure product quality, sometimes the buyer is more efficient.54 In
such cases, the parties should not rely on standard forms. Instead, they should
negotiate fully. An "expressly conditional" form as envisioned by section 2-
207(1) would signal the need for meaningful negotiations. If the uncustomary
warranty disclaimer is really in the interests of both parties, then reaching an
agreement on a disclaimer should not be difficult. The need for allowing an
expressly conditional form is borne out by the next tenet as well.
C. Providing Legal Stability
Properly conceived, transaction costs include not only the costs of negoti-
ating and performing contracts, but also the costs of enforcing or litigating
contractual matters. Vagueness or uncertainty in the law frustrates attempts by
the parties to settle their own disputes and increases the need for costly litiga-
tion. Any redraft of section 2-207, therefore, should strive for clarity and ease
of judicial administration.
As discussed previously, judicial interpretations of section 2-207 vary
widely.55 Hence, when judged by a stability standard, the section generally
fails. On first blush, the mirror image rule appears to fair better. By insisting
that the parties reach a full accord on all express terms, the rule seems to limit
judicial discretion. But even with the mirror image rule, if there has been part
performance, the court must still order restitution or fashion some sort of
quasi-contractual adjustment. Thus, the gains in legal predictability are not as
great as may first appear.
By contrast, a rule which emphasizes customary gap fillers should be
much easier to implement. First, the courts would ask whether the exchange of
forms together with the conduct of the parties indicates an intention to be
bound. "A definite expression of acceptance"56 as envisioned by section 2-
207(1), or "[c]onduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a con-
tract," as envisioned by section 2-207(3),17 would suffice to bind the parties.
Welshing would not be permitted. Once the contract was formed, the terms
would be: (1) those upon which the parties had in-fact agreed; (2) those that
consistently appeared on both forms; and (3) supplemental gap fillers derived
from industry customs, past dealings, and provisions of Article 2.
53. As part of the reform process, all Article 2 gap fillers are under review. Sellers seem
particularly keen on changing the implied warranties provided by the U.C.C. See Roszkowski &
Wladis, supra note I, at 1068-69.
54. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 1, at 1250-51 (using this illustration as a reason to
return to a modified version of the mirror image rule).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
56. This standard would complement §§ 2-204 and 2-206. See supra notes 12-14 and accom-
panying text.
57. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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Either party could avoid the creation of a contract on the above terms by
conspicuously indicating on its form that its offer or acceptance was "express-
ly conditional,""8 and then refuse to deliver the goods or to take delivery until
the other party expressly agreed to the non-customary term.5 9 The conspicu-
ously conditional language would preserve the right to "welsh," and would
signal the need to negotiate. The conditional terms, however, could not be
agreed to by mere performance.6' If the parties shipped and took delivery
without first engaging in meaningful negotiations, then agreed terms, matching
terms, and gap fillers would control. In effect, the gamesmanship associated
with trying to be the last party to send a form (described as the counteroffer
riddle) would be avoided by simply eliminating it.
The principle of legal stability would be served on a number of fronts.
First, the conspicuousness requirement would provide a "safe harbor" for
parties who wished to enter meaningful negotiations, instead of relying on
standard forms, thereby clarifying section 2-207(1). Second, under our propos-
al there would be no need to distinguish between offeror or offeree, between
material and immaterial terms, or between "different" and "additional" terms
as envisioned by section 2-207(2).6" Finally, there would be no need to dis-
tinguish between contracts formed through exchange of forms, conduct, or a
combination of writings and conduct as currently envisioned by section 2-
207(3).
D. Summary
Thus, the current practice of using unexamined forms to introduce uncus-
tomary provisions must change. Formation should be treated as a separate
issue from the determination of terms. If the parties manifest an intent to be
bound, either through words or actions, then a contract is formed and welshing
should not be permitted. The terms should be determined on the basis of those
on which the parties negotiate or on which their forms agree, supplemented by
default terms provided by Article 2's gap fillers including trade usage, course
of performance, and course of dealing. If a party wants to propose an uncus-
tomary term, such as a warranty disclaimer, it should not engage in the current
practice of exchanging unread boilerplate. It must provide the courts with
58. See generally Baird & Weisberg, supra note 1, at 1260-61 (weighing the advantages and
disadvantages of a conspicuousness requirement in this context).
59. Under this proposal, the shipping of goods is interpreted as an offer to contract based on
agreed terms, matching terms, and gap fillers. If the receiving party takes delivery, then that offer
is accepted. Hence, either party could avoid contract formation by expressly conditioning its form
and then refusing to deliver or to take delivery.
60. This is the counteroffer riddle. See supra text accompanying note 35.
61. Our proposal would also remove the present incentive to draft long and detailed form
contracts. Under current law, reciting all U.C.C. gap fillers in one's form is well advised. Since it
is harder to introduce "different" terms into a contract than it is to include "additional" terms, it is
important to make sure customary as well as non-customary terms appear on one's form. Under
our proposal, the only terms needed on a standardized form are those terms that contradict custom.
There would be no advantage in reciting U.C.C. gap fillers chapter and verse. This should help the
parties maintain the advantages of form contracting while simultaneously empowering them to
craft their own exchange.
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more evidence than its own form coupled with an accepted delivery; it must
also show that the term was subjectively agreed to by the other party. If an
uncustomary term is reasonable, then that meaningful consent should be easily
obtained. Finally, the counteroffer riddle should be resolved in favor of Code
gap fillers. Such an approach would be both just and economically efficient.
III. APPLYING THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO PROPOSED SECTION 2-207
The Proposed section 2-207, as part of the larger revision of Article 2 by
the National Commission of Uniform State Laws, incorporates much of the
approach suggested in the prior section. In 1988, the Commission formed a
study group that issued its first report in 1990.62 A task force addressed the
issues presented in the 1990 report, and its critique was published, along with
the 1990 report, in 1991.63 Further discussions and revisions resulted from a
1993 review.' In 1994, the National Commission conducted a first reading of
the proposed revision and conducted extensive discussions.65 A final proposal
is not expected until 1996 or 1997.66
The above mentioned process involved several revisions to proposed sec-
tion 2-207. The Study Group's initial suggestion followed the general structure
proposed by John Murray in a pair of 1986 articles. 67 The 1991 task force
criticized the complexity of that approach and the abandonment of the struc-
ture of the existing section 2-207, which the task force felt worked in a major-
ity of situations.' The version produced in 1993 took on a more mechanical
nature with the careful identification of formation and term issues.' The ver-
sion discussed in 1994 further refined the language of the 1993 version and
reorganized its sections.70
62. McCarthy, supra note 1, at 1020 n.5.
63. An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial
Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Report].
64. McCarthy, supra note 1, at 1020.
65. Proceedings in the Committee of the Whole, Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, Sales,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1994) (Chicago, II1., July
29-Aug. 4) [hereinafter Proceedings].
66. Zan Hale, UCC Article 2 Drafting Committee Faces Critics, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct.
1994, at 24. The changes discussed in this section are one part of a significant proposed redesign
of Article 2 to accommodate the growth of leasing and sale of software as well as to revise prob-
lematic sections of the existing Article 2. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts:
Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337 (1994).
67. Preliminary Report, supra note 63, at 1056 (citing Murray, supra note 1; Murray Chaos,
supra note 1). For further discussion of the Preliminary Report, see Alex Devience, Jr., The Rec-
ommendations to Revise Article 2, 24 UCC L.J. 349, 352 (1992) (suggesting that the changes
reflect a broader agenda to weaken the traditional approach to formation and move the Article
toward principles consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
68. Preliminary Report, supra note 63, at 1056-57.
69. Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised Article 2, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305, 1325 (1994).
70. For the text of the 1994 revision, see infra text accompanying note 71.
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A. The Battle of Forms Revision: Circa 1994
The 1994 revision separates the problems of formation and terms into
different sections of the Code. Sections 2-204 and 2-206 provide the basis for
finding a contract. Section 2-207 describes the process for determining the
terms of the contract.
The formation provisions direct the parties and courts to look for the
existence of the contract without reference to the niceties of common law offer
and acceptance rules, and they rejected the mirror image rule. Proposed sec-
tion 2-204 provides:
(a) A contract for sale may be made in any manner sufficient to
manifest agreement, including offer and acceptance and conduct by
both parties recognizing the existence of the contract.
(b) If the parties so intend, an agreement is sufficient to make a con-
tract for a sale even if the moment of the making of the agreement is
not determined, one or more terms are left open or to be agreed upon,
or writings or records of the parties contain varying terms as defined
in Section 2-207(a).
(c) If a contract for sale is made and one or more terms in the agree-
ment are left open, the contract does not fail for indefiniteness if
there is a reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy."
Section 2-206 further provides:
(a) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances:
(1) an offer to make a contract must be construed as invit-
ing acceptance in any manner and by any medium reason-
able under the circumstances including an expression of
assent which contains varying terms as defined in Section
2-207(a).
(2) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or
current shipment must be construed as inviting acceptance
either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or
current shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods.
However, a shipment of nonconforming goods is not an
acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that
the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the
buyer.
(b) If the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode
of acceptance, an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a
reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before accep-
tance.72
71. Proceedings, supra note 65, at 56. The first reading of § 2-204 produced no comments
from the attending commissioners. Id.
72. Id. at 58. The first reading of § 2-206 produced no comments from the attending com-
missioners. Id. at 59.
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The effect of the two sections is to remove the constraints of the traditional
rules of offer and acceptance. This result is achieved in several ways. First,
pursuant to section 2-204(a), circumstances demonstrating the existence of a
contract are expanded beyond the traditional model of a negotiated offer and
acceptance to include the parties' conduct. Second, section 2-204(b) references
the intent of the parties which would presumably include the customary under-
standings associated with the transaction. More importantly for the battle of
forms problem, under section 2-204(c), the terms of the offer and acceptance
need not agree if the parties' intent demonstrates the existence of a contract.
Welshing would not be permitted. This provision is an obvious rejection of the
mirror image rule.
The demise of the mirror image rule is carried out in the determination of
the terms of the contract created by a mixture of conduct and other actions. If
the parties intended to contract, then the terms may be determined under pro-
posed section 2-207. That section provides:
(a) In this article, "varying terms" means terms prepared by one party
and contained in a standard form writing or record.
(b) If an agreement of the parties contains varying terms, a contract
results if Sections 2-204 and 2-206 are satisfied.
(c) Varying terms contained in the writings and other records of the
parties do not become part of the contract unless the party claiming
inclusion proves that the party against whom they operate expressly
agreed to the terms or assented to and had notice of the terms from
trade usage, previous course of dealing or course of performance.
Between merchants, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of
evidence. Otherwise, it is by clear and convincing evidence.
(d) If a contract with varying terms is formed under subsection (a),
the terms are:
(1) terms upon which the writings or records agree;
(2) terms varying terms [sic] included under subsection (c);
(3) terms to which the parties have otherwise agreed; and
(4) any supplementary terms incorporated under any other
provisions of this [Act].73
This revision constitutes a significant change from existing law in that it
rejects the distinction between additional and different terms, drops the "unless
proviso" that has become the basis of modem form drafting, 74 and eliminates
the convoluted parsing necessary for determining the fate of additional
terms."
73. Id. at 59-60.
74. McCarthy, supra note 1, at 1022.
75. The complexity and inconsistency of § 2-207 decisions have led proponents of some
variation of the existing statute to suggest that this complexity has allowed the courts to do justice
in particular cases. Preliminary Report, supra note 63, at 1062. We do not attempt to enter that
particular fray. Some have suggested that the criticism is to hide a more broadly based concern
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B. Critiquing Proposed Sections 2-204, 2-206, and 2-207
The proposed sections reflect many of the elements suggested by the eco-
nomic approach to the battle of the forms. Both the treatment of formation
issues and the manner of determining contractual terms tend to contemplate a
solution that is consistent with the goals of autonomy, reduction of transaction
costs, and stability. Hence, the revision is a major step in the right direction.
Further refinements, however, could improve the final product.
Proposed sections 2-204 and 2-206 largely conform with our economic
model. Instead of emphasizing a moment in time when the proper formalities
are accomplished, the proposed sections ignore the sequential trading of forms
in favor of the substance of formation as demonstrated by the content of the
forms and the actions of the parties. The approach serves the principles of
autonomy and freedom to contract, and reduces the potential of costly oppor-
tunism through welshing.
Yet a troublesome formation issue remains. Under the current section 2-
207(1), a "definite expression of acceptance" forms an agreement, unless the
acceptance is made "expressly conditional." Distinguishing a definite expres-
sion of acceptance from an expressly conditional one has proven particularly
difficult for the courts and has generated a good deal of private gamesman-
ship.76 The proposed treatment deletes the expressly conditional language of
current law in favor of the language of section 2-206(a). It provides: "Unless
otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances: (1) an
offer to make a contract must be construed as inviting acceptance in any man-
ner and by any medium reasonable under the circumstances." Our fear is that
the interpretation of "unless otherwise unambiguously indicated" may prove
just as troublesome as interpreting the current term "unless expressly condi-
tional."
Our proposed solution is to construct a "safe harbor" through which a
party could "unambiguously indicate" that its attempt to contract is conditional
on the agreement of the parties to that party's terms. One alternative is to
include a provision that creates a boilerplate set of requirements that notify the
other party of the intent of the initiating party.77 Alternatively, this could be
achieved through an official comment. Either approach would specify particu-
lar language unambiguously indicating that a party does not intend to be
bound unless its uncustomary terms are expressly agreed to. The provision or
comment should also provide that such language be "conspicuous." A party
that used such conspicuous language would know that no express contract
that any alternative that results in the explicit recognition of using gap fillers would result in con-
tracts that are unfair to vendors. Roszkowski & Wladis, supra note 1, at 1068-70.
76. By "gamesmanship" we refer to the practice of each party drafting a clause that states
the terms on its form must control and no others, and that shipment or taking delivery constitutes
acceptance of these terms. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Armed with such a clause,
parties have an incentive to additionally "game" the system by being the last party to send a form.
See supra text accompanying note 35.
77. An example of this approach is taken in U.C.C. § 2-719 (West 1995). In this section, the
seller must indicate that the intended remedy is exclusive. Similarly, under § 2-316(2), an attempt
to disclaim a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must be in writing and conspicuous.
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would be formed on the exchange of conflicting forms. In effect, it would ex-
pressly reserve the right to welsh. A party using such language would also
know that it should not deliver goods or take delivery of goods until the un-
customary language is expressly agreed to by its trading partner.
Proposed section 2-207 also seems to follow our economic prescriptions.
The statute plainly rejects the possibility of surprising the parties with
unbargained for terms by defining the terms of the agreement to be those
terms that the parties expressly agree to, either in their forms or otherwise, and
those terms provided by the U.C.C71 Varying terms on the forms (including
different and additional terms identified by comparing the forms) 79 must be
agreed to or the party must have notice and must have provided some prior
assent to the term before it is included in the contract. Hence, proposed sec-
tion 2-207 eliminates the need to distinguish between offeror or offeree, be-
tween material and non-material terms, or between additional and differing
terms.
The goal of providing freedom to and from contract is enhanced by this
approach. In general, parties are bound only to the terms to which they agree
and those terms provided by statute and custom as defaults for terms that are
not properly resolved by agreement. Moreover, transaction costs are reduced in
those instances in which the forms do not agree by the provisions directing the
inclusion of the U.C.C.'s supplementary terms. Since a supplementary term
will always enter unless it is expressly negated through mutual agreement,
there is no need to provide customary terms in one's boilerplate. Such forms
should become much shorter and easier to use. Conspicuously conditional
language would point the parties to the need to negotiate for different terms if
they desire a different result (consistent with concerns for autonomy). Finally,
reliance on supplementary terms assures a level of stability in those instances
when the parties fail to define the particular terms in their agreement. In ef-
fect, the default terms are provided by the U.C.C. The parties may alter them,
but if they fail to do so, the U.C.C. provides the terms for them.
Notwithstanding the virtues of proposed section 2-207, two problems are
apparent. First, the counteroffer riddle needs to be treated more directly. The
simple case is suggested by a traditional offer to buy that is limited by its
terms to that offer. The seller rejects the uncustomary terms reflected in the
offer, but nonetheless ships the goods and the buyer takes delivery. Under
section 2-207(c), the "varying terms" of the offer are not expressly agreed to,
so they do not become part of the contract. Under section 2-207(d), however,
terms to which the parties have "otherwise agreed" do enter the agreement.
One could argue that shipment reflects agreement to the uncustomary terms of
the offer. To compound matters, proposed section 2-206 specifies that an offer
to buy is accepted by shipment, but does not specify whether uncustomary
terms in such an offer become part of the agreement. Perhaps this is not a
case involving section 2-207 at all, but merely is an offer that has been accept-
ed in its entirety by performance. This result, however, presents the parties
78. Proceedings, supra note 65, at 59-60.
79. But see infra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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with a return to the last hit rule; the last party to send a form gets its terms by
wrapping the offer or acceptance in nonnegotiated language.
Reading the proposed sections in their entirety suggests that the redrafting
committee intends to resolve the counteroffer riddle in favor of supplementary
terms. This is also the solution suggested by our economic tenets. Again, an
official comment should specifically address the counteroffer riddle. The com-
ment should state that an uncustomary term appearing on a standardized form
will never enter a contract unless it matches express language on the other
party's form or has been expressly agreed to by both parties.8" Merely ship-
ping goods or taking delivery is not sufficient evidence that uncustomary
language has been subjectively agreed to.
The second problem with proposed section 2-207 is similar in nature. As
noted before,8' the mere agreement of forms on a particular term may not
indicate actual agreement of the parties. For example, the forms may agree
that the parties will arbitrate claims, but one form is premised on the availabil-
ity of implied warranties while the other form disclaims them. Under these
circumstances, the parties' forms would direct arbitration (pursuant to section
2-207(d)(1)), but the warranty may or may not be included. If there is no rea-
son to include either term under subsection (c), the default term would be an
implied warranty of merchantability. Under these circumstances, the injured
party, likely the seller, would have arbitration, but not upon the circumstances
that it bargained for. It never agreed to arbitrate a warranty. The only apparent
solution is for the seller to incur additional costs to put the buyer on notice
and attempt to negotiate a different deal. If the buyer refuses, the deal is lost
and the seller should not deliver the goods. Again, considering the recurring
nature of this "integration problem," an official comment indicating the pre-
ferred results seems appropriate.
In summary, the focus should be on finding those terms on which the
parties agreed and determining the proper default terms based on the U.C.C.
and the historical and industrial customs. The goal is to find agreement with-
out forcing any surprising or unexpected terms on any party. Businesspersons
will soon learn that uncustomary and surprising language will not enter an
agreement simply by printing such language on an unread form. While at
times this may work to the advantage of one party or the other, the solution
for the disadvantaged party is to negotiate better terms than those provided in
the existing contract, by the U.C.C., or by custom.
C. Additional Drafting Problems of Proposed Section 2-207
Despite the obvious strengths of the revision, several apparent drafting
problems are likely to cause problems.82 The first, and potentially most
80. In this context, express agreement is a necessary, but not sufficient, reason for an uncus-
tomary term to enter the contract. Express language does not control if derived through duress,
misrepresentation, or unconscionable business conduct.
81. See supra note 45.
82. In addition to the comments in the text, there were two identifiable drafting errors in the
1994 draft. The reference to subsection (a) in the opening clause of subsection (d) should read
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significant, is the definition of varying terms found in section 2-207(a)." On
its face, "varying" suggests the notion of difference or additional. The appar-
ent goal was to find a term that encompassed both categories of terms under
existing law without using the words "additional" or "different." That goal is
understandable, given the semantic confusion created by the current language.
The definition, however, states that it refers to terms prepared by one party
and contained in a standard form. The meaning is clarified somewhat in sub-
sections (b), (c), and (d), in which there is a suggestion that varying terms are
those on which the forms do not agree. But even here the meaning is ambigu-
ous, since varying terms are brought into the contract if they are agreed to or
assented to with notice. In short, the definition of "varying" gives too little
guidance about the kinds of terms that it is meant to address. This definitional
problem is further complicated by the remaining subsections.8 4
Our proposed solution is to define varying terms as those terms prepared
by one party and contained in a standard form writing or record that vary from
trade usage, previous course of dealing, course of performance, or any supple-
mentary terms incorporated under any other provisions of Article 2. The heart
of the battle of forms problem is that unread boilerplate language can some-
times be used to introduce uncustomary (surprising) terms. Under our defini-
tion, it would be clear that where boilerplate conflicts and where both parties
have suggested an uncustomary term, neither term would enter the contract;
the court would supply a customary gap filler. If boilerplate conflicts, with one
party suggesting an uncustomary term and the other reciting the customary
treatment, then again, custom would control. In short, we believe that our
definition would better capture the essence of the battle of forms problem and
would also will harmonize well with the cross-references to section 2-207(a)
contained in sections 2-204 and 2-206.
The use of the word "agreement" in subsection (b) raises a second draft-
ing problem. First, it is not clear what agreement means.8 5 This ambiguity is
further complicated by the use of "contract" in the same subsection. It is far
from clear what is meant by "agreement" when "contract" is defined by sec-
tions 2-204 and 2-206. The drafters were probably referring to the collective
forms or records issued by the parties. 6 If so, then the phrase "forms or re-
cords issued by the parties" should replace the word "agreement."
Third, subsection (c) presents a difficulty by referring to "assented to"
terms through notice of trade usage, previous course of dealing, or course of
performance. The same sentence makes reference to "agreed ... terms." No-
where is there a suggestion of how an agreed term differs from an assented
term, nor how assent and agreement to terms differ. The context of assent
suggests a prior performance under the term, or an agreement with a similar
"subsection (b)" and the first use of "terms" in subsection (d)(2) should be removed. Proceedings,
supra note 65, at 60, 64.
83. A discussion draft circulated in December, 1994 dropped the reference to "varying
terms." Copy on file with the authors.
84. Roszkowski & Wladis, supra note I, at 1077-78.
85. Proceedings, supra note 65, at 60.
86. Id.
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term (course of dealing), but it is not clear whether that constitutes assent. The
language does nothing to identify those instances in which the assent is effec-
tive to bring a varying term into the contract because assent itself is ambigu-
ous." The solution is to focus on actual agreement. We suggest placing a
period after the phrase "expressly agreed to the terms," and deleting the phrase
following the "or."
Fourth, subsection (d)(3) is not clear in its context. Subsection (d)(3)
provides that the agreement includes "terms to which the parties have other-
wise agreed." It would appear to apply to those terms that the parties orally
agreed to but failed to include in the forms. This reading would be consistent,
though redundant, with the notion that any agreed to terms are already incor-
porated into the contract by subsection (d)(l). More importantly, care must be
taken to avoid resurrecting the counteroffer riddle through the language of
(d)(3)." Varying terms (uncustomary boilerplate) contained in the "last form"
should not be deemed accepted merely through conduct. To avoid this pitfall,
we suggest inserting the word "expressly." The new language could read:
"(d)(3) terms to which the parties have otherwise expressly agreed." Alterna-
tively, a comment could clarify that the "terms" referenced in (d)(3) do not
include "varying terms."
Finally, subsection (d)(4) should make explicit reference to usage of trade
and course of performance as terms to be included in the contract as supple-
mentary terms.89 This is particularly true if the reference to usage of trade
and course of performance is deleted from subsection (c) as suggested above.
Currently, the section's simple reference to supplementary terms may suggest
only those terms that are substantively described in the Article such as the
warranty of merchantability. Anything that is not specifically set out might
then be lost in the search to find a second step. On the other hand, if the sec-
tion makes it explicit that these provisions are part of the contract by default,
there will be added incentives for the parties to take any necessary steps to
make clear their intent, thus stabilizing the relationship and avoiding the
gamesmanship inherent in the current maze created by section 2-207.
Taken together, the critique and drafting suggestions would result in the
following proposed redrafting of section 2-207:
(a) In this Article, "varying terms" means terms prepared by one
party and contained in a standard form writing or record that vary
from trade usage, previous course of dealing, course of performance,
or any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions
of Article 2.
(b) If an agreement of the parties contains varying terms, a contract
results if sections 2-204 and 2-206 are satisfied.
(c) Varying terms contained in the writings and other records of the
parties do not become part of the contract unless the party claiming
87. Roszkowski & Wladis, supra note 1, at 1074.
88. Roszkowski and Wladis raise a similar concern in a prior version of proposed § 2-207
containing similar language. Id.
89. For a similar argument, see id. at 1074-75, 1078.
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inclusion proves that the party against whom they operate expressly
agreed to the terms. Between merchants, the burden of proof is by a
preponderance of evidence. Otherwise, it is by clear and convincing
evidence.
(d) If a contract with varying terms is formed under subsection (b),
the terms are:
(1) terms upon which the writings or records agree;
(2) varying terms included under subsection (c);
(3) terms to which the parties have otherwise expressly
agreed; and
(4) any supplementary terms, including those provided by
previous course of dealing, course of performance, or
usage of trade, incorporated under any other provisions of
this [Act].
In addition, we recommend the inclusion of official comments that suggest the
preferred outcomes to the counteroffer and integration problems noted before.
CONCLUSION
The proposed revisions to the battle of the forms make important steps
toward remedying one of the most notorious problems under the current Arti-
cle 2. The proposed approach to section 2-207 emphasizes the customary
terms associated with the sales of goods. Such an approach is consistent with
the vision initially offered by Karl Llewellyn, the chief draftsperson of Article
2. Llewellyn wrote that "the modem contract scholar's task is to find six to
twelve transaction-types, to locate, describe, and test proper specifics for an
iron core of exchange expectations.'" Trade customs, previous course of
dealing, course of performance, and the supplementary provisions of Article 2
provide these expectations. Pursuant to proposed section 2-207, unread
boilerplate will no longer suffice to vary these expectations. Moreover, such
an approach reflects sound economic reasoning based on the needs to preserve
individual autonomy, reduce transaction costs, and provide legal stability.
90. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 368-69 (1960).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A limited liability company ("LLC") is a business entity intended to offer
its owners the limited liability protection of a traditional corporation and the
tax advantages of a partnership.' Although the Wyoming legislature enacted
1. For a comprehensive analysis of limited liability companies, including tax and business
aspects, see LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, I RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES (1994 & Cum. Supp. 1995); MARK A. SARGENT & WALTER D.
SCHWIDETZKY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK (1994-95) [hereinafter SARGENT HAND-
BOOK]; Allan G. Donn, Practical Guide to Limited Liability Companies, in I STATE LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY & PARTNERSHIP LAWS at PGLLC-I (Michael A. Bamberger & Arthur J.
Jacobson eds., 1995-1 Supp.), Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability
Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (1991); Thomas E. Geu, Understanding the Limited
Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44 (1992); Thomas
E. Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part Two),
37 S.D. L. REV. 467 (1992) [hereinafter Geu, Part Two]; Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited
Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375 (1992). A bibliography of
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the first limited liability company statute in 1977,2 few states followed until
the Internal Revenue Service ruled in 1988 that LLCs would be treated like
partnerships for tax purposes? Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia
now allow for the formation of LLCs,4 and thousands have been formed in
the last few years.
Treatises, articles, and commentaries written about LLCs have focused
primarily on the organizational, tax, and formation aspects of the entity.'
articles written about limited liability companies is set forth in Chapter 7 of the SARGENT HAND-
BOOK, supra.
2. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (codified
as amended at Wyo. Stat. §§ 17-15-101 to -143 (1989 & Supp. 1994)).
3. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. Florida enacted LLC legislation in 1982, but few
states followed Wyoming's and Florida's lead until Revenue Ruling 88-76 was announced. In
1990, Colorado and Kansas enacted LLC statutes and Indiana enacted a statute requiring foreign
LLCs to register with the Indiana Secretary of State. In 1991, Nevada, Texas, Utah, and Virginia
passed LLC legislation. By 1994, 43 states had enacted LLC statutes and six others were consider-
ing legislation, SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.02. For a discussion of the origins and
pattern of LLC enactments, see SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.02; Keatinge et al., supra
note 1, at 381-84.
4. For the text of many state limited liability company statutes, see 2-4 RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, supra note 1, app. D; 2-5 STATE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY & PARTNERSHIP LAWS
(Michael A. Bamberger & Arthur J. Jacobson eds., 1994 & 1995-2 Supp.). For a survey of the
existing statutes and pending legislation, see SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, ch. 5. As of this
writing, 47 states and the District of Columbia have adopted limited liability company statutes and
the remaining states (Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont) are considering adoption. ALA. CODE
§§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010-995 (Supp. 1994); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 29-601 to -857 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1316 (Michie Supp. 1993);
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17705 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101
(West Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-100 to -242 (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1107 (1993 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1301 to -1375
(Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.514 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§
14-11-100 to -1109 (1994 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to -672 (1994 & Supp. 1995);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-1 to /1-60 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§
23-18-1-1 to -19 (Burns 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100-.1601 (West Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7652 (Supp. 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001-.455
(Michie/Bobbs-Merill Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301-:1369 (West 1994); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601-762 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§
4A-101 to -1103 (1993 & Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West Supp.
1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01-.960 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to -
1204 (Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.010-.740 (Vernon Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -2653 (Supp. 1994); NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 86.010-.571 (Michie 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1 to :85 (1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie
1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. LAW §§ 101-1403 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (1993 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -155
(1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01-.58 (Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 18,
§§ 2000-2060 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.001-.990 (1995); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8901-8998 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1992 & Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-43-101 to -1409 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-34-1 to
-59 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-201-101 to -248-606 (Supp. 1994); TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -158 (1994 &
Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 25.15.005-.902 (West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-lA-I to -69 (Supp. 1995); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102-1305 (West 1994); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (1989 & Supp.
1995).
5. John R. Emshwiller, New Kind of Company Attracts Many--Some Legal, Some Not,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at BI.
6. See supra note 1. For helpful background material refer to sources listed supra note 1,
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Comparatively few authors, however, have addressed whether LLC interests
should be considered securities. Those who have are divided on the issue of
whether LLC interests should be treated as securities.7
While commentators continue to debate whether LLC interests should be
treated as securities, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and a
number of state securities regulators have taken action. On March 24, 1994,
the SEC filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia against Vision Communications, Inc. and several related parties!
The SEC alleged that the defendants violated the antifraud, securities registra-
tion, and broker-dealer registration provisions of the federal securities laws by
selling membership units in a limited liability company.9 By the summer of
1995, the SEC had filed complaints against defendants in at least six unrelated
actions also alleging violations of the federal securities laws for selling inter-
ests in limited liability companies."0 An attorney with the SEC Division of
and see Limited Liability Company Bibliography in Chapter 7 of the SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra
note 1, at 7-1 to 7-6.
7. Treatises, articles, and commentaries addressing whether LLC interests constitute securi-
ties include I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-5 (proposing that there should
be at least a presumption against a "security" characterization for LLC interests or LLC interests
might be characterized as nonsecurities because LLC interests are closely held); MARK A.
SARGENT, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK ch. 3 (1993-94) (concluding that LLC inter-
ests are not securities in most instances); Donn, supra note 1, § 3.4, at PGLLC-16 (noting that the
determination depends on the circumstances of the particular case); S. Brian Farmer & Louis A.
Mezzullo, The Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 789, 828-30 (1991)
(suggesting courts will find an LLC interest a security if it satisfies the definition of investment
contract); Geu, Part Two, supra note 1, at 510-18, 520 (observing that there is no bright line test
and suggesting a case-by-case analysis depending on the organization and operating agreement);
Carol R. Goforth, Why Limited Liability Company Membership Interests Should Not Be Treated as
Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage this Result, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1994) (arguing an
LLC interest should not be treated as a security); Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 403-04 (stating
that the critical question is "whether profits are expected 'from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party"'); Joseph C. Long, Cellular Telephone and Wireless Cable Interests as Investment
Contracts, I Enforcement L. Rep. 86, 110-14 (1993) (stating that a unit in an LLC can be an
investment contract and therefore a security); John A. Peralta, Limited Liability Company Interests
as Securities, I Enforcement L. Rep. 29, 36 (1993) (LLC interests are usually securities); Larry E.
Ribstein, Form and Substance in the Definition of a "Security": The Case of Limited Liability
Companies, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807 (1994) (urging courts to hold that an interest in an
LLC is presumptively not a security); Mark A. Sargent, Will Limited Liability Companies Punch a
Hole in the Blue Sky?, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 429, 439-40 (1994) (proposing that evaluation should be
on a case-by-case basis, without a presumption that LLC interests are securities) [hereinafter
Sargent Blue Sky]; Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 1069 (1992) (arguing that LLC interests normally do not satisfy the definition of a
security) [hereinafter Sargent Article]; Marc I. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Lia-
bility Company as a Security, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1105 (1992) (arguing that LLC interests normally
are securities) [hereinafter Steinberg Article).
8. See SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC Docket
880, 1994 WL 96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994); Civil Action Against Vision Communications, Inc.,
SEC News Digest 94-56-4, 1994 WL 94496 (SEC) (Mar. 25, 1994); SEC Enforcement: Alleged
Boiler Room Sales of Interests in Cable Venture Subject to SEC Suit, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Mar.
28, 1994); Alleged Boiler Room Sales of Interests in Cable Venture Subject of SEC Suit, Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 662 (May 6, 1994).
9. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC Docket 880,
1994 WL 96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994).
10. SEC v. Irwin Harry Bloch, Litigation Release No. 14511, 59 SEC Docket 931, 1995 WL
317420 (SEC) (May 25, 1995); SEC v. United Communications, Ltd., Litigation Release No.
14477, 59 SEC Docket 424, 1995 WL 254714 (SEC) (Apr. 24, 1995); SEC v. American Interac-
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Enforcement stated that the SEC was evaluating a number of LLC operations
to determine whether such organizations were violating federal securities
laws.'
At least sixteen states have taken action under state securities laws against
entities offering or selling LLC interests. 2 In at least twelve states, state
courts or regulators have ordered LLC promoters to cease and desist from
offering or selling LLC interests in violation of state securities laws, based on
findings of sufficient evidence to conclude such LLC interests were securi-
ties. 3 In addition, a number of jurisdictions have adopted legislation that ei-
ther expressly states or implies that LLC interests are securities. For example,
the legislatures in eight states amended their securities laws to expressly state
that certain LLC interests may be securities. 4 The legislatures in seven states
have amended their securities law statutes to include references to LLCs. 5
tive Group, LLC, Litigation Release No. 14462, 59 SEC Docket 203, 1995 WL 229088 (SEC)
(Apr. 10, 1995); SEC v. Future Vision Direct Mktg., Inc., Litigation Release No. 14384, 58 SEC
Docket 1716, 1995 WL 25731 (SEC) (Jan. 18, 1995); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab.
Co., Litigation Release No. 14085, 56 SEC Docket 1974, 1994 WL 186833 (SEC) (May 16,
1994); Commission Obtains TRO Against Knoxville, LLC, SEC News Dig. 94-130-10, 1994 WL
328317 (SEC) (July 12, 1994). For a discussion of such actions see part I1.A.
11. John R. Emshwiller, SEC Sets Sights on Certain Limited Liability Companies, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 31, 1994, at B2.
12. Emshwiller, supra note 5. In November 1993, an article in the Wall Street Journal stated
that at least 16 states had filed legal actions against a variety of wireless cable and related com-
munications technology firms on the grounds that they had violated securities laws by offering or
selling LLC interests. Id.
13. Orders have been issued under the securities laws of Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, and Wis-
consin. Many are summary cease and desist orders. Some of these orders are available on either
Westlaw or Lexis. Unfortunately, many trial and administrative decisions are unreported. For ex-
ample, California and New York courts, as well as federal courts, frequently do not publish their
securities opinions. JOSEPH C. LONG, 12 BLUE SKY LAWS xi (1995). As a result, there may be
numerous orders relating to alleged violations of state securities laws for the offer and sale of LLC
interests that are not reported.
Table I of this article contains a summary of the various state actions either declaring that
LLC interests are securities or indicating that LLC interests may be securities. Table I is organized
by state and by case and provides the citation to each case. Table I sets forth the state action
taken, the securities law violations raised, and the securities law theories discussed. Finally, Table
I indicates whether the action was a summary order, or whether it resulted in written findings of
fact, conclusions of law, or an opinion.
14. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1995);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-2(V) (Michie Supp.
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § I-
102(t) (Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202a(14) (Supp. 1995); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 551.02(13)(c) (West Supp. 1995). Table 11 of this article contains a listing of the state statutes
that expressly address whether LLC interests are securities under state law. Table II is organized
alphabetically by state and provides the statutory citation, a short summary of the statutory provi-
sion, and the relevant statutory language.
15. For example, the following state securities laws include references to LLCs: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 36b-1 (West Supp. 1995) (general statement); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.207A(2)(a)
(West Supp. 1995) (expedited registration by filing for small issuers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
1262(l) (Supp. 1994) (exempt transactions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:709(12) (West Supp.
1995) (exempt transactions); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421 -B:1 I(11) (Supp. 1994) (registration
requirement); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:13(I) (Supp. 1994) (registration by coordination);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B: 17(ll)(k) (Supp. 1994) (registration exemption); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-04-05(4), (10), (11), (13) (1995) (exempt securities); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-06(4), (6),
(10), (14) (1995) (exempt transactions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-07(2)(b)(3) (1995) (registration
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These references imply that the offer and sale of LLC interests are subject to
such securities laws. 6 The legislatures in four states included provisions in
their limited liability company acts that raise the securities law issue. 7 Addi-
tionally, a 1993 survey of state securities regulators indicated that twenty-four
states had taken the position, either formally or informally, that LLC interests
may be securities under their state securities laws. 8 A more recent survey of
state laws, regulations, and securities administrators indicates that now at least
thirty-five states have taken that position, either formally or informally. 9
The outcome of federal and state LLC securities litigation, together with
the various legislative measures, is of great practical importance to practitio-
ners. If an LLC interest is a security, it triggers, among other things, securities
registration requirements, broker-dealer registration requirements, securities
fraud liability, and in some cases disclosure obligations." The SEC, state
securities commissioners, and private parties2' may bring suit for securities
law violations. Criminal liability may even be imposed under certain circum-
stances.
Absent legislative action, many LLC ownership interests probably will not
be deemed securities. It is highly unlikely that courts will hold ownership
interests in all LLCs are per se securities. Nevertheless, based on the litigation
to date, it appears highly likely courts will hold that ownership interests in
LLCs with certain characteristics are securities.22 As a result, the structure of
an LLC may determine whether an ownership interest is a security.
Part II of this article provides an overview of the current federal and state
LLC securities litigation. It describes the types of offerings targeted by the
government and outlines the common characteristics these LLC entities alleg-
edly share. Part III analyzes the various theories asserted by commentators,
federal regulators, and state regulators to bring such LLC offerings within the
by description); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(7)(b) (Michie Supp. 1995) (exempt transactions).
16. See supra note 15.
17. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(n) (1994) provides, "[n]othing in this chapter shall be
construed as establishing that a limited liability company interest is not a 'security'...." MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.5103 (West Supp. 1995) provides, "[an interest in a limited liability
company to which this act applies is a security to the same extent as an interest in a corporation,
partnership, or limited partnership is a security." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.185 (Vernon Supp. 1995)
states, "[it shall be rebuttably presumed that a member's interest in a limited liability company in
which management is not vested in one or more managers is not a security for purposes of any
and all laws of this state regulating the sale or exchange of securities." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 183.1303 (West Supp. 1995) provides, "[a]n interest in a limited liability company may be a
security ....
18. See Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 430-35.
19. See I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 1 6551; see also Tables 1, 1I, and III, infra, pp. 495-505.
20. See I RIBSrEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, §§ 14.02-14.03, at 14-6 to 14-12 (describing
federal and state requirements).
21. The author found only one reported case in which private parties alleged violations of
the securities laws in connection with the purchase or sale of an LLC interest. See Fransen v.
Terps Ltd. Liab. Co., 153 F.R.D. 655 (D. Colo. 1994) (seeking damages for violation of federal
and state securities laws in connection with the sale of membership interests in an LLC) (summary
judgment granted for defendants on other grounds). Although there are few reported cases, from
discussions with practitioners it appears that private parties are beginning to raise and litigate such
securities law claims.
22. See discussion infra parts IlIl.A, II1.B, and III.E.
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ambit of the securities laws. These theories include the investment contract
theory, risk capital analysis, the characteristics of stock test, the commonly
known as a security test, and state statutory grounds. Part III also presents
possible defenses to each of these theories. The discussion of each theory
concludes with the author's evaluation of the theory's applicability, and an
assessment of the arguments asserted and the defenses presented. Part IV
summarizes the analysis of these theories and discusses the author's conclu-
sions.
II. BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL AND STATE ACTIONS
Federal and state actions against LLC offerings have focused primarily on
entities selling interests in so-called "wireless cable" 3 and related communi-
cations technology. 4 Although such actions have been directed at wireless
communications companies, these cases indicate: (1) the type of LLC offering
the government is targeting; (2) the common characteristics these offerings
allegedly share; and (3) the types of claims raised by the government. But
even more importantly, these cases dispel certain myths and misconceptions
about LLCs.
For example, commentators have argued that LLC interests should not be
treated as securities because LLCs generally are closely held and member-
managed.2 5 They maintain that since most LLC members are actively en-
gaged in the management of the LLC, such investors are not dependent on the
efforts of others and therefore are not in need of the protection provided by
the securities laws. 6 They contend that LLC interests should not be treated as
securities because LLCs resemble general partnerships.27 General partnership
interests are presumed not to be securities because each partner retains control
over the management of the partnership."
The federal and state actions against LLCs illustrate that not all LLCs are
closely held or member-managed. In fact, some LLCs have hundreds of mem-
bers.29 These cases demonstrate that many LLC promoters have mass-market-
23. Wireless cable, also known as Super High Frequency Television ("SHFTV"), refers to a
method of transmitting video entertainment programming through the use of microwave radio
technology. SHFTV is a new broadcast system that uses microwave technology to transmit up to
32 video channels from a transmitter antenna to small rooftop antennas where signals are received
and sent to television sets for viewing. SHFTV technology allows wireless networks to broadcast
television programming similar to that offered by cable television companies. See Plaintiff Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Other Relief at 3 n.2, SEC v. Vision
Communications, Inc., No. 94-0615 (CRR), 1994 WL 326868 (D.D.C. May 11, 1994) [hereinafter
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision].
24. See, e.g., infra Table I pp. 495-98 (19 of the 23 state actions cited involve companies in
the telecommunications business).
25. See, e.g., I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note I, § 14.02, at 14-5; SARGENT HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-10 to 4-13.
26. See, e.g., I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-5 to 14-6.
27. See, e.g., l id. at 14-4; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-10 to 4-11.
28. See, e.g., Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986); Williamson v. Tucker,
645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
29. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 2, 7, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Sup-
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ed LLC offerings indiscriminately to the general public, using telemarketing
techniques, promotional mailings, and even television infomercials to induce
financially unsophisticated individuals to invest their retirement funds in LLC
ventures.3" The SEC and state regulators allege that such LLC investors often
have no practical control over their investment due to the number of investors,
the relatively small size of each investment, the geographic dispersion of the
investors, and the lack of sophistication of the typical investor.3 Such inves-
tors appear to be precisely the type of investors the securities laws were de-
signed to protect.
Prosecutors have targeted primarily LLC investment opportunities which
allegedly involved a relatively high degree of risk and were mass-marketed to
unsophisticated investors using high pressure sales techniques and claims of
immediate and exorbitant returns. 2 Admittedly, these egregious cases are not
representative of all LLCs, but they clearly demonstrate the inaccuracy of
common assumptions and generalizations that all LLCs are closely held and
member-managed. The following is an overview of several selected cases that
briefly describes the characteristics of these offerings, the claims raised by the




On March 24, 1994, the SEC filed suit against Vision Communications,
Inc., Wilkes-Barre-Scranton L.C., and two individual defendants.33 SEC v.
Vision Communications, Inc.34 was the first case in which the SEC sought a
judgment under the federal securities laws in connection with the offer and
sale of LLC interests.: The case raised an issue of first impression36 in the
federal courts: whether an LLC interest was a security and therefore subject to
federal securities laws.
port of Its Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Other Relief at 2,
SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., (No. 94-1079) (SSH) (D.D.C. May 16, 1994) [herein-
after Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg].
30. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 2, 4-6, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order at 3-4, SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., No. 94-0615 (CRR),
1994 WL 326868 (D.D.C. May 11, 1994) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Vision];
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Parkersburg at 2, 5, 7-8, 15, (No. 94-1079).
31. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 13, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Parkersburg at 15-16, (No. 94-1079).
32. See supra note 30.
33. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC Docket 880,
1994 WL 96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994).
34. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., No. 94-0615 (CRR), 1994 WL 326868 (D.D.C.
May 11, 1994).
35. Emshwiller, supra note 11.
36. See Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 12-14, SEC v. Vision Communications, No. 94-0615




The defendants in Vision Communications purportedly were developing a
wireless cable television system.37 They claimed to be selling interests in an
LLC to raise capital to obtain a license to install, operate, and market a super-
high-frequency-television system, or to purchase an interest in such a system
in the Wilkes-Barre-Scranton, Pennsylvania area."
The SEC alleged several violations of the federal securities laws. First, the
SEC maintained that membership units in the LLC constituted investment
contracts and as such were securities under the Securities Act of 1933'9 ("Se-
curities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 19 3 4'° ("Exchange
Act").4' Second, the SEC charged that the defendants offered and sold these
unregistered securities in violation of sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities
Act. 2 Third, the SEC asserted that the defendants engaged in the business of
selling the securities without registration as broker-dealers in violation of
section 15(a) of the Exchange Act.43 Finally, the SEC alleged that the defen-
dants made false and misleading statements about the LLC and its business
prospects in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act," section 10(b) of
37. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 3, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
38. Id. at 3, 5.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1994).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1994).
41. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 9-16, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
42. Id. at 1. Section 5(a) of the Securities Act provides:
Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through
the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security
for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
15 U.S.C. § 77e(a).
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or
otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security
15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
43. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Vision at 1, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). Section 15(a)
of the Exchange Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer ... to make use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transactions in, or to in-
duce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security ... unless such broker or
dealer is registered in accordance with [the Exchange Act].
15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1).
44. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Vision at 1-2, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
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the Exchange Act,4" and Rule lOb-5 promulgated under the Exchange Act.'
The SEC sought emergency relief, including a freeze on the defendants' as-
sets, a temporary restraining order, an order for a preliminary injunction, an
order for a permanent injunction, and civil penalties."
The SEC described the defendants' sales activities as a "boiler room oper-
ation"'  where sales people made cold calls and used high pressure sales
techniques49 to solicit scores of financially unsophisticated, geographically
dispersed investors." The solicited investors allegedly possessed little or no
business experience and included clerical workers, blue-collar workers, and
retirees, who were often induced to invest their retirement funds.5 The SEC
charged that the defendants made numerous false statements, including misrep-
resentations about immediate, exorbitant returns and the risks associated with
the investment.52 In response, the defendants argued that ownership interests
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
45. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 1-2, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails ... [tlo use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
46. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 1-2, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). Rule lOb-5
promulgated under the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
47. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Vision at 1, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
48. Id. at 1, 5. The term "boiler room" is usually used to refer to
a temporary operation established to sell a specific speculative security. Solicitation is by
telephone to new customers, the salesman conveying favorable earnings projections,
predictions of price rises and other optimistic prospects without a factual basis. The pro-
spective buyer is not informed of known or readily ascertainable adverse information; he
is not cautioned about the risks inherent in purchasing a speculative security; and he is
left with a deliberately created expectation of gain without risk.
Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 n.14 (2d Cir. 1969) (citations omitted).
49. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 5, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615) (alleging the
use of high pressure techniques, including "repeated telephone calls," that were "insistent and
aggressive").
50. Id. at 2, 5, 7, 13. The defendants' allegedly raised at least $1.25 million from about 125
investors nationwide. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 2, 7; Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Vision at 2-4, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615). According to the SEC, $759,000 in individual retirement account ("IRA") funds were trans-
ferred to the defendants to be invested in the LLC. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 7, 1994
WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
52. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 5-7, 14-15, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). The
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in LLCs were not securities and therefore not subject to the federal securities
laws or SEC jurisdiction.53 The defendants also denied any misconduct.5 4
They claimed that the investors were fully and accurately apprised of the risks
associated with the venture in the promotional literature and operating docu-
ments.5 The defendants pointed to carefully crafted operating provisions and
procedures intended to insure that the LLC interests would not be deemed
securities."
On March 24, 1994, the day the SEC filed its complaint, the United States
District Court granted the SEC's request for emergency relief.57 The court
froze all investor funds under the defendants' control and ordered that any
new funds raised be placed in an interest-bearing escrow account.58 After
taking the matter under advisement, on April 13, 1994, less than a month after
the SEC filed its complaint, the court ordered the defendants to immediately
cease offering or selling interests in the LLC pending trial.5 9
On May 11, 1994, the United States District Court entered a final judg-
ment permanently enjoining the defendants from future violations of the regis-
tration and antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.' The court,
however, made no findings of fact or conclusions of law.6 The defendants
agreed to the entry of a permanent injunction without admitting or denying the
allegations." The defendants also waived the entry of findings of facts and
conclusions of law.63 Although the SEC won its first battle and obtained a
judgment, the federal court did not issue an opinion on the securities law
issues. Nevertheless, the decision is significant because the granting of the
injunction indicates that the LLC interests were securities.
SEC charged, among other things, that the defendants falsely stated that the LLC had an opera-
tional 20 channel wireless cable system, the LLC had obtained all necessary regulatory approvals,
investors would receive 300% to 400% returns on their investment within three years, and the
risks of an investment in the LLC were extremely low. Id. at 5-7.
53. Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 1-2, 24, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
54. See id. at 2-3.
55. Id. at 3, 25-27.
56. See id. at 16-19.
57. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC Docket 880,
1994 WL 96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994); Civil Action Against Vision Communications, Inc., supra
note 8; SEC Enforcement: Alleged Boiler Room Sales of Interest in Cable Venture Subject to SEC
Suit, supra note 8.
58. See supra note 57.
59. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14054, 56 SEC Docket
1472, 1994 WL 148556 (SEC) (Apr. 18, 1994); Civil Action Against Vision Communications Inc.,
SEC News Digest 94-72-3, 1994 WL 131465 (Apr. 18, 1994).
60. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., No. 94-0615 (CRR), 1994 WL 326868, at *1-*2
(D.D.C. May 11, 1994); SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14081, 1994
WL 183414 (SEC), at *1 (May 11, 1994).
61. See Vision Communications, 1994 WL 326868, at *1 (final judgment); see also Vision
Communications, 1994 WL 183414 (SEC), at *1 (litigation release).
62. See Vision Communications, 1994 WL 326868, at *1 (final judgment); see also Vision
Communications, 1994 WL 183414 (SEC), at *1 (litigation release).
63. The defendants waived the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule
52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Vision Communications, 1994 WL 326868, at *1
(final judgment).
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2. Parkersburg, Knoxville, and Other SEC Actions
The SEC has taken action against a number of other wireless cable televi-
sion and communications ventures purportedly selling LLC interests. In SEC v.
Parkersburg Wireless Limited Liability Co., the defendants allegedly sold LLC
interests to raise capital to acquire or develop a wireless cable television sys-
tem in Parkersburg, West Virginia.' In SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, the defen-
dants allegedly sold LLC membership interests to acquire part of a wireless
cable television system in Knoxville, Tennessee.65
Parkersburg and Knoxville are mirror images of the Vision Communica-
tions case. As in Vision Communications, the SEC sought temporary restrain-
ing orders, preliminary injunctions, and other relief for violation of the federal
securities laws.' The SEC charged that the defendants violated the antifraud,
securities registration, and broker-dealer registration provisions of the federal
securities laws.67 In each case, the United States District Court quickly issued
temporary restraining orders." The court later entered preliminary injunctions
temporarily restraining and enjoining the defendants from violating the federal
securities laws, pending resolution of the action on the merits.' In each case,
the court entered final judgments permanently enjoining certain defendants
from future violations of the securities laws.7" However, because the defen-
dants had agreed to the injunctions and waived the entry of findings of facts
and conclusions of law, the federal court did not issue any opinion on the se-
curities law issues.
7'
64. Complaint, SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., (No. 94-1079) (SSH) (D.D.C.
May 16, 1994) [hereinafter Parkersburg Complaint]; SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co.,
Litigation Release No. 14085, 1994 WL 186833 (SEC) (May 16, 1994); SEC Suit Alleges Boiler
Room Scheme Involving Unregistered LLC Securities, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 775
(May 27, 1994); SEC Enforcement: SEC Suit Alleges Boiler Room Scheme Involving Unregistered
LLC Securities, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (May 24, 1994).
65. Complaint, SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, (No. 941073B) (RBB) (S.D. Cal. July 11, 1994)
[hereinafter Knoxville Complaint); Commission Obtains TRO Against Knoxville, LLC, et al., SEC
News Digest 94-130, 1994 WL 328317 (SEC) (July 12, 1994).
66. Parkersburg Complaint, (No. 94-1079); Knoxville Complaint, (No. 941073B).
67. Parkersburg Complaint, (No. 94-1079); Knoxville Complaint, (No. 941073B).
68. Temporary Restraining Order and Order Freezing Certain Assets and Granting Other
Relief, and Setting Hearing for Motion for Preliminary Injunction, SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, (No.
941073B) (RBB) (S.D. Cal. July 11, 1994); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., Litiga-
tion Release No. 14091, 1994 WL 194875 (SEC) (May 19, 1994); Temporary Restraining Order
and Order Freezing Certain Assets and Granting Other Relief, SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd.
Liab. Co., (No. 94-1079) (SSH) (D.D.C. May 18, 1994); Commission Obtains TRO Against Knox-
ville, LLC, et al., supra note 65; SEC Suit Alleges Boiler Room Scheme Involving Unregistered
LLC Securities, supra note 64; SEC Enforcement: SEC Suit Alleges Boiler Room Scheme Involving
Unregistered LLC Securities, supra note 64; Temporary Restraining Order Entered Against
Parkersburg Wireless LLC and Other Defendants, SEC News Digest 94-95-3, 1994 WL 195526
(May 20, 1994).
69. SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, Litigation Release No. 14538, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1594 (June 21,
1995); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., Litigation Release No. 14126, 56 SEC Docket
2534, 1994 WL 264301 (June 15, 1994); Court Enters Preliminary Bar in Alleged LLC Boiler
Room Scheme, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 982 (July 8, 1994); Preliminary Injunction
Entered Against Parkersburg Wireless LLC and Other Defendants, SEC News Dig. 94-113, 1994
WL 262956 (SEC) (June 16, 1994).
70. SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 94-1079 (JHP), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15006, at *1-*6 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1994); SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, Litigation Release No. 14538,
1995 SEC LEXIS 1594 (June 21, 1995).
71. SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 94-1079 (JHP), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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The SEC's allegations in Parkersburg and Knoxville parallel those in
Vision Communications. The SEC maintained that the LLC interests constitut-
ed investment contracts and were, therefore, securities.72 The SEC charged
that the defendants in both cases used high pressure sales tactics to solicit nu-
merous financially unsophisticated investors nationwide, who were induced to
invest their retirement funds through the use of false and misleading state-
ments.73
By the summer of 1995, the SEC had filed complaints against defendants
in at least four other unrelated actions also alleging federal securities law vio-
lations for selling interests in LLCs.74 One of the most publicized cases is an
action against Irwin "Sonny" Bloch, a "self-styled consumer advocate" and
nationally syndicated radio talk show host. Bloch has been charged in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York with de-
frauding investors of $3.8 million in connection with the sale of LLC member-
ship interests in radio stations. 75 Additional SEC enforcement actions against
entities and individuals offering and selling LLC interests are bound to fol-
low.76
B. State Actions
State securities commission actions against LLCs predate the SEC's first
suit in Vision Communications.77 Although federal cases tend to be more
15006, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1994); SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, Litigation Release No. 14538, 1995
SEC LEXIS 1594 (June 21, 1995).
72. See Knoxville Complaint at 1, (No. 941073B); Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Ex Parte Application for Tempo-
rary Restraining Order and Other Relief and Application for Preliminary Injunction and Other
Relief at 10-19, SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, (No. 941073B) (RBB) (S.D. Cal. July 11, 1994) [herein-
after Plaintiff's Memorandum in Knoxville]; Parkersburg Complaint at 2-3, (No. 94-1079);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 11-16, (No. 94-1079).
73. Knoxville Complaint at 1, 7-8, (No. 941073B); Plaintiffs Memorandum in Knoxville at
1-2, 4-7, (No. 941073B). The SEC alleges that the defendants raised $12 million from more than
575 investors in 48 states. Id. at 2-3. More than $2 million in individual retirement account funds
("IRAs") were invested in the LLC. Id. at 3; Parkersburg Complaint at 2, 9-10, (No. 94-1079);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 2, 4-7, (No. 94-1079). The SEC alleges that the defen-
dants in Parkersburg raised at least $10 million from hundreds of investors. Id. at 2. At least 333
investors invested $3.6 million in Parkersburg through IRAs. Id.
74. SEC v. Irwin Harry Bloch, Litigation Release No. 14511, 59 SEC Docket 931, 1995 WL
317420 (SEC) (May 25, 1995); SEC v. United Communications, Ltd., Litigation Release No.
14477, 59 SEC Docket 424, 1995 WL 254714 (SEC) (Apr. 24, 1995); SEC v. American Interac-
tive Group, LLC, Litigation Release No. 14462, 59 SEC Docket 203, 1995 WL 229088 (SEC)
(Apr. 10, 1995); SEC v. Future Vision Direct Mktg., Inc., Litigation Release No. 14384, 58 SEC
Docket 1716, 1995 WL 25731 (SEC) (Jan. 18, 1995).
75. SEC v. Irwin Harry Bloch, Litigation Release No. 14511, 59 SEC Docket 931, 1995 WL
317420 (SEC) (May 25, 1995).
76. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
77. For example, the Indiana Cease and Desist Order in In re Express Communications states
that North Dakota and South Dakota issued cease and desist orders against Express Communica-
tions on April 14, 1992, and February 27, 1992, respectively, two years before the SEC began to
take action against such wireless communication companies. Compare In re Express
Communictions, Inc., No. 93-0027 CD, 1993 Ind. Sec. LEXIS 46, at *8 (Mar. 23, 1993) (orders
issued in 1992) with SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC
Docket 880, 1994 WL 96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994) (first SEC action filed March 24, 1994).
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widely followed and carry more precedential value than similar state cases, 78
it appears the numerous state prosecutions of LLCs prompted the SEC to initi-
ate actions against LLCs under the federal securities laws. 79 In fact, the SEC
briefs in Vision Communications, Parkersburg, and Knoxville each catalog
state actions against LLC offerings in support of the SEC's claims."
Table I summarizes some of the actions taken under state securities laws
against defendants offering or selling LLC interests.8 Table I is organized by
state and indicates the action taken, the securities law violations raised, and
the theories of liability discussed." Action has been taken against LLCs un-
der state securities laws in Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Min-
nesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wisconsin. 3 Many other states have also taken action, but such lower court
and administrative securities decisions often are not reported.84 As a result,
the list in Table I may be only a small sampling of the state actions against
defendants offering or selling LLC interests.
The vast majority of these state actions involve defendants offering LLC
interests in wireless communication companies, such as cellular telephone
businesses, interactive video ventures, and wireless cable television systems. 5
State regulators charge that many of these wireless communication companies
are packaging their investment products as LLCs to avoid state and federal
securities laws. 6 State actions against these LLCs have been aimed at closing
down such wireless communication investment-sales operations.87
78. Most state securities statutes parallel, or are patterned after, the federal Securities Act
and the federal Exchange Act. Sauer v. Hays, 539 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); see
also People v. Schock, 199 Cal. Rptr. 327, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (stating California law was
patterned after the federal Securities Act). While state courts are not bound by federal law inter-
preting their state's securities statutes, state courts generally consider federal authority highly
persuasive. See, e.g., State v. Gunnison, 618 P.2d 604, 606-07 (Ariz. 1980); Schock, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 331; Lowery v. Ford Hill Inv. Co., 556 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Colo. 1976); Sauer, 539 P.2d at
1346-47; State v. Kershner, 801 P.2d 68, 69 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
79. A list of state actions is set forth in Table I, pp. 495-98 of this article. Four states
brought action against Parkersburg Wireless Limited Liability Company before the SEC brought
its action in the summer of 1994. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 9-10, (No. 94-
1079). Two states brought action against the two named individual defendants in Vision Communi-
cations before the SEC brought its action against them in Vision Communications. See Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Vision at 2-3, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). At least three states, South Da-
kota, South Carolina, and Iowa, issued cease and desist orders against Knoxville, LLC before the
SEC brought its action. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Knoxville at 7, (No. 941073B).
80. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 9-10, (No. 94-1079); Plaintiff's Memoran-
dum in Vision at 2-3, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615); Plaintiff's Memorandum in Knoxville at
7, (No. 941073B).
81. See infra Table I pp. 495-98.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See JOSEPH C. LONG, 12 BLUE SKY LAW xi (1992). For example, a Wall Street Journal
article reported that 16 states had filed actions against Express Communications, a company in-
volved in offering LLC interests in wireless communications companies. Emshwiller, supra note
5, at B2. However, WESTLAW and LEXIS reported only three such actions against Express
Communications. See infra Table I pp. 495-98, Illinois Express Action, Indiana Express Action,
and Washington Express Action.
85. See infra Table I pp. 495-98.
86. Emshwiller, supra note 5; Emshwiller, supra note 11.
87. Emshwiller, supra note 5; Emshwiller, supra note 11.
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In each of the cases listed in Table I, the state charged the defendants
offering LLC interests with violating securities registration and broker-dealer
registration provisions of state securities laws.8" In some cases, the state
charged the defendants with violating antifraud provisions as well.89 In every
case, the trier of fact found sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendants
violated state securities laws in offering or selling LLC interests. 9w The defen-
dants did not prevail in any of the actions reported. 9' Unfortunately, the ma-
jority of these cases involved the issuance of summary cease and desist or-
ders.92 Often the trier of fact either cited no legal theory, or simply made a
conclusory finding that the LLC interest was an investment contract and
therefore constituted a security.93
III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY AND POSSIBLE DEFENSES
The securities laws apply only if a transaction involves a security. 9'
While there are some differences, the basic definition of a "security" in the
Securities Act,95 the Exchange Act96 and under state securities laws97 is the
same. 9 The term "security" generally covers a broad range of transactions,
but there is no single test for determining what constitutes a security. 99 Each
88. See infra Table I pp. 495-98 (see column labeled "Securities Law Violations Ad-
dressed").
89. Id.
90. See infra Table 1 pp. 495-98 (see column labeled "Action Taken").
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See infra Table I pp. 495-98 (see column labled "Legal Theories Discussed"); see also In
re UEG, L.C., No. 93E068, 1993 WL 208898 (Kan. Sec. Comm'r) (May 12, 1993) (no legal
theory discussed); In re Hancock Communications Riverside PCS, No. 93E-058, 1993 WL 145928
(Kan. Sec. Comm'r) (Apr. 14, 1993) (conclusory finding that LLC interest was an investment con-
tract).
94. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, 3 SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 2.02
(1990).
95. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1994).
96. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994).
97. Thirty-five states have adopted securities acts based on the 1956 version of the Uniform
Securities Act, which was amended in 1958. UNIF. SEC. ACT (1958), 7B U.L.A. 154 (Supp. 1995).
Six states have adopted securities acts based on the 1985 revision of the Uniform Securities Act,
which was amended in 1988. UNIF. SEC. ACT (1988), 7B U.L.A. 87 (Supp. 1995). Therefore,
forty-one jurisdictions have adopted acts modeled on the Uniform Securities Act. The 1956 Uni-
form Securities Act and the 1985 Uniform Securities Act shall be referred to collectively herein as
the Uniform Securities Acts. The term "security" is defined in § 401(1) of the 1956 Uniform Secu-
rities Act and in § 101(16) of the 1985 Uniform Securities Act. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(l) (1958),
7B U.L.A. 580-81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16) (1988), 7B U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995).
98. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16), 7B
U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(l), 7B U.L.A. 580-81 (1985). The definition of
"security" in the Uniform Securities Act is modeled after the definition in § 2(1) of the federal
Securities Act. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(l), 7B U.L.A. 583 cmt. (1985). The definition of "security"
in § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act is virtually identical to the definition in § 2(1) of the Securities
Act. See infra note 99. Further, the United States Supreme Court stated that the definition of "se-
curity" will be treated as identical for purposes of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.l (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 342 (1967).
99. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 2 SECURITIES REGULATION 871 (3d ed. 1989 & 1994
Supp.); see also statutory definitions of "security," supra note 98. For example, § 2(1) of the
Securities Act, which is virtually identical to the definition in § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act and
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of the acts sets forth a list of specific instruments that are considered securi-
ties, such as stocks, bonds, notes, and debentures."m The statutory definitions
also include a number of catch-all phrases for instruments that do not fit into
the conventional categories, such as "certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement," "investment contract," and any "instrument
commonly known as a 'security."""'
Although a few states have amended their state law definition of a "secu-
rity" to include interests in limited liability companies, 102 the federal acts and
the securities laws in most states do not expressly list interests in limited lia-
bility companies. 3 Since LLC interests generally are not included in the
enumerated list of interests and instruments that constitute securities under the
federal securities acts or the Uniform Securities Acts,"°4 LLC promoters and
commentators argue that LLC interests are not securities. °5
The SEC, state regulators, and commentators counter that LLC promoters
may not use formalistic devices to insulate what is in substance a security
from the application of the securities laws."m They argue that the United
the definitions in the Uniform Securities Acts, provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. §77b(l).
Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act defines a security in substantially the same manner
except (i) it does not contain a reference to "evidence of indebtedness," (ii) it excludes from the
definition short-term "commercial paper," and (iii) it uses a slightly different approach to classify
oil and gas interests. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
100. See supra note 99, definition of security in § 2(1) of the Securities Act; 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10); UNIF. SEC. ACT. § 401(1) (1958), 7B U.L.A. 580-81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT. §
101(16) (1988), 7B U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995).
101. See supra note 100. These general catch-all phrases are not defined in the federal securi-
ties acts or the Uniform Securities Acts. As a result, the courts have been left to define these
terms.
102. The legislatures in Alaska, California, Indiana, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin amended the definition of security in their state securities laws to expressly
include certain LLC interests. See supra note 14. The statutory language of these provisions is set
forth infra Table 11 pp. 499-501. Commentators argue that the enumeration of certain LLC inter-
ests in the list of instruments constituting securities does not result in LLC interests becoming
securities per se. For a discussion of this issue and the various defenses see infra parts III.E.2,
III.E.3.
103. See statutory definitions of "security," supra notes 97-99.
104. See statutory definitions of "security," supra notes 97-99.
105. See, e.g., Opposition to Plaintiff SEC's Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Other Relief and Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 11-12, SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless
Ltd. Liab. Co., (No. 94-1079) (SSH) (D.D.C. filed May 16, 1994) [hereinafter Defendants' Memo-
randum in Parkersburg].
106. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 10, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615) (cit-
ing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981));
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 12, (No. 94-1079) (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422);
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States Supreme Court has rejected the use of rigid, formalistic analysis to
determine whether an instrument constitutes a security. 7 Courts have broad-
ly construed the securities acts to extend to "[n]ovel, uncommon or irregular
devices" '' 8 in an attempt to reach the "countless and variable schemes de-
vised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits.' 9
The SEC, state regulators, and commentators assert that LLC interests are
securities because they fall into the general catch-all categories that have been
left to the courts to define."' They argue that LLC interests are securities
because they (i) constitute an investment contract;"' (ii) meet the re-
quirements of the risk capital test adopted by some states;'2 (iii) possess the
characteristics of stock;"' (iv) constitute an instrument commonly known as
a security;" 4 or (v) are subject to liability on state statutory grounds. ' 5 The
following sections discuss these various theories, present possible defenses,
and conclude with the author's evaluation of each theory.
A. Investment Contract Theory
1. Arguments Asserted
The SEC"6 and at least twenty-three state securities commissions" 7
have taken the position that certain LLC interests constitute securities under
the investment contract test set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. '" Section
2(1) of the Securities Act," 9 section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act 2" and
most state securities laws' 2' provide that an "investment contract" is a securi-
ty. In Howey, the United States Supreme Court set forth a four-prong test to
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Knoxville at 10, (No. 941073B) (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422).
107. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
108. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
109. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; infra parts III.A-D.
111. See infra part III.A.
112. See infra part III.B.
113. See infra part III.C.
114. See infra part III.D.
115. See infra part III.E.
116. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 10-13, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 12-16, (No. 94-1079); Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Knoxville at 10-14, (No. 941073B).
117. See I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 916551; see also infra Table I pp. 495-98 (see columns
labeled "Legal Theories Discussed" and "Action Taken" for associated citations); infra Table III
pp. 502-05 (discussion of Connecticut release, Indiana policy statement, Kansas interpretive opin-
ion, Minnesota interpretive opinion, Montana opinion letter, Oklahoma exemption request, South
Carolina statement of policy, South Dakota Division of Securities letter, Tennessee statement of
policy, and Wyoming interpretative opinion).
118. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1). For the text of § 2(1), see supra note 99.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). For a comparison of the text of § 2(1) of the Securities Act and
§ 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, see supra note 99.
121. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(l) (1958), 7B U.L.A. 580-81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16)
(1988), 7B U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995). For a discussion of the state law definitions of a "security,"
see supra notes 97-99.
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determine whether an interest is an "investment contract."'22 The Court stat-
ed, "an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a con-
tract, transaction or scheme whereby a person [1] invests his money, [2] in a
common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits [4] solely from the efforts
of a promoter or a third party .. 2 '
The following is a discussion of each of the four elements of the Howey
investment contract test, which includes an overview of how courts have inter-
preted each element and an analysis of whether an LLC interest is likely to
meet each requirement. The analysis indicates that LLC interests typically
meet the first three prongs of the Howey test; therefore, the key issue in de-
termining whether an LLC interest is a security usually depends on whether
profits are expected from the efforts of a promoter or a third party. Conse-
quently, most of the discussion in this section focuses on the fourth prong of
the Howey test, with particular emphasis on the arguments asserted by the
SEC and state securities regulators, who have claimed that certain LLC in-
terests are securities.
a. Investment of Money
Courts have broadly interpreted the investment of money requirement.'24
It is clear that the investor need not invest cash.'25 All that is required is that
the purchaser give up some tangible and definable consideration.'26 Such
consideration may be goods or services.'27 In fact, anything constituting legal
consideration under contract law is probably sufficient to meet the investment
of money requirement.'
An investment in an LLC normally would satisfy the first prong of the
Howey investment contract test. While the LLC statutes do not require mini-
mum contributions in exchange for membership interests, 29 members usually
agree as to what and how much property or services each member will con-
122. See W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298-99.
123. Id. The definition of "security" in § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act is virtually identical to
the definition in § 2(1) of the Securities Act. See supra note 99. The United States Supreme Court
has stated that the definition of "security" will be treated as identical for purposes of both the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Supra note 98. As a result, even though the Howey Court
expressly addressed the definition of "investment contract" under the Securities Act, the same
four-prong test is used to interpret "investment contract" in the Exchange Act and in many state
securities laws. See supra notes 78, 98.
124. See infra note 127.
125. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the United States
Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that to meet the definition of an "investment con-
tract" the investment must take the form of cash. Id. at 560 n.12.
126. Id. at 560.
127. See, e.g., Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976) (providing credit for a
loan); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir.) (supplying collateral for a
loan), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); Harris v. Republic Airlines, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) R 93,772 (D.D.C. May 19, 1988) (specific wage concessions); Sandusky Land, Ltd. v.
Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (services).
128. Carl W. Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a "Security," in GLOBAL CAPITAL MAR-
KETS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES 105, 109 (Franklin E. Gill ed., 1991). But see Ameri-
can Grain Ass'n v. Canfield, Burch & Mancuso, 530 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D. La. 1982).
129. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 5.03, at 5-4.
[Vol. 73:2
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
tribute to the enterprise. 3 ' Most LLC statutes are broadly phrased so that
cash, property, or services constitute eligible contributions. 3' Member contri-
butions are often important in determining each member's rights.'32 In the
SEC actions and the state actions noted in Table I, investors contributed cash
to the LLC ventures at issue.'33
b. Common Enterprise
Generally all courts agree that the common enterprise prong of the Howey
test'34 is satisfied when there is a pooling of interests of several investors
who share an investment risk with each other.33 This type of pooling of
multiple investors' interests is known as "horizontal commonality."' 36 Such
an arrangement will usually satisfy any version of the Howey test.'37
Courts disagree, however, on whether "vertical commonality" is suffi-
cient.'38 Vertical commonality requires only that one investor and one pro-
moter be involved in some common enterprise.'39 Some courts require a
130. Id. at 5-4 to 5-5.
131. Id. § 5.04, at 5-5.
132. Id. § 1.04, at 1-4, § 5.02, at 5-2.
133. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 2, 4, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Parkersburg at 2, 5, 13, (No. 94-1079); Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Knoxville at 3, 11, (No. 941073B); In re Express Communications, Inc., No. 9200106, 1993 WL
566300, at *17 (II. Sec. Dep't) (Dec. 13, 1993) [hereinafter Illinois Express Action]; Report and
Recommendation of Referee at 51, Cleland v. Express Communications, Inc., No. 50-93-0075 (Ga.
Mar. 23, 1994) [hereinafter Georgia Express Action].
134. For in-depth discussions of the common enterprise test and related case law, see 2 Loss
& SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 927-35; Carl W. Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a "Securi-
ty": A 1990 Update, in GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES 119,
120-21 (Franklin E. Gill ed., 1991); Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1108-09 & n.21-23, 26;
John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, "Common Enterprise" Element of Howey Test to Determine
Existence of Investment Contract Regulable as "Security" Within Meaning of Federal Securities
Act of 1933 (15 USCS §§ 77a et seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCS §§ 78a et
seq.), 90 A.L.R. FED 825 (1988).
135. MARC 1. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW § 2.02, at 22 (1989); Schneider,
supra note 134, at 120; Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1108 n.22 (quoting STEINBERG, supra,
at 250).
136. See supra note 135. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold that a showing of hor-
izontal commonality is required to meet the common enterprise test. See, e.g., Hart v. Pulte
Homes of Mich. Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Union Planters Nat'l Bank v.
Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1183 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1124 (1981)); Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir.
1982); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972).
137. See supra note 135.
138. See Long v. Schultz Cattle Co., Inc., 881 F.2d 129, 140 & n.l I (5th Cir. 1989); 2 Loss
& SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 928-35 & n.130; STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02, at 22;
Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1108-09. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have expressly
rejected the view that horizontal commonality is required to meet the common enterprise test.
Long, 881 F.2d at 140. These circuits have found vertical commonality sufficient. See, e.g.,
Villeneuve v. Advanced Business Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11 th Cir. 1983), affd en
banc, 730 F.2d 1403 (11 th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79
(5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). Some state statutes expressly state that vertical commonality is suffi-
cient to meet the common enterprise requirement. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-
201(17) (West 1995).
139. STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02, at 22; Schneider, supra note 134, at 121; Steinberg
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showing of horizontal commonality, rather than vertical commonality alone, to
satisfy the common enterprise test."
An investment in an LLC would normally meet the common enterprise
requirement. Most LLC statutes require an LLC to have more than one owner
or two or more members. 4' In the typical LLC venture, multiple investors
pool their contributions and share the risk of the venture. Under such circum-
stances there is horizontal commonality and the common enterprise element of
the Howey test is met.
Probably the only instance in which an LLC would not meet the horizon-
tal commonality test is when it had only one owner or member. LLC statutes
in at least seven states permit an LLC to be formed with only one owner and
do not require the LLC to have more than one member.'42 Even though a
number of statutes permit this structure, the typical LLC will usually have
more than one member. Also, if there is at least one investor and one promot-
er, the venture may still meet the vertical commonality test which is sufficient
to meet the common enterprise requirement in many circuits.'43 In the SEC
actions, for example, prosecutors alleged both horizontal commonality and ver-
tical commonality were present because each investor received a pro rata share
of the profits generated through operation or sale of the LLC venture and,
therefore, the common enterprise element was satisfied.'"
c. Expectation of Profits
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,'45 the United States Su-
preme Court elaborated on the expectation of profits element of the Howey
test. 46 The Court noted that in referring to profits it has meant either capital
appreciation from the development of the initial investment,41 or a participa-
Article, supra note 7, at 1109.
140. Long, 881 F.2d at 140-41; STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02, at 22; Steinberg Article,
supra note 7, 1108-09 & n.23. The theoretical and practical problems presented by requiring only
horizontal commonality are discussed in 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 930-31; James D.
Gordon III, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contractual Theory for Defining In-
vestment Contracts and Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 635, 660-63.
141. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 4.03, at 4-3 to 4-4.
142. Id. at 4-3 n.8. At least one commentator, Allan Donn, warns that a single member LLC
is not advisable, even if state LLC statutes permit such a structure. Mr. Donn notes that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service ("IRS") has not announced how a single member LLC will be taxed, there-
fore, there is a substantial risk that the IRS will classify such an LLC as a corporation for tax
purposes. Dorm, supra note 1, § 4.3, at PGLLC-17 to -18.
143. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. The broader version of the vertical com-
monality approach only requires some relationship between the investor's success or failure and
the promoter's efforts. Under a narrower version of the vertical commonality test, there must be a
direct relationship between the investor's profit and loss and the promoter's profit and loss. See id.
144. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 11-12, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 940615);
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Parkersburg at 13-14, (No. 94-1079); Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Knoxville at 11-12, (No. 941073B); see also Illinois Express Action at *16, 1993 WL 566300
(No. 9200106).
145. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
146. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-58.
147. Id. at 852. To illustrate the capital appreciation concept, the Court cited SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), which involved the "sale of oil leases conditioned on
[the] promoters' agreement to drill [an] exploratory well." Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
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tion in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds." The Court
stressed that the critical inquiry is the motive of the purchaser.'49 If an inves-
tor is attracted by the prospect of a return on his investment, the expectation
of profits element is met. 5" However, when a purchaser is motivated to use
or consume the item purchased, the expectation of profits element is not
met.'
5'
In most situations, an investor contributes to an LLC venture expecting to
make a profit from either capital appreciation or earnings.'52 Generally, there
is no problem establishing the expectation of profits element. " For example,
in the SEC actions, prosecutors presented evidence that promoters enticed
investors by promises of enormous and immediate returns in brochures and
sales calls, thereby demonstrating that purchasers were motivated to invest
because of the expectation of profits.'54 Even though state LLC statutes do
not expressly require LLCs to be operated for profit, " and some states even
appear to permit not-for-profit LLCs,'56 the vast majority of LLCs are oper-
ated for profit.'57
d. Solely from the Efforts of Others
The final element of the Howey test is that the investor must expect prof-
its to be derived "solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third party."'
58
In applying the Howey test, lower federal courts have rejected a literal inter-
148. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. To illustrate the concept of participation in earnings, the Court
cited Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1967), where "dividends on the investment
[were] based on a savings and loan association's profits." Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
149. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53.
150. Id. at 852 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946)). Lower court
opinions have held that "the promotion of an investment 'largely for tax advantages' may consti-
tute an "expectation of profits." Also, "'the prospect of tax benefits resulting from initial losses
does not necessarily detract from an expectation of profits."' 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99,
at 937 & nn.150-51.
151. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53. For example, in Forman, the Court held that the sale of
stock to tenants in a cooperative housing project did not constitute the sale of securities since such
tenants purchased the stock for "personal consumption, [as] living quarters for personal use." Id. at
858. Similarly, the Court noted that the purchase of real estate would not constitute the purchase
of a security if the purchaser desired to "'occupy the land or develop it [himself]."' Id. at 852-53
(quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946)).
152. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1110.
153. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-2; Peralta, supra note 7, at 41.
154. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 5-6, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 6, (No. 94-1079); Plaintiffs Memorandum in Knoxville
at 5-6, (No. 941073B).
155. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 16.07, at 16-29; Donn, supra note 1, § 4.5, at
PGLLC- 18.
156. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 16.07, at 16-29 & n.119; Donn, supra note 1,
§ 4.5, at PGLLC-18.
157. Commentator Allan Donn argues that even though some state LLC statutes do not ex-
pressly require LLCs to be operated for profit, there may be an implied "for profit" requirement if
the statute sets forth the permitted businesses in which an LLC may engage. Mr. Donn cautions
that even if not-for-profit LLCs are permitted by state law, an LLC that does not conduct a busi-
ness and have a profit objective risks losing the tax advantages associated with an LLC. Donn,
supra note 1, § 4.5, at PGLLC-18.
158. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
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pretation of the word "solely." Ten circuits have adopted a more liberal and
flexible interpretation, simply requiring proof that "the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." '59
As a result, many courts have found an investment constituted a security, even
when the investor was required to participate to some extent, provided his
efforts were not the undeniably significant ones."'
While the United States Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on
whether the term "solely" should be interpreted literally, 6' the Court deleted
the term "solely" in its restated formulation of the Howey test.'62 Also, the
Court's repeated direction to evaluate transactions in light of economic reali-
ties and the ease with which the securities laws could be circumvented if the
"solely" language were interpreted literally suggests that when faced with the
question, the Court will adopt the more liberal and flexible interpretation.'63
Since most LLCs involve an investment of money in a common enterprise
with the expectation of profits," 4 the pivotal issue in determining whether an
LLC interest is a security becomes whether profits are expected "solely from
the efforts of others." If profits are to come substantially from the efforts of
others, the interest may be a security. On the other hand, if profits are to come
from the joint efforts of the members, the interest may not be a security. 65
So whether an LLC interest is a security depends, in part, on the management
structure of the LLC, the allocation of management control, and the relation-
ship among investors and third parties.
159. This more liberal and flexible test is set forth in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc.,
474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). The more liberal interpretation of
the term "solely" has been adopted by nine other circuits. Rivanna Trawlers, Unlimited v. Thomp-
son Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 n.4 (4th Cir. 1988); SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d
349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 831 (1984); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982); Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir.
1982); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch
Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d
912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976).
160. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479, 485 (5th Cir. 1974);
Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d at 482.
161. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975).
162. In Forman, the United States Supreme Court restated the Howey test as follows: "The
touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expec-
tation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Id. at 852.
The restated test is repeated in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561
(1979).
163. SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982).
164. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-2; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra
note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-10.
165. Cf 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 961-63 (analogous discussion distinguishing




In literature promoting the use of LLCs, commentators have touted the
LLC as a highly flexible entity which allows the owners of the business to set
up management of the entity as they please." s While most LLC statutes pro-
vide that management is vested in the members of the LLC,' 67 the statutes
generally allow the members to opt out of the member-managed form and
adopt a corporate-style centralized management structure by agreement.'" In
other words, the LLC members can choose to manage the LLC directly them-
selves or delegate full or partial responsibility for management to a manager
or group of managers. 69 Typically, such managers are not required to be
members. 7
In a very closely held, member-managed LLC in which each member is
financially sophisticated and participates actively in the venture, the LLC inter-
est is probably not a security under the Howey investment contract test.' 7'
But not all LLCs are closely held or member-managed. Some LLCs have hun-
dreds of members. In some cases, members have placed controlling power in
the hands of promoters or third parties.' The structure of such LLCs often
resembles a corporation or a limited partnership where investors are passive
participants. The key inquiry in such situations becomes whether "the efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones,
those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise."'7 Given the flexibility of the LLC management structure, wheth-
er an LLC is a security under the investment contract test depends on the facts
and circumstances of the particular investment arrangement.
[2] Allocation of Management Control
If, for example, an LLC's articles of organization or operating agreement
allocate members' powers as in a limited partnership, the LLC interest may be
a security.' 4 Limited partnership interests are normally considered securities
under the Howey investment contract test.'75 This is because limited partners
166. See, e.g., SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-4.
167. Most LLC statutes provide that the entity will be managed by LLC members, unless the
articles of organization provide otherwise. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 1.05, at 1-4;
SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1-13 n.38; Donn, supra note 1, § 10, at PGLLC-36 to -37.
Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas permit management by separate managers, as in
corporations. I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 8.02, at 8-2, IS-47 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
168. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 1.05, at 1-4; Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at
390.
169. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1-4; Donn, supra note 1, § 10, at PGLLC-37.
170. Donn, supra note 1, § 10, at PGLLC-37; Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 397.
171. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-2.
172. See, e.g., Emshwiller, supra note 11; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Vision at 2-4, 12-13,
1994 WL 326868 (No. 940615); Plaintiffs Memorandum in Parkersburg at 2, 14-15, (No. 94-
1079).
173. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
174. Cf. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423 (5th Cir.) (indicating that if an agreement
allocates partnership power as in a limited partnership, such an arrangement may be held to be an
investment contract), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
175. See, e.g., L&B Hosp. Ventures, Inc. v. Healthcare Int'l, Inc., 894 F.2d 150, 151 (5th
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have little or no authority to participate in the management of the partner-
ship. "'76 In fact, to insure their status as limited partners and to preserve their
limited liability, it is essential that they not participate in the management of
the partnership.' Also, limited partners cannot ordinarily dissolve a partner-
ship nor do they have the power to bind other partners."' Limited partners,
therefore, are presumed to depend on the efforts of others.'79 Consequently,
if an LLC is structured as a limited partnership, it is likely that an interest in
such an LLC is a security. 80
But what about situations where the articles of organization or operating
agreement allocates management powers to each member? LLC promoters
argue that under such circumstances each member has the ability to protect his
or her investment and exercise his or her managerial rights.'' The mere
delegation of certain powers does not undermine such rights.8 2 Because the
investors are ultimately in control and, therefore, not dependent on the efforts
of others, there is no investment contract and no security.' 83
The SEC and state regulators argue that the grant of certain management
powers in an operating document should not immunize an LLC from charges
that its interests are securities. For example, the operating documents of some
LLCs grant their members management powers, but those same LLCs have
hundreds of geographically-dispersed, unsophisticated members who have
delegated control of the entity to promoters or third parties.8 4 The SEC and
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 (1990); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-08 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 2.05[2] (citing nu-
merous authorities).
176. Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., 3 BLOOMENTHAL,
supra note 94, § 2.0512], at 2-50.
177. See, e.g., 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 2.05[2].
178. Youmans, 791 F.2d at 346.
179. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-10.
180. Cf supra note 174. Limited partnership interests are considered securities under the
investment contract test because of the limited partners' (1) lack of management control, (2) limit-
ed liability, (3) lack of dissolution powers, and (4) lack of power to bind. See supra notes 175-78.
An LLC may be structured to resemble a limited partnership. As indicated in the text, an operat-
ing agreement can delegate substantial authority to managers, leaving LLC members with little or
no control. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text; see also SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra
note 1, § 4.02t1], at 4-11. Members of an LLC also have limited personal liability. SARGENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 2.02(1], at 2-3; Donn, supra note 1, § 1, at PGLLC-6,
§ 6.2, at PGLLC-30. Dissolution provisions of LLC acts typically are modeled after the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act dissolution provisions. Donn, supra note 1, § 12.2, at PGLLC-45
to -46. Also, an LLC member's power to bind can be restricted by a provision in the articles of
organization or elsewhere. I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 8.06, at 8-17.
181. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 16-19, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615); cf Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating
that when a partnership agreement allocates powers to general partners and those powers provide
the general partners with the ability to protect their investment, then the presumption is that the
partnership is not a security).
182. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 19, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
cf Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423 (5th Cir.) ("The delegation of rights and duties [by
partners]-standing alone-does not give rise to the sort of dependence on others which underlies
the third prong of the Howey test."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
183. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 16-19, 24, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615); cf Banghart, 902 F.2d at 808.
184. See, e.g., supra note 172.
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state regulators charge that interests in such LLCs are securities since the
members expect to receive profits from the efforts of others.' s5 In making
their case that such members are in fact relying on the efforts of others, the
SEC and state prosecutors have focused on three factors: (1) the lack of so-
phistication of certain investors; (2) the special management or entrepreneurial
skill supplied by promoters or third parties; and (3) the lack of control the
investors have over the investment as a practical matter.' 6
For example, in many of the LLC communications ventures targeted by
the SEC and state regulators, prosecutors claimed investors had little or no
business experience.' 7 Members included retirees, clerical workers, and
blue-collar workers unfamiliar with business operations or communications
technology.' 8 The promotional materials distributed to investors often touted
the experience and background of the management team and even informed
investors that their roles would be similar to shareholders.'89 While the oper-
ating documents were carefully drafted so that members retained certain man-
agement powers, '" prosecutors argued that the investors had no practical
control over their investment.'9 ' Prosecutors maintained that because mem-
bers were so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business, they were inca-
pable of intelligently exercising any managerial control.'92 As a result, mem-
bers were dependent on the promoters or managers. The SEC also charged
that the promoters solicited primarily unsophisticated, individual investors who
were geographically dispersed. Given the number of investors, the compara-
tively small size of each investment, and the geographic distribution of inves-
tors, the SEC argued it was highly unlikely such investors could exercise any
meaningful control over the LLC."9 The SEC therefore concluded that the
investors were required to rely on the efforts of others.9 '
(a) Partnership Case Law
In support of their position that such LLC interests are securities, prosecu-
tors have relied on a line of cases that deals with when partnership interests
185. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 14-15, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 14-15, (No. 94-1079).
186. Commentator Carl Schneider has noted that in applying the fourth prong of the Howey
test, courts may examine any or all of these three factors. Schneider, supra note 134, at 122. In its
briefs, the SEC has focused on all three factors. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at
12-13, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615); Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 14-15, (No.
94-1079); see also Illinois Express Action at *4, *14, 1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
187. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Memorandum in Vision at 2, 12, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
188. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Vision at 3-4, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615).
189. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 4, 12, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
190. Id. at 13.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.; cf Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423 (5th Cir.) (stating that with respect to
partnership interests, "at some point there would be so many partners that a partnership vote
would be more like a corporate vote, each partner's role having been diluted to the level of a
single shareholder in a corporation"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
194. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 12, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
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and joint ventures interests may be securities.'95 These cases focus primarily
on the economic reality of the transaction and the relationship among inves-
tors. The seminal case in this area is Williamson v. Tucker.'9 In Williamson,
the court noted that even if the investor retains some managerial control, the
investment may still be a security if the investor can demonstrate "he was so
dependent on the promoter or on a third party that he was in fact unable to
exercise meaningful [managerial] powers."'97 The Williamson court described
three situations where such an interest may constitute a security: (1) if the
agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the inves-
tors that the arrangement distributes power as would a limited partnership; (2)
if the investor is "so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs
that he is incapable of intelligently exercising" his managerial powers; and (3)
if the investor is "so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial
ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the
enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful" managerial power.9" The Wil-
liamson court also recognized that other factors could give rise to dependence
on the promoter or manager so that the exercise of control would be effec-
tively precluded.' 99
In support of their contention that certain LLC interests may be securities,
prosecutors cite cases"° such as Siebel v. Scott,"' SEC v. Professional
Associates, 2 SEC v. International Loan Network, Inc.," and SEC v.
Aqua-Sonic Products Corp."°4 In Siebel, the Fifth Circuit held that limited
partnership interests in a cable television system were securities because the
limited partners did not plan or desire to participate in the operation of the
system and viewed themselves as simply investors relying on the managerial
skills of the general partner to bring in profits. 5 In Professional Associates,
the Sixth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding
that interests in a joint venture to exploit leased phonographic master tapes
were securities because at least some of the investors were entirely passive
and relied on the expected efforts and expertise of the venture's manager.2
In International Loan Network, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
held that an investment in a financial distribution network constituted a securi-
ty because investors looked predominantly to others to generate profits. 2 7 In
Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., the Second Circuit held that licenses for the sale
195. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 12-13, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 14-16, (No. 94-1079).
196. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.) (analyzing whether the purchase of joint venture interests in
parcels of undeveloped real estate were securities), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
197. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 424 n.15.
200. See supra note 195.
201. 725 F.2d 995 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984).
202. 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984).
203. 968 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
204. 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982).
205. Siebel, 725 F.2d at 998-99.
206. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d at 357.
207. International Loan Network, 968 F.2d at 1308.
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of certain dental devices were securities, even though investors retained some
legal rights over distribution, because the promoters of the scheme sought to
attract only passive investors.0 8
(b) State Interpretative Opinions
Prosecutors' arguments are bolstered further by interpretative opinions
issued by state securities regulators. A 1993 survey of state securities regula-
tors indicated that as many as fourteen state securities agencies had taken the
position, either formally or informally, that LLC interests may be investment
contracts under their state securities laws.2" A more recent survey of state
securities regulators and state policy statements indicates that now at least
twenty state securities agencies have taken that position, either formally or
informally.2 Of these, at least ten state regulatory agencies have issued for-
mal opinions stating that LLC interests may be securities under their state
laws.2 State securities agencies in nine states have stated in policy state-
ments, opinions or no-action letters that whether an LLC interest is a security
in their state turns on the facts-and-circumstances investment contract analy-
sis.2"2 Specifically, the key issue is whether profits are expected to be de-
rived substantially through the efforts of others.2 3 These opinions indicate
208. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d at 585.
209. See Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 431 & n.14.
210. See I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) J 6551.
211. Limited liability company interpretative release, IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9 14,562
(Conn. Aug. 24, 1994) [hereinafter Connecticut Release]; Statement of policy on classification of
limited liability company interests as securities, IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 124,681 (Ind. Sept.
20, 1993) [hereinafter Indiana Policy Statement]; Interpretative Opinion Orchards Drug, L.C., 1991
WL 101804 (Kan. Sec. Comm'r) (May 1, 1991) [hereinafter Kansas Interpretative Opinion); Ex-
emption for professional limited liability companies, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) T 32,630 (Mich.
Mar. 24, 1994) [hereinafter Michigan Exemptive Order]; Interpretive Opinion, Lindquist, Vennum
Professional Ltd. Liab. Co. (Minn. Dep't Comm.) (Dec. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Minnesota Interpre-
tive Opinion]; Opinion Letter, H-I Missoula, LLC (Mont. Sec. Dep't) (June 15, 1995) [hereinafter
Montana Opinion Letter]; Exemption request--Offers of interests in limited liability company, 2
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Tj 40,642 (N.J. Bureau of Sec.) (July 27, 1994) [hereinafter New Jersey
Exemption Request); Exemption request-Membership interests in a limited liability company, 2A
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 46,664 (Okla. Dep't of Sec.) (Aug. 28, 1992) [hereinafter Oklahoma
Exemption Request]; Statement of Policy 95-2-Limited liability company membership interest as
securities, 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9H 51,580 (S.C. Secretary of State and Sec. Comm'r) (June,
1995) [hereinafter South Carolina Statement of Policy]; Limited liability company interests as
securities, 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 54,521 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Tennessee
Statement of Policy]. See infra Table III pp. 502-05 for a summary of state policy statements,
interpretative opinions and no-action letters.
212. See Connecticut Release, supra note 211, at 10,554; Indiana Policy Statement, supra
note 211, at 19,569-70; Kansas Interpretative Opinion, supra note 211, at *2; Minnesota Interpre-
tive Opinion, supra note 211; Montana Opinion Letter, supra note 211; Oklahoma Exemption
Request, supra note 211, at 41,655-56; Letter from Debra M. Bollinger, Director, S.D. Div. of
Sec., to Hon. Thomas C. Barrett, Executive Director of State Bar of S.D. (May 16, 1995) [herein-
after South Dakota Letter]; Tenessee Statement of Policy, supra note 211, at 48,559-60; Draft
Interpretative Opinion Letter, Are Limited Liability Company Memberships Securities?, at I
(Wyo. Secretary of State) (July 16, 1993) (in-house opinion drafted by staff members of the Wyo-
ming Securities Division and has not been released as a formal legal opinion of the Wyoming
Attorney General's office) [hereinafter Wyoming Draft Opinion].
213. See Connecticut Release, supra note 211, at 10,554; Indiana Policy Statement, supra
note 211, at 19,570-71; Kansas Interpretative Opinion, supra note 211, at *2; Minnesota Interpre-
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that the determination depends not only on the legal control granted in the
operating documents but also on the member's actual ability and opportunity
to exercise such powers in a meaningful way.
2 4
(c) State Litigation
In addition, at least twelve states have ordered certain LLC promoters to
cease and desist from offering or selling LLC interests in violation of state
securities acts." 5 The majority of these cases involved the issuance of sum-
mary cease and desist orders, where no opinion was issued, but sufficient evi-
dence was found to conclude a violation of the securities laws occurred.2"6
Often the trier of fact either cited no legal theory217 or simply made a
conclusory finding that the LLC interest constituted an investment con-
tract. 8 Nevertheless, these decisions are significant because the sanctions
applied indicate the state court or state administrative authority found that the
LLC interests constituted securities and usually made such findings based on
an investment contract analysis.2 9
(d) State Administrative Decisions
While there have been no reported judicial decisions analyzing the
grounds upon which LLC interests have been found to be securities, 220 ad-
ministrative decisions issued by hearing officers in Illinois and Georgia pro-
vide detailed analysis and reasoned opinions that preview the battleground for
future litigation.2 In those state enforcement proceedings, the hearing offi-
cers found the LLC interests constituted securities under state securities law by
tive Opinion, supra note 211, at 2; Montana Opinion Letter, supra note 211, at 2; Oklahoma Ex-
emption Request, supra note 211, at 41,655-56; South Dakota Letter, supra note 212, at 2; Ten-
nessee Statement of Policy, supra note 211, at 48,559-60; Wyoming Draft Opinion, supra note
212, at 1, 4.
214. See Connecticut Release, supra note 211, at 10,554; Indiana Policy Statement, supra
note 211, at 19,570-71; Kansas Interpretative Opinion, supra note 211, at *2; Oklahoma Exemp-
tion Request, supra note 211, at 41,656; South Dakota Letter, supra note 212, at 2; Tennessee
Statement of Policy, supra note 211, at 48,560; Wyoming Draft Opinion, supra note 212, at 5.
215. See infra Table I pp. 495-98 for a summary of state actions under state securities laws
against defendants offering or selling LLC interests (see columns labeled "Action" and "Action
Taken" for citations to applicable authorities).
216. See, e.g., Feigin v. Infotech Group, Inc., No. 94 CV 1756, 1994 Colo. Sec. LEXIS 1, at
*1-*6 (Apr. 8, 1994); In re Express Communications, Inc., No. 93-0027 CD, 1993 Ind. Sec.
LEXIS 46, at *1-*12 (Mar. 23, 1993).
217. See, e.g., In re Replen-K, Inc., Nos. SE 9209063, SE 9301897, SE 9304735, 1993 WL
451199 (Minn. Dep't Comm.) (Oct. 7, 1993); In re UEG, L.C., No. 93E068, 1993 WL 208898
(Kan. Sec. Comm'r) (May 12, 1993).
218. See, e.g., In re Hancock Communications Riverside PCS, No. 93E-058, 1993 WL
145928 (Kan. Sec. Comm'r) (Apr. 14, 1993); In re Parkersburg Wireless, LLC, No. 9403-11,
1994 WL 125846 (Pa. Sec. Comm'n) (Apr. 6, 1994).
219. See infra Table I pp. 495-98 (see columns labeled "Action," "Action Taken," and "Legal
Theories Discussed").
220. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.03[l][b], at 4-18; Georgia Express Action at 40,
(No. 50-93-0075).
221. Georgia Express Action at 34-64, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at *9-*17,
1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
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applying the investment contract test.222 Both hearing officers applied the
definition of investment contract set forth in Howey and its progeny as adopt-
ed in each state223 and focused primarily on the element of reliance on the
efforts of others.224 Both hearing officers discussed general partnership cas-
es,225 including the language and exceptions stated in Williamson v. Tuck-
er.226 In the Georgia enforcement action, the hearing officer found that al-
though each member had the power to make managerial decisions for the
LLC, the members could not effectively exercise control because they lived in
diverse geographic areas, and lacked technical expertise and business experi-
ence.22 Because the members were incapable of exercising the illusory pow-
ers granted to them, they were placed in the position of relying on the exper-
tise and managerial abilities of others.28  Similarly, in the Illinois en-
forcement action, the hearing officer found that even though the investor was
offered the opportunity to become an officer of the LLC, he was unsophis-
ticated and believed himself to be in the hands of an expert that would take
care of matters for him.229 As a result, he could effectively exercise his man-
agerial rights only with the expert advice of others.230
[3] Summary
Under the Howey investment contract test, an LLC interest is a security if
a person invests money in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.2 1' In the cases to
date involving LLC interests, the battle has been waged over whether investors
expected profits from the efforts of others.232 To support their position that
certain LLC interests are securities, prosecutors have focused on the economic
realities of the transaction to demonstrate that LLC members relied on the ef-
forts of others.233 Prosecutors have pointed to: (1) the lack of sophistication
of certain investors; (2) the special management or entrepreneurial skills sup-
plied by third parties; and (3) the lack of control investors had over the invest-
222. Georgia Express Action at 61, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at *8, 1993 WL
566300 (No. 9200106).
223. Georgia Express Action at 51-61, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at *9, *15-
*16, 1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
224. Georgia Express Action at 57-61, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at *13-*14,
* 16, 1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
225. Georgia Express Action at 58-60, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at * 11-* 13,
1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
226. Georgia Express Action at 58-60, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at *12, 1993
WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
227. Georgia Express Action at 60, (No. 50-93-0075).
228. Id. at 60-61.
229. Illinois Express Action at *16, 1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 122-23, 161-62 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 12-24, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615)
(contending that the LLC interests at issue are not investment contracts only because they do not
meet the profits from the efforts of others element of the Howey test); Defendants' Memorandum
in Parkersburg at 13-30, (No. 94-1079) (contending the LLC interests at issue are not investment
contracts, but focusing only on the efforts of others element of the Howey test).
233. See supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
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ment as a practical matter.234 Prosecutors have relied on the Williamson case
and its progeny which detail the circumstances whereby partnership interests
and joint venture interests may be securities.235 Prosecutors' arguments have
been bolstered by interpretative opinions issued by state securities regulators,
the many cease and desist orders issued in state enforcement actions, and the
two administrative decisions that were issued in state enforcement actions.236
2. Possible Defenses
Commentators and even LLC promoters concede that typically LLC inter-
ests meet the first three prongs of the Howey investment contract test.237 The
purchase of LLC interests generally involve an investment of money in a com-
mon enterprise with an expectation of profits. As a result, the critical issue in
determining whether an LLC interest is a security becomes whether profits are
expected solely or substantially from the efforts of others.23
But some commentators and LLC promoters contend that there should be
a presumption against characterizing LLC interests as securities. 29 They ar-
gue courts have held that general partners in a general partnership are not
solely or substantially dependent on the efforts of others when, under state
partnership law or a partnership agreement, partners retain the ultimate power
to control the business.24 Several courts have stated there is a strong pre-
sumption that general partnership interests are not securities under the Howey
test.24" ' Further, courts have stated that an investor who claims a general part-
234. See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 209-30 and accompanying text.
237. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-2; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra
note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-10; Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 12-24, 1994 WL 326868 (No.
94-0615) (contending that the LLC interests at issue are not investment contracts only because
they fail to meet the profits from the efforts of others element of the Howey test); Defendants'
Memorandum in Parkersburg at 13-30, (No. 94-1079) (contending that the LLC interests at issue
are not investment contracts, but focusing only on the efforts of others element of the Howey test).
The Howey test for an investment contract is set forth in the text accompanying supra notes 122-
23.
238. See text accompanying supra notes 158-63 for court interpretations of the Howey test's
"solely from the efforts of others" prong.
239. See, e.g., I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-5; SARGENT HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, § 4.02[l], at 4-11.
240. See, e.g., I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-3 to 14-4; SARGENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[l], at 4-10; Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 13, 1994
WL 326868 (No. 94-0615); Defendants Memorandum in Parkersburg at 13-14, (No. 94-1079).
Commentators and LLC promoters cite cases such as Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership,
902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1990) (whether the interest is a security turns on the partnership
agreement); Reeves v. Teuscher, 881 F.2d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing that "the proper
focus must be on the partnership agreement and not how ... the entity functioned"); Rivanna
Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1988) (interest
not a security because the partnership agreement conferred broad authority to manage and control
the business); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir.) (must read the statute and the
private agreement to determine legal powers vested), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Odom v.
Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1983) (indicating that the issue is whether the general partner
had power under the partnership agreement and state partnership laws).
241. Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 14, (No. 94-1079) (citing Banghart, 902
F.2d at 808); see also Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986); 1 RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-3 to 14-4 (the general partnership form is close to a per se
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nership interest is an investment contract has a difficult burden to over-
come.242 These commentators and LLC promoters assert that LLCs are close-
ly analogous to general partnerships. 243 They claim LLCs share the same crit-
ical features as general partnerships.2 " In both entities, investors have the
power to participate in the management of the entity.245 Most LLC statutes,
for example, provide that the LLC will be member-managed unless the articles
of organization provide otherwise."l LLC members normally have the power
to elect and remove managers.2 47 LLC members also have the authority to
bind the entity.2" Moreover, there are tax risks associated with delegating
authority to managers which create an incentive for member-management.
249
Since both LLCs and general partnerships allow for investor participation in
management decision-making, they argue that profits are not expected solely
or substantially from the efforts of others; therefore, there should be a strong
presumption against characterizing LLC interests as securities under the
Howey investment contract test.
250
In support of their position that LLC interests should not be treated as
securities, LLC promoters have relied on cases that have held that general
partnership interests were not securities because the partners had the power to
manage the business either under the state partnership statute or the partner-
ship agreement.51 These courts reason that such investors do not require the
protection of the securities laws because the investors have the ability to take
care of their own interests due to the inherent powers such investors have
nonsecurity); SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[l], at 4-10 ("General partnership inter-
ests are virtually presumed not to be securities .... ").
242. See, e.g., Youmans, 791 F.2d at 346; Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 425 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
243. See, e.g., I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-3 to 14-4; SARGENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-11.
244. See supra note 243.
245. See supra note 243.
246. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 1.05, at 1-4; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note
I, § 4.02[1], at 4-11; Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 390.
247. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-11.
248. Id.
249. Internal Revenue Service Treasury Regulations use certain characteristics to distinguish
entities treated as partnerships for federal income tax purposes from entities treated as associations
taxable as corporations. Those characteristics include: (i) continuity of life; (ii) centralized man-
agement; (iii) limited liability; and (iv) free transferability of interests. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2
(as amended in 1993). A business organization is treated as a corporation and not a partnership for
federal income tax purposes if it has at least three of these characteristics. See id.; see also
Ribstein, supra note 7, at 820-21. As a result, to be classified as a partnership, the entity must
lack at least two of these characteristics. Daniel S. Goldberg, The Tax Treatment of Limited Lia-
bility Companies: Law in Search of Policy, 50 BUS. LAW. 995, 1000 (1995). Since LLCs have
limited liability, a centrally-managed LLC would have to lack both continuity of life and free
transferability for partnership tax treatment. Given the uncertainty surrounding these
characteristics, centrally-managed LLCs would run a greater risk of being denied partnership tax
treatment. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 820-21; Sargent Article, supra note 7, at 1077-78.
250. See SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[l], at 4-11; Defendants' Memorandum in
Parkersburg at 13-14, (No. 94-1079).
251. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 13-22, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615); Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 13-14, (No. 94-1079). For the cases typically
cited by such LLC promoters, see supra note 240.
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under state law or the partnership agreement.252 For example, general part-
ners may act on behalf of the partnership and bind other partners by their ac-
tions.253 General partners are personally liable for the liabilities of the part-
nership, and they may dissolve the partnership.
254
Citing general partnership cases, LLC promoters argue that the power to
exercise managerial control is determinative, regardless of the control actually
exercised. 255 The mere delegation of management control does not create a
security.256 So even if the LLC member does not participate in the manage-
ment of the business, the retention of control under a statute, the articles of
organization, or the operating agreement precludes finding a security. LLC
promoters often set forth a litany of examples to illustrate LLC members re-
tained the legal right to manage the entity, despite the delegation of authority
to a management group. In Vision Communications, for example, the LLC
promoters cited, among other things, the fact that members had the express
authority under the operating agreement: (i) to convert the manager-managed
LLC to a member-managed LLC; (ii) to terminate the management agreement;
(iii) to elect managers; and (iv) to participate in the management and control
of the LLC in proportion to the number of membership interests owned." 7 In
Parkersburg, the LLC promoters cited, among other things, that the operating
agreement provided: (i) each member had the right to participate in the man-
agement and control of the company in proportion to the number of member-
ship interests owned; (ii) members had the power to remove managers; (iii)
unanimous consent of the members was required for dissolution; and (iv) ma-
jority consent was required for acquisition or disposition of any license or
equity interest in entities owning and operating wireless cable systems.2 58
Prosecutors counter that the grant of certain management powers to mem-
bers should not immunize an LLC from charges that its interests are securi-
ties.259 Even if there were a presumption that such interests were not securi-
ties, in the general partnership cases courts have held that the presumption
may be overcome when a Williamson-type analysis indicates the investor is so
unsophisticated, inexperienced, uninformed, or dependent on others that the
investor is unable to exercise meaningful control.2' As a result, the
252. See, e.g., Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1990);
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240-41 (4th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Williamson); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 831 (1984).
256. See, e.g., Rivanna, 840 F.2d at 240-41; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F.
Supp. 1303, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("The fact that a partner may choose to delegate his day-to-day
managerial responsibilities to a committee does not diminish in the least his legal right to a voice
in partnership matters, nor his responsibility under state law for acts of the partnership.").
257. See Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 17-19, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
258. See Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 15-18, (No. 94-1079).
259. See supra notes 184-208 and accompanying text.
260. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-11; see Williamson v. Tucker, 645
F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
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investor's ability to exercise meaningful control is determinative, not merely
the grant of such control.
LLC promoters respond that the knowledge and sophistication of an indi-
vidual member should not determine whether an interest is a security.261
First, if the knowledge and sophistication of an individual member is determi-
native, whether a promoter is selling a security would turn on the identity of
the purchaser.2 62 This would unduly burden promoters by requiring them to
investigate the business experience and knowledge of all potential investors.
Such a litmus test would create uncertainty. Also, the promoter could find
himself offering a security to some investors (the "unsophisticated" investors),
but offering a nonsecurity to other investors (the "knowledgeable and sophisti-
cated" investors). Second, in the general partnership cases, courts have indicat-
ed that investors who lack financial sophistication or expertise may still exer-
cise meaningful control, because they are free to consult with more knowl-
edgeable investors or third persons, or to employ accountants and lawyers.263
Consequently, an individual's business sophistication should not be determina-
tive.
On theoretical grounds, Professor Larry Ribstein argues that courts should
strongly presume LLC interests are not securities.26 Professor Ribstein criti-
cizes the Howey approach and other cases which emphasize "economic reali-
ty" and "substance-over-form" because such tests require courts to conduct a
fact-specific inquiry into each transaction.26 Such tests become subjective
and often lead to anomalous results.266 Consequently, neither investors nor
issuers know without litigation whether the securities laws apply.267 This un-
predictability increases litigation, makes it difficult for parties to make and
price contracts, decreases the probability of settling disputes without litigation,
and inhibits capital formation.26 Professor Ribstein asserts that the form of
the investment, rather than the substance or economic reality, should determine
whether an interest is a security.26 A strong presumption that LLC interests
are not securities would provide a clear and predictable rule, reduce litigation,
and decrease associated costs.27 Moreover, a presumption based on the form
261. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 20-21, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615).
262. Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 729 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing this issue in connection
with whether a general partnership interest is a security); Rivanna, 840 F.2d at 241 n.7 (also in
connection with general partnership interests).
263. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 21 n.5, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615); see also Banghart, 902 F.2d at 808 n.5 (citing Rivanna); Rivanna, 840 F.2d at 242 n.10.
264. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 810.
265. Id. at 809, 828-29.
266. See Schneider, supra note 128, at 107-08 (noting the results-orientation of courts);
Schneider, supra note 134, at 122-27 (noting that the Howey test gives courts the power to reach
any outcome the court desires in a given case and detailing the various factors that appear to
affect court decisions).
267. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 809.
268. Id. at 809, 828-31.
269. Id. at 810, 824.
270. Id. at 824-32; see also Park McGinty, What Is a Security?, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1033,
1082 (noting that "[plresumptions are the most effective method for providing predictability" and
creating settled expectations).
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of the transaction allows the parties themselves to determine the amount of
disclosure necessary and whether the securities laws apply.
2 7'
3. Conclusions
Clearly, LLC interests can be securities under the Howey investment con-
tract test. 72 Whether a particular LLC interest is a security under the Howey
test is a factual question which must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis that
typically will focus on whether profits are expected from the efforts of oth-
ers.
2 73
By comparing LLCs to general partnerships, limited partnerships, and
corporations, commentators and litigators appear to have missed the mark. The
LLC is a hybrid entity that is highly tailorable and flexible.274 LLC statutes
permit prohmoters to structure an entity so that it may have the characteristics
of a general partnership, limited partnership, or corporation, sometimes with
characteristics of each.2 5 The LLC statutes purposefully permit a wide spec-
trum of member participation and control. 276 As a result, any attempt to gen-
eralize or base presumptions on comparisons to other types of legal entities is
doomed to be inaccurate and lead to undesirable results.
In particular, the preoccupation with applying general partnership case
law277 to LLCs appears misguided. While LLC promoters and some com-
mentators would have us believe all LLCs are analogous to general partner-
ships,2 78 LLCs differ from general partnerships in at least two critical
repects.2 79 First, an LLC member has only limited liability for the debts and
obligations of the LLC,280 whereas a general partner has unlimited personal
liability for the debts and obligations of the general partnership."' Unlimited
personal liability gives a general partner the incentive to be highly informed
about the business and the motivation to be actively involved in the manage-
ment of the general partnership. The risk of unlimited personal liability also
discourages involvement by unsophisticated investors."2 In comparison, an
LLC member's liability is limited to his or her investment.2"3 Members are
not personally liable for the debts and obligations of the LLC. In this respect,
members are more like corporate shareholders284 than general partners. So
271. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 812.
272. See supra part III.A.I.
273. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
274. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-3 to 1-4.
275. Id.
276. Id. § 4.02[l], at 4-11.
277. Both prosecutors and LLC promoters cite general partnership case law in support of their
respective positions. See supra notes 195-208, 251-56 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
279. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 816-17 (discussing the differences between general
partnerships and LLCs, including investor liability and management structure).
280. LLC members normally are not liable for obligations of the LLC, except to the extent
that they personally guarantee the debts of the LLC. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, §
3.06[l][b]; see also I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 12.02.
281. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 3.0212][a].
282. Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 404.
283. See supra note 280.
284. See SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 3.04[1][a] (noting that "[slhareholders are not
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LLC members have less incentive than general partners to investigate or ac-
tively participate in the management of the business."8 5 LLC members there-
fore are more likely than general partners to be passive investors, less in-
formed, less sophisticated, and more dependent on the efforts of others.286
Second, the LLC statutes provide a formal structure that permits central-
ized management." 7 LLCs can easily adopt a corporate or limited partner-
ship centralized-management structure in lieu of an investor-managed general
partnership structure. An investor in an LLC with centralized management
would not expect to participate in management to the same extent as he would
in a general partnership.' These differences between LLCs and general
partnerships promote passive investment and reliance on the efforts of others,
major factors that affect whether an interest is a security. Moreover, the en-
forcement actions to date demonstrate that even when an LLC adopts a mem-
ber-managed structure, all investors may not be actively involved in the man-
agement of the LLC. Courts therefore should not assume that all LLCs are
analogous to general partnerships and that all investors are actively involved in
the management of the LLC.
In addition, the legal powers granted LLC members do not necessarily
bestow meaningful management control. The legal powers granted to LLC
members may be no more than the legal powers granted to corporate
shareholders.'89 In the Vision Communications and Parkersburg cases, LLC
promoters claimed LLC members had the power to control the entity because,
among other things, LLC members could vote to elect or remove managers
and vote on extraordinary decisions, such as amending the articles of organiza-
tion, dissolution, and the sale of all or substantially all the LLC's assets."9
liable for the debts of the corporation").
285. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 816-17.
286. Professor Mark Sargent dismisses the liability distinction argument as merely a formalis-
tic distinction:
As a practical matter, investors in such enterprises-whatever the form of business orga-
nization-all have substantial incentives "to be highly informed about the business" be-
cause their investment is likely to represent a large percentage of their personal wealth,
because their position is illiquid since there is no real secondary market for their inter-
ests, and because they have often personally guaranteed the business's obligations. It is
also by no means clear that the general partnership's lack of limited liability either en-
courages or discourages "unsophisticated investors." Many unsophisticated investors are
attracted to the general partnership form because of its relative simplicity. This purported
distinction between the incentives of general partners and LLC investors thus has little
bearing on the question of whether LLC members are more or less dependent on the
efforts of others, and thus does not undermine our basic conclusion: LLC interests
should be presumed not to be investment contracts under the Howey test.
SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-13; see also Ribstein, supra note 7, at 822-23
(arguing that the differences in liability should not make a critical difference in applying the secu-
rities laws).
287. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 817. "Some LLC statutes provide for corporate-type cen-
tralized management." Id. Other LLC statutes allow LLC members to "elect to be centrally-man-
aged in their articles of organization or operating agreement." Id.; see supra notes 167-69 and ac-
companying text.
288. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 817.
289. See, e.g., Long, supra note 7, at 112-13 (discussing the rights possessed by the members
of Cellvision, a Texas limited liability company).
290. Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 17-19, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
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Such legal rights do not necessarily constitute management control. In effect,
these LLC members have no greater rights than most corporate shareholders.
Corporate shareholders are allowed to vote to remove directors and are typi-
cally granted the right to vote on similar extraordinary corporate matters.,9
A shareholder's possession of such rights usually is not viewed as constituting
legal control or participation in the management of the corporation, particular-
ly when he is only one of many shareholders. His shares of stock are securi-
ties. Why then should the grant of such rights change an LLC interest from a
security to a nonsecurity?
Courts should resist playing into the hands of LLC promoters by applying
general partnership case law to determine whether an LLC interest is a securi-
ty. If you start with the premise that general partnership cases are controlling,
prosecutors and civil plaintiffs begin with three strikes against them: (i) a
"strong presumption" the interests are not securities;"2 (ii) a "difficult bur-
den to overcome";293 and (iii) a narrow Williamson-type exception that al-
lows the presumption to be overcome in only limited circumstances by show-
ing the member is so unsophisticated, uninformed, or dominated that he is
wholly dependent on the manager, or by showing deferral of authority to the
manager is so extreme that members essentially have no control." 4 Since
LLCs differ from general partnerships in several important repects and the
legal powers granted to members may be no more than the corporate power
granted to shareholders, there is no reason to saddle prosecutors and plaintiffs
with the burdens and baggage of general partnership case law. The Howey in-
vestment contract test requires a case-by-case analysis.29 There are no pre-
sumptions. There are no narrow exceptions. The test is simply whether there is
an investment of money in a common enterprise with the expectation of prof-
its from the efforts of others.
Moreover, the presumptions used in partnership cases, that an interest in a
general partnership is not a security and an interest in a limited partnership is
a security, 2" are proving less and less useful to courts. Under a Williamson-
type analysis, courts may find general partnership interests are securities.? 7
Revisions to state limited partnership laws now allow limited partners to enjoy
some of the same rights traditionally possessed only by general partners. 8
As a result, certain limited partnership interests may not be securities.2
Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 15-18, (No. 94-1079).
291. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONs 511-12, 957 (3d ed.
1983); Long, supra note 7, at 113.
292. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
294. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-11.
295. See supra notes 123, 165 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 175-80 (limited partnership interests), 241-42 (general partnership inter-
ests) and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text; see also 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 99, at 958-59 & n.203.
298. Conrad E.J. Everhard, The Limited Partnership Interest: Is It a Security? Changing
Times, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 441, 482 (1992); see also 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 959
n.203, 960 & n.204, 961 n.211.
299. Everhard, supra note 298, at 466-68.
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These presumptions are losing their relevance. Instead, courts must analyze
each partnership on a case-by-case basis. So why attempt to impose presump-
tions that are not determinative or necessarily useful in partnership cases in
LLC cases? Furthermore, the courts' inability to clearly specify the character-
istics which can overcome such presumptions creates practical problems in
terms of application and anomalous results.
Applying general partnership case law to LLCs does not appear to be a
satisfactory solution on theoretical grounds either. The strict literalist approach
some federal courts have taken in general partnership cases has been criticized
for focusing on the form of the transaction and legal powers retained by inves-
tors, rather than the economic reality of the transaction."" LLC promoters
tend to cite cases such as Rivanna, Banghart, and Goodwin in support of their
contention that the legal power to control an entity should determine whether
an interest is a security."' But such cases look to the form of the transac-
tion," 2 which is contrary to the Supreme Court's constant admonishments to
look at substance rather than form.33 Courts have begun to reject or limit the
prior authority that focused on form and restricted the scope of the "efforts of
others" inquiry to the legal powers retained by investors.34 Now the trend is
to recognize that investor control depends not only on the form of the transac-
tion and legal powers granted in the documents, but the investor's actual abili-
ty and opportunity to exercise management powers." 5 Courts have begun to
return to this case-by-case "economic realities" approach.
To date, commentators, prosecutors, and LLC promoters have all overem-
phasized the provisions in the articles of organization and the operating
agreements." The undue emphasis on the grant of power is not only at odds
with prior Supreme Court precedent, 30 7 but invites promoters to try to escape
the securities laws by merely parceling out duties to investors and using
300. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson & Karl S. Okamoto, The Supreme Court's Literalism and
the Definition of "Security" in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1076-77 (1993).
301. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 255.
303. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
304. See, e.g., Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1475-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the district
court's reliance on Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988), and stating, "[tlhe question of
investor's control .. .is decided in terms of practical as well as legal ability to control"); Bailey
v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 921-25 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1990) (questioning the district
court's application of Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236 (4th
Cir. 1988) and holding that the district court improperly limited its examination to the language of
the contracts and should have considered the practical limitations on the investor's ability to exer-
cise meaningful control). Also, the Tenth Circuit case, Banghart, relies on the Matek decision
which has been undercut and discredited by more recent Ninth Circuit opinions such as Holden v.
Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992); Koch, 928 F.2d at 1475-81; Hocking v. Dubois,
885 F.2d 1449, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990). See Banghart, 902 F.2d
at 808 (citing Matek and Rivanna). For a discussion of the trends in general partnership case law,
see Branson & Okamoto, supra note 300, at 1076-88.
305. See Everhard, supra note 298, at 448-49; Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 11 1-12.
306. For example, see the following discussions focusing on provisions in the articles of orga-
nization and operating agreements: Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 17-19, 1994 WL
326868 (No. 94-0615); Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 15-18, (No. 94-1079);
Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1112-13.
307. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
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boilerplate provisions to protect against securities law violations." 8 Promot-
ers should not be allowed to hide behind documents that grant powers that are
not intended to be used, cannot practically be used, or have never been
used." A strict contractual interpretation of documents results in a mechan-
ical, underinclusive, and unduly restrictive view of a security that frustrates the
remedial purposes of the securities laws."' The key issue in the Howey test
is whether the investor in the LLC is led to expect profits from the entrepre-
neurial or managerial efforts of others, not the legal power retained.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet considered whether general
partnership interests are securities or whether any presumptions are warranted.
Given the limited usefulness of these presumptions in partnership cases,"'
the inappropriate focus they place on the form of the transaction and the legal
rights retained by investors," 2 the practical problems with clearly specifying
the characteristics which can overcome such presumptions, and the potential to
frustrate the remedial purposes of the securities laws,3 3 it appears applying
general partnership case law to LLCs does not present a satisfactory solution
from either a practical or theoretical standpoint. For the securities laws to keep
pace with ever-changing investment structures, the courts must return to the
basic premise of the Howey test which requires case-by-case analysis and a
focus on the economic realities. 3 4
Professor Ribstein advocates on theoretical grounds that there should be a
strong presumption LLCs are not securities. 35 He claims such a presumption
would provide a clear and predictable rule, reduce litigation, decrease the cost
of capital formation, and allow parties themselves to determine whether the
securities laws apply by their choice of entity." 6 But such a presumption sac-
rifices investor protection to save costs and provide docket control. Legisla-
tures passed securities acts to provide broad investor protection." 7 In Howey,
the Supreme Court stated investor protection should not be thwarted by formu-
las3"8 and instead adopted a case-by-case analysis approach.3"9 A strong
presumption for convenience and cost-cutting is the type of formula the Su-
preme Court attempted to avoid with Howey.
308. See SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir.) (discussion in connec-
tion with analysis of licenses for sale), cert. denied sub nom. Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086
(1982); Probst v. State, 807 P.2d 279, 284 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (discussion in connection with
analysis of limited partnership interest).
309. Probst, 807 P.2d at 285.
310. Id. at 288 (Lane, J., concurring).
311. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 300-04 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 300-10 and accompanying text.
314. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975) (stating that in
applying Howey and determining what is an investment contract we "must examine the sub-
stance-the economic realities of the transaction-rather than the names that may have been em-
ployed by the parties"); accord International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558
(1979); see also supra note 303.
315. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
318. Id.
319. See id. at 298-301.
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A strong presumption that LLCs are not securities would allow promoters
to choose to avoid the securities laws by choosing the form of the legal enti-
ty. 2 Such a presumption could affect a promoter's choice of entity decision
by providing promoters with an incentive to form an LLC rather than a corpo-
ration. Moreover, such a presumption would encourage every dishonest pro-
moter to structure his transactions as an LLC.32" ' State regulators already
charge that many promoters are now packaging their investment products as
LLCs in an attempt to avoid state and federal securities laws.322 If, as Profes-
sor Ribstein advocates, the courts allow private ordering, 2 ' who will suffer?
Private ordering invites fraudulent promoters to prey on the unsophisticated
and uninformed. The effect of such a presumption is to leave those investors
who are least able to protect themselves vulnerable to the schemes of clever
promoters.
If there is a need for a clear, predictable rule to reduce litigation and
decrease the cost of capital formation, a presumption that LLC interests are
securities would better serve the purposes of the securities laws than a pre-
sumption that LLC interests are not securities. The hybrid nature of the entity,
the wide variations in the number of investors and management structure, and
the potential for abuse compel such a conclusion. A presumption that LLC
interests are securities would provide a clear, predictable rule. 2' Parties
could better predict the outcome of litigation. This would reduce litigation and
make it easier for parties to make and price contracts. As for the cost of com-
plying with the securities laws, for many ventures the cost would be minimal.
If the number of LLC members are limited and all members are active and
well-informed, such an offering usually would qualify for an exemption from
the registration provisions of the securities acts.32 In many situations, the
320. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 810, 812 (advocating a "private ordering" approach where
parties could determine whether the securities laws applied by selecting the form of the transac-
tion).
321. Cf. Branson & Okamoto, supra note 300, at 1081 (observing that once courts began
presuming general partnership interests were not securities, "[elvery promoter who knew what she
was doing, or who had a decently schooled transactional lawyer, structured their deal as a general
partnership").
322. Emshwiller, supra note 5; Emshwiller, supra note 11.
323. For a discussion of the "private ordering approach" advocated by Professor Ribstein
which would allow private parties to determine whether the securities laws apply, see Ribstein,
supra note 7, at 812; Larry E. Ribstein, Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of
General Partnerships, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1992).
324. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 838-40 (recognizing that changing the definition of a secu-
rity to include LLCs would reduce predictability problems and litigation costs).
325. Such LLC interests would probably be exempt from registration requirements under the
Securities Act as a nonpublic offering, limited offering, or intrastate offering. For a discussion of
federal registration exemptions and related disclosure requirements, see STEINBERG, supra note
135, §§ 3.01-3.12. For a discussion of state registration exemptions and related disclosure require-
ments, see 12 LONG, supra note 84, at 4-1 to 5-185. As equity securities, the LLC interests would
only be subject to the registration provisions of the Exchange Act if there are 500 or more record
holders. Registration is required under the Exchange Act only for firms that are listed on an ex-
change or have total assets exceeding $5 million and equity securities held by more than 500
persons. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1994) (making it unlawful to effect any transaction in a security on a
national exchange unless the security is registered under the Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)
(requiring registration for companies with assets of more than $1 million and held of record by
more than 500 persons); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1995) (exempts issuers with total assets under $5
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disclosure requirements of the securities acts would either not apply or the acts
would require only limited disclosure." 6 Purchases and sales of LLC inter-
ests, however, would be subject to the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws.3"7 The antifraud provisions provide investors with remedies in the
event of misrepresentation, fraud, or deceit.38 So in most instances, the cost
of complying with the securities laws would be minimal, but the protection
and safeguards provided to investors would be great.3 29 Also, even with the
presumption that LLCs are securities, investors would still be allowed to deter-
mine whether the securities laws apply. If they did not want the securities laws
to apply, they could select the general partnership form, rather than the LLC
form. But more importantly, such a presumption would discourage promoters
from packaging their investment products as LLCs to avoid the securities laws,
encourage compliance with the securities laws, and provide investors greater
protection against fraudulent schemes.
LLC interests clearly can be securities under the Howey investment con-
tract test.330 Because the LLC is a hybrid entity, any attempt to generalize or
base presumptions on comparisons to other types of legal entities is doomed to
be inaccurate and lead to undesirable results. 3 For example, LLCs differ
from general partnerships in a number of critical respects that affect whether
an interest is a security. 32 Courts should resist applying general partnership
case law and its associated presumptions to LLCs.333 Courts should return to
the case-by-case analysis dictated by the Howey investment contract test and
focus on the economic realities of the transaction.334 If there is a need for
presumptions to provide a clear, predictable rule, courts should presume LLC
interests are securities. 35 The costs associated with such a presumption
million from registration). Cf 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 2.05[3], at 2-51 (suggesting that
if all partnership interests were classified as securities, in most instances, the principal impact
would be that the purchase and sale was subject to the antifraud provisions of the securities laws).
326. For a discussion of the federal disclosure requirements associated with various
exemptions, see STEINBERG, supra note 135, §§ 3.01-3.12. For a discussion of the state disclosure
requirements associated with various exemptions, see 12 LONG, supra note 84, at 4-1 to 5-185.
327. "The anti-fraud provisions ... [of the federal securities laws] apply to all sales of securi-
ties involving interstate commerce or the mails, whether or not the securities are exempt from
registration." STEINBERG, supra note 135, ch. I app. at 6 (quoting "The Work of the SEC," pub-
lished by the SEC in 1982).
328. For a discussion of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,
see STEINBERG, supra note 135, §§ 6.01-7.12.
329. Contra Goforth, supra note 7, at 1278-88; see also Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at
438-39. After a thoughtful discussion of the benefits and costs of federal securities law regulation,
Professor Goforth concludes that the likely costs of regulation and other potential consequences
far exceed any potential benefits. Goforth, supra note 7, at 1278-88. Professor Sargent argues that
a "rule defining all LLC interests as securities would be overinclusive. It is difficult to justify
imposing all of the consequences of securities status on an entity with a small number of mem-
bers, all of whom are legally and practically capable of participating in control." Sargent Blue
Sky, supra note 7, at 438-39.
330. See supra part III.A. 1.
331. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 279-88 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 292-314 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 303-14 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 324-29 and accompanying text.
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would be minimal in most situations, but the benefits in terms of investor
protection would prove great.
B. Risk Capital Tests
1. Arguments Asserted
A 1993 survey of state securities regulators indicated that some state secu-
rities agencies may have already taken the position, either formally or infor-
mally, that LLC interests may be investment contracts under a risk capital
analysis."6 A number of states 37 have adopted the risk capital test by case
law,338 statute,3 9 or administrative ruling." ° In some jurisdictions, the risk
capital test is used as an alternative to the Howey test to determine what con-
stitutes an "investment contract. 34' In other jurisdictions, the risk capital test
serves as an independent means of defining a security. '2 There is no one
formulation of the test.343 There are many variations. Regardless of the ver-
sion used, the risk capital test is considered broader in scope than the Howey
336. See Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 431.
337. The United States Supreme Court has not adopted the risk capital test. In United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Court stated that "[elven if we were inclined to
adopt . . . a 'risk capital' approach we would not apply it in the present case." Id. at 857 n.24.
Also, the federal courts have not generally adopted the risk capital test. STEINBERG, supra note
135, § 2.02, at 24; see, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 483 & n.10 (9th Cir.)
(refusing to apply risk capital test), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); see also Annotation, "Risk
Capital" Test for Determination of Whether Transaction Involves Security, Within Meaning of
Federal Securities Act of 1933 (15 USCS §§ 77a et seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
USCS §§ 78a et seq.), 68 A.L.R. FED. 89 (indicating the disagreements in the federal courts re-
garding the formulation of the risk capital test, its application, and its applicability) [hereinafter
Annotation].
338. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal. 1961);
Jaciewicki v. Gordarl Assocs., Inc., 209 S.E.2d 693, 695-97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Hawaii
Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971); State v. George, 362 N.E.2d 1223, 1226-29 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1975); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549, 552-54 (Or.
Ct. App. 1971).
339. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(a)(26)
(1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(l) (West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-
02(13) (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s)(16) (West 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 21.20.005(12) (West 1989).
340. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 130.201(d) (Mar. 26, 1990), IA Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) 9l 22,614; Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. No. 66-284 (June 2, 1967), [1961-1971 Transfer Binder]
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 70,747 (applying risk capital test to sale of a franchise); Okla. Sec.
Comm'n Interpretive Op., 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9 46,641 (July 3, 1980) (applying risk
capital test to a franchise agreement).
341. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(a)(26) (1994) ("The term 'investment contract' shall
include but is not limited to an investment which holds out the possibility of return on risk capital
...."); Healy, 482 P.2d at 554 ("We hold that the Howey test is not exclusive and that the 'risk
capital' test is also to be used in determining whether a particular financial activity constitutes an
offer of an 'investment contract'....").
342. A number of states define the term "security" to include, among other things, an invest-
ment contract and a form of the risk capital test. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(1) (West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(13)
(Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s)(l 1), (16) (West 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 21.20.005(12) (West 1989).
343. For example, compare the forms of the risk capital test infra notes 352, 354, 356.
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test.3" Application of the risk capital test often leads to finding a "security"
where the Howey test would hold that no security is present. 4
At least one state no-action letter" and four state administrative deci-
sions347 have cited the risk capital test as possible grounds for finding that an
LLC interest is a security.3" In states that have adopted the risk capital test,
the test may prove particularly important when LLC interests may not be se-
curities under the Howey test. 49 In such states, the risk capital test will usu-
ally provide prosecutors and plaintiffs with an alternative theory for arguing
that certain LLC interests are securities.3 °
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court first articulated the risk
capital theory in a 1961 opinion, Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski."'
Simply stated, the opinion indicated that a "security" is present under the Cali-
fornia Corporation Code when investors provide "risk capital" for a busi-
ness.352 The Hawaii Supreme Court applied and modified the risk capital the-
ory in a 1971 opinion, State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.3 3' The modified
test required not only a finding of risk capital, but findings that the value
given was induced by an offeror's representations of a valuable benefit, and
344. See infra notes 360-82 and accompanying text.
345. STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02, at 24; see also infra notes 360-90 and accompanying
text.
346. Exemption request-Membership interests in a limited liability company, 2A Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) 46,664 (Okla. Dep't of Sec.) (Aug. 28, 1992) (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 2(s)(16) (Oklahoma's risk capital test)).
347. Georgia Express Action at 44-61, (No. 50-93-0075) (noting that, under Georgia law, the
definition of a security includes both the Howey test and the "risk capital" test, but focusing pri-
marily on the Howey test elements as applied in Georgia, and finding that the LLC interests con-
stituted securities); Illinois Express Action at *11, 1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106) (noting Illi-
nois Administrative Code Rule 130.201(d) provides a broad risk capital test, but analyzing the
facts and holding that the LLC interests were securities under the Howey test as applied in Illi-
nois); In re Third Mobile Ltd. of Las Vegas, No. 94-03-0018, 1996 WL 28692 (Wash. Sec. Div.)
(Jan. 18, 1996) (stating that the offer and/or sale of investments in the LLC constituted the offer
and/or sale of "an investment contract and/or risk capital"); In re Dallas MobileComm L.C., No.
94-03-0018, 1995 WL 431589 (Wash. Sec. Div.) (July 10, 1995) (stating that the offer and/or sale
of investments in the LLC constituted the offer and/or sale of "an investment contract and/or risk
capital").
348. The authors of the no-action letter and two administrative decisions applied the Howey
test and its progeny to determine whether the LLC interests constituted a security. Because the
administrative hearing officers found the LLC interests in question to be securities under the
Howey test, there was no reason to apply the broader risk capital test. However, by citing the risk
capital test in each of these opinions, the authors are indicating that the risk capital test may be
possible grounds for finding that an LLC interest is a security. See supra notes 346-47.
349. See supra notes 344-45, infra notes 360-90 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
351. 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal. 1961).
352. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 203 (1988). In concluding a
membership interest in a country club was a "security," the California Supreme Court stated:
Since the [California Corporation Code] does not make profit to the supplier of capital
the test of what is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford
those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legiti-
mate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or anoth-
er.
Silver Hills, 361 P.2d at 908-09. The court's emphasis on the investor's advance of "risk capital"
caused the theory to be referred to as the "risk capital" test.
353. 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971).
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that the investor did not receive the right to exercise practical or actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise."'
Since 1971, a number of state courts and state legislatures have adopted
various versions of the risk capital test.35 5 The most common statutory for-
mulation defines a "security" as an "investment of money or money's worth
including goods furnished or services performed in the risk capital of a ven-
ture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where the investor
has no direct control over the investment or policy decision of the ven-
ture.
356
354. The Hawaii Supreme Court's version of the risk capital test is based on the risk capital
test suggested by Professor Ronald Coffey in his seminal article, The Economic Realities of a
"Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367, 377 (1967). In Ha-
waii Market Center, the Hawaii Supreme Court articulated its version of the risk capital test:
[Wle hold that for the purposes of the Hawaii Uniform Securities Act (Modified) an
investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or representa-
tions which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind,
over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of
the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over
the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., 485 P.2d at 109 (footnote omitted).
355. There are a number of different versions of the risk capital test. For example, compare
the California test set forth supra note 352, the Hawaiian test set forth supra note 354, and the
other various formulations set forth in the cases cited at supra note 338. For an overview of state
applications of the risk capital test see 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3].
356. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(13)
(1995) (differs only in that it provides "expectation of profit or some other form of benefit to the
investor"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s)(16) (West 1995) (differs only in that it provides
goods furnished "and/or" services performed); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.005(12) (West
1989) (differs in that it provides an investment of money or "other consideration," the benefit
must be a "valuable" benefit, and the investor "does not receive the right to exercise practical and
actual control").
The Georgia and Michigan formulations of the risk capital test differ from the more com-
mon statutory version. Georgia defines the term "security" to include, among other things, an in-
vestment contract and provides further:
The term "investment contract" shall include but is not limited to an investment which
holds out the possibility of return on risk capital even though the investor's efforts are
necessary to receive such return if:
(A) Such return is dependant upon essential managerial or sales efforts of the issuer or
its affiliates; and
(B) One of the inducements to invest is the promise of promotional or sales efforts of
the issuer or its affiliates in the investor's behalf; and
(C) The investor shall thereby acquire the right to earn a commission or other compen-
sation from sales of rights to sell goods, services, or other investment contracts of the
issuer or its affiliates.
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(a)(26) (1994). Michigan defines the term "security" to include, among
other things, an investment contract and:
[Alny contractual or quasi contractual arrangement pursuant to which: (1) a person fur-
nishes capital, other than services, to an issuer; (2) a portion of that capital is subjected
to the risks of the issuer's enterprise; (3) the furnishing of that capital is induced by the
representations of an issuer, promoter, or their affiliates which give rise to a reasonable
understanding that a valuable tangible benefit will accrue to the person furnishing the
capital as a result of the operation of the enterprise; (4) the person furnishing the capital
does not intend to be actively involved in the management of the enterprise in a mean-
ingful way; and (5) a promoter or its affiliates anticipate at the time the capital is fur-
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In essence, the risk capital tests are a refinement and an extension of the
Howey investment contract test. Courts adopting the risk capital tests were
seeking a more flexible approach to the definition of a security.357 They were
seeking a formulation that would recognize economic reality and reach the
various schemes whereby promoters go to the public to solicit capital that will
be risked in a business venture.' They hoped to protect the public by re-
quiring registration so that promoters would disclose to potential investors that
their investment would be at risk, and by providing remedies to investors if
promoters failed to comply.3"9
The risk capital tests are expressly broader in scope than the Howey
test.36" First, the Howey test literally requires an investment of money.'
Courts have loosely construed this requirement and found it to include invest-
ments of goods, services, and probably anything that constitutes legal consid-
eration.362 The risk capital tests differ from the Howey test in that they ex-
pressly require only a contribution of something of value.363 Some tests even
explicitly state nonmonetary contributions, such as goods and services, are
sufficient. " So, the tests differ in that the risk capital tests often contain an
expressly broader statement of the type of investment sufficient to meet the
requirement.365
Second, the Howey test requires a court to find a "common enter-
prise."'" Courts have interpreted "common enterprise" as requiring some
pooling of interests or some form of profit-sharing, referred to as horizontal
commonality or vertical commonality.367 The risk capital tests do not use the
phrase "common enterprise.""sas As a result, prosecutors and plaintiffs may
nished, that financial gain may be realized as a result thereof.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(1) (West Supp. 1995)
357. See, e.g., State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549, 554 (Or. Ct.
App. 1971).
358. See, e.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971); Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal. 1961).
359. See, e.g., Healy, 482 P.2d at 554.
360. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the United States Supreme Court
stated, "an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person [1] invests his money [2] in a common enterprise and [3] is led to ex-
pect profits [41 solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party .... Id. at 298-99. For an
extensive discussion of each of the elements of the Howey test, see supra part III.A. I.
361. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
362. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
363. See, e.g., Hawaii Mkt. Cir., 485 P.2d at 109.
364. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994).
365. At least two commentators maintain that the investment requirement in Howey and the
investment requirement in the risk capital tests are essentially equivalent. 12 LONG, supra note 84,
§ 2.04[3), at 2-156; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.01[21, at 4-8. While the Howey test
and the risk capital tests may prove equivalent in application, the tests differ in that the applicabil-
ity of the Howey test to ventures where the investment is in a form other than money depends on
a court's continued broad construction of the Howey investment of money requirement. On the
other hand, the applicability of the risk capital test to such a situation is dictated by the express
terms of the test.
366. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
367. For a discussion of the Howey common enterprise requirement, see supra notes 134-40
and accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994); Hawaii Mkt. Crr., 485 P.2d at 109.
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argue there is no pooling of interest requirement or profit-sharing require-
ment.3" So, the risk capital tests are broader than the Howey test in that a
court may find an interest is a security even if there is no horizontal or verti-
cal commonality, as long as the investor has transferred value to the seller. 7
Third, the Howey test provides that the investor must expect "profits"
from the investment.37" ' The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this
requirement as meaning the investor must be motivated to invest by an antici-
pated return on investment through either capital appreciation or earnings, not
by a desire to use or consume the item purchased." The risk capital tests
are more liberal. They represent a departure from Howey in that they generally
require only that investors be motivated by the expectation of a benefit.373
The benefit can be monetary or nonmonetary, tangible or intangible.374 The
investor can even use or consume the anticipated benefit. For example, courts
and state regulators have found club memberships, hotel reservations, and con-
dominium time-share agreements to involve the sale of a security under risk
capital tests. 75 The broader benefit concept means the risk capital tests apply
to transactions that the Howey test may not cover due to the Howey test's
more restrictive "profits" requirement.
Finally, the Howey test literally requires the investor to expect profits
"solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." '376 Lower federal
courts have rejected a literal interpretation of the word "solely" and simply
require proof that the efforts made by those other than the investors are the
undeniably significant efforts.377 The risk capital tests, on the other hand, ex-
pressly adopt the more liberal version of the efforts of others requirement. The
369. Most commentators agree that under the risk capital tests there is no horizontal common-
ality requirement, and thus no requirement that multiple investors pool their interests. See, e.g.,
THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.5, at 42 (2d ed.
1990); SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.01[2], at 4-9; STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02,
at 24. Several commentators have also observed that there is no vertical commonality requirement,
and therefore, no requirement that the promoter and investor share the profits or losses of the
enterprise. HAZEN, supra; see also William J. Carney & Barbara G. Fraser, Defining a "Security":
Georgia's Struggle with the "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORY L.J. 73, 111-13 (1981). But see, 12
LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3], at 2-156 (asserting that the concept of "risk capital of an enter-
prise" should be treated the same as the concept of the common enterprise in the Howey test).
370. Carney & Fraser, supra note 369, at 113.
371. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
372. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-58 (1975). For a discussion of
the Howey expectation of profits requirement, see supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
373. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(l) (West. Supp. 1995) ("a reasonable un-
derstanding that a valuable tangible benefit will accrue"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s)(16)
(West 1995) ("with the expectation of some benefit to the investor"); Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., 485 P.2d
at 109 ("a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the
initial value, will accrue").
374. 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3][a], at 2-156 to 2-157.
375. Id. at 2-157; see, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal.
1961) (memberships in country clubs); In re Alaska v. Vacation Int'l, Ltd., [1971-1978 Transfer
Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) T 71,294 (Alaska Sec. Div. 1976) (condominium time-share
units); see also Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 186 (Mar. 18, 1975), [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] Blue
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,200 (prepaid hotel accommodations).
376. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
377. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). For a discussion of the Howey test's solely from the efforts of others
requirement, see supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
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risk capital tests do not utilize the qualifier "solely." They require that the
investor either have no direct control or that the investor have no right to exer-
cise practical or actual control.378 Again, the risk capital tests are expressly
broader than the Howey test and eliminate the need for courts to interpret the
Howey "solely" from efforts of others requirement. The risk capital tests make
it clear that the key to finding a security is the amount of practical or actual
control the investor has over the managerial decisions of the venture.
To summarize, the risk capital tests generally are considered more expan-
sive than the Howey investment contract test because: (1) nonmonetary invest-
ments are expressly recognized as sufficient;379 (2) the "common enterprise"
requirement is eliminated;3 . (3) the expectation of "profits" is not required,
only the expectation of a benefit;"' and (4) the efforts of others standard is
expressly relaxed. 2
Given that certain LLC interests can clearly qualify as securities under the
Howey test, 383 there is an even greater probability that a court would charac-
terize an LLC interest as a security under the risk capital theory. Investments
in an LLC typically meet the first three elements of the risk capital tests. Un-
der the risk capital tests, an investor must risk money, property, or services in
a venture with the expectation of some benefit.8 4 An investment in an LLC
normally involves contributing money, property, or services,385 and it is
unlikely an investment in an LLC venture would be risk free. As one com-
mentator noted, LLC investments usually are not collateralized, nor do pro-
moters generally provide fixed rates of return, a guarantee, or priority over
creditors.386 Also, in most situations, an investor contributes to an LLC ex-
pecting some form of benefit in return.38 7 Like the Howey test, the key issue
often will be whether the investor exercises practical or actual control over the
managerial decisions of the enterprise.3"8 However, given the risk capital
theory's focus on economic reality and investor protection,8 9 courts are like-
ly to construe the control element more liberally under the risk capital tests
than under Howey. Due to its broader application and the more liberal con-
378. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(l) (West Supp. 1995) ("the person fur-
nishing the capital does not intend to be actively involved in the management of the enterprise in
a meaningful way"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(13) (1995) ("the investor has no direct control
over the investment or policy decisions of the venture"); Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., 485 P.2d at 109 ("the
offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial deci-
sions of the enterprise").
379. See supra notes 361-65 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 366-70 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 371-75 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 376-78 and accompanying text.
383. See supra part III.A.1.
384. See STEINBERG, supra note 135, at 257; see also ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994);
Hawaii Mkt. Cr., 485 P.2d at 109.
385. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
386. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[2], at 4-14.
387. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
388. See SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[2], at 4-14; see also ALASKA STAT. §
45.55.990(12) (1994); Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., 485 P.2d at 109.
389. See supra notes 357-59 and accompanying text.
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struction, there is an even better chance that courts will characterize LLC
interests as securities under the risk capital theory.3' 9
2. Possible Defenses
Some commentators contend that the risk capital test is not substantially
different than the Howey test.39' First, some commentators argue the invest-
ment element under the risk capital tests is basically equivalent to courts'
liberal construction of the Howey investment of money requirement.392 Sec-
ond, although the risk capital tests do not use the phrase "common enterprise,"
the investment must be risked in some sort of venture.3 93 At least one com-
mentator has argued that the venture or enterprise requirement under the risk
capital tests is essentially the same as the Howey common enterprise require-
ment. 4 Third, even though the expectation of a benefit element under the
risk capital tests is broader than the expectation of profits element under
Howey,395 the benefits element only impacts the few extraordinary situations
where investors do not expect profits in the narrow sense. 96 Finally, to the
extent the risk capital tests require that the investor have no direct control over
the investment or policy decisions of the venture,3 97 some commentators
claim the risk capital tests are simply adopting the liberal construction of the
case law interpreting the phrase "efforts of others" that has developed under
Howey.39 Consequently, application of the broader risk capital tests might
affect a few marginal cases, but essentially the issues and the analysis are the
same.3' 9 Therefore, there should be no greater chance of LLC interests being
characterized as securities in risk capital jurisdictions than under the Howey
test.' m
Very few jurisdictions have adopted the risk capital test to determine the
existence of a security.' Critics of the risk capital test charge that the test is
plagued by limited acceptance, lack of uniformity in its application, and uncer-
tainty about its meaning."° For example, the exact meaning of the key term
"risk capital" still remains unclear.: 3 Does the risk capital test apply when-
390. See STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02, at 24.
391. See, e.g., SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.01[2], at 4-8.
392. Id.; see also 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3], at 2-156.
393. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s)(16) (West 1995) ("investment ... in the risk
capital of a venture"); Hawaii Mkt. Cr., 485 P.2d at 109 ("a portion of this initial value is sub-
jected to the risks of the enterprise").
394. 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3], at 2-156 ("The concept of an enterprise under the
risk capital test will be essentially the same as the concept of common enterprise as outlined under
the Howey test.").
395. See supra notes 371-75 and accompanying text.
396. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.01[2], at 4-9.
397. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(13) (1995); Hawaii Mkt. Cir., 485 P.2d at 109.
398. 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[4], at 2-166; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1,
§ 4.0112], at 4-8.
399. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[2), at 4-14.
400. Id.
401. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text indicating adoption of the risk capital
test in only eleven states. Also, the risk capital test generally is not adopted by the federal courts.
See supra note 337.
402. See, e.g., SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.01[2], at 4-7 to 4-8.
403. 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3), at 2-155 to 2-156; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note
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ever a person invests capital with less than a fair chance of receiving a return
or does the test only apply when capital is invested in a highly risky or unsta-
ble venture? 4 Does the test only apply when a venture is seeking its initial
capitalization"' or does the test apply when an on-going concern is seeking
additional capital?' Decisions are split on the answers to these
questions."' There is no universal understanding as to the tests' application.
LLC promoters therefore may argue that given the ambiguity created by the
risk capital tests, the relative lack of case law, and the fact that the tests are
merely a refinement of the Howey test, courts should be guided by the Howey
line of cases. Specifically, courts should draw on the Howey general partner-
ship cases to interpret the control element and adopt a strong presumption
against characterizing LLC interests as securities.' LLC promoters may
contend that courts have no basis for adopting a more liberal interpretation of
the control element under the risk capital tests than under the Howey test.4
Further, on theoretical grounds, a strong presumption that LLC interests are
not securities would provide a clear and predictable rule, reduce litigation, and




Clearly, certain LLC interests may be securities under a risk capital
analysis.4 ' In states that have adopted risk capital tests, 41
2 the tests will
usually provide prosecutors and plaintiffs with an alternative theory for argu-
ing certain LLC interests are securities.4 3 While the risk capital tests focus
1, § 4.01[21, at 4-9; Louis C. Novak & Howard Rosten, Note, Franchise Regulation Under the
California Corporate Securities Law, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 140, 152-55 (1968).
404. Novak & Rosten, supra note 403, at 152-55. Compare Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal. 1961) (stating that the objective of the risk capital test is "to
afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives") with Mr.
Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970) (arguing that the bet-
ter view is to limit the applicability of the risk capital test to exceptionally high risk, speculative
ventures), affd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972). For other cases interpreting the risk requirement,
see Annotation, supra note 337, § 3[a].
405. See, e.g., State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549, 555 (Or. Ct.
App. 1971) ("Under the 'risk capital' test we are concerned with whether the franchisor is depen-
dent upon the franchisees' capital to initiate his operations, not just manufacture his product.").
406. See, e.g., State ex rel. Park v. Glenn Turner Enters., Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder]
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9171,023 (Idaho Dist. 1972).
407. See supra notes 404-06 and accompanying text.
408. For a discussion of the Howey line of cases dealing with general partnership interests
and related presumptions see supra notes 240-54 and accompanying text.
409. LLC promoters may argue that the language in some risk capital tests is even more re-
strictive than the more liberal control test adopted by most courts under Howey. Compare WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.005(12) (West 1989) (stating that "the investor does not receive the
right to exercise practical or actual control over the managerial decisions of the venture") with
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) (requiring proof that "the
efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise"), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973).
410. For a discussion of the arguments that on theoretical grounds there should be a strong
presumption that LLC interests are not securities, see supra notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 384-88 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
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on some of the same criteria as the Howey test, they are explicitly broader in
scope.4 4 The risk capital tests expressly apply to transactions that the Howey
test does not reach.4 " The risk capital tests also eliminate the need for liberal
judicial construction, which is often required to find that a security is present
under the Howey test."16 As a result, application of the risk capital tests may
lead to finding an LLC interest is a security, where the Howey test would hold
no security is present.
In most cases, an investment in an LLC will satisfy the first three ele-
ments of the risk capital tests.417 Most LLC investors risk money, property,
or services in an LLC venture, expecting a benefit in return. Like Howey, the
critical issue will be whether the investor exercises practical or actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.18 Since there is lack of uni-
formity and some ambiguity in applying the risk capital tests,"9 courts have
the opportunity to refine and develop the definition of a security under these
tests. In applying the risk capital tests to LLCs, courts are not required to
follow the general partnership case law that evolved under Howey nor adopt
the associated presumptions. Courts are free to construe the risk capital tests
liberally and adopt flexible constructions designed to protect investors against
fraud and clever new schemes devised by promoters to evade the securities
laws.
C. Characteristics of Stock Test
1. Arguments Asserted
Commentators42 ° and at least two state securities commissions"' have
asserted that certain LLC interests may be securities under the characteristics
of stock test set forth in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth.2 In Landreth,
the United States Supreme Court held that if an instrument bears the label
414. See supra notes 360-82 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 361-82 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 362-65, 371-78 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 384-87 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 388, 397-98 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 402-07 and accompanying text.
420. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 36-40.
421. Limited liability company interests as securities, 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9 54,521
(Tenn. Mar. 7, 1995) (stating that if an LLC interest possesses the characteristics of stock set forth
in Landreth, it is the Tennessee Division of Securities' position that the interest is a security)
[hereinafter Tennessee Statement of Policy]; see Georgia Express Action at 46, (No. 50-93-0075)
(stating that the Georgia Commissioner of Securities urged the referee to apply the test traditional-
ly used to determine whether a particular investment constitutes stock to determine whether an
LLC interest is a security). Also, in a request for an interpretive opinion from the Maryland Secu-
rities Division, an LLC issuer argued that the LLC interests at issue were not securities because,
among other things, the interests bore no resemblance to stock as characterized by the Tcherepnin,
Landreth, and Forman Courts. Exemption request-Whether membership interests in a limited
liability company are required to be registered, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9 30,579 (Md. Sec.
Comm'r) (Apr. 25, 1994). The Maryland Securities Division stated that it would take no action to
require the registration of the LLC interests in question, but the Division did not state the grounds
for its decision. Id.
422. 471 U.S. 681 (1985). The SEC did not raise this argument in Vision Communications,
Parkersburg, or Knoxville.
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"stock" and possesses all the characteristics typically associated with stock, the
securities laws apply.423 The Court did note, however, that the instrument's
label is not determinative.424 The key inquiry is whether the instrument bears
the attributes usually associated with stock, meaning: (i) the right to receive
dividends upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability
to be pledged; (iv) voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned;
and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value.42
Professor Marc Steinberg maintains that LLC interests ordinarily possess
the five attributes commonly associated with stock.426 First, since LLC stat-
utes generally provide for the distribution of profits to members based on
capital contribution,427 owners of an LLC often have the right to receive div-
idends upon the apportionment of profits. Second, LLC statutes allow mem-
bers to transfer or assign their LLC interests, therefore LLC interests are nego-
tiable.428 Third, an LLC interest is personal property and as such may be
pledged.429 Fourth, most LLC statutes vest management in the members, un-
less the LLC operating documents provide otherwise.43 Voting rights are
usually determined in proportion to the member's capital contribution, so
members have voting rights. 3 Fifth, LLC interests may increase in val-
ue.432 Professor Steinberg and other commentators have argued that because
"companies" issue LLC interests and companies typically issue stock to evi-
dence an equity interest, investors expect such interests to be governed by the
securities laws.433 They assert substance should prevail over form and la-
bels. 434 If LLC interests possess the five attributes usually associated with
stock, such interests should be deemed securities.435
At least one state securities commission has taken the position that LLC
interests may be securities under the characteristics of stock test set forth in
Landreth. In a Statement of Policy, the Tennessee Division of Securities stated
423. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686; see also Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985)
(applying the standard from Landreth).
424. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686; see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
848-51 (1975) (stating that the emphasis should be on "economic reality").
425. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686; see also Gould, 471 U.S. at 704; Forman, 421 U.S. at 851.
426. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1119; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 37-39.
427. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116-17; see also I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra
note 1, § 5.02, at 5-2 (stating that financial rights in LLCs are generally based on members' capi-
tal contributions).
428. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1117-19; see also I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra
note 1, § 7.04, at 7-4 (stating that LLC statutes provide for transfer and assignment of membership
interests).
429. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1119; see also Donn, supra note 1, § 12, at PGLLC-
40 (stating that the general rule in all the state LLC acts is that an LLC interest is personal proper-
ty).
430. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1117; see also Donn, supra note 1, § 10, at PGLLC-
36 (stating that generally management is vested in the members).
431. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1117; see also I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1,
§ 8.03, at 8-8.
432. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1119.
433. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33, 36-40
(on their face LLCs appear to be nothing more than traditional corporations with a different set of
descriptive terms).
434. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33, 36-40.
435. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33, 36-40.
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that it believes LLC interests should be analyzed under Landreth."" The Di-
vision takes the position that if an LLC interest possesses the five attributes
usually associated with stock, the LLC interests could be labeled "stock"
which is a security under Tennessee law.437 If an LLC interest possesses the
five attributes usually associated with stock, prosecutors and plaintiffs may
argue, citing Landreth and the authorities and arguments outlined above, such
LLC interests should be deemed securities.
2. Possible Defenses
The Kansas Securities Commissioner and a trier of fact in an administra-
tive hearing in Georgia considered, but ultimately rejected, the argument that
LLC interests should be considered securities because they possess the char-
acteristics of stock.43 "Stock" is one of the many financial instruments listed
expressly in the statutory definitions of a "security.""'  Commentators argue
that each statutory term is susceptible to separate analysis, based on separate
analytical concepts."0 In Landreth, the United States Supreme Court made it
clear that stock may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of
interpreting the scope of the definition of a security."'
In Landreth, as in the other United States Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with the characteristics of stock test, the interest the Court considered was
labeled "stock.""' 2 LLCs do not issue "stock,""' 3 and LLC statutes do not
refer to LLC interests as "stock."'2 Also, commentators and others do not
refer to LLC interests as "stock.""' 5 The issue therefore becomes whether an
instrument not labeled "stock" could constitute a security under the separate
test the Court devised for "stock."' LLC issuers may argue that Landreth
and the related cases apply only to instruments that are labeled "stock." No-
where, in either Landreth or the other United States Supreme Court decisions,
did the Court indicate that any instrument that possessed the characteristics of
stock constituted a security.'
436. Tennessee Statement of Policy, supra note 421.
437. Id.
438. Interpretive Opinion Orchards Drug, L.C., 1991 WL 101804, at *3 (Kan. Sec. Comm'r)
(May 1, 1991); Georgia Express Action at 46, (No. 50-93-0075).
439. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(1) (1958), 7B U.L.A. 580-
81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16) (1988), 7B U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995).
440. 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 871.
441. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 (1985).
442. See id. at 683; Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 702 (1985); United Hous. Found.,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975).
443. Sargent Article, supra note 7, at 1095; Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116.
444. See, e.g., Donn, supra note 1, § 1, at PGLLC-6 to -7; see generally state limited liability
company statutes, supra note 4.
445. See generally supra note I (commentaries on limited liability companies).
446. See Interpretive Opinion Orchards Drug L.C., 1991 WL 101804, at *3 (Kan. Sec.
Comm'r) (May 1, 1991); see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 36.
447. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 832-33; see, e.g., Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985);
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 848 (1975). But see Peralta, supra note 7, at 36-37 (citing United States Supreme Court
authority and arguing that for an investment to constitute a security as "stock," the word "stock"
itself need not be used).
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Professor Steinberg maintains that the characteristics of stock test should
be applied to LLC interests because "companies" issue such interests and in-
vestors expect such interests to be governed by the securities law.' Critics
assert that the statutory definition of a security does not contain the term
"company."" 9 Further, entities that might be thought of by investors as
"companies" issue most, if not all, financial instruments. The logical extension
of Professor Steinberg's theory would result in applying the characteristics of
stock test to all instruments issued by "companies." Applying the characteris-
tics of stock test to all instruments in the statutory definition of a "security"
that are issued by companies would make the definition's enumeration of the
various types of instruments superfluous. 5° The Supreme Court has also
made it clear that there is no universal or generic test for what constitutes a
security.45 Nevertheless, taking Professor Steinberg's argument to its logical
conclusion would result in a generic test applied to all interests issued by
"companies."
Furthermore, many business people use the term "company" loosely to
refer to partnerships and other joint ventures.452 If the characteristics of stock
test were applied to all such ventures, including general partnerships, most or
at least many of the elements of the characteristics of stock test would be
met.453 Such a result is not consistent with prior precedent holding that cer-
tain general partnership and joint venture interests are not securities.4 4 Some
commentators charge that investors do not expect LLC interests to be "stock"
merely because limited liability companies have the term "company" in their
title,455 thus allowing LLC issuers to argue that investors do not necessarily
expect LLC interests to be covered by the securities laws.456
Professor Larry Ribstein asserts that, even if the Landreth test applies,
LLC interests do not meet the characteristics of stock test. 55 Professor
448. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116.
449. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-5; see also supra notes 98-99
(statutory definitions of a security).
450. Cf Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692 (applying the Howey investment contract test to all instru-
ments would make the statutory enumeration superfluous).
451. 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 871 & n.5; see also Landreth, 471 U.S. at 691-
92.
452. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 7, at 833.
453. See Interpretive Opinion Orchards Drug L.C., 1991 WL 101804, at *3 (Kan. Sec.
Comm'r) (May 1, 1991).
454. Generally, courts do not treat a general partnership interest as a security, unless the gen-
eral partner is expected to be a passive investor who will not participate in the management of the
business. Schneider, supra note 134, at 138; see, e.g., Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership,
902 F.2d 805, 807-08 (10th Cir. 1990); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 102-03 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424-25 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). Joint ventures are subject to the same analysis as partnership inter-
ests. 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 956 n.200 (citing numerous authorities). The United
States Supreme Court has not considered whether interests in general partnerships or joint ventures
constitute securities.
455. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 833.
456. See id.; see also Georgia Express Action at 46, (No. 50-93-0075) (LLC interests do not
appear on their face to be what is commonly known as traditional "stock"); infra discussion part
II1.D (explaining arguments and defenses regarding instruments commonly known as securities).
457. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 833; see also Goforth, supra note 7, at 1242-47 (arguing LLC
interests are no more akin to stock than general partnership interests, which have not been found
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Ribstein maintains that LLC statutes do not generally provide for dividend
rights, they invariably restrict transferability of management rights, and they
allow allocation of voting rights per capita rather than pro rata.45 Based on
the arguments and authorities discussed in this section, LLC issuers have a
strong argument that LLC interests should not be deemed securities under the
Landreth characteristics of stock test.
3. Conclusions
Professor Steinberg's argument that LLC interests should be analyzed as
stock because companies issue the interests"'9 is a novel approach. Neverthe-
less, there appears to be no authority to support the application of the charac-
teristics of stock test to instruments other than those labeled "stock."' The
argument is also at odds with the Supreme Court's statement that stock should
be viewed as being in a category by itself." Moreover, the logical extension
of this argument would lead to results inconsistent with prior precedent. 2
Commentators have criticized the characteristics of stock test on theoreti-
cal grounds. Commentators argue the formalistic five-factor Landreth test
elevates form over substance, 3 therefore conflicting with many United
States Supreme Court decisions stating that form should be disregarded for
substance and emphasis placed upon economic reality.' Landreth is viewed
as an anomaly. Some argue that Landreth's precedential value is limited since
it represents a situation where the Court ignored traditional considerations
because it was unwilling to rule that common stock was not a security. 5 In
light of such criticism, there is little reason to broaden the test's application
beyond its narrow purpose to determine whether stock is a security.
From a practical standpoint, if a court applies the characteristics of stock
test to determine whether an LLC interest is a security, the determination
would depend on whether the LLC interest satisfies the Landreth five-factor
test. Professor Steinberg maintains that LLC interests ordinarily satisfy the
test.' Professor Ribstein, on the other hand, asserts that LLC interests nor-
mally do not meet the test. 7 Given that LLC statutes provide members the
flexibility to tailor the characteristics of the entity,' application of the
to possess the characteristics of stock).
458. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 833; see also Goforth, supra note 7, at 1242-47.
459. See supra notes 433-35 and accompanying text.
460. See supra note 447 and accompanying text.
461. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 450-54 and accompanying text.
463. See, e.g., Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, What Is a Security Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws?, 56 ALB. L. REV. 473, 559 (1993).
464. Id.; see, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); Unit-
ed Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 336 (1967).
465. See, e.g., Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 463, at 559-60.
466. See supra notes 426-32 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 457-58 and accompanying text.
468. Sargent Article, supra note 7, at 1073-77. For example, LLC distribution provisions,
transfer restrictions, and voting rights allocations may vary depending upon the state of formation
or the provisions in the articles of organization or the operating agreement. See I RIBSTEIN &
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Landreth test to LLC interests would result in a case-by-case analysis. A court
would need to review an LLC's operating agreement and articles of organiza-
tion to determine whether the LLC interest satisfies the test.'
Not only would use of the characteristics of stock test lead to litigation,
but more importantly, it would result in carefully drafted LLC documents
designed to escape the reach of the securities laws by insuring that one of the
elements in the five-factor test is not met. Application of the Landreth test to
LLCs would create an environment where formalistic devices could become
determinative due to the way the test is structured. Moreover, if an LLC inter-
est did not satisfy the elements of the Landreth test, nothing would preclude a
court from applying the investment contract test.47 As such, application of
the Landreth test to LLC interests does not appear to be a satisfactory solution
from either a theoretical or practical standpoint.
D. Commonly Known as a Security
1. Arguments Asserted
The federal securities acts and most state securities acts define the term
"security" to include any "instrument commonly known as a 'security."'' "
At least one commentator has argued that an interest in an LLC constitutes an
interest or instrument "commonly known as a 'security." '472 The phrase
"commonly known as a 'security"' has not generated much litigation473 and
neither the United States Supreme Court nor other federal courts have provid-
ed much guidance on how to interpret the phrase.474 Professor Marc
KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 6.02, at 6-2 (distribution provisions may be customized), § 7.04, at 7-4
to 7-5 (some LLC statutes permit variation of transferability restrictions by contrary provisions in
the articles of organization or operating agreement), and § 8.03, at 8-8 (most states allocate voting
ights according to capital contribution, but several states allocate voting rights per capita).
469. See Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1119.
470. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-58 (1975) (concluding that
the interest did not satisfy the characteristics of stock test, the Court then considered whether the
interest constituted an investment contract).
471. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401() (1958), 7B U.L.A. 580-
81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16) (1988), 7B U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995). The Securities Act and
Uniform Securities Acts list any interest or instrument commonly known as a security, while the
Exchange Act lists only any instrument commonly known as a security. However, this distinction
appears to have little practical effect due to the expansiveness of other terms in the Exchange Act.
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5B LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5, § 38.03[a][i], at 2-155 to
2-156 (1994).
472. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1120-22 (arguing that one can classify an LLC inter-
est as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a security"). The SEC did not make this
argument in its complaints or memorandums to the court in Vision Communications, Parkersburg,
or Knoxville. The triers of fact in the state actions summarized and cited infra Table I did not ex-
pressly address this argument either.
473. 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 209 (Supp. 1994); Geu, Part Two, supra note 1,
at 514.
474. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1967) (criticizing court of appeal's
conclusion that withdrawable capital shares were not an instrument commonly known as a securi-
ty); 5B JACOBS, supra note 471, § 3 8 .03 [q] (discussing how to determine whether an instrument is
"commonly known" as a security)
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Steinberg suggests4"' that to determine what interests or instruments are com-
monly known as securities, courts should: (i) examine the expectations or
perceptions of the investing public, or, alternatively; (ii) apply the family
resemblance test set forth in Reves v. Ernst & Young. 6
a. Public's Expectations
Alluding to the phrase any instrument "commonly known as a 'security,"'
the United States Supreme Court stated, "Congress intended the securities laws
to cover those instruments ordinarily and commonly considered to be securi-
ties in the commercial world . ....,,477 In Forman,4 7' Landreth,479 and
Reves," ° the Court indicated the investing public's expectations or percep-
tions are relevant in determining whether an instrument is a security.' Com-
mentators argue that an investor purchasing an LLC interest would reasonably
expect the transaction to be governed by the securities laws. 2 Investors are
purchasing an equity interest in a "company" and such transactions are typical-
ly subject to the securities laws. s3 Additionally, LLC interests generally pos-
sess the characteristics associated with securities such as stock. 4 Thus, a
reasonable investor would be justified in assuming the securities laws
apply,"' especially since nothing indicates that the securities laws do not ap-
ply. Courts, therefore, should deem an LLC interest to be an interest "com-
monly known as a 'security,"' considering the public's expectation. 6
475. See Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1120-22.
476. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
477. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982).
478. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). In Forman, there is dicta
stating that the name given to an instrument might reasonably lead an investor to believe the fed-
eral securities laws apply. The Court noted that the use of traditional names such as "stocks" or
"bonds" will lead the purchaser to justifiably assume the securities laws apply. Id. at 850. But, the
Court held that although the instrument was called "stock," it had none of the characteristics of
stock. The purchaser, therefore, could have no reasonable expectation that his transaction was
covered by the securities law. Id. at 851.
479. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985). In Landreth, the Court held that
because the instrument was called "stock" and bore the usual characteristics of stock, the purchas-
er was justified in assuming the federal securities laws governed the purchase. Id. at 687. The
Court, relying on public expectations, held common stock is a security. Id. at 687, 694.
480. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). In Reves, the Court stated that in deciding
whether a transaction involves a "security" it will examine the "reasonable expectations of the
investing public." Id. at 66. The Court said it "will consider instruments to be 'securities' on the
basis of such public expectations." Id.
481. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 463, at 555-57; Steinberg Article, supra note 7,
at 1120; supra notes 478-80.
482. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116, 1120; see Peralta, supra note 7, at 31.
483. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116, 1120; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33,
36-40; supra note 433 and accompanying text.
484. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116-19; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33, 36-
40; supra notes 426-32 and accompanying text.
485. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116, 1120; see Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33.
486. Cf Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1990).
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b. Family Resemblance Test
One can also argue an LLC interest is a security under the family resem-
blance test set forth in Reves." 7 In Reves, the United States Supreme Court
analyzed when a "note" is a security. 8 The Court stated that in deciding
whether a transaction involves a security, the Court examines four factors: (i)
the motivations of the buyer and seller; (ii) the plan of distribution; (iii) the
reasonable expectations of the investing public; and (iv) the presence of other
risk-reducing factors. 9 The Court uses these four factors to identify those
instruments that bear a strong "family resemblance" to items previously identi-
fied as securities.4' If, based on these factors, an LLC interest bears a strong
"family resemblance" to other items previously identified as securities, at least
one commentator has argued courts should deem such LLC interests securities.
In discussing the first factor, motivations, the Court stated that if the sell-
er's purpose is to raise money for general business operations or to finance a
substantial investment and if the buyer is interested primarily in profit, the
instrument is likely to be a security.49 Often LLC interests are sold to raise
seed capital for a venture. Also, LLC investors ordinarily expect a return on
their investment from capital appreciation, earnings, or tax benefits.492 Ap-
plying this analysis, the sale of an LLC interest is likely to meet the first test.
With respect to the second factor, plan of distribution, the Court stated
that if there is common trading for speculation or investment, the instrument is
more likely to be a security.493 Based on the Court's application of this fac-
tor in Reves, the test apparently is satisfied if the instrument is offered to the
general public, even if no secondary trading market exists.494 As a result, if
an LLC interest is offered to the general public, even if there were few
offerees or purchasers, this element apparently is satisfied.49
The Court noted in discussing the third factor, public expectations, that it
will consider instruments to be securities based on the reasonable expectations
or perceptions of the investing public.496 As discussed previously, investors
may be justified in expecting the securities laws to apply to the purchase and
sale of LLC interests. 97 Therefore, the public expectation requirement may
be met.
487. Id. at 65-67. For additional commentary on Reves, see James D. Gordon III, Inter-
planetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as Securities, 69 TEX. L. REV. 383 (1990); Janet
Kerr & Karen M. Eisenhauser, Reves Revisited, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1123 (1992); Marc 1. Steinberg,
Notes as Securities: Reves and Its Implications, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 675 (1990).
488. Reves, 494 U.S. at 60-73.
489. Id. at 66-67.
490. Id. at 65-67.
491. Id. at 66.
492. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1121 & n.100.
493. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
494. See id. at 68; see also Schneider, supra note 134, at 130.
495. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1121 & nn.101-02.
496. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67.




Finally, the Court noted that the existence of another regulatory scheme
reducing the investor's risk would make the application of the securities laws
unnecessary and militates against the Court finding the interest a security.498
Since no other regulatory scheme governs the offer or sale of LLC interests or
significantly reduces the risk to LLC investors, application of the securities
laws appears necessary.499 Given that LLC interests generally appear to satis-
fy each element of the family resemblance test, prosecutors and plaintiffs may
argue courts should deem LLC interests to be interests "commonly known as a
'security."'
2. Possible Defenses
LLC promoters can make a strong argument that neither the public's ex-
pectations nor the family resemblance test should determine whether an inter-
est is an interest "commonly known as a 'security."' As previously indicated,
the phrase "commonly known as a 'security"' has not generated much litiga-
tion and there is little guidance from the courts on how to interpret the
phrase." There is no precedent indicating the public's expectations alone
should dictate whether an interest is one that is "commonly known as a 'secu-
rity.""'5 " Nor is there any precedent stating that a court should apply the
Reves family resemblance test to determine whether an interest is one "com-
monly known as a 'security.""'5 2 In fact, the United States Supreme Court
indicated that, at least under the facts in Forman, it perceived no distinction
between the test for "investment contract" and the test for "an instrument
commonly known as a 'security.""'5 3 The Court noted that in either case, the
Howey test" should be used to determine whether the transaction involved a
security. 5 Therefore, courts should use the Howey test, rather than a public
expectations test or family resemblance test, to determine whether an interest
or instrument is one "commonly known as a 'security.""'
498. Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.
499. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1122.
500. See supra notes 473-74 and accompanying text.
501. For example, in Reves, Landreth, and Forman, the public's expectations were only one
of a number of factors considered by the Court. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67 (adopting the family
resemblance test and stating that the courts look to the buyers and seller's motivations, the plan of
distribution, and the reasonable expectations of the investing public); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685-97 (1985) (stating that the Court often looks to the language of the
statute, the definition of security, the characteristics of the instrument, and the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-58 (1975)
(considering the statutory definition of security, the purpose of the statute, and the public's expec-
tations).
502. See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 65-67 (stating that courts are to apply the family resem-
blance test to determine whether a "note" is a "security").
503. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
504. The Howey test, also known as the investment contract test, is set forth and discussed
supra part IIl.A.
505. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
506. For a discussion of the Howey investment contract test and an analysis of when an LLC
interest constitutes a security under the Howey test, see supra part III.A.
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a. Public's Expectations
While the Court has indicated the investing public's expectations are rele-
vant to determining whether an instrument is a security, 7 the Court has nev-
er stated the public's expectations are determinative." 8 The public's expecta-
t'ons were only one of many factors considered by the Court in these cas-
es. 5" As a result, the public's expectations alone do not dictate whether an
interest is a security.
Even if the public's expectations determined what interests were "com-
monly known as a 'security,"' LLC promoters may still argue that LLC inter-
ests are not securities. Commentators maintain, given the relatively recent
origin of LLCs, it is unlikely that an LLC interest has reached the status of an
interest "commonly known as a 'security.""'5 " Many investors do not even
know about the LLC form of business organization, let alone whether the
securities laws govern. The phrase "commonly known as a 'security"' appears
more applicable to widely-used instruments, such as stock options.5 ' Also,
given the variety of business arrangements that may utilize the LLC form and
the flexibility under the LLC statutes to vary the structure of the entity," 2 it
is difficult to generalize about such entities. It seems ironic that entities which
cannot be easily characterized because of their uniqueness would be treated as
offering an interest "commonly known as a 'security."' 5
There is no evidence to indicate that investors expect LLC interests to be
securities. Court documents filed in cases where the SEC alleged that LLC
interests constituted securities indicate that the offering documents in these
cases expressly disclosed that the interests did not constitute securities, were
not registered under any securities laws, and were not subject to the protection
of the securities laws." ' Consequently, a reasonable investor would not ex-
pect the protection of the securities laws. Of course, the counter argument is
that a seller may not effect a waiver of the securities laws by simply disclos-
ing that the securities laws do not apply. 5 If the instrument is a security,
the securities laws apply regardless of the disclosures made by the seller.
LLC promoters may also argue that LLCs share many of the characteris-
tics of a general partnership.5 6 Ordinarily, general partnership interests are
507. See supra notes 478-80 and accompanying text.
508. See supra note 501 and accompanying text.
509. See supra note 501.
510. Geu, Part Two, supra note 1, at 514.
511. See id.; 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 2.04 [141; 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note
99, at 1070-7 1.
512. See, e.g., supra note 468 and accompanying text.
513. Cf 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 2.04 [141, at 2-44 to 2-45.
514. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 9-11, (No 94-1079); Defendants'
Memorandum in Vision at 3, 26, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
515. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994) ("Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of
this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."). A similar pro-
vision prevents waiver of the Exchange Act. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1994).
516. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-4.
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not considered securities." 7 Since LLCs and general partnerships share many
of the same features, a reasonable investor would not assume the securities
laws apply to LLCs. For these reasons, LLC promoters may argue an LLC in-
terest may not be an interest "commonly known as a 'security."'
b. Family Resemblance Test
The Reves Court adopted the family resemblance test to determine when
an instrument denominated a "note" is a security." 8 The Court developed the
test to expand the enumerated categories of instruments that are not securi-
ties." 9 There is no indication that the Court was attempting to develop a
broader test or develop a test to determine whether an interest is one "com-
monly known as a 'security.' 5 20 Additionally, each term in the definition of
"security" is susceptible to a separate analysis, based on separate analytical
concepts. 2 ' Therefore, an argument can be made that the family resemblance
test only applies to notes.
As commentators have noted, the Reves test has created as much, if not
more, confusion than it has eliminated . 2 The four-factor family resemblance
test has been criticized by commentators as ambiguous enough to lead to a
variety of interpretations.525 In part, this is because the expectations of the
investing public are not easily discernible.5 2' Also, it is not clear what is
meant by the term the "investing public." '525 Does it mean an average reason-
able investor, a particular segment of the investing public, or those individuals
who were offered the investment opportunity?5 26 The Reves opinion provides
little guidance.527 In addition, the motivations of the buyer and seller are not
easily discernible, and any interpretation of motivations tends to be highly sub-
jective.5 2' There is no indication in the Reves opinion how a court is to de-
termine such motivations.529 It is not clear whether a court should use a sub-
jective or an objective test.530 As a result, courts are left to consider self-
serving testimony and are allowed to find the factors mean whatever the court
decides they mean.53
517. See supra note 454.
518. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65-70 (1990).
519. Id. at 65-67.
520. See id.
521. See supra note 440 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 441 and accompanying text.
522. Gordon, supra note 487, at 402-04; Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1124 & n.6,
1133-57, 1162; Steinberg, supra note 487, at 678-85.
523. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 487; Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1153;
Schneider, supra note 134, at 129-36; Steinberg, supra note 487.
524. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 463, at 560.
525. Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1156.
526. Id.
527. Id.; see Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990).
528. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 463, at 559-60.
529. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67; Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1153.
530. See Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1153.
531. Id.; Schneider, supra note 134, at 135-36.
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An analysis of court decisions applying the Reves test notes inconsisten-
cies and ambiguities abound." 2 There is no agreement as to the meaning of
each factor, or the ranking or relative weight of each factor.533 The test cre-
ates a situation where courts may determine for other reasons what the out-
come should be and then use the various factors of the family resemblance test
to justify the result reached.534
Commentators have also criticized the family resemblance test on philo-
sophical grounds.53 To what extent should the application of the securities
laws depend upon private impressions and personal motivations of those in-
volved in a transaction?536 The Reves test has been criticized for affording
too much weight to private impressions and personal motivations, rather than
emphasizing the public policy goals of the securities laws to protect the invest-
ing public and prevent fraud.537
3. Conclusions
The phrase "commonly known as a 'security"' appears applicable to inter-
ests more widely-used than LLCs.535 Given the relatively recent origin of the
LLC form,539 the variety of organizational structures available,5" and the
fact it shares many of the same features as a general partnership, 4' it is
doubtful that the LLC has reached the status of an interest "commonly known
as a 'security."'
The public's expectations are only one of many factors a court should
consider in determining whether an interest is one that is "commonly known
as a 'security."' 542 Because the public's expectations are not easily discern-
ible and such a highly subjective and speculative test would lead to inconsis-
tent and unpredictable results, a determination should not rest on that factor
alone.543 Rather, the public's expectations should be considered as one of
many relevant factors, as the Court has done to date.5"
532. Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1133-57, 1162.
533. Id. at 1153; Schneider, supra note 134, at 132-36.
534. Schneider, supra note 134, at 136.
535. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 463, at 559-60 (taking issue with whether the
public's expectations and the motivations of the buyer and seller should be determinative on
whether the federal securities laws apply).
536. Id. at 560.
537. Id. Professor Goforth argues that even if courts analyze LLC interests under the family
resemblance test, LLC issuers can argue the interests are not securities under the test on the
grounds that: (i) LLC interests are not expected to be traded for speculation or investment, since
LLC interests typically have limited transferability; (ii) given that LLCs have been viewed princi-
pally as a replacement for general partnerships and general partnership interests are not securities,
investors might not expect the securities laws to apply to LLCs; and (iii) there are at least two
possible alternative regulatory schemes that reduce the risk of the investment, including various
LLC statutes that offer investor protection and the Internal Revenue Code requirements that pro-
tect investors. Goforth, supra note 7, at 1254-70.
538. See supra note 511 and accompanying text.
539. See supra note 510 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 512-13 and accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 516-17 and accompanying text.
542. See supra notes 507-09 and accompanying text.
543. See supra notes 524-27, 531 and accompanying text.
544. See supra note 501 and accompanying text.
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Nor should the courts use the family resemblance test in Reves to deter-
mine whether an interest is one that is "commonly known as a 'security."' In
light of the practical and philosophical problems with the Reves test,545 there
is little reason to broaden its application beyond its current narrow purpose to
determine whether an instrument constitutes a "note." Given the criticism of
the Reves test and the confusion it has caused, the Reves test appears an un-
likely candidate for courts to use in determining whether an interest is one that
is "commonly known as a 'security."' For these reasons, neither the public's
expectations test nor the Reves family resemblance test provides a satisfactory
test from either a practical or philosophical standpoint for determining whether
an LLC interest is a security.
E. State Statutory Grounds for Liability
1. Arguments Asserted
State legislatures have begun to take the initiative by passing legislation
that either expressly states or implies that certain LLC interests are securities.
For example, legislatures in eight states have amended their securities laws to
expressly state certain LLC interests are securities." Seven states have
amended their securities laws to include references to LLCs.547 Such refer-
ences imply the offer and sale of LLC interests are subject to that state's
securities laws. In addition, legislatures in four states have included provisions
in their limited liability company acts that raise the securities law issue."
All of these statutes provide prosecutors and civil plaintiffs with state law
grounds for arguing that certain LLC interests are securities.
States have adopted three different types of securities law statutes to ex-
pressly address whether LLC interests are securities. The first type of statute
specifically lists LLC interests in the state securities act definition of a "securi-
ty."549 If the legislature expressly lists LLC interests in the definition of a
545. See supra notes 522-37 and accompanying text.
546. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1995);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-2(V) (Michie Supp.
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § I-
102(t) (Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202a(14) (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
551.02(13)(c) (West Supp. 1995). Table II of this article contains a listing of the state statutes that
expressly address whether LLC interests are securities under state law. Table II is organized al-
phabetically by state and provides the statutory citation, a short summary of the statutory provi-
sion, and quotes the relevant language.
547. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36b-1 (West Supp. 1995) (general statement); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 502.207A(2)(a) (West Supp. 1995) (expedited registration); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
1262(l) (Supp. 1994) (exempt transactions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:709(12) (West Supp.
1995) (exempt transactions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-05 (1995) (exempt securities); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 421-B:17(ll)(k) (Supp. 1994) (registration exemption); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
514(B)(7)(b) (Michie Supp. 1995) (exempt transactions).
548. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(n) (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.5103 (West
Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.185 (Vernon Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.1303
(West Supp. 1995). Table II of this article sets forth the relevant statutory language of the Geor-
gia, Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin statutes.
549. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-2(V); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202a(14). For example, the Ohio statute pro-
vides .'security' means any ... membership interests in limited liability companies ...." For the
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"security," prosecutors and plaintiffs may argue that state securities laws apply
to all LLC interests offered and sold in that state. In such states, courts no
longer need to determine whether LLC interests are securities under the in-
vestment contract test or a risk capital analysis.5 ° A court's inquiry is limit-
ed to whether the interest being offered or sold is an LLC interest.55" ' Prose-
cutors and plaintiffs can assert that by explicitly enumerating LLC interests in
the list of items that are "securities," the legislature mandated all LLC inter-
ests are securities and all LLC investors are entitled to the protection of the
state's securities laws. They may assert that by including LLC interests in the
definition the legislature effectively eliminated all judicial interpretation and
discretion.
The second type of statute also lists LLC interests in the state securities
act definition of a "security," but, in addition, such statutes state that an LLC
interest is not a security under certain specified circumstances.552 For exam-
ple, some statutes state that an LLC interest is not a security when all of the
members of the LLC are actively engaged in the management of the LLC.553
Moreover, some of the exclusionary provisions shift the burden of proof.554
In states adopting this statutory structure, prosecutors and plaintiffs would also
be able to argue that LLC interests are securities without having to apply the
investment contract test or any risk capital analysis.55 Litigants will battle
instead over whether the LLC interests meet the exclusionary conditions. But
these statutory conditions are subject to judicial interpretation. Courts may
draw on the Howey and risk capital lines of cases to interpret exclusionary
conditions such as "actively engaged in the management of the LLC." '556
With the new, specific statutory language, however, the issues are more limit-
ed and courts are not bound by precedent relating to the investment contract
test or risk capital test. Prosecutors and plaintiffs can argue that courts are free
relevant text of the Alaska, New Mexico, and Vermont statutes, see infra Table II.
550. In Reves, Landreth, and Gould, the United States Supreme Court held that the Howey
investment contract test and the economic reality approach do not apply in cases involving instru-
ments specifically listed in the statutory definition of a "security," other than to cases involving
the catch-all category of "investment contracts." See Reves v. Emst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64
(1990); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 691-92 & n.5 (1985); Gould v.
Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985). If LLC interests are expressly listed in the definition of a
"security," prosecutors and plaintiffs can argue similarly that the investment contract test, the
economic reality approach, and the risk capital analysis do not apply. For a discussion of the in-
vestment contract test and risk capital tests, see supra parts III.A and 11.B, respectively.
551. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 838-39 & n.1 10. The court need only determine whether the
firm was a properly formed LLC. Id. at n.ll0.
552. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, § 1-102(t). For the relevant text of these statutes, see infra Table I1.
553. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k).
554. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k) ("'Security' does not include ... an interest in
a limited liability company if the person claiming that the interest is not a security can prove that
all of the members of the limited liability company are actively engaged in the management of the
limited liability company.").
555. See supra note 550.
556. Courts may draw on the Howey "efforts of others" analysis or the risk capital test control




to adopt narrower interpretations crafted to reflect the legislature's intent to
provide greater protection for LLC investors.
The third type of statute sets forth certain presumptions in its definition of
a "security." '57 For example, such statutes may state that a "security" is pre-
sumed to include an LLC interest if the right to manage the LLC is vested in
one or more managers or if the aggregate number of members exceeds a spec-
ified number.558 Similarly, such statutes may also state a "security" is not
presumed to include an interest in an LLC if the aggregate number of mem-
bers is below a specified number.559 If the LLC interest in question meets
the statutory conditions that give rise to the presumption that the interest is a
security, prosecutors and plaintiffs can claim the legislature provided the court
with clear guidance-practically a bright-line test."6 However, if the LLC
interest in question does not meet the conditions giving rise to the presump-
tion, all is not lost. The presumptions are rebuttable, although they may shift
the burden of proof.56" ' Prosecutors and plaintiffs can probably present a
Howey-type analysis in an attempt to overcome the presumptions. 62 Litiga-
tion can also focus on interpreting the language of the statute. For example,
when is the right to manage the LLC vested in one or more managers? 63 In
an attempt to provide guidance, the legislature may have added simply another
layer of analysis and more confusion. Nevertheless, such statutes provide addi-
tional grounds to argue that an LLC interest is a security. Moreover, because
the presumption is rebuttable, the statute does not preclude arguments on other
grounds.
In addition, a number of states have amended their securities laws to
include references to LLCs5  and several states have included provisions in
their limited liability company act that raise the securities law issues. 65 Pros-
ecutors and plaintiffs may claim these provisions evidence legislative intent.
They may argue that by passing such provisions, the legislature indicated that
LLC interests are securities and that LLC investors are to be afforded the
protection of the state's securities laws. All of the statutes discussed in this
557. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)(c) (West Supp. 1995). For the relevant text of
this statute, see infra Table II.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 437 (discussing the Wisconsin approach). Prosecutors
and plaintiffs may assert that the presumptions indicate legislative intent. Interests in an LLC with
less than the specified number of members are not securities, while interests in an LLC with more
than the specified number of members are securities. Id.
561. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 301. The federal rules of evidence, for example, provide that a
"presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption." Id.
562. A discussion of the Howey analysis is presented supra part III.A.
563. Is the "fight to manage" satisfied by an operating agreement that vests management of
the LLC in its members, even if some members do not actually participate in its management? Or
does the "right to manage" not only require the vesting of management fights in its members, but
also actual exercise of those rights? Louis R. Briska, When Does a Member's Interest in an LLC
Become a Security?, 67 Wis. LAW., Sept. 1994, at 18, 20.
564. See supra note 547 and accompanying text.
565. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(n) (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.5103
(West Supp. 1995). For the relevant text of these statutes, see infra Table II.
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section provide prosecutors and plaintiffs with state law grounds for arguing
certain LLC interests are securities.
2. Possible Defenses
LLC issuers can challenge state statutory provisions, that either expressly
state or imply certain LLC interests are securities, on a number of grounds.
They may argue that a statutory characterization of an LLC interest as a "se-
curity" is not necessarily conclusive, since the clause preceding many
definitional sections provides "unless the context otherwise requires," thereby
mandating a review of the surrounding factual circumstances.5" Also, several
of these statutory provisions may be vulnerable to attack on constitutional
grounds for discriminating between domestic and foreign LLCs.567 Moreover,
all such statutory provisions are subject to judicial interpretation."'
LLC issuers can argue that including LLC interests in the statutory laun-
dry list of interests deemed "securities" does not mean all LLC interests are
automatically "securities." 5" They can contend that such statutory character-
izations are not conclusive. Inclusion in the list merely tilts the analytical scale
by creating a kind of presumption that simply makes it more difficult to estab-
lish the interest is not a security, but not impossible.57
This argument is premised on the fact that the definitional sections of the
federal securities acts57' and most state securities acts... begin with the
qualifying language "unless the context otherwise requires." Courts have inter-
preted the context clause as authorizing judicial exclusion of certain instru-
ments on the basis of factual circumstances, even if an instrument falls within
the statutory definition of a security.5 7 For example, the United States Su-
preme Court held in Reves v. Ernst & Young574 that the phrase "any note" in
the federal securities acts should not be interpreted to mean literally "any
note," but must be interpreted in light of what Congress was attempting to
accomplish.575 The Court concluded that Congress was concerned with regu-
lating the investment markets, not with creating a general cause of action for
566. See infra notes 569-82 and accompanying text.
567. See infra notes 583-85 and accompanying text.
568. See infra notes 586-96 and accompanying text.
569. Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 436 (discussing New Mexico's statutory definition of
a "security").
570. Id.
571. Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1994).
572. UNIF. SEC. AcT § 401 (1958), 7B U.L.A. 578 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 (1988), 7B
U.L.A. 91 (Supp. 1995); see also ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990 (1994); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25001
(West 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1 (West 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-102 (Supp.
1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.02 (West Supp. 1995).
573. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (excluding certain notes); Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982) (excluding certain certificates of deposit). For an
excellent critique of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the context clause, see
Marc 1. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of a "Security":
The "Context" Clause, "Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 489 (1987); see also 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 873-75.
574. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
575. Reves, 494 U.S. at 63.
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all fraud.576 Therefore, courts must look at the surrounding factual circum-
stances, including the offering context,5" to determine if a particular note is
a "security." The Court then held that many types of notes would not be treat-
ed as securities, despite inclusion of the phrase "any note" in the statutory
definition of a "security. 578
Citing a context clause, LLC issuers can argue courts are permitted to
carve out a relatively broad category of LLC interests as not constituting secu-
rities. 7 9 They can claim the context clause is intended to provide courts
some latitude to use judicial discretion and to avoid mindless, literal interpreta-
tion. 8 They can also argue that categorically defining all LLC interests as
securities is undesirable because it is over-inclusive."' While certain interests
may be within the letter of the statute, such broad coverage is not within the
spirit or intent. For instance, there is no justification for imposing all of the
consequences of the securities laws on a closely held LLC where all the mem-
bers are actively engaged in the management of the LLC 82
Also, at least two of the statutes that include LLC interests in the defini-
tion of a "security" may be subject to attack on constitutional grounds. The
definition of a "security" in Alaska provides that a "security" means an LLC
interest as defined in title 10, chapter 50 of the Alaska Statutes.583 The defi-
nition of a "security" in Wisconsin includes presumptions about interests in
LLCs organized under chapter 183 of the Wisconsin Statutes.584 Both provi-
sions appear to apply only to domestically organized LLCs. Presumably, LLCs
organized in other jurisdictions would be subject to an investment contract or
risk capital analysis. Professor Mark Sargent charges that this differential
treatment of domestic and foreign LLCs may be vulnerable to constitutional
attack under the Commerce Clause as either being discriminatory against or
placing an undue burden on interstate commerce.585
Even if a state has adopted a statute that lists LLC interests in the defini-
tion of a "security," many of the statutes contain exclusionary conditions5 6
or the statute may merely set forth a presumption. Since the exclusionary
conditions and presumptions often turn on whether members are engaged in
the management of the LLC,88 the conditions and presumptions are subject
576. Id. at 65.
577. See id. at 62-67.
578. Id. at 64-67.
579. Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 436 (discussing the New Mexico securities statute).
580. 3 BLOOMENTiAL, supra note 94, § 2.01, at 2-5.
581. McGinty, supra note 270, at 1039; Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 438.
582. Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 438-39.
583. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994). Title 10, chapter 50 of the Alaska Statutes in-
cludes provisions dealing with the formation of LLCs. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.50 (Supp. 1995).
For a definition of "limited liability company" and "limited liability company interest," see ALAS-
KA STAT. § 10.50.990. Both definitions refer to LLC entities organized under Alaska law. Id.
584. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)(c) (West Supp. 1995). For the relevant text of the Wis-
consin statute see infra Table I1. Chapter 183 of the Wisconsin Statutes deals with LLCs orga-
nized in Wisconsin. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 183 (West Supp. 1995).
585. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.03[1l][a), at 4-16 to 4-17.
586. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2- 1-1(k); PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 70,
§ 1-102(t).
587. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)(c).
588. See, for example, the language of the California, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin
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to interpretation. LLC issuers can argue for a broad interpretation of what
constitutes member management.589 They can continue to assert that LLCs
are closely analogous to general partnerships,"g thus courts should draw on
the Howey line of cases dealing with general partnership interests to determine
who has the right to manage the LLC or whether members are engaged in the
management of the LLC.59" ' Interpretation of these conditions and presump-
tions open the door for LLC issuers to cite case law dealing with general
partnership interests and argue for a strong presumption that LLC interests are
not securities.592
LLC issuers can also argue provisions in LLC acts that raise the securities
law issue... and the various references to LLCs in state securities law stat-
utes594 are not evidence of legislative intent to treat all LLC interests as se-
curities. Most of the provisions in the LLC acts simply raise the securities law
issue and leave it to the courts to decide whether an LLC interest is a securi-
ty.595 LLC issuers can argue that references to LLCs in state securities law
registration and exemption provisions simply indicate that the legislature rec-
ognized a court may find an LLC interest to be a security under the invest-
ment contract test or a risk capital analysis.596 By adding references to LLCs,
the legislature was merely making certain that registration and exemption pro-
visions are available for LLC offerings. If the legislature intended that all LLC
interests be treated as securities, then it would have amended the state laws to
provide so, rather than including sporadic references to LLCs. As a result,
such provisions are not dispositive of legislative intent.
Challenges to state statutory provisions on the basis of a context clause,
constitutionality, interpretation, or legislative intent may serve to undercut the
statutes set forth infra Table 11.
589. Such statutes tend to exclude LLC interests if the members are actively engaged in the
management of the LLC. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k)(iii). Therefore, a broad defini-
tion of what constitutes management would tend to exclude more LLC interests from coverage
under the securities laws.
590. See supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
591. For a discussion of the Howey line of cases dealing with partnership interests and a dis-
cussion of the arguments LLC issuers may make, see supra part III.A.2.
592. Several courts have stated there is a strong presumption that general partnership interests
are not securities under the Howey investment contract test. See supra note 241 and accompanying
text.
593. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11- 1107(n) (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.5103
(West Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.1303 (West Supp. 1995). For the relevant text of the
Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin statutes, see infra Table II.
594. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36b-1 (West Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 502.207A(2)(a) (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(l) (Supp. 1994); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51:709(12) (West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-05(4), (10), (11), (13)
(1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-06(4), (6), (10), (14) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-
07(2)(b)(3) (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:11(11) (Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421-B:13(l) (Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:17(ll)(k) (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(7)(b) (Michie Supp. 1995).
595. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(n) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
as establishing that a limited liability company interest is not a 'security'...."); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 183.1303 ("An interest in a limited liability company may be a 'security'....").
596. For a discussion of the grounds for finding that an LLC interest is a security under the
investment contract test or risk capital analysis, see supra parts III.A and III.B.
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statutory arguments made by prosecutors and plaintiffs. If nothing else, such
challenges provide grounds for increased litigation.
3. Conclusions
Prosecutors and plaintiffs have a very strong argument that all LLC inter-
ests are securities in states that specifically list LLC interests, without any
qualifications or conditions, in the state securities law definition of a "securi-
ty."'597 Several states do not have context clauses preceding the statutory defi-
nitions."' Clearly all LLC interests are securities in such states.
Even in states where the definitional section begins with a context clause
qualification, prosecutors and plaintiffs have strong arguments that all LLC
interests in such states are securities. They may argue that the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the "starting point in every case in-
volving construction of a statute is the language itself."' The context clause
usually does not modify the term "security" in particular, but generally pre-
cedes a long list of general definitions.' Early drafts of the proposed federal
securities laws show the context clause language was intended to refer to the
context in which the defined terms appeared in the statute itself."I The con-
text clause only meant that the same words may have different meanings in
different parts of the same act. Parties may argue the context clause was not
meant to refer to the context of the underlying transaction. 2 Given the leg-
islative intent, prosecutors and plaintiffs may contend that courts should not
use the context clause to justify excluding any LLC interests from the defini-
tion of a "security" on the basis of the offering context.
The Landreth3 case also provides prosecutors and plaintiffs with
grounds for arguing that the plain meaning of the statutory language should
control. In Landreth, the United States Supreme Court held that since the term
"stock" was plainly within the statutory definition of a "security," the plain
meaning of the statute mandated that the stock in question be treated as a
security.' There was no reason to examine the offering context or underly-
ing transaction."5 Similarly, prosecutors and plaintiffs can argue that inclu-
sion of LLC interests in the definition of a "security" mandates that all LLC
interests must be treated as securities.
597. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01 (Baldwin Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 4202a (1993 & Supp. 1995).
598. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202a.
599. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, I., concur-
ring); accord Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979).
600. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1994); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401 (1958), 7B U.L.A. 578 (1985);
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 (1988), 7B U.L.A. 91 (Supp. 1995).
601. For a discussion of early drafts of the federal securities laws and the context clause lan-
guage, see Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 573, at 504-05 & n.91; see also Gary S. Rosin,
Functional Exclusions from the Definition of a Security, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 333, 363-64 (1986).
602. Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 573, at 504.
603. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
604. Id. at 687, 697.
605. Id. at 690.
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Even though the United States Supreme Court excluded certain notes and
certificates of deposits from the definition of a "security" based on factual
context," prosecutors and plaintiffs can argue that such cases are distin-
guishable. Changes in the usage of notes and certificates of deposits by the
financial community over time and significant variations in the character of
these instruments resulted in changes in their meanings. 7 Although both
terms are listed in the definition of a "security," ' 8 the terms no longer have
well-settled meanings.' The Court therefore looked behind the labels to the
offering context to determine if instruments labeled notes and certificates of
deposits should be treated as securities.60 Prosecutors and plaintiffs, howev-
er, may argue LLC interests are different. LLC interests are not some unusual
type of financial instrument.6 ' Neither the meaning of the term nor the
character of LLC interests have changed. There is no need to look beyond the
characteristics of the instrument. The legislature meant what it said: LLC
interests are securities. The plain meaning of the statute should control. No
justification exists for judicial modification of the statutory terms based on the
factual situation because legislative intent is clear.
By including LLC interests in the statutory definition of a "security," the
legislature presumably intended to provide some certainty and
predictability.6 2 The legislature wished to make clear that certain LLC inter-
ests are securities. If courts begin to use the context clause to exclude interests
that clearly fit within the statutory definition, courts will undermine the legis-
lative purpose. Such exclusions create uncertainty." 3 When courts do not ap-
ply the law according to its express terms, they reduce the public's ability to
understand what the law requires of them. Without lawyers, discovery, and
litigation, neither LLC issuers nor investors will know whether their transac-
tion is covered by the securities laws. In the interest of predictability and
clarity, courts should resist judicially excluding interests expressly listed in the
definition. Moreover, the statutes neither define nor even suggest the scope of
the context clause.6 4 Nor have courts ever really elaborated on the precise
606. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (stating that a note may or may not be
a security); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding that a certificate of deposit
purchased from a federally regulated bank is not a security).
607. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 62-63 (discussing notes); Landreth, 471 U.S. at 694 (discussing
notes); Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 557-58 & n.5 (discussing certificates of deposit); see also 2
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 875 n.18 (tracing changes in the meaning of the term note).
608. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(!); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(l) (1958), 7B U.L.A. 578 (1985).
609. See supra note 607 and accompanying text.
610. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-70 (addressing notes); Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 555-59
(discussing certificates of deposit).
611. Cf. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 689-90 n.4 (noting that cases where the Court looked at the
economic reality of the transaction usually "involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition").
612. If a securities act does not list LLC interests in its definition of a security, courts gener-
ally must conduct a case-by-case investment contract or risk capital analysis to determine if the
interest is a security. See discussion supra parts III.A and III.B.
613. See Gary S. Rosin, Historical Perspectives on the Definition of a Security, 28 S. TEX. L.
REV. 575, 618 (1987); Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 573, at 490.
614. McGinty, supra note 270, at 1039.
[Vol. 73:2
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
role of the context clause.6 5 Courts should not expand the use of this vague
concept which creates uncertainty and allows for unbounded judicial discre-
tion.6"6 Courts should apply the statute according to its express terms, rather
than using the context clause to embark down the road of judicial activism.
Courts should also resist LLC issuer efforts to draw on the Howey line of
cases dealing with general partnership interests in interpreting statutory phrases
dealing with LLC interests. If the legislature intended courts simply to apply
the Howey investment contract test, any references to LLCs in the definition
would be superfluous. It may be argued that by including a reference to LLCs
in the definition of a "security," the legislature intended to provide greater
guidance to the courts than the Howey test provides, and possibly more cer-
tainty and increased investor protection. Following a Howey line of cases
would undermine the legislature's intent. The new statutory language frees the
courts to adopt judicial interpretations that provide greater investor protection
and more certainty. As a result, state statutes that address the issue of whether
LLC interests are securities may provide prosecutors and plaintiffs with some
very powerful weapons in arguing that LLC interests are securities.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
While commentators are divided on the issue of whether LLC interests
should be treated as securities,6"7 the SEC and at least thirty-five state securi-
ties commissions have taken the position that certain LLC interests may be
securities.6 Commentators, the SEC, and state securities agencies have ad-
vanced five different legal theories in their attempts to bring LLC offerings
within the ambit of the securities laws. These theories include the investment
contract test, the risk capital test, the characteristics of stock test, the common-
ly known as a security test, and state statutory grounds. Clearly certain LLC
interests can be securities under the Howey investment contract test and a risk
capital analysis.6"9 While prosecutors and plaintiffs may make colorable ar-
guments that LLC interests are securities under the characteristics of stock test
or the commonly known as a security test,62° such arguments probably will
not prevail. In light of both practical and philosophical problems, there is little
reason to broaden the application of the characteristics of stock test or the
commonly known as a security test to cover LLC interests.62" ' The recent
passage of state statutes defining certain LLC interests as securities provides
prosecutors and plaintiffs with additional state law grounds for arguing LLC
interests are securities.622 While such statutes are subject to judicial interpre-
615. See Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 573, at 490-91.
616. McGinty, supra note 270, at 1039; Rosin, supra note 601, at 361-64; Steinberg &
Kaulbach, supra note 573, at 511-12.
617. See supra note 7.
618. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
619. See supra parts III.A.I, III.A.3, III.B.1, and III.B.3.
620. See supra parts III.C.I and III.D.1.
621. See supra parts II1.C.2, 1II.C.3, IlI.D.2, and III.D.3.
622. See supra parts III.E.1 and III.E.3.
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tation, these statutes may prove to be a powerful weapon for prosecutors and
plaintiffs attempting to apply the securities laws to LLC offerings.
As courts grapple with these various legal theories to determine whether
LLC interests are securities, they will have the opportunity to refine and devel-
op the definition of a security. How the courts apply the securities laws to the
offer and sale of LLC interests will determine the degree of protection afford-
ed investors. Absent legislative action, courts will use the Howey investment
contract test and the risk capital tests to determine whether an LLC interest is
a security." 3 The formulation of the Howey test and the risk capital tests, the
remedial purpose of the securities laws,624 the hybrid nature of the LLC enti-
ty, and the recent proliferation of fraudulent LLC schemes,625 all compel the
conclusion that each LLC offering must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
Courts must focus on the substance, not the form, of each transaction and
examine the economic realities of the transaction, not just the operating docu-
ments.626 Applying general partnership case law and its related presumptions
to LLC offerings is inappropriate and will lead to undesirable results.6" If
the courts determine there is a need for presumptions to provide clear, predict-
able rules, they should presume that LLC interests are securities.62 The costs
associated with such a presumption would be minimal in most situations, but
the protection provided investors would be great. However, if the goal is truly
clarity, predictability, and maximizing investor protection, the best approach
would be for legislatures to enact legislation expressly stating that all LLC
interests are securities. 629
623. See supra parts III.A.3 and III.B.3.
624. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1974); Fortier v. Ramsey, 220 S.E.2d 753, 755 (Ga. Ct. App.
1975).
625. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text; see also Division of Enforcement Warns
of Fraud in the Sale of Unregistered Securities of Telecommunications Technology Ventures,
News Release, SEC 94-105, 1994 WL 507361 (SEC) (Sept. 16, 1994) (explaining that fraudulent
telecommunications technology ventures frequently take the form of LLCs); Jim McTague, Regu-
lators Say Cable-TV Investment Scams Are Rampant, BARRON'S, Sept. 5, 1994, at 15 (explaining
that "scamsters" try to steer clear of securities regulators by using LLCs); Ellen E. Schultz, IRA
Money May Attract Shady Deals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at Cl (reporting that many of the
deals are packaged as LLCs).
626. See supra parts IIl.A.3 and III.B.3.
627. See supra part III.A.3.
628. See supra notes 324-29 and accompanying text.
629. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 4202a(14) (Supp. 1995).
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A PAGE OF HISTORY OR A VOLUME OF LOGIC?:
REASSESSING THE SUPREME COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
"History is a voice forever sounding across the centuries the laws of
right and wrong. Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and
fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity."-Froude
"History is bunk. "-Henry Ford
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Holmes once said, "A page of history is worth a volume of log-
ic."' Nowhere does that sentiment ring more true than in the context of dis-
cerning the proper scope of the Establishment Clause. Unfortunately, since
1947 the Supreme Court has severed the Clause from its historical roots, aban-
doning the lessons of its poignant historical experiences. The result has proved
catastrophic, as the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence seems to shift,
sometimes drastically, with every personnel change on the Court.2 Nonethe-
less, history may be as poor a barometer of the Clause's intended scope as are
the Court's inconsistent decisions. Indeed, the history of the Establishment
Clause is not only confusing, but mired in minutiae and readily manipulated.
Unwary jurists consistently fall prey to its simple deceptiveness and overlook
its unquantifiable complexity. The ominous result is an Establishment Clause
jurisprudence which is one-sided and distorted, a jurisprudence without sub-
stance and historical support.
The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from making any law "re-
specting an establishment of religion."3 Although the plain language of the
Clause would seem to indicate that it proscribed only establishments as they
were commonly known to the Framers, i.e., legislative designation of an offi-
cial state church, courts have read much into the term "respecting" and con-
cluded the Clause's reach is broader than its face suggests.4 Engaged in an
inherent (and necessary) conflict with the Establishment Clause is the Free
Exercise Clause, which forbids Congress from enacting any law prohibiting
the free exercise of religion.5
1. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
2. For an example, see infra notes 422-26, 440 and accompanying text, which discuss the
impact of Justice O'Connor upon the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. For an argument suggesting that the plain language approach has been incorrectly and
without explanation rejected, see William C. Porth & Robert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A
Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 109 (1987).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. i. One author argues that the Religion Clauses "must be construed
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Given the breadth and generality of the Clause's language, it is not sur-
prising that many interpretations have been proffered. Nonetheless, most histo-
rians and jurists generally adopt one of two views: separationism or
nonpreferentialism.6 Separationism, which is the view most often espoused by
the Supreme Court, advocates, as its name suggests, strict separation between
church and state. 7 Separationists allege that the Constitution and the Establish-
ment Clause prohibit any and all federal government aid to religion.! The
competing view of nonpreferentialism in essence proffers that the Framers
intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit only congressional establishment
of a national church and elevation of one religious sect to a preferred status
over other sects.9 Hence, nonpreferentialism permits government support for
religion provided no religions or religious sects are excluded from receipt of
the benefit."
This article begins with a brief overview of the Establishment Clause's
adoption and the writings of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, the two
figureheads upon which the Supreme Court most regularly relies to support its
decisions and its endorsement of separationism. Specifically, the article exam-
ines Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance and Jefferson's Danbury letter
and Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom. Following this discussion, the article
briefly outlines the rise of the Lemon test, the traditional standard developed
by the Court to resolve Establishment Clause disputes. It then traces the Su-
preme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and examines its two most
recent pronouncements: Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia" and Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette.2 Final-
ly, the article evaluates the merits and historical accuracy of the Court's Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. In this respect, it concludes that the Court's
decisions in this area, and the test on which those decisions are based, are rid-
dled with historical inaccuracies. These inaccuracies include the Court's gross
overemphasis on, and misunderstanding of, the individual church-state view-
points of both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. 3 Not only has the
as never in contradiction." Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Reli-
gious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 594 (1995). This
assertion ignores, however, that the Clauses frequently must be in conflict-they protect different
interests and seek conflicting objectives. The Establishment Clause limits the state's involvement
in religion while the Free Exercise Clause protects religious expression. Therefore, whenever reli-
gious expression is curtailed by the Establishment Clause, the two are in contradiction.
6. For an interesting debate regarding the merits of each view, see Robert L. Cord &
Howard Ball, The Separation of Church and State: A Debate, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 895.
7. Note that even the Court has not gone so far as to say all aid, even that which is inci-
dental, is restricted. As will be shown, however, the Court's tendencies have historically leaned far
more to the separationist side than any other.
8. ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CUR-
RENT FICTION 19 (1982).
9. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 112-13 (1994).
10. For an interesting historical overview of the tension between nonpreferentialists and
strict-separationists, see John Witte, Jr., The Theology and Politics of the First Amendment Reli-
gion Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMORY L.J. 489 (1991).
11. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
12. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
13. For discussions of Madison and Jefferson, see infra notes 40-63, 462-94 and
accompanying text.
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Court characterized Jefferson and Madison as indisputably separationist, it has
further attributed their views to every Framer of the Bill of Rights and found
the concept of separationism to be inherent in the Clause itself. 4 As such, the
Court has ignored and belittled the views of virtually every person involved in
the framing of the Establishment Clause. The Court further ignored history
when it incorporated the Clause and subsequently applied it to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 This incorporation dramatically altered the fed-
eralist structure the Framer's intended to inhere in the Clause and has resulted
in chaos, as the Court has been forced to engage in a number of roles for
which it is ill-suited. These roles include Court micromanagement of religious
issues in public schools, 6 Court decisions as to the amount and types of aid
states may render to private religious schools, 7 and a host of other local and
regional issues the Framers intended the states, rather than the national govern-
ment, to resolve. As such, this author posits that the Court should return the
vast majority of those decisions to the states, and allow local citizens to make
these delicate and sensitive determinations."
II. ADOPTING THE AMENDMENT
It was to fulfill a campaign promise that Madison stood on June 8, 1789,
to address the First Congress and introduce preliminary versions of the Reli-
gion Clauses.' His first proposal read: "The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in
any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."2" Not to be hurried, the House
referred Madison's proposals to committee, where they remained until the
House debates of August 15.2 During this time, the committee, which includ-
ed Madison, altered the amendment to read as follows: "No religion shall be
established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed."22
The rewording was not complete, however, for, again on August 15, the
House adopted by a 31-20 vote a version stating, "Congress shall make no
laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience., 23 The final
changes came on August 20, when the House at long last settled on the fol-
lowing wording and submitted this amendment to the Senate: "Congress shall
14. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion and critique of this incorporation, see infra notes 77-78, 508-28 and
accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the public education cases, see infra notes 170-275 and accompany-
ing text; for a critique of those decisions, see infra notes 449-61 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the aid to parochial school cases, see infra notes 73-169 and accom-
panying text; for an analysis of those decisions, see infra notes 444-48 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 508-28 and accompanying text.
19. ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 17 (1990).
20. Id.; CORD, supra note 8, at 7; LEVY, supra note 9, at 95.
21. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 17.
22. Id.; LEVY, supra note 9, at 96.
23. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 18; LEVY, supra note 9, at 101.
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make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to
infringe the rights of conscience."24
Much debate has .centered around the significance of the House's use of
language in these various proposals. In short, the evidence is insufficient to
assert confidently either that the changes were made in response to simple
stylistic differences or were meant to embody substantive variations in the
meaning of the proposals themselves.2' Recall that the amendment first before
the floor that day read: "No religion shall be established by law, nor shall the
equal rights of conscience be infringed." This proposal spawned a variety of
reactions, ranging from fear that it would "abolish religion altogether,"26 to
doubt that it was necessary at all." Without expressing an opinion as to the
amendment's utility, Madison believed it necessary to calm those who in the
State Conventions feared that Congress would act under the Necessary and
Proper Clause to establish a national religion or infringe the rights of con-
science.28 He therefore furthered a version which on its face prevented Con-
gress from establishing a national religion.29 The use of "national," however,
met resistance because it implied that "this [a national] form of Government
consolidated the Union" and thereby invaded those rights reserved to the
states.30 Although Madison disagreed, he did not press the motion further.3
Representative Livermore noted his discontent with the amendment as written
and proposed the version temporarily adopted.32
No comparable records of the Senate's debate, which began on September
3, exist. Because of the debate's secret nature the record notes only that the
Senate considered and dismissed three motions.33 These read as follows:
First, "Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society in
preference to others"; second, "Congress shall not make any law infringing the
rights of conscience, or establishing any religious sect or society"; and third,
"Congress shall make no law establishing any particular denomination of
24. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 18; LEVY, supra note 9, at 101.
25. Nonetheless, the scant legislative history suggests most members participating in the
House debate concerned themselves primarily, if not exclusively, with two objectives: protecting
the rights of conscience, or religious freedom in the form of religious choice, and alleviating fears
that Congress could create, or establish, a national religion. Commentators are in virtual consensus
that these were fundamental, legitimate fears which the Framers meant to address in the Religion
Clauses. The point of contention, however, is whether the Framers intended the Clauses to encom-
pass only these apprehensions. Certainly, some weight must be accorded the fact that Madison di-
rected all his comments to free exercise and formal establishments. Even Representative Gerry,
who opposed use of the term national, did so not out of any opposition to the term's inherent
concept or because he considered the amendment's reach to extend beyond prohibition of a na-
tional church, but rather because he feared an Antifederalist backlash. LEVY, supra note 9, at 98-
99.
26. Id. at 97.
27. Id.
28. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 17; CORD, supra note 8, at 9; LEVY, supra note
9, at 97.
29. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 17; LEVY, supra note 9, at 98.
30. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 18.
31. Id.; LEVY, supra note 9, at 99.
32. LEVY, supra note 9, at 98.
33. Id. at 102.
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religion in preference to another." 4 Unable to agree on any of these three
proposals, the Senate that day adopted a proposal which included the simple
statement, "Congress shall make no law establishing religion."3 Following
the House's example of indecisiveness, however, the Senate returned six days
later to pass its final version: "Congress shall make no law establishing arti-
cles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of reli-
gion."36
The House rejected the Senate's proposed amendments, and in an attempt
at reconciliation suggested a joint committee. 7 This committee formulated
the following proposal: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."38 On September
25, the Senate approved this wording, and with it the Religion Clauses. 9
III. MADISON AND JEFFERSON
Unfortunately, the men who framed the First Amendment did not explain,
at least in detail, what actions they collectively believed the Establishment
Clause encompassed. Although undoubtedly all the Framers believed the
Clause prohibited the formal establishment of a national religion, it is not clear
what, if any, other actions beyond formal establishment the Clause restrict-
ed.' Nonetheless, courts and commentators have proffered various construc-
tions.4"' None of these constructions, however, has been so hotly debated or
yielded such dramatic results as the one proffered by the Supreme Court in
1947 in Everson v. Board of Education.2 There, the Court not only unani-
mously endorsed separationism, but based its decision exclusively on the
views, acts, and writings of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. 4' The
Court did so despite the fact that Jefferson did not even participate in the
framing, adoption, and ratification of the Establishment Clause and that Madi-
son was only one of many Framers." Given the Court's continuing propensi-
ty to frame its historical dialogues in terms of Madison's and Jefferson's
church-state jurisprudence, the following discussion describes those writings
which the Court consistently relies upon.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 18; CORD, supra note 8, at 9.
37. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 18; CORD, supra note 8, at 9; LEVY, supra note
9, at 103.
38. LEVY, supra note 9, at 103-04.
39. Id. at 104.
40. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIN-
CIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS 18-19 (1995).
41. Compare the separationist view of Leonard Levy, supra note 9, with the
nonpreferentialist view of Robert Cord, supra note 8.
42. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
43. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-14. For a discussion of Everson, see infra notes 73-89 and ac-
companying text.
44. For a critique of the Court's overemphasis of Madison and Jefferson in its decisions, see
infra notes 462-506 and accompanying text.
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A. Madison's Remonstrance
In the annals of Religion Clause jurisprudence, history reserves only Jef-
ferson a pedestal so high as Madison, who was not only the fourth President
of the United States, but also a ratifier, and in essence the creator, of the Bill
of Rights. One of Madison's earliest encounters with religion and government
came in 1785, when in response to a proposed Virginia bill attempting to
impose a tax on Virginia property owners to support Christian teachers, he
authored a tract entitled "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments, 1785." 4' In this Remonstrance, Madison proffered fifteen argu-
ments against passage of the bill. Primary among these was the importance of
free exercise of religious conscience.' To this end, Madison wrote, "It is the
duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he
believes to be acceptable to him."'47 Madison further stated that the legislature
was without such authority as to enact the bill.' If society lacked any author-
ity over religion, it was axiomatic that society's appointed representatives
could exercise no such influence; to do so was tyrannical.49 Finally, Madison
was concerned with the proven historical pattern that ecclesiastical establish-
ments tainted and corrupted religion.5"
Undoubtedly, the Remonstrance sheds light on Madison's position regard-
ing church and state. Without question, he opposed any taxes or other coercive
payments the proceeds of which specifically and exclusively supported any
one religion or religious endeavor.5 Indeed, the Remonstrance focused upon
the dangers of exalting one sect or one religion over all others. The Remon-
strance did more, however, than simply address establishments. It grounded
the right to free exercise of religion in natural law, indicating the paramount
reverence Madison accorded religious freedom.52 For Madison, protection of
these liberties entailed casting the church and the national government into
mutually exclusive spheres and forbidding each from encroaching on the
other's appointed domain.
B. Jefferson's Danbury Letter and Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom
Undoubtedly, Thomas Jefferson's metaphor that the Establishment Clause
erects a wall of separation between church and state is the most quoted state-
ment in the annals of Establishment Clause jurisprudence." Notwithstanding
45. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 1785, re-
printed in CORD, supra note 8, at 244-49; see also ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 12;
ANSON P. STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1964).
46. CORD, supra note 8, at 244.
47. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 12; CORD, supra note 8, at 244; STOKES &
PFEFFER, supra note 45, at 56.
48. CORD, supra note 8, at 245.
49. Id. ("Because if religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less
can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body .... The Rulers who are guilty of such an en-
croachment, exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants.").
50. Id. at 246.
51. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 12; CORD, supra note 8, at 246.
52. CORD, supra note 8, at 246.
53. Interestingly, Jefferson was not the original author of the metaphor. That credit belongs
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this fame, the metaphor's actual utility as an indicator of Jefferson's intent is
limited.54 The letter in which the phrase appears, an 1802 response to the
Danbury Baptist Association, neither offers any explanation of what exactly
this wall is nor any discussion of whether it is absolute.5 That Jefferson, in
using this metaphor, intended the wall to sever completely government and
religion is at best untenable, at least, insupportable. This does not suggest,
however, that Jefferson did not advocate a rigid separation, but that such ten-
dencies are best developed by other evidence.
It is not Jefferson's Danbury letter, but rather his renowned proposal enti-
tled "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" that demonstrates Jefferson's
insights regarding religious liberty. One historian has gone so far as to pro-
claim the bill "the most important document in American history, bar
none."56 Despite its modem repute, the bill's path to enactment was a long
and storied one.
Introduced in the Virginia legislature in 1779, it proved too radical and
thus was not enacted until 1786."7 In the interim, the general assessment con-
troversy diverted all of Jefferson's and Madison's attention from the Bill, as
they found themselves locked in a fierce struggle58 with those seeking to in-
stitute a tax which undoubtedly curtailed religious liberty. Indeed, it was this
assessment controversy which led to Madison's Remonstrance. Once Jefferson
and Madison orchestrated the assessment's defeat in 1785, both returned their
attention to Jefferson's Bill, which finally passed on January 19, 1786.'9
The Bill began with a sparkling preamble emphasizing the gravity of
religious freedoms. There, Jefferson stated, "Almighty God hath created the
mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain, by mak-
ing it altogether insusceptible of restraint." In addition, Jefferson con-
to Roger Williams, who wrote in 1644 that when a religion "ha[si opened a gap in the hedge or
wall of separation between the garden of the Church and the wilderness of the world, God hath
ever broke down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, etc., and made his garden a wilderness,
as at this day." ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 5-6; see also STOKES & PFEFFER, supra
note 45, at 52 (discussing Roger Williams's contributions to the religious freedom debates and
influence upon Thomas Jefferson).
54. Consider the following remarks Chief Justice Rehnquist leveled at "the wall" in 1985: "It
is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitu-
tional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with
Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. For a reproduction of Jefferson's letter, see CORD, supra note 8, at 112-13.
56. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and Bills Number 82-86 of the Revision of the
Laws of Virginia, 1776-1786: New Light on the Jeffersonian Model of Church-State Relations, 69
N.C. L. REv. 159, 160 (1990) (quoting Harvard historian Bernard Bailyn).
57. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 45, at 52; Dreisbach, supra note 56, at 163-64.
58. Fearful of the unexpectedly strong support for the assessment, which was sponsored by
Patrick Henry, Jefferson disclosed to Madison a possible course of action: "What we have to do I
think is devoutly to pray for his [Henry's] death." Dreisbach, supra note 56, at 166. As Dreisbach
notes, however, Madison had a much more sensible solution: have Henry elected Governor so as
to remove him and his influence from the state's legislative body. Id. In the end, Madison won
out and Henry was elected Governor. Id.
59. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 12; Dreisbach, supra note 56, at 169 n.60.
60. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785, in ADAMS &
EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 110 (emphasis omitted).
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demned forced contributions for the propagation of religion, and staunchly
characterized the opinions of humanity as beyond the jurisdiction of the civil
government.6' Also prohibited under the Bill were government compulsions
upon the citizenry to frequent or support religious institutions.6 2 Not surpris-
ingly, the idea expressed in the Bill's conclusion parallels that in Madison's
Remonstrance-that free exercise rights emanate from natural law and cannot
be compromised by governmental coercion or persecution.63 Noticeably, the
Bill failed to mention any restriction on religious establishments.
IV. THE CLAUSE AND THE COURT: A HISTORY
A. Introduction
Between the ratification of the Establishment Clause and 1947, the Su-
preme Court rendered few Establishment Clause decisions, and thus had no
cause to develop a comprehensive framework for resolving Establishment
Clause disputes. Of the few Establishment Clause decisions actually made,
none were meaningful or contrary to the understood meaning of the Clause:
the national government could not establish religions, but state governments
were free to legislate on the subject.'M Given this understanding, it is natural
that few conflicts over the Clause's scope occurred. In the late 1800s and
early 1900s, however, the movement to apply the provisions of the Bill of
Rights to the states gained momentum.65 As such, it was inevitable that the
debate would arise over whether the Establishment Clause should, or would,
apply to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Beginning with Everson,
which is discussed immediately below, the Supreme Court's answer to that
question was a resounding yes. With the application of the Establishment
Clause to the states, however, a new host of problems developed. These prob-
lems included the extent to which the Clause would apply to the states and the
degree to which existing state institutions, legislation, and practices would be
altered by that application.
Incorporation created an additional, and significant, difficulty-how to
construe the Clause so as to ensure its consistent application. From 1947 to
1971, the Court searched for a malleable yet effective framework. During this
period, it decided cases based mostly upon its own intuitions of those actions
it collectively believed the Clause was intended to prohibit. Not surprisingly,
the result was a jurisprudence without much consistency. In 1971, however,
the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman66 established a three part test for
use in resolving Establishment Clause issues.67 Although the Court had de-
61. Id. at 110-12.
62. Id. at 111.
63. Id. at 112.
64. SMITH, supra note 40, at 18.
65. CORD, supra note 8, at 93-101; SMITH, supra note 40, at 51.
66. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
67. For a discussion of Lemon, see infra notes 112-26 and accompanying text. The Court in
Lemon prohibited cash subsidies to parochial school teachers because the authorizing statutes
excessively entangled the state governments of New York and Rhode Island with religion. Lemon,
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lineated each of the factors in previous decisions, Lemon marked the first time
the Court combined the factors to form a comprehensive framework. To be
valid under that new framework, a statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose, must have a principal or primary effect which neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion.' A determination of excessive entanglement consists of
"examin[ing] the character and the purposes of the institutions that are bene-
fitted, the nature of the Aid that the State provides, and the resulting relation-
ship between the government and the religious authority." '69
Oddly enough, the line of cases subsequent to the creation of the Lemon
framework has proved no more consistent than the cases decided before the
test's existence." Indeed, nearly twenty-five years after Lemon, the Court
continues to struggle with the seemingly insurmountable issue of how to de-
fine the scope of the Establishment Clause and articulate its prohibitions into a
workable framework. It appears that the Court has conceded that the Lemon
articulation is not that framework.7' Although not authoritatively disposed of,
the Court has not applied the test in any Establishment Clause decision since
1993.72
The discussion that follows demonstrates the struggle faced by the Su-
preme Court in its search for a standard. As will be shown, the Court's opin-
ions reflect a collective failure on the part of the Justices from 1947 to the
present to agree on the mandates inherent in the Establishment Clause. This
dilemma is reflected in the Court's decisions, whether in the private or public
educational sphere, or the areas of higher education and religious symbols.
B. Education and the Establishment Clause
A vast majority of the Establishment Clause cases before the Court con-
cern education. In particular, disputes implicating public education arise with
alarming frequency. For example, issues before the Court on a regular basis
have included-and continue to include-the constitutionality of school prayer,
Bible reading in classrooms, creationism, and the so-called "released time"
programs. Aid to private religious schools, and parochial schools in particular,
has also stirred much debate. In fact, it was a dispute over parochial school
aid from public generated funds which embarked the Court on the road to the
confusion now abundant in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
403 U.S. at 612-13.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 615.
70. Compare the pre-Lemon instructional materials turmoil, infra notes 90-111 and accompa-
nying text, with Lemon itself and the post-Lemon chaos regarding the cash subsidies cases, irfra
notes 112-49 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of the Lemon test's demise, see infra notes 416-43 and accompanying
text.
72. See infra notes 432-35 and accompanying text.
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1. Aid to Parochial Schools
a. Everson and the Beginning
The Court's first Establishment Clause decision of the modem era was its
1947 decision in Everson v. Board of Education." The substantive issue in
Everson involved a New Jersey statute which granted local school districts the
authority to make rules and enter into contracts for the transportation of
schoolchildren to and from school.7 4 The statute made no distinction between
private and public schools, but rather made accessibility to the aid contingent
upon the school not operating for profit.75 A taxpayer challenged the statute
because part of the reimbursement went to Catholic parochial school stu-
dents;76 hence, the law purportedly constituted a prohibited establishment of
religion.
The Court first held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
encompassed the restrictions found in the Establishment Clause." The Estab-
lishment Clause thus incorporated, the Court was free to apply it to state and
local governmental action, including the New Jersey statute in Everson." It
then delved into what it perceived to be the Clause's relevant history. In so
doing, it turned to Jefferson's Bill for Religious Liberty and Madison's Re-
monstrance.7 9 With respect to the Bill for Religious Liberty, the Court boldly
stated that the concerns expressed in the Virginia Bill mirrored exactly those
enshrined in the Establishment Clause.8" The Court then invoked Jefferson's
wall of separation metaphor as grounds for the no-aid, strict separationist
interpretation it adopted."' Although it rejected the nonpreferentialist position,
73. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
74. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3 n.l.
75. Id. This, of course, operated to allow public schools and non-profit private schools ac-
cess to the aid.
76. Id. at 3. One commentator attributes the dispute in Everson, at least in part, to the inter-
group tensions between Protestants and Catholics which developed in the post-World War 11 peri-
od. RICHARD MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 81 (1972). Morgan posits that dur-
ing World War 1I Roman Catholics lost their consciousness of themselves as a minority group,
and that once the war was over, Catholics' attempts to exert their own identity and influence their
own culture were perceived by Protestants as disturbing and aggressive. Id. at 81-82.
77. Although the Court had previously held that the First Amendment applied to the states,
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), it had not until Everson explicitly incorporated the
Establishment Clause. For a critique of the Court's decision to incorporate the Establishment
Clause, see infra notes 508-28 and accompanying text.
78. Note that a majority of Supreme Court Justices have never favored "total incorporation,"
or the incorporation of every right found in the first eight amendments. See Note, Rethinking the
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1700 (1992)
[hereinafter Note]. Rather, the Court has adopted a theory of "selective incorporation," which Jus-
tice Cardozo has described as those specific pledges of particular amendments found to be "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become
operative on the states." Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
79. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-14.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id. In the Court's words:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Nei-
ther a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
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the majority found the New Jersey statute constitutional, 2 apparently in part
out of fear that to otherwise hold would preclude all religions and religious
denominations from receiving, because of their faith, the benefits of public
welfare legislation."3 For the Court, its decision coincided perfectly with the
Constitution's mandate that government be neutral with respect to religion.
Because the majority characterized the benefit as flowing to the student rather
than the school, 4 it had little difficulty finding the requisite governmental
indifference. The law, therefore, was not one respecting an establishment of
religion. 5
Justices Jackson and Rutledge each wrote vigorous dissents which agreed
with the majority's analytical framework but disagreed with its conclusion.
Jackson leapt into an in-depth discussion of Catholic dogma, apparently read-
ing the statute, which was facially neutral, as if it discriminated against all
religious schools not Catholic. 6 Moreover, there was no indication that there
existed within the school district any not-for-profit private schools of other
faiths (or of no faith) that had been denied aid. Hence, Jackson's conclusion
that the statute as applied violated the Establishment Clause was unsupported
and premature. 7 In contrast, Justice Rutledge characterized Jefferson's Vir-
ginia Bill, as well as Jefferson's views on church and state, as inapposite to
the majority's conclusion.8 He also took issue with the majority's assertion
that the use of funds was for a public purpose-namely that of education of
children.
entertaining religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or in-
stitutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect a "wall of separation between church and state."
Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id. at 18.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 21 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
87. Jackson stated that, "As applied to this taxpayer by the action he complains of, certainly
the Act does not authorize reimbursement to those who choose any alternative to the public school
except Catholic Church schools." Id. The statute did, however, authorize expenditures to any pri-
vate school whether religious or non-religious, which complied with its terms, i.e., was not operat-
ed for profit. If no alternative private schools existed within this specific school district, then
Jackson's presumption imposed a burden on the parochial schools which was not only misdirected
but also impossible to meet. If no other eligible schools existed, then the Catholic schools should
not have been denied aid unless evidence suggested that the statute was created to specifically aid
Catholic schools. Jackson mentioned no such evidence.
88. Id. at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 49, 51, 52-53. Under Rutledge's views, however, religious institutions and reli-
gious people acting for religious purposes are ineligible to receive the benefits of public aid and
social welfare legislation. This constitutes discrimination against religion and could potentially
chill free exercise rights. Finally, consider that Rutledge's position rings of an unconstitutional
condition-to secure a legislatively or constitutionally permitted benefit a person would be re-
quired to forego exercising constitutional rights guaranteed under the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause.
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b. The Post-Everson Turmoil: Instructional Materials
Sixteen long years after its ratification of separationism, the Supreme
Court set out to more clearly delineate the bounds within which such schools
may receive aid from the public coffers. Anything but clarity, however, result-
ed from this line of cases. In Board of Education v. Allen," a 1968 case, the
Court held constitutional a New York statute that required school districts to
loan textbooks to students in grades seven through twelve who were enrolled
in any school within the district.9' The statute did not differentiate between
public and private schools, or religious and non-religious schools. Rather, it
was a blanket authorization. Relying on the Everson rationale, the Court char-
acterized the law as simply making "available to all children the benefits of a
general program to lend books free of charge." '2 Moreover, the statute autho-
rized only the loan of secular books, and each book loaned was approved by
public school officials.9" Given the secular nature of the books, the Court
refused to abandon its Everson rationale, or "child-benefit theory,"94 and ac-
cordingly found the statute not contradictory to the mandate of separation
imbedded in the Establishment Clause. 95
If Everson and Allen reflected the Court's accommodationist tendencies,
Meek v. Pittinger" embodied its separationist propensities first expressed in
Everson. In Meek, the Court held unconstitutional a statute authorizing public
school officials to lend instructional materials directly to nonpublic schools.97
These materials included books, periodicals, documents, pamphlets, photo-
graphs, maps, charts, and globes.9" Although these materials, like the text-
books in Allen, were self-policing and neutral, the Court declared them uncon-
stitutional, stating that the nonpublic schools, rather than the students, were the
primary beneficiaries." Despite this ruling, the Court upheld a separate sec-
tion of the Act which authorized public school officials to lend secular text-
books to religious schools." Yet the Act defined textbooks as books,
0'
which the Act further defined as instructional materials, 2 which the Court
declared unconstitutional." 3
The Court only two years following Meek passed judgment on yet another
instructional materials dispute in Wolman v. Walter." Wolman involved an
Ohio statute which authorized public officials to provide nonpublic school
90. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
91. Allen, 392 U.S. at 238.
92. Id. at 243.
93. Id. at 244-45.
94. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 154.
95. Allen, 392 U.S. at 248.
96. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
97. Meek, 421 U.S. at 366.
98. Id. at 355 n.4.
99. Id. at 364-66.
100. Id. at 362.
101. Id. at 354 n.3.
102. Id. at 355 n.4.
103. Id. at 366.
104. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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students not only with instructional materials and equipment and books, but
also with standardized testing and scoring services, diagnostic services, thera-
peutic services, and field trip transportation.' 3° After again confirming the
constitutionality of secular textbook loan programs," the Court, in a surpris-
ing extension of its parochial school decisions, held that Ohio could constitu-
tionally furnish testing and scoring, °7 diagnostic,"'8 and therapeutic servic-
es."9 These services, according to the Court, posed insubstantial threats,
lacked educational content, or were offered at religious neutral locations.""
Notwithstanding these rulings, the Court was unwilling to disturb its conclu-
sion in Meek that the Establishment Clause prohibited states from loaning in-
structional materials and equipment to nonpublic schools."'
c. Cash Subsidies and Tax Exemptions
The parade of parochial school aid cases marched on in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,"2 where the Court addressed aid to religious schools of an en-
tirely different nature-cash subsidies to parochial schools and their teachers.
The companion cases at issue involved statutes passed by the Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island legislatures out of concern over the quality of the education
at each states' nonpublic schools." 3
The Rhode Island Act authorized public officials to reimburse nonpublic
school teachers of secular subjects up to 15% of their current annual sala-
ry." 4 The statute further required eligible schools to submit financial data to
the state for determination of the appropriate subsidy amount.' Moreover,
the Act required eligible teachers to use only secular teaching materials and
105. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 233.
106. Id. at 238.
107. Id. at 240-41.
108. Id. at 241.
109. Id. at 247-48.
110. Id. at 242, 244, 248.
111. Id. at 249-50. The only distinction between the Meek and Wolman programs was that the
materials and equipment in Meek were loaned directly to the school, whereas in Wolman it was
the pupil or the pupil's parent who was, theoretically, loaned the equipment. Id. at 250. Justice
Blackmun, presumably with a straight face, noted that "it would exalt form over substance if this
distinction were found to justify a result different from that in Meek." Id. Yet it was this very
distinguishing characteristic which the Court deemed so essential in both Allen and Meek with re-
spect to the textbook programs.
Even further clouding matters in Wolman was the Court's fickle decision that it violated
the Establishment Clause for nonpublic schools to use public school buses for field trips to "gov-
ernmental, industrial, cultural, and scientific centers." Id. at 252, 255. The Court characterized the
bus services in Everson as different in nature than the bus services at issue in Wolman. The trans-
portation services in Everson were routine in that the children were bused only to and from
school. Id. at 253-54. In contrast, the services in Wolman were unique, in that the students were
bused to the field trip sites. Id. Moreover, field trips are, at least for the Court, rendered meaning-
ful only through the efforts of the individual sectarian teacher. Id. at 254. Hence, for the Court,
the risk was simply too great that such a teacher would seize the moment and unconstitutionally
foster religion. Id.
112. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
113. Rapidly rising costs and low teacher salaries were particular fears the statutes were de-
signed to reverse. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 609.
114. Id. at 607.
115. Id. at 607-08.
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teach only secular subjects."6 The Pennsylvania law, in contrast, authorized
the subsidy directly to the parochial schools for those expenses accrued for
teacher's salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials." 7 Only courses in
math, modem foreign languages, physical science, and physical education were
eligible for these reimbursements."' Like Rhode Island, however, Pennsylva-
nia required the schools to use specific accounting procedures, submit specific
financial data, and if necessary undergo a state audit."9
After the Court delineated the three part Lemon test, 2' it proceeded to
apply its new framework. It began by accepting as valid the requisite secular
purpose as described by the respective statutes. It never determined, however,
whether the statutes' principal effect advanced religion."' Instead, it skipped
to the third element and concluded that both statutes excessively entangled
government and religion.'22 Because of both the extensive governmental con-
trols necessary to determine compliance and the fact that parochial schools
involve "substantial religious activity and purpose," the Court refused to up-
hold the laws.'23 It distinguished Allen by noting that books can be indepen-
dently inspected once to determine their contents; to assure teacher compli-
ance, however, requires a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance."'2 4 The Pennsylvania statute suffered from a further defect in
that the aid flowed directly to the school.'25 Coupled with the political divi-
siveness inherent in the subsidies, the number and nature of entanglements
proved too many and too pervasive to justify a finding of constitutionality.
26
A statute similar in effect but different in design to the one in Lemon was
that passed by New York granting a package of benefits to nonpublic schools
and their students. Specifically, the statute, which was challenged in Commit-
tee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,'27 provided direct
116. Id. at 608.
117. Id. at609.
118. Id. at 610.
119. Id. at 609-10.
120. Recall that the Lemon test proscribes statutes, policies, and actions that have sectarian
purposes, primarily affect or advance religion, and foster an excessive entanglement between gov-
ernment and religion. Id. at 612-13; see supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
121. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 616-17.
124. Id. at 619.
125. Id. at 621.
126. Disputes over aid to teachers would continue to haunt the Court. Fourteen years after
Lemon, the Court invalidated two Michigan school district programs using public school funds for
various nonpublic school programs and classes. School District of the City of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985). The Shared Time program, which was offered during the school
day involved a variety of remedial subjects. Id. The Community Education program, in contrast,
was offered at the conclusion of the school day. Id. at 376. The activities in both programs oc-
curred inside the nonpublic school buildings. Id. at 375-76. Although Shared Time program cours-
es were taught by public school teachers, instructors in the Community Education program were
conducted by nonpublic teachers, who usually taught at the same nonpublic school where they
rendered their Community Education program. Id. at 377. The Court struck both programs down,
holding that each failed the purpose prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 385. Of primary importance to
the Court were both the effective subsidy provided by the programs, id., and the "substantial risk
of state-sponsored indoctrination." Id. at 387.
127. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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grants to nonpublic schools for facilities maintenance and repair as well as tax
exemptions and tuition grants to students. Not surprisingly, the Court found all
challenged authorizations of the statute unconstitutional. 2
The provisions authorizing facilities maintenance and repair, which pos-
sessed the requisite secular purpose, had the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion by allowing sectarian schools to finance all necessary facilities upkeep
from taxpayer revenues.'29 Similarly, the tuition reimbursement program also
failed to meet the purpose requirement. 30 To this end, the Court noted that
"by reimbursing parents for a portion of their tuition bill, the State seeks to
relieve their financial burdens sufficiently to assure that they continue to have
the option to send their children to religion-oriented schools."'
' 3
The final component of the New York benefits package bestowed tax
exemptions upon parents of nonpublic school students, provided the parents'
income was greater than $5000 but less than $25000.132 As with the tuition
grants, however, the Court rejected the argument that the provision was consti-
tutional because the parent rather than the school was the beneficiary. 3  The
more difficult task for the Court lay in distinguishing the tax exemption at
issue in Nyquist from the one in Walz v. Tax Commission, 34 a case in which
the Court held that the Establishment Clause was not violated by granting
churches wholesale tax exemptions. 3 It effectively contrasted Walz by not-
ing first that the tax exemption there served the noble purpose of minimizing
church and state involvement, 36 and, second, that the exemption essentially
applied to a class of organizations composed of many non-religious institu-
tions. "'
128. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 769.
129. Id. at 774.
130. Id. at 783.
131. Id. The excessive financial relief referred to by the Court, however, simply did not exist.
The statute capped grants at $100 per child; moreover, a qualifying parent's income could be no
greater than $5000. Id. at 780. Given these statistics it is doubtful the grants influenced a great
number of, if any, parents to send their children to nonpublic schools. Indeed, the opinion over-
looked that supplying textbooks and transportation to students similarly lessened the financial
burden on parochial school students.
132. Id. at 790. The effect was to ensure that all parents of nonpublic school students earning
under $25,000 received either a tuition reimbursement grant or a tax credit.
133. Id. at 791.
134. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
135. Walz, 397 U.S. at 680.
136. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 793. The Court delineated this as follows:
To be sure, the exemption of church property from taxation conferred a benefit, albeit a
an indirect and incidental one. Yet the "aid" was a product not of any purpose to sup-
port or to subsidize, but of a fiscal relationship designed to minimize involvement and
entanglement between Church and State. The exemption... tends to complement and
reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other. Furthermore, elimination
of the exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to
tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations
and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes. The granting of the tax
benefits under the New York statute, unlike the extension of an exemption, would tend
to increase rather than limit the involvement between Church and State.
ld.
137. Id. at 793-94. The class of organizations consisted of corporations and associations orga-
nized exclusively for "the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious,
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Tax exemptions were again the issue in Mueller v. Allen. 3 There, Min-
nesota allowed taxpayers a deduction for various educational expenses, includ-
ing tuition, textbooks, and transportation. 39 Although the statute was facially
neutral and applied to parents of students attending both public and nonpublic
schools,'" its purpose and effect were suspect because Minnesota law gener-
ally prohibited public schools from charging tuition.'4' Nonetheless, the
Court considered this facial neutrality paramount in distinguishing the modest
deductions available there from the grants and exemptions in Nyquist.42
Moreover, the Minnesota deductions flowed only to the individual parents
rather than to the schools themselves, 43 and were part of a comprehensive
program of similar deductions provided for in the Minnesota tax laws.'"
Given these distinctions, the Court found the Minnesota statute constitution-
al. "45
Justice Marshall, in dissent, took the majority to task for its form over
substance decision, which in effect allowed deductions strikingly similar to the
exemptions and grants found unconstitutional in Nyquist." Describing the
majority's attempt to distinguish tax deductions from tax credits and exemp-
tions as "a distinction without a difference,"'47 Marshall relied on the indis-
putable fact that most of the deduction's beneficiaries were parents of parochi-
al school children." As such, the statute's primary effect unconstitutionally
advanced religion.'
4
d. The Use of Federal Funds
In 1985 the Court decided Aguilar v. Felton,"° its most criticized and
inequitable parochial school aid decision. The facts were simple: New York
City used federal funds to provide remedial instruction to children of low-
income families on parochial school grounds.'' The classrooms were free of
religious symbols and the government provided the requisite materials.'52
bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public playground,
scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purpos-
es." Walz, 397 U.S. at 667 n.l.
138. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
139. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391 n.l.
140. Id. at 397.
141. Id. at 405 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 398. The maximum deduction available was $700. Id. at 391. The actual tax sav-
ings were, of course, much lower.
143. Id. at 399.
144. Id. at 396.
145. Id. at 403-04.
146. Id. at 405.
147. Id. at 411.
148. Id. at 405. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, countered, "We would be loath
to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting
the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law." Id. at 401.
149. Id. at 414.
150. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
151. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 405-06.
152. Id. at 407.
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Only public school personnel effectuated the remedial instruction.' Yet, be-
cause the aid was "provided in a pervasively sectarian environment,' 54 the
necessary oversight fostered an excessive entanglement between church and
state. "'55 Justice Brennan, who wrote for the majority, feared government
agents roaming parochial school halls suspiciously peering inside classrooms
and searching profusely for a hint of sectarian influence penetrating the state
funded classes.'56 Unfortunately for the 20,000 New York City schoolchil-
dren his decision affected, Brennan proffered no evidence to substantiate this
alleged need for pervasive state oversight.
The Court's most recent parochial school aid pronouncement occurred in
1993 in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.'" The dispute in
Zobrest centered around James Zobrest, who had been deaf since birth. 158
Although a pupil in the public schools through grade eight, his parents hoped
to enroll him in a private religious school for his upcoming ninth grade
term.5 9 To this end, both James and his parents sought, under the federal
IDEA'60 program designed to benefit disabled children, to procure a sign-
language interpreter for James's use while attending the private school. 6'
Although state officials cited the Establishment Clause as a bar to complying
with James's request,62 the Court sided with Zobrest and found that furnish-
ing the interpreter for use in a private, religious school did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
63
In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the nature of the benefits
received by Zobrest determinative." In particular, the fact that the federal
program provided aid to any disabled child without regard to public-private or
sectarian-nonsectarian distinctions proved convincing. 65 Furthermore, instead
of providing benefits directly to the parochial school, the program merely
ensured "that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian
school only as a result of the private decision of individual parents."'" Be-
cause of this choice, no financial incentive existed for James's parents to
prefer sectarian to public schools.'67 As a final determinative factor, the
Court noted that the school itself was not relieved of any expenses that it
153. Id. at 406.
154. Id. at 412.
155. Id. at 413.
156. Id. at 414.
157. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
158. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
159. Id.
160. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1992). IDEA is an acronym for the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
161. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
162. Id.
163. Id. Mention of the Lemon test was noticeably absent in Zobrest. For an argument that the
Court nonetheless relied on the factors embodied in Lemon, see Lisa S. Pierce, Making Aid With-
out Lemon?, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 565 (1994).
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would have incurred had the government not provided the interpreter.'
Hence, one is hard-pressed to find fault with the Court's assertion that in
Zobrest, "Handicapped children, not sectarian schools, are the primary benefi-
ciaries of the IDEA."' 69
2. Public Education and the Establishment Clause
a. Released Time Programs
In 1948, just one year after its historic decision in Everson, the Court in
McCollum v. Board of Education"' decided its first public education case
and addressed the so called "released time" programs. Under these arrange-
ments, students in public schools were "released" during the school day from
regular classes to receive religious instruction. In McCollum, this instruction
was carried out by religious teachers inside the schoolhouse.'' Only those
students whose parents consented could attend the religion classes; other stu-
dents were excused from participation but remained confined on school
grounds.' Writing for an 8-1 majority, Justice Black found that the program
violated the Establishment Clause and was therefore unconstitutional.' Of
primary importance to the Court was the use of the state's compulsory educa-
tion machinery to provide students for religious instruction classes." This,
according to Black, was an impermissible use of the tax-supported public
schools to aid religious groups in spreading their faith.'
Proponents of released-time programs were not discouraged by the man-
date of separation inherent in McCollum, and just four years later managed to
bring the issue before the Court once again. The released time program in
Zorach v. Clauson1 6 presented an interesting twist on the McCollum pro-
gram-the students under the Clauson plan received instruction not on school
grounds but instead at various religious facilities.'77 So in both cases the in-
struction occurred during the school day, but in McCollum the religious teach-
ers went to the children, while in Clauson the children went to the religious
teachers. Drawing on this distinction, a 6-3 Court found the Clauson program
constitutional. Speaking for the majority, Justice Douglas stated that "[tihe
First Amendment ... does not say that in every and all respects there shall be
a separation of Church and State."' 78 Effecting such an assumption, rather
than making the state neutral, Douglas observed, would render it hostile to
religion.' Such hostility is neither mandated by the Constitution nor in ac-
168. Id. at 2469.
169. Id.
170. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
171. McCoUum, 333 U.S. at 209. Teachers included Catholic priests, Jewish rabbis, and Prot-
estant instructors. See id.
172. Id. at 207-09.
173. Id. at 210. The lone dissenter was Justice Reed. Id. at 238.
174. Id. at 212.
175. Id. at 210.
176. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
177. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 308.
178. Id. at 312.
179. Id.
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cordance with our history as a religious people. s° In any event, and despite
the apparent inconsistencies between the two released time decisions, Clauson
nonetheless continues to serve as the Court's definitive answer to the released
time issue. 8'
b. School Prayer, Bible Reading, and Creation Science
The zenith of the Court's separationist campaign, as well as its most con-
troversial Establishment Clause decision, was handed down a decade after
Clauson when in Engel v. Vitale,"8 2 a 6-1 Court declared that prayer in
school was unconstitutional. 3 The prayer at issue in Engel was nondenomi-
national and read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and
our Country."'84 Students not wishing to recite the prayer were allowed ei-
ther to remain silent or leave the room.'85 In contrast to the Free Exercise
Clause, however, Establishment Clause claims do not require that a coercive
element be present.' 6 Hence, the opportunity for students to not participate
played no role in determining the recital's constitutionality. Rather, the rele-
vant issue was simply whether the state had forged an unconstitutional union
between religion and government. Given that here the state had composed an
180. Id. at 314. Douglas expounded on this notion as follows:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee
the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs
and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the
part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state en-
courages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.
Id. at 313-14.
181. Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson each wrote dissenting opinions, essentially argu-
ing that there were no distinctions between McCollum and Clauson. Justice Black in particular
relied upon a supposed element of coercion implicit in the state's compulsory education laws. Id.
at 318 (Black, J., dissenting). Black, however, confused the compulsion to attend public schools
with the compulsion to attend the religion classes; the second was a result of free exercise, the
first was not. Attendance at the religion classes required parental consent, and because the instruc-
tion itself was removed from the school grounds, the attendant air of authority and endorsement in
McCollurm ceased to exist in Clauson.
Note, however, that the released time programs should be constitutional only to the extent
that they do not "punish" dissenters or those who for whatever reason opt out of attending the
religion classes. For these students, the school should not during this time become, as Justice
Jackson feared it would, a "jail for the pupil who will not go to Church." Id. at 324 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
182. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
183. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424. Justices Frankfurter and White did not participate in the Court's
decision.
184. Id. at 422.
185. Id. at 430.
186. Id. This does not mean, however, that laws which establish religion do not coerce com-
pliance. "When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a partic-
ular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Id. at 431. This element, however, is an issue to
be resolved under the Free Exercise Clause. Compare Justice Douglas's concurring opinion which
states that "there is no element of compulsion or coercion in New York's regulation." Id. at 438.
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official prayer to be recited by a group of Americans, the Court had little
difficulty finding such a forbidden coupling.
87
Public reaction to the Court's decision, although expected to be harsh, was
extremely intense. 8 8 In Congress, representatives and senators rushed to
sponsor a nullifying constitutional amendment.89 One senator rhetorically
queried whether "we, too are ready to embrace the foul concept of athe-
ism."'" Another maintained that "the Supreme Court has made God uncon-
stitutional."'' Criticism of the decision was not, however, limited to federal
officials. The Conference of State Governors voted unanimously to call for an
overruling constitutional amendment.9 2  Members of the clergy were
"shocked and frightened" and marvelled at the Court's insensitivity to
America's religious tradition.'93 One popular evangelist noted the increasing
secularization of the United States and argued that "[tihe Framers of our Con-
stitution meant we were to have freedom of religion, not freedom from reli-
g io n .
,194
Although intense, the criticism was not unanimous. In fact, several Protes-
tant organizations and individuals, including the Joint Baptist Committee on
Public Affairs, The Christian Century, and the Reverend Martin Luther King,
opposed the movement for a constitutional amendment, as did nearly all Jew-
ish organizations and rabbis. 5 Unexpectedly, many of the nation's major
newspapers, including the New York Times and the Washington Post, support-
ed the decision.' In any event, the movement and support for a constitu-
tional amendment dwindled as none of the proposals garnered the necessary
two-thirds majority."
Notwithstanding this reaction, the Court only one year later in Abbington
Township School District v. Schempp'98 considered and held unconstitutional
the equally divisive issue of Bible reading in public schools. Abbington Town-
ship consisted of two companion cases in which the legislature of Pennsylva-
nia and the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore mandated that the
187. Id. at 425. Interestingly, Justice Douglas, a member of the Everson majority which up-
held the New Jersey law against an Establishment Clause attack, admitted his decision was wrong.
Recall that Everson was a 5-4 decision. See supra text accompanying notes 73-89.
188. The effects on the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence were great as well. In
fact, Professor Ira Lupu describes the decision, along with the other school prayer cases, as one of
five crucial gestures of the Court in its "embrace of the separationist ethos" between 1947-1980.
Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 233-34 (1994).
189. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 45, at 378.
190. Id.
191. LEVY, supra note 9, at 185.
192. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 45, at 378.
193. Id.
194. Id. (statement of Reverend Dr. Billy Graham).
195. Id. at 379.
196. Id. Press support was certainly not unanimous. Indeed, Levy reports that "newspaper
headlines screamed that the Court had outlawed God from the public schools." LEVY, supra note
9, at 185.
197. LEVY, supra note 9, at 185. In recent years there has been renewed increase in securing
a constitutional amendment to restore prayer in schools. For one author's view that such an
amendment impedes upon religious freedoms, see Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the American
Idea of Religious Liberty, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1123 (1995).
198. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
[Vol. 73:2
PAGE OF HISTORY OR VOLUME OF LOGIC
Bible be read aloud to students at the beginning of the school day.'" Specifi-
cally, Pennsylvania required that at least ten verses be read and the Lord's
Prayer thereafter recited."° No comments accompanied the reading and those
children whose parents requested in writing were excused.2"' These
nonparticipants, however, could in effect not escape the reading, as it was
broadcast over the school's intercommunications system.2"2 Baltimore's plan
was substantially similar. It authorized one chapter to be read from the Bible
and authorized nonparticipation if the child's parents consented." 3
In a precursor to the Lemon test, the Court examined the "purpose and the
primary effect of the encroachment," and noted that enactments which either
advance or inhibit religion violate the Establishment Clause."' Hence, to
withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny "there must be both a secular legisla-
tive purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion.""0 5 Applying these principles, the Court found both the Pennsylvania
and Baltimore directives unconstitutional.2' Although both laws had secular
purposes, the primary effect of each was religious in nature."3 Moreover, the
Court reiterated its earlier implicated position that coercion is not a predicate
for an Establishment Clause violation.2"' As such, the ability of students to
opt out of the readings was irrelevant." 9
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan launched into an exhaustive historical
discussion, but in an odd move simultaneously eschewed history. Instead of
strict reliance on history, Brennan preferred to base his decision upon "wheth-
er the practices here challenged threaten those consequences which the Fram-
ers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of inter-
dependence between religion and state which the First Amendment was de-
signed to prevent."2 ' Hence, Brennan stated that fruitless searches into the
minds of Madison, Jefferson, Washington, and the other Founders to deter-
mine what each would have thought, either individually or collectively, with
respect to modem church-state issues were useless. Invoking John Marshall's
often used but essentially meaningless utterance that "we must never forget
that it is a Constitution we are expounding," Brennan proclaimed that the
Court should only use the Founders' history for its broad purposes rather than
199. Abbington Township, 374 U.S. at 205, 211.
200. Id. at 207.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 211.
204. Id. at 222.
205. Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
206. Id. at 226-27.
207. Id. at 223-24. Proponents of both programs asserted that each was passed for secular
reasons, such as "the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of
our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature." Id. at 223.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 224-25.
210. Id. at 236 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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its specific practices. 2' Brennan failed to recognize, however, that specific
practices are the broad purposes put into action.
In 1985 the specter of school prayer again reared its head, this time in the
intensely controversial guise of moments of silence. Since 1962 and the
Court's decision outlawing school prayer, critics had been searching faithfully
for a comparable surrogate which could pass constitutional muster. At least
twenty-five states had found what appeared to be a workable constitutional
substitute.2 2 These states authorized moments of silence at the beginning of
each school day, during which students were free to meditate, pray, or simply
sit quietly. The empowering legislation in these various states, however, only
authorized a moment of silence-neither the statute, nor in theory the public
school officials, encouraged students to use the moment of silence for prayer.
Alabama fell into this category until 1981, when it amended its moment of si-
lence statute to authorize a "period of silence 'for meditation or voluntary
prayer.' 213 Just one year later in 1982 it further amended the statute to allow
teachers to lead willing students in a voluntary prayer.2 These amendments
led to Wallace v. Jaffree,2 5  an extraordinary case which for many
reasons216 wound its way quickly through the federal dockets to the Supreme
Court.
Significantly, the plaintiff in Wallace did not challenge Alabama's original
and still valid moment of silence statute. Rather, plaintiff objected to the two
amended versions, which in his mind, encouraged prayer, either silently or
aloud. 7 Moreover, because the Court in a previous opinion had ruled the
second amended version, which authorized teachers to lead willing students in
prayer, unconstitutional, the sole and narrow issue considered was the adden-
dum to the statute which explicitly authorized use of the moment of silence
for voluntary prayer.2 8 Applying Lemon, the Court concluded that the
statute's sole purpose was to advance religion.2 9 Both the legislative history
and the testimony of the bill's primary sponsor made this determination an
easy one. State Senator Donald G. Holmes, when testifying before the District
211. Id. at 241. Brennan's view held that the Establishment Clause prohibits "those in-
volvements of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities
of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or
(c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suf-
fice." Id. at 295.
212. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 40.
214. Id.
215. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
216. One of these reasons was the maverick opinion of the district court judge, who rebel-
liously concluded that the two amended statutes were an attempt by Alabama to encourage reli-
gious activity, but proceeded to find them constitutional because "the establishment clause of the
first amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit the state from establishing a
religion." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41, 45. In short, the judge single-handedly attempted to expunge
the Court's previously determined Fourteenth Amendment incorporation of the Establishment
Clause. Not surprisingly, the Court took offense at the judge's attempted rebellion and reaffirmed
its commitment to incorporation. Id. at 48-49.
217. Id. at 41.
218. Id. at 41-42.
219. Id. at 55-56.
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Court, stated the bill was "an effort to return voluntary prayer to our public
schools" and that passage of this bill was "a beginning and a step in the right
direction."22 When asked if this was his sole motivation for passage of the
bill, he stated, "I did not have no other purpose in mind."22' Similar state-
ments appeared in the statute's legislative history.2 Contrasting this intent
with a law which simply protects "every student's right to engage in voluntary
prayer during an appropriate moment of silence," '23 the Court stated that the
statute's endorsement of the manner in which the moment of silence was to be
used violated the principle of government neutrality toward religion.
224
The Court's most recent statement addressing school prayer is its 1992
decision of Lee v. Weisman,22 in which the Court held prayer at graduation
ceremonies unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted
the pervasive involvement of government and religion in commencement
prayers.226 Following this, he briefly mentioned the Lemon test but then
based his opinion on the supposed element of coercion implicit in the com-
mencement exercise,228 all the while overlooking that the Court had express-
ly repudiated the existence of such a factor, either implicit or explicit, in Es-
tablishment Clause claims.
229
220. Id. at 43.
221. Id. at 57.
222. Id. at 57 n.43.
223. Id. at 59.
224. Id. at 60. All indications are that had the statute proffered some secular purpose, it would
have survived scrutiny. For example, Justice Powell in concurrence stated outright that he "would
vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a clear secular purpose." Id. at 66 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Similarly, Justice O'Connor differentiated the Alabama statute from other moment of
silence authorizations because its unavoidable conclusion pointed to the state's intent to endorse
prayer in public schools. Id. at 77 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Rehnquist, White, and Bur-
ger supported a finding of constitutionality in spite of the statute's alleged voluntary prayer en-
dorsement. Id. at 85-91 (Burger, J., dissenting). Justice White considered the statute as merely
providing a preemptive legislative answer to a student's inquiry as to whether the moment of
silence could be used for prayer. Id. at 91 (White, J., dissenting). Burger remarked that simply
amending the statute to permit voluntary prayer did not constitute an endorsement, and, further-
more, no evidence existed which suggested that the entire Alabama legislature accepted the
sponsor's motive. Id. at 85-87 (Burger, J., dissenting). Rehnquist attacked the Court's strict-
separationist history, and again put forth his historical argument for nonpreferentialism, claiming
that even generalized endorsements of voluntary prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 113-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
225. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
226. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2661 ("The sole question presented is whether a religious exercise may be con-
ducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where, as we have found, young graduates who
object are induced to conform."). Kennedy reiterated this coercion element throughout the opinion.
For example, at another point, he states:
The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a high school
graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending stu-
dents to stand as a group or, at least maintain a respectful silence during the Invocation
and Benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt
compulsion.
Id. at 2658; see supra text accompanying note 186.
229. For an argument in favor of Justice Kennedy's coercion test, see Timothy C. Caress, Is
Justice Kennedy the Supreme Court's Lone Advocate for the Coercion Element in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence? An Analysis of Lee v. Weisman, 27 IND. L. REV. 475 (1993); see also
Symposium, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman, 43 CASE W. L. REV. 795
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For this reason, Blackmun and Souter wrote concurring opinions, both
joined by Stevens and O'Connor. Blackmun applied the Lemon test and con-
cluded that the prayer served an unconstitutional religious purpose.230 More-
over, Blackmun believed that the government, by placing its imprimatur upon
the prayer, had undoubtedly advanced and promoted religion."' For his part,
Souter wrote to defend the Court's no-aid approach of forty-five years from
what he may have perceived as increasing pressure to embrace a more
accommodationist, nonpreferentialist philosophy.232 This wing of the Court,
now numbering four,2 33 voiced itself in Scalia's dissent, which bashed both
Kennedy's coercion test (described by Scalia as the Court's "psycho-jour-
ney")234 and the concurring Justices reliance on Lemon.2 35 As one com-
mentator notes, Lee v. Weisman was just the first shot in the commencement
prayer battle.236
Between the prayer issues involved in Wallace and Lee, the Court ad-
dressed a public education issue of a different kind-whether states could
require public school teachers to instruct students on the topic of "creation
science." The case which presented this issue, Edwards v. Aguillard,237 in-
volved a Louisiana statute requiring public schools which taught evolution to
also teach what it termed creation science, or "the scientific evidence for cre-
ation and inferences from those scientific evidences.""23 Despite the fact that
(1993) (debating whether Lee v. Weisman marked the end of the Lemon test and served as a pre-
lude to development of a coercion test).
230. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2663 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 2664.
232. Id. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring). Ironically, both Souter and Scalia drew from the
same historical practices and works, including those of Madison, to reach their diametrically op-
posed conclusions. Id. at 2674, 2680.
233. These four were Justices Scalia, White, and Thomas, as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Id. at 2678.
234. Id. at 2684.
235. Id. at 2685. In contrast to limiting religious harmony, Scalia characterized the scenario as
follows:
The founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of sectarian religious belief to
generate civil dissension and civil strife. And they also knew that nothing, absolutely
nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a tolera-
tion-no, an affection-for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to
the God whom they all worship and seek. Needless to say, no one should be compelled
to do that, but it is a shame to deprive our public culture of the opportunity, and indeed
the encouragement, for people to do it voluntarily. The Baptist or Catholic who heard
and joined in the simple and inspiring prayers of Rabbi Gutterman on this official and
patriotic occasion was inoculated from religious bigotry and prejudice in a manner that
can not be replicated. To deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism, in
order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing
or even sitting in respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupport-
ed in law.
Id. at 2686.
236. LEVY, supra note 9, at 204.
237. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
238. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581. In 1968, the Court had grappled with a substantially similar
problem. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Court held invalid an Arkansas statute
which prohibited public schools from teaching, or using any textbook which taught the theory of
evolution. ld. at 98-99. Although the Court recognized the power of the state to proscribe the
scope of its public school curriculum, it held that such power did not extend to those acts whose
purpose was to excise a particular topic because it was contrary to widely held religious beliefs
[Vol. 73:2
PAGE OF HISTORY OR VOLUME OF LOGIC
the Louisiana legislature's stated purpose in passing the Act was to protect
academic freedom,239 the Court probed the substantial legislative history and
concluded that the legislature had identified no clear secular purpose.2"
Instead, the Court concluded the Act's primary purpose was to "advance the
religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind."24 ' Al-
though the Court reached this conclusion by purportedly relying on the Act's
legislative history,242 Justices Scalia and Rehnquist pointed out in dissent that
the history evidenced no intent to advance religion.243 Instead, the history, as
recorded over a period of nearly a year, demonstrated that the Act's stated
purpose was indisputably secular.2" According to Scalia the majority relied
not on the stated purpose of the Act in striking it down, but rather on the reli-
gious motivations of those who initially passed the Act.245 Hence, the majori-
ty overlooked that the Establishment Clause does not forbid laws passed for
religious motivations, but rather laws that have the purpose of advancing reli-
gion.2" Moreover, the Court had historically accepted a legislature's stated
secular purpose without subjecting that purpose to any examination, let alone
the type of legal gymnastics required to imply a nonsecular purpose to the
Louisiana law here.247 Nonetheless, the majority was unable to conceive of a
nonreligious theory of creationism, and more or less equated creation science
with the theory of creation as proffered in the Bible.2" Given this mindset, it
is no doubt the Court never wavered from its conclusion that the Louisiana
law's primary and unconstitutional purpose was to advance religious beliefs.
c. Equal Access
At the same time that the moment of silence, commencement ceremony,
and creation science disputes were brewing, another issue involving the public
schools was coming to a head. That issue was equal access to public school
facilities-access not only for students but also for other community organiza-
tions. The first case to address this issue was the 1990 decision of Board of
Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.249 There, a Ne-
braska secondary school cited the Establishment Clause and an express school
board policy in denying Bridget Mergen's request to form a Christian club at
and violative of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 107-08.
239. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 581.
240. Id. at 585.
241. Id. at 591.
242. Id. at 591 n.10, 591-92.
243. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 620-21.
245. Id. at 614-15.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 613.
248. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 192. Justice Brennan
regarded creation science as if it were an oxymoronic term for a religious belief; he did
not address himself to the fact that it claimed to be scientific and to rest on scientific
evidence. He saw only the relation between creationism and the Book of Genesis. In that
regard his opinion for the Court was unfair and misleading.
Id.
249. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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the school. 2" This denial, based on the Court's separationist precedent, was
made in spite of the school's recognition of at least thirty other student
groups.25' In response to the denial, Mergens, who was a student at the
school, sued the school board under the Equal Access Act, a federal law
which prohibited public secondary schools receiving federal financial assis-
tance from denying students equal access to open forums based on the content
of the students' speech.252
Although the school board raised the shield of the Establishment Clause
as its defense, the majority effectively side-stepped the issue by limiting its
holding to the conclusion that the Act itself required the school to allow the
club.253 The critical issue thus became whether, as the school board alleged,
the Act itself violated the Establishment Clause. In holding that it did not, the
Court noted that "if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open
to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward reli-
gion. 12 4 To this end, the Court proceeded to apply the Lemon test and
deemed it met, finding both a secular legislative purpose which was not in-
tended to endorse or disapprove of religion, and no excessive govern-
ment/religion entanglement.255
An open issue after Mergens was whether public schools which had poli-
cies allowing community groups to use school facilities after the conclusion of
the school day were compelled to prohibit use of the grounds to religious
groups or groups with religious purposes. The Court addressed this issue in
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,26 and in a
relatively brief opinion concluded that no Establishment Clause violation oc-
curred by allowing a church group after-hours access to show a film, the
viewing of which was open to the public, on school grounds. 7 According to
the Court, these factors ensured the absence of any realistic danger that outsid-
ers would perceive the school as endorsing a religion or creed."8 As did the
coercion issue in Lee v. Weisman, this inquiry into endorsement evoked strong
responses from Justices Scalia and Kennedy, who both concurred in the deci-
sion.259 Notwithstanding this internal quibbling among the Justices, it at least
appears that given Mergens and Lamb's Chapel, the Court as a whole is com-
mitted to preserving equal rights of access for, and preventing unfair discrimi-
nation against, religious groups and groups with religious messages seeking to
use public school facilities.
250. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 232-33.
251. Id. at 231.
252. Id. at 233 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1992)).
253. Id. at 247.
254. Id. at 248.
255. Id. at 248-50, 252.
256. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). For in-depth discussions of Lamb's Chapel, see Wirt P. Marks,
The Lemon Test Rears Its Ugly Head Again: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 1153 (1993); Robert P. Viar, Jr., Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District: A Modest Home for God in the Public Schools, 71 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 965 (1994).
257. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2149, 2151.
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Undoubtedly, one of the Court's oddest and most unjust public school
cases is the 1994 decision of Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet." Kiryas Joel is a village composed entirely of
members of the Satmar Hasidic sect,26 who attempt, at all costs, to avoid as-
similation into the modem world.262 To this end, all children attend private
religious schools, except for the few, numbering approximately forty, who are
mentally handicapped.26 Although these children received special education
services from public school teachers at a nearby parochial school, this practice
ceased in 1985."6 After the Court's mandate in Aguilar, these children were
forced to attend public schools outside the village.265 This arrangement lasted
only a short time, however, as most parents removed their children from the
secular schools because of the attendant emotional distress and trauma
wrought by the children's attendance. 2" To alleviate the problem, the New
York legislature passed in 1989 a statute creating a separate school district for
the village.26 This district was designed to deal particularly with the needs
of the handicapped children, and all evidence suggested that the only school
operated by the new district provided special education for these handicapped
children.2" Moreover, Kiryas Joel students were not the only members of
this school; several neighboring districts sent similarly handicapped children to
the Kiryas Joel school district. In fact, two-thirds of the students came from
outside the village.269
Notwithstanding that the authorizing statute made not one mention of
religion, and that the only courses offered at the school were secular in nature,
the Court found the Kiryas Joel district unconstitutional.27 ° Justice Souter,
writing for a 6-3 majority, concluded that the New York legislature had un-
constitutionally created a school district based on nothing but the inhabitants'
religion. 7' In short, Souter noted that "a state may not delegate its civil au-
thority to a group chosen according to a religious criterion." '272 To do so vio-
lated the Establishment Clause's mandates of government neutrality.
273
In a blistering attack on the majority's incredulous decision, Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, took the Court to task
260. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). For discussions of Kiryas Joel, see Basilios E. Tsingos, Forbid-
den Favoritism in the Government Accommodation of Religion: Grumet and the Case for Over-
turning Aguilar, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 867 (1995) (maintaining that Kiryas Joel conforms
with the requisite separation of church and state); Note, Sorting Through the Establishment Clause
Tests, Looking Past the Lemon, 60 MO. L. REV. 653 (1995) (discussing the Justices' failure to
develop a workable alternative to the Lemon test).
261. Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2484.
262. Id. at 2485.
263. Id. at 2486.
264. Id. at 2485.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2486.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 2484.
271. Id. at 2487.
272. Id. at 2488.
273. See id. at 2491.
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for its blindness to the facts and its obtuse application of the Establishment
Clause. In dissent, Scalia remarked that, "The Court today finds that the Pow-
ers That Be, up in Albany, have conspired to effect an establishment of the
Satmar Hadism; I do not know who would be more surprised at this discov-
ery: the Founders of our Nation or Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum, founder of
the Satmar. ' '274 Scalia, whose historical analysis is sometimes questionable,
grasped the issue here. As historian Leonard Levy notes, Scalia perceived the
Satmar Hadist's peculiarities as cultural, not religious; hence, to hold, as
Souter and the majority did, that protection of this small minority sect violated
the Establishment Clause is inapposite to the very reason for the entire
Constitution's existence.275 In short, Kiryas Joel represents little more than
the culmination of forty years of unduly rigid separationism.
3. Higher Education and the Establishment Clause
Establishment Clause challenges to statutes and policies involving higher
education are not only fewer in number but also lower in profile than those
concerning primary or secondary education in both private and public schools.
This is due in part to the widely-held creed that higher education, and univer-
sity campuses in particular, hold innate a preeminent level of academic free-
dom. Moreover, the Court understands that university students are less impres-
sionable than schoolchildren, whose sensitive needs it seeks to protect from
overwhelming religious pressures.
As with aid to parochial schools, aid to religiously-affiliated colleges and
universities generates a substantial amount of the higher education Establish-
ment Clause litigation. Consider in this respect Tilton v. Richardson,276 a
1971 decision in which the Court sustained provisions of a federal act
"provid[ing] construction grants for buildings and facilities used exclusively
for secular educational purposes." '277 Although private religious institutions
undoubtedly benefitted from the grants, the Act itself was facially neutral, and
"carefully drafted" to ensure the colleges would engage in only secular func-
tions within the federally funded facilities.278 As such, the holding, like those
in Everson and Allen, simply permitted sectarian institutions to participate in
and receive the benefits of neutral governmental assistance programs.7 9
274. Id. at 2505-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 256. Levy further noted that this case was about the special
needs of handicapped children and "not at all about religious education." Id. As such, the child-
benefit theory, which neither the majority or the dissent considered, should have been controlling.
Id.
276. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
277. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 674-75.
278. Id. at 679. Note, however, that the Court did strike down one provision limiting the use
on secular restrictions to twenty years. Id. at 683. Because there was no guarantee and mechanism
for ensuring that the facilities would not then be used for sectarian activities, the Court effectively
extended the provision's time frame and the corresponding restriction on sectarian use to the life
of the facility. Id.
279. Id. at 679.
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A statute similar in effect to that in Tilton was at issue in Hunt v.
McNair!"° The mechanism through which the state tendered the aid, how-
ever, was substantively different. South Carolina permitted colleges and uni-
versities to submit to a state authority proposals for construction of various
educational facilities."' Upon receipt of a proposal, the authority issued rev-
enue bonds, the proceeds of which the college received and used to fund the
proposed project.282 The college, in turn, conveyed the project to the authori-
ty, which then leased the project back to the college until the institution paid
back the bond amount. 83 By adhering to this procedure the authority ensured
no taxpayer funds supported private religious institutions.284 Unable to signif-
icantly distinguish the aid in Hunt from that approved only two terms before
in Tilton the Court sustained the South Carolina statute. 5
Three years after Hunt, the Court in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of
Maryland8 . sustained a Maryland statute authorizing grants to private colleg-
es. Although the funds could be used only for secular purposes," 7 the subsi-
dies were undoubtedly substantial and of a more pervasive nature than the
construction grants or revenue bonds at issue in Tilton or Hunt. As in Tilton,
however, the Court relied on its "participation in government benefit pro-
grams" rationale to lend credence to its decision. 88 Lost in the shuffle, how-
ever, was the fact that in Tilton and Hunt the legislation authorized benefits on
a neutral basis-that is, both public and private parties purportedly benefitted
equally. Here, the law by its terms applied only to private institutions. Hence,
the only conceivable rationale for the Court's invocation of the government
benefit theory posits that to preclude private religious institutions from govern-
ment aid distributed to other private institutions constitutes discrimination
against, or governmental hostility towards, religion.
The Court in Roemer further delineated the function and scope of the
primary effect analysis in the higher education context. Relying on the ap-
proach set forth in Hunt, the Court characterized the primary-effect element as
both prohibiting state aid from flowing to institutions so pervasively sectarian
that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones, and permitting
funding only of those secular activities which can be so separated.2' 9 Here,
although religion or theology courses were mandatory and some classes began
with prayer, the Court deemed both requirements met.2" Important in this
respect was that faculty hiring decisions were made on a religion-blind basis,
ensuring the appropriate level of professional standards as well as relegation of
280. 413 U.S. 734, 736 (1973).
281. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 736-37.
282. See id. at 737-38.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 738.
285. Id. at 746-49.
286. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
287. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 740-41.
288. Id. at 745-47.
289. ld. at 753-54.
290. Id. at 756-57.
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religious matters to the periphery of the overall institutional environment.29" '
As to matters of sectarian funding, the Court uncharacteristically appeared
content to trust the judgment of the state oversight council and the institutions
themselves.292
One of the Court's most reasonable (and reasoned) Establishment Clause
decisions is Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind.293
There, the Court held the Clause did not prevent a state from providing finan-
cial assistance, as part of a comprehensive statute authorizing aid to visually
handicapped persons, to a blind person attending a private religious college
and studying for a career in the ministry.294 In short, the Court reasoned the
aid flowed only to the religious institution as "a result of the genuinely inde-
pendent and private choices of aid recipients."295 Hence, the individual, rath-
er than the state, made the decision to support the religious institution.2"
Moreover, because the statute made the aid available to Witters regardless of
where he chose to pursue his education, it devised no financial incentive for
him to choose sectarian education over secular education.297
It was not aid but access at the heart of the dispute in Widmar v. Vin-
cent,29" a 1981 case in which the Court required a university to permit reli-
gious groups to meet in university facilities.' By opening its doors general-
ly to other groups, the university had created an open forum and was therefore
obligated to justify its discriminations and exclusions.'" Because the
university's only rationale for excluding the group was the religious content of
its speech,"' the First Amendment required the university to proffer a com-
pelling interest for its discrimination." 2 Although the Court agreed that com-
plying with the constitutional mandates inherent in the Establishment Clause
constituted a compelling interest, it nonetheless held that neutral policies were
not "incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases."' '3 Such
open-forum policies, the Court concluded, had neither a religious purpose nor
the primary effect of advancing religion." Nor, as the university alleged,
would allowing religious groups access create a perception of state endorse-
ment of religion, any more than allowing a "Young Socialist Alliance" group
access would confer a state imprimatur of socialism.3"5 Hence, at least in this
291. Id. at 757-58.
292. Id. at 760.
293. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
294. Witters, 474 U.S. at 482.
295. Id. at 488.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
299. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-65.
300. Id. at 267.
301. Id. at 269.
302. Id. at 270.
303. Id. at 271.
304. Id. at 273.
305. Id. at 274.
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instance, both the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses limited the applica-
bility of the Establishment Clause.3"
C. Religious Symbols and the Establishment Clause
The debate over establishment, and the corresponding controversy over
nonpreferentialism and separationism, rarely exists outside of the educational
context. Nonetheless, the most recent addition to the long list of potentially
divisive Establishment Clause issues is the placement of governmentally spon-
sored religious symbols on public or private land during the holiday season. In
only two decisions regarding the appropriateness of such symbols, however,
the Court managed to produce a multiplicity of inconsistent opinions. In 1984
the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly"' sustained an Establishment Clause attack
against a forty-year Pawtucket, Rhode Island tradition of displaying a city
owned creche, or nativity scene, in a private park owned by a non-profit orga-
nization." 8 Secular decorations of the holiday season, such as a Christmas
tree, a Santa Clause house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, and a host of cut-
out figures, surrounded the creche.3" Applying the Lemon test, the Court
characterized the city's erection of the creche as having the secular purpose of
depicting "the historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a
National Holiday."3 Nor, the Court asserted, did including the creche in the
display advance religion.3 ' Instead of articulating this assumption, however,
the Court simply noted the benefit to religion here was no greater than that
conferred in other decisions, such as Allen, Everson, and Roemer."2
The dissenters, led by Justice Brennan, attacked the Court for characteriz-
ing the creche as a secular symbol representative of the holiday season." 3
The religious message necessarily present in the creche's very existence was
not eliminated simply by surrounding it with secular holiday symbols.3 4 In
short, the presence of Rudolph and Santa in no way diminished the message of
the creche--"that God sent His son into the world to become a Messiah."3
Given the creche's irrefutable religious content, its placement by a public
body, even on nonpublic land, benefitted religion and therefore violated the
Establishment Clause.3' 6
306. Id. at 276.
307. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). For criticisms of this decision, see Glenn S. Gordon, Lynch v.
Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1985);
Joshua D. Zarrow, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly Sponsored
Displays of Religious Materials, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 477 (1986).
308. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 680.
311. Id. at 681-82.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 708.
315. Id. at 711.
316. Id. at 695.
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Four years later, Allegheny County v. ACLU" forced the Court to reck-
on with its decision in Lynch. Like Lynch, the dispute in Allegheny County in-
volved a creche; unlike Lynch, however, it also involved a menorah." Both
symbols were situated on public property, but in different locales." 9 Yet, in
an odd move, the Court required the county to remove the creche but allowed
the menorah to remain. Placement of the creche on the "Grand Staircase" of
the county courthouse sent the "unmistakable message that [the County] sup-
port[ed] and promot[ed] the Christian praise to God that is the creche's reli-
gious message.""32 Unlike the creche in Lynch, the one here was not sur-
rounded by secular manifestations of the holiday season. Hence, the county
had unconstitutionally endorsed religion.32
A group of dissenters characterized the Court's conclusion on the creche
issue as "an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with
our history and our precedents." '322 Following Lynch's lead, Kennedy depict-
ed the county as simply celebrating the season.323 Given that the creche rep-
resented no real threat to religious liberty and that the county had not used its
governmental power to further any Christian interests, he failed to see the
rationale for its invalidity.324
Further entangling the decision was the menorah issue. Only two of the
five Justices, Blackmun and O'Connor, who declared the creche unconstitu-
tional believed the menorah to be constitutional. Three members of the majori-
ty consistently concluded that both violated the Establishment Clause. In con-
trast, the four dissenters, White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy all thought
both the menorah and the creche constitutional. Hence, it is Blackmun and
O'Connor who accounted for the different outcomes.
In the majority opinion addressing the menorah, from which Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, who had voted for holding the creche unconstitutional,
dissented, the Court relied on two facts to support its holding. First, the meno-
rah had a cultural as well as a religious message.3 2 Therefore, acknowledg-
ing Chanukah as a secular holiday coincided with and was consistent with the
tradition of celebrating Christmas as a secular holiday.326 Second, the meno-
rah was merely a component of a larger display which included a 45-foot
Christmas tree.32' As such, the tree predominated the display and overshad-
owed the 18-foot tall menorah, which served simply as a reminder "that
317. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
318. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 578.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 579, 600.
321. Id. at 599-600.
322. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the numerous opinions in Alle-
gheny County, see Barbara S. Barrett, Religious Displays and the First Amendment:. County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399 (1990).
323. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 663.
324. Id. at 664-65.
325. Id. at 613-14.
326. Id. at 615.
327. Id. at 617.
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Christmas is not the only traditional way of observing the winter-holiday sea-
son."
328
O'Connor tacked a different approach but reached the same conclusion as
the majority. Important to her, however, was a sign accompanying the meno-
rah and tree exhibit which stated, "During this holiday season, the city of
Pittsburgh salutes liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the
keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom. '329 The city's
erection of the menorah, therefore, constituted not an endorsement of religion
but rather a "message of pluralism and freedom. '3" Hence the distinction
between the religious message inherent in the creche and the political message
attendant to the menorah serves to reconcile O'Connor's seemingly inconsis-
tent opinions.
V. RECENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DECISIONS
A. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette
3
Capitol Square, handed down on the last day of the Court's 1995 term,
was despite its dissentious features an easy case. Indeed, it was the nature of
the facts rather than the constitutionality of the action which created a hotbed
of controversy. At the heart of the debate was the appropriate use of Capitol
Square, a 10-acre public plaza encircling the Columbus, Ohio statehouse.332
The Square enjoyed a century old history as a public forum for "free discus-
sion of public questions, or for activities of a broad purpose. '3 3 To regulate
access to the forum, Ohio law vested control over the permit process to the
Capitol Square Review Board (Board), which traditionally allowed broad ac-
cess and diverse groups to conduct events in the Square.334 In late November
1993, the Board acted on two applications.33 it granted one, denied the oth
er.336 The application approved permitted a rabbi to erect a menorah. 3 7 The
application denied prevented the Klan from erecting a cross.33" To substanti-
ate its denial of the Klan's application, the Board cited both the Ohio and
United States Constitutions.339
After an unsuccessful attempt to procure administrative relief, the Klan's
leader, Vincent Pinette, sued the Board in federal district court .3' Despite
the Board's assertion that the Establishment Clause prevented it from permit-
ting the Klan to display its cross, that court issued an injunction requiring the
328. Id.
329. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
330. Id.
331. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
332. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2444.
333. Id.
334. Id.





340. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 844 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
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Board to grant the permit.34' In support of its decision the district court
weighed heavily both the First Amendment protection accorded free speech
and the lack of evidence indicating that display of the cross constituted state
endorsement of religion.342 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed.343 Hence,
the Klan's cross went on display in Capitol Square.344
Although the 1993-94 Holiday season came and went, the Capitol Square
dispute lingered until June 29, 1995, when a 7-2 Supreme Court affirmed the
lower courts' decisions. The Court, however, proved incapable of reaching a
consensus as to the rationale underlying its conclusion. Rather, the fragmented
Court could produce only a plurality opinion, as well as three rounds of con-
currences and two dissents. Justice Scalia spoke for the four member plurality,
which also included Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Thom-
as. 3' At the outset, he rejected the Klan's attempt to recharacterize the issue
not as one regarding establishment of religion but as one regarding content-
based speech discrimination. The Court, Scalia remarked, would hear the case
as the lower courts decided it and the parties presented it.3' Hence, the sole
issue for decision was that pertaining to the Establishment Clause.347
The Board's decision to ground the Klan's denial in the Establishment
Clause proved in hindsight to be cataclysmic. As the plurality noted, the
Klan's display constituted private expression subject to the full protection of
the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.3" Moreover, because Capitol
Square constituted a public forum, the Board could prohibit protected conduct,
such as the Klan's, only if the restriction was narrowly drawn to serve a com-
pelling state interest.349 Although the Court agreed with the Board that com-
pliance with the Establishment Clause constituted a compelling state interest, it
refused to characterize the Klan's attempt to erect a cross in a traditional pub-
lic forum as an act prohibited by the Establishment Clause.35 To this end, it
adopted a per se rule of constitutionality for religious expression which is "(1)
purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, pub-
licly announced and open to all on equal terms."']
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on Lamb's Chapel and
Widmar, noting that in both it rejected identical Establishment Clause defenses
because of the variety of the forum's uses, the lack of direct sponsorship of
the questioned activity, and the incidental benefit conferred upon the particular
religious group.352 Despite the obvious similarities, the Board forced the
341. Id. at 1188.
342. Id. at 1186-88.
343. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1994).
344. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445.
345. Id. at 2440.
346. Id. at 2445.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 2446.
349. Id. In the absence of such an interest, the Board could only impose reasonable time,
place, and manner restriction. Id.
350. Id. at 2446-50.
351. Id. at 2450.
352. Id. at 2447.
[Vol. 73:2
PAGE OF HISTORY OR VOLUME OF LOGIC
Court to address one distinguishing characteristic-the Square's proximity to
the statehouse.353 In essence, the Board maintained the Court should find the
restriction constitutional because observers could conceivably mistake the
Klan's expression as a religious message supported and endorsed by the
state.354 The Court in response noted simply, "We find it peculiar to say that
government promotes or favors a religious display by giving it the same ac-
cess to a public forum that all other displays enjoy.
'355
The plurality opinion sparked a variety of responses. Although Justice
Thomas agreed with and joined in the plurality's opinion, he wrote separately
to denote that the Klan's expression was essentially and indisputably political
rather than religious." 6 Nonetheless, because the Board presented an Estab-
lishment Clause defense, the Court decided the case applying Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.357 In contrast, O'Connor, who did not join the plurali-
ty, emphasized her discontent with the plurality's characterization of the ap-
propriate jurisprudential standard and its adoption of a per se rule.358 In addi-
tion, she believed it important that the display bear a sign disclaiming govern-
ment sponsorship of the exhibit.359
For his part, Souter wrote to degrade the per se rule, which he character-
ized as an irrebuttable presumption, and to reinforce the perhaps forgotten
ability of the Board to ban all unattended displays in the Square.3" Another
apparent danger Souter feared was that while on the Square the cross "would
have been the only private display on the public plot."36' Despite the Board's
legitimate apprehensions, however, Souter felt its response inappropriate.362
Rather than simply banishing the display altogether, Souter argued, the Board
should either have required the Klan to post a disclaimer or banned all un-
attended displays from the square.363 Because it opted for neither of these
alternatives, it could not in good faith claim the display endorsed any religious
message inherent in the Klan's cross. 6"
In dissent, Justice Stevens advocated a bright-line rule which "created a
strong presumption against the installation of unattended religious symbols on
public property." '365 Stevens considered the unattended displays in Capitol
Square to be of a fundamentally different nature than the private speakers in
both Lamb's Chapel and Widmar.36 Unattended displays inherently convey a
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. The Court further distinguished Allegheny County and Lynch, two previous display
cases the Board relied upon, by noting that those cases involved, respectively, unequal access to
the forum and a display which did not endorse religion. Id. at 2448.
356. Id. at 2450 (Thomas, J., concurring).
357. Id. at 2447-50.
358. Id. at 2451, 2454 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
359. Id. at 2453.
360. Id. at 2457, 2459 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
361. Id. at 2461.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 2461-62.
364. Id. at 2462.
365. Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 2471.
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message which, unlike oral speech, cannot be disassociated from the state, and
in fact can be reasonably perceived as state endorsement of the expression.
Indeed, "when a statue or some other freestanding, silent, unattended immove-
able structure-regardless of its particular message-appears on the lawn of
the Capitol building, the reasonable observer must identify the State either as
the messenger, or at the very least, as one who has endorsed the mes-
sage. ' '367 Hence, in Stevens's view, a public body which permitted any group
to erect unattended religious displays on public property violated the funda-
mental principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause.
Problems abound in Stevens's approach. Foremost among these is its
hostility towards religious speech. For example, under Stevens's framework,
only unattended religious displays are prohibited. Exhibits erected for any
other motive, no matter how unpopular or distasteful, are allowed. This result
is rendered even more absurd when one considers the preeminent protection
afforded religious expression under the Free Exercise Clause. Yet Stevens
would bestow upon the state the power to exclude "unattended symbols when
they convey a type of message with which the state does not wish to be iden-
tified." Perhaps Stevens overlooks that the First Amendment protects all
speech, not simply that which happens to conform with a given public body's
perception of the appropriate. At one point, Stevens noted, "I think it obvious,
for example, that Ohio could prohibit certain categories of signs or symbols in
Capitol Square-erotic exhibits, commercial advertising, and perhaps cam-
paign posters as well-without violating the Free Exercise Clause."'  In
short, Stevens attempted singlehandedly to relegate a vital facet of private
religious speech "to a realm heretofore inhabited only by sexually explicit
displays and commercial speech.""37 As Scalia pointedly concluded, however,
"It will be a sad day when this Court casts piety in with pornography, and
finds the First Amendment more hospitable to private expletives than to pri-
vate prayers." '
367. Id. at 2467.
368. Id. at 2468.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 2449.
371. Id. Professor Rodney Blackmun describes why protection of religious speech is critical to
American democracy:
Religious discourse is a form of speech, and religious activity and practice, even if not
considered forms of speech, are found in primitive and advanced states alike. The reason
why religious activity is so ubiquitous is because it fills needs. Humans tend to seek
answers to ultimate questions: Why am I here? What is the meaning of life? How
should I relate to other living creatures and nature itself? How did life develop? How
should I act? Is there any life to which I can aspire that transcends this earthly one? Is it
an innate aspect of the human psyche to engage in religious speculation, or is it a reflec-
tion of our collective state of ignorance that will become stated in time when science
can supply more answers to basic questions? Either way, the centrality of religious
thought and practice to much of humankind cannot be easily denied. If our democratic
state is to exist for the fulfillment of human needs, then this religious expression and
practice must be regarded as a very important value to be protected along with other
forms of speech.
Rodney J. Blackmun, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 287-88 (1994).
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B. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia372
Rosenberger, unlike Capitol Square, involved a novel Establishment
Clause issue: whether a university which provided payments to outside con-
tractors for various student group expenses could refuse payment because a
student paper "primarily promot[ed] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or
about a deity or ultimate reality." '373 Perhaps Justice O'Connor best character-
ized the dilemma confronting the court as one "at the intersection of the prin-
ciple of government neutrality and the prohibition on state funding of religious
activities."""
The University of Virginia (University), in an attempt to "enhance the
University environment," '375 allowed various student groups to apply for
funding distributed from the Student Activities Fund (SAF), which was com-
prised and replenished by a mandatory fee of $14 per student per semes-
ter.376 University guidelines charged the student council with responsibility
for distributing SAF resources, and further required that in lieu of direct pay-
ments to the particular student groups, the council should reimburse the
group's creditors directly. 77 Funding, however, was not automatic. In fact,
only those groups who first obtained CIO, or Contracted Independent Organi-
zation status, were eligible for consideration.37 Importantly, University poli-
cy excluded religious organizations from achieving CIO status.379
In 1990, Rosenberger, the complainant, formed Wide Awake Productions,
or WAP, to publish a school paper dedicated to "challeng[ing] Christians to
live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage
students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means. '"380
Despite this mission, the University awarded WAP CIO status, evidencing it
did not consider WAP a religious organization.38' Nonetheless, the Appropri-
ations Committee, as did all subsequent University bodies, denied WAP's re-
quest that $5862 be paid to its printer for expenses associated with printing its
publication. 32 The committee based its denial on WAP's University prohibit-
ed status as a religious activity in that "the newspaper promoted or manifested
a particular belief in or about an ultimate deity."3 3 Unwilling to be subjected
to what he considered blatant religious discrimination, Rosenberger (and
WAP) filed suit in district court, alleging violations of their free speech, free
press, and free exercise rights, as well as their right to equal protection of the
law.3"4 The district court entered summary judgment against WAP, citing the
372. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
373. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2513.
374. Id. at 2525 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
375. Id. at 2514.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 2414-15.
378. Id. at 2514.
379. Id. at 2515.
380. Id.
381. Id. University Guidelines defined a religious organization as one "whose purpose is to
practice a devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity." Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 759 F. Supp. 175, 176-78 (W.D.
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Establishment Clause as a bar to releasing the funds.38 After the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed, Rosenberger filed for and was granted certiorari. In a narrow 5-
4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed.
The majority, led by Justice Kennedy, characterized the SAF as a forum
for speech purposes and found that its refusal to authorize the reimbursement
was a form of invidious viewpoint discrimination." 6 In depicting the restric-
tion as one which restricted only "those student journalistic efforts with reli-
gious editorial viewpoints," the Court noted the skewing effect on the market-
place of ideas.387 To this end, the Court relied on its conclusion in Lamb's
Chapel, where it held that a school's refusal to permit a religious group access
to show a Christian film constituted viewpoint discrimination.3" In an at-
tempt to evade this already stretched Lamb's Chapel rationale, the University
asserted that funds were fundamentally different from facilities. 9 In short,
the University argued funds are scarce, facilities are not."' The Court in re-
sponse turned the University's argument on its head and remarked that under
this premise the University could engage in viewpoint discrimination in the
Lamb's Chapel context if physical space exceeded money.' Because the Es-
tablishment Clause forbad such discrimination, the University could likewise
not justify its viewpoint discrimination on economic scarcity grounds.3" Fi-
nally, the Court feared the broad sweep of the University's restriction, noting
that if pressed to its bounds it could preclude "funding of essays by hypotheti-
cal student contributors named Plato, Spinoza, and Descartes." '393 Moreover,
because the prohibition applied to atheists as well, the policy would preclude
the writings of Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, and Jean-Paul Sartre.39' Given
these concerns, the University's refusal to allow Rosenberger and WAP to
participate in SAF funding constituted a denial of their free speech rights.395
This free speech protection, however, would be trumped if the University
could demonstrate that the Establishment Clause mandated its restriction."
Unfortunately for the school, the Court held the Establishment Clause imposed
no such prohibitions, and then characterized the SAF program as one emanat-
ing neutrality and evenhandedness.3 97 Rather than seeking to advance reli-
gion, the program's object was "to open a forum for speech and to support
various student enterprises, including the publication of newspapers, in recog-
nition of the diversity and creativity of student life."39 Nor, the Court
Va. 1992).
385. Id. at 182-83.
386. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517.
387. Id. at 2517-18.
388. Id. at 2517.








397. Id. at 2521-22.
398. Id. at 2513.
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opined, could the program be construed as University endorsement of religion,
especially given the extensive measures and disclaimers the school required
CIOs to implement.'"
The final card played by the majority tendered the indisputable fact that
no funds flowed directly to WAP.00 Although the Court conceded the ex-
penditure of funds, it preferred to focus upon the nature of the benefit WAP
received. In this respect, the SAF program did not differ from one in which
the University provided eligible student groups access to its printing
services."° Indeed, when viewed in this light, religion benefitted only inci-
dentally.'
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor articulated several reasons for her
decision, noting first the independence maintained between the student groups
and the University. 3 Because school guidelines required explicit disclaim-
ers, readers of WAP were on notice that it was not a University sponsored
publication.' Second, the mechanism by which the University distributed
funds ensured no impermissible uses. 5 To this end, O'Connor characterized
the situation as analogous to one where the school simply made available on
an equal basis a printing press for student use.' Third, the numerous publi-
cations, in addition to WAP, funded by SAF served to decrease the likelihood
that readers would perceive the University as endorsing the publication's reli-
gious message. 7 Finally, O'Connor reasoned the possibility that a dissenting
student could refuse to pay into the fund protected the fee from a Free Speech
Clause challenge and ensured few disputes over the issue of religious fund-
ing."
Justice Thomas, who agreed with the Court's opinion, wrote only to dis-
agree with the dissent's historical conclusions.' In short, the dissenters, led
by Souter, offered Madison's Remonstrance as evidence that the Establishment
Clause necessitated the University's SAF restriction.4 Unfortunately, Souter
mischaracterized and distorted the Remonstrance in an attempt to render it
applicable to the issue at hand. The Remonstrance involved an assessment to
support Christian teachers; unlike the exaction upon the students here, it did
not involve using a common pool fund to bestow, on a neutral basis, benefits
to a variety of institutions without regard to secular or sectarian viewpoints.
As such, the tax which prompted the Remonstrance was of a different nature
than the "tax" imposed in Rosenberger." ' Following this historical
399. Id. at 2523.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 2524.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring).




408. Id. O'Connor's emphasis on this point lacks substance, however, because there was no
mechanism through which an objecting student could receive a pro-rata reimbursement.
409. Id. at 2528 (Thomas, J., concurring).
410. Id. at 2535-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
411. After discussing the Remonstrance, Souter proceeded to cite the Virginia Bill. Id. at
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discussion, the dissenters ridiculed the Court's reliance on the channel through
which the funds flowed and its characterization of the restriction as viewpoint
rather than content discrimination.2 Indeed, in Souter's mind, the Court for
the first time, and in direct contravention of convincing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, upheld "direct core funding of core religious activities by an
arm of the state."4 3
In short, Rosenberger posed an unusual issue for decision. In this respect
many would contend Souter's dissenting opinion simply lends credence to the
homage that hard cases make bad law. Unfortunately, Rosenberger does not
fall into this category. Its facts were straightforward, the inequitable effect on
WAP obvious. Yet the dissent consisted of unrealistic and unfounded assump-
tions regarding the threat posed to religious freedom by the alleged Establish-
ment Clause breach. Even more upsetting is Souter's failure to mention the
University's unabashed double-standard with respect to funding publications of
a religious nature. In fact, nowhere does the dissent, which critically perused
WAP's publication for a Christian message, note that the "University has
provided support to The Yellow Journal, a humor magazine that has targeted
Christianity as a subject of satire, and Al-Salam, a publication 'to promote a
better understanding of Islam to the University Community."' 4 Indeed, only
Justice O'Connor recognized the Court was treading new ground and acknowl-
edged the inadequacy of strict reliance on precedent. Unlike the dissenters,
however, the majority, including O'Connor, proved willing to make an equita-
ble decision based on a thorough understanding of what government neutrality
entails.4
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Rosenberger and Capital Square represent the culmination of the Court's
inability to delineate a workable Establishment Clause framework. In addition,
the decisions exemplify the frustration engendered between the Justices with
respect to which, if any, framework is worthy of selection and application.
Consider the legal landscape before Rosenberger and Capital Square. The
Lemon test, which was twenty-four years in the making before its explicit
adoption in 1971, was considered an unabashed failure, having lingered on
uselessly for twenty-five years after its creation. Yet despite the criticism
heaped on Lemon from courts and commentators, the Court had not expressly
2536-37. Unfortunately, he conveniently overlooked the Bill's religious presumptions and its his-
torical context as one of many Virginia laws passed by Madison and Jefferson which dabbled in
religious matters. See infra notes 488-90 and accompanying text.
412. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2544, 2549-50.
413. Id. at 2533.
414. Id. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
415. For more detailed discussions of Rosenberger, see Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J.
Russo, Religion in Public Education: Rosenberger Fuels an Ongoing Debate, 103 ED. LAW REP.
13 (1995) (arguing that Rosenberger was merely the culmination of an equal access movement
that began with Widmar and included Mergens and Lamb's Chapel); David Schimmel, Discrimi-
nation Against Religious Viewpoints Prohibited in Public Colleges and Universities: An Analysis
of Rosenberger v. The University of Virginia, 102 ED. LAW REP. 911 (1995) (maintaining that
Rosenberger's legal impact upon Establishment Clause jurisprudence will be limited and narrow).
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repudiated it. Nonetheless, the Court had not applied the test in any of its
Establishment Clause decisions rendered in the last two terms. Instead, it had
simply ignored, as it for the most part did in Rosenberger and Capitol Square,
Lemon's existence. Failure to formally repudiate Lemon did not, however,
prevent the Court from continuing its dialogue over what framework should
replace the admittedly defunct Lemon test. Undoubtedly, as Capitol Square
and Rosenberger evidence, unanimity in this respect is not likely to occur in
the near future. Consider that in these two cases alone, the Justices proffered
at least three different tests: O'Connor's endorsement test, the per se test ap-
plied in Capitol Square, and the historical test of the Rehnquist, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas wing. Although the survival of any of these tests is tenuous
and speculative at best, it at long last appears that the Justices agree that
Lemon's limited utility does not justify its continued application. In this re-
spect the following discussion traces Lemon from its inception to its demise.
The critique then turns to the educational arena, where the Court reaped the
inconsistent results sowed from its endorsement of separationism and its adop-
tion of Lemon. The reasons for these failures, inattentiveness to, and ignorance
of, history, are then discussed. In short, Lemon failed because it, like most of
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, is based on inaccurate history.
To this end, the discussion attempts to characterize the views of Madison,
Jefferson, and the other Framers and Founders in a fair, and often overlooked,
historical light. This historical misinterpretation is itself based on the Court's
most fundamental mistake-its incorporation of the Establishment Clause and
its subsequent application to the states. This analysis proffers that the incorpo-
ration decision, and the Court's subsequent attempts to use originalist,
Framers' intent to justify its regulation of even-handed, nonpreferential state
actions with respect to religion is inapposite to the Clause's inherent federal-
ism component and is therefore the root of the Court's inability to render
equitable and historically supported Establishment Clause decisions.
A. The Failure of the Lemon Test
and the Fruitless Search for Workable Standards
The Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is, to say the least, a
mess. Sadly, even the Justices themselves acknowledge the "hopeless disarray"
which permeates the inconsistent stack of "embarrassing" Supreme Court
Establishment Clause announcements.4 6 Much of the turmoil can be traced
to the Court's resolute adherence to the maligned Lemon test. Fortunately,
there has been in recent years a strident shift away from this jurisprudence in
which inconsistency was the only hallmark."7
416. See, e,g., Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2532 (Thomas, J., concurring); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that since Everson the Court has
decided at least 140 Establishment Clause decisions. See Stuart D. Poppel, Federalism, Fundamen-
tal Fairness, and the Religion Clauses, 25 CLIMB. L. REv. 247 (1995).
417. In Aguillard, Justice Scalia had the following to say about the effect of Lemon upon the
Court's Establishment Clause doctrine:
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, the ringleader of the Lemon malcontents, initiated
the shift away from the historically baseless test in 1985. There, in Wallace v.
Jaffree,4 s he voiced discontent with both the purpose and entanglement
prongs. The purpose element, he noted, was particularly useless given the
Court's acceptance of virtually every legislature's proffered secular
purpose." 9 Such pretextual inquires unnecessarily tempted legislators to sim-
ply express a secular purpose so as to ensure compliance with the purpose
prong. 420 In contrast, the entanglement element created the "insoluble para-
dox" of requiring public officials to closely monitor parochial schools under
the purpose or effect prongs, yet at the same time concluded that overarching
supervision created an unconstitutional entanglement.42
Justice O'Connor, although a newcomer to the Court, also expressed
doubts about Lemon's usefulness in Wallace.422 Nonetheless, she argued for
its retention in hope that the Court could refine Lemon so as to ensure it not
only reflected accurate historical interpretation but "also proved capable of
consistent application."423 She further lobbied for adoption of her view, ex-
pressed the year before in Lynch v. Donnelly,4 4 that the "Establishment
Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to religion relevant
to a person's standing in the political community.'" This determination,
O'Connor further asserted, required the Court to determine, under Lemon's
purpose and effect prongs, "whether government's purpose is to endorse reli-
gion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement." '426
In 1987, Scalia jumped on the anti-Lemon bandwagon by not only charac-
terizing the test as having no basis in history and yielding unprincipled
Our cases interpreting and applying the purpose test have made such a maze of the
Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can only
guess what motives will be held unconstitutional. We have said essentially the follow-
ing: Government may not act with the purpose of advancing religion, except when
forced to do so by the Free Exercise Clause (which is now and then); or when eliminat-
ing existing governmental hostility to religion (which exists sometimes); or even when
merely accommodating governmentally uninhibited religious practices, except that at
some point (it is unclear where) intentional accommodation results in the fostering of
religion, which is of course unconstitutional.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 636.
418. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
419. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The purpose prong posed other
problems as well. For instance, courts frequently held that the purpose prong reflected the errone-
ous assumption that the "Establishment Clause imposes a constitutional disability on religion...
rather than a protection of religious liberty." Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W.
Ras. L. REV. 795, 801 (1993). The purpose prong thus "misleadingly implied (and many courts
thus held) that laws motivated by a desire to promote religious freedom or to accommodate reli-
gious practice automatically constitute an Establishment Clause violation." Id.
420. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108.
421. Id. at 109. The entanglement prong was under increasing fire; in Aguilar v. Felton, Jus-
tice O'Connor boldly stated, "I question the utility of entanglement as a separate Establishment
Clause standard in most cases." Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 422 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
422. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
423. Id. at 69.
424. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
425. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
426. Id.
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results,"' but also by advocating that the Court abandon the purpose element
entirely.4 5 By the time the Court decided Lamb's Chapel six years later,
Scalia, and Thomas and Rehnquist along with him, were advocating that the
Court scrap Lemon completely.429 To this extent, Scalia forcefully advised, "I
will decline to apply Lemon-whether it validates or invalidates the govern-
ment action in question-and therefore cannot join the opinion of the Court
today."43 His remarks regarding Lemon were justifiably hostile:
The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so
easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it
to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will. When
we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we
wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes
we take a middle course, calling its three prongs "no more than help-
ful signposts." Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping
around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one
might need him.43" '
Indeed, as Scalia noted, a majority of the current Justices had personally
condemned the test in one form or another, but the Court as a whole, despite
numerous opportunities, had never specifically repudiated it.432
The 1994 Kiryas Joel decision marked the turning point in the efforts of
Rehnquist, Thomas, Kennedy, Scalia, and O'Connor to rid Establishment
Clause jurisprudence from Lemon's sour effects. Although the Court did not,
and has not, specifically countenanced that Lemon's days are over, it has not
applied the test in any case decided since 1993. In Kiryas Joel, only Justice
Blackmun clung to the principles enunciated in Lemon.433
This trend away from Lemon continued in 1995 in both Rosenberger and
Capitol Square. Noticeably, the Capitol Square plurality (Rehnquist, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas) applied neither Lemon nor O'Connor's increasingly
popular endorsement test. Rather, it created the per se rule described above.
Not surprisingly, O'Connor, joined by Souter and Breyer, advocated the en-
dorsement test. In the unattended display context, O'Connor argued, endorse-
ment would occur if a reasonable observer, knowledgeable of the "history and
context of the community and the forum in which the religious display
exists," 3 would believe the display to be endorsed by the state. Justice
427. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
428. Id. at 640.
429. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
430. Id. at 2150.
431. Id. (citations omitted).
432. Id.
433. Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2494-
95 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Scalia, while disagreeing with the Court's Kiryas Joel decision,
wholeheartedly supported its "snub" of the Lemon test. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He
correctly pointed out, however, the difficulties the Court imposes by not specifically denouncing
the test. For example, the Kiryas Joel parties produced over 80 pages of briefs devoted solely to
the test's principles. Id.
434. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2455.
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Stevens also applied the endorsement test but differed with O'Connor over the
proper level of knowledge the Court should attribute to the reasonable observ-
er.
435
The Rosenberger Court, like the Capitol Square Court, was dominated by
the Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas wing. Hence it ignored both
Lemon and the endorsement test, which O'Connor loyally and steadfastly
defended.436 Instead, Justice Kennedy characterized the necessary inquiry as
"one into the purpose and object of the governmental action in question
and ... into the practical details of the program's operations."437 Kennedy's
opinion also emanated nonpreferentialist tendencies, noting at one point that
"the apprehensions of our predecessor involved the levying of taxes upon the
public for the sole and exclusive purpose of establishing and supporting spe-
cific sects." '438 To this end, the Souter dissent, perhaps too secure in the
Court's historical separationism, admonished that the nonpreferential battle
was waged and lost long ago.439 Perhaps Souter is ignorant to the Scalia
wing's intent to replace separationism with nonpreferentialism. In any event, it
will be neither Scalia nor Souter, but O'Connor who will determine the direc-
tion of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence."0
The very real possibility is that regardless of the test applied, Establish-
ment Clause cases will inevitably yield inconsistent decisions. Sadly, even a
Supreme Court Justice has admitted that the only guiding source in this juris-
prudential area is the Justices' personal and political views."' One commen-
tator reaches precisely this result:
If the Court should repudiate the test ... it would surely employ
similar considerations .... Moreover, tests have little to do with
decisions; the use of a test lends the appearance of objectivity to a
judicial opinion, but no evidence shows that a test influences a mem-
ber of the Court to reach a decision he or she would not have reached
without that test. And Justices using the same test often arrive at
contradictory results. 2
435. Id. at 2466 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
436. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526.
437. Id. at 2521.
438. Id. at 2522.
439. Id. at 2537 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
440. As Rosenberger depicts, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas will continue to sup-
port nonpreferentialism; likewise, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer are undoubtedly
separationist. Hence, O'Connor and her endorsement test will tack the Court's Establishment
Clause future. Note that O'Connor's endorsement tests are, for the most part, well received by
scholars. For a critique of the test, see Matthew S. Steffey, The Establishment Clause and the
Lessons of Context, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 775 (1995) (maintaining that the endorsement test is correct
in its focus on the context of the dispute).
441. Justice Jackson observed:
It is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find in the Constitution one
word to help us as judges to decide where the secular ends and the sectarian begins
.... Nor can we find guidance in any other legal source. It is a matter on which we can
find no law but our own prepossessions.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)
442. LEVY, supra note 9, at 156.
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In this respect, consider that even though the bell has tolled for Lemon, dis-
putes are already arising over the scope of the endorsement test."3
B. The Education Mess
1. Private Education
Nowhere has the effects of the Court's inability to articulate a standard
been more profound than in the sphere of education. Consider that the Court
decided many of these cases before it delineated the Lemon test. As such, it
was forced to conform or distinguish those pre-Lemon decisions once it articu-
lated the Lemon test. Moreover, education cases crop up with such frequency
that in many instances the Court has not even applied the Lemon test when
resolving an Establishment Clause dispute over education. In short, the dis-
putes have outlived the test that was designed to resolve them. The result is a
sphere of Establishment Clause jurisprudence which is distorted and filled with
meaningless distinctions.
This unfortunate byproduct is especially true in the context of aid to paro-
chial schools, where time and again the Court has reiterated that the Establish-
ment Clause permits incidental benefits and does not preclude religious
schools and their students from partaking in neutral government benefit pro-
grams. Yet even a cursory analysis of its decisions belies this assertion. Con-
sider in this respect Chief Justice Rehnquist's lengthy but pointed summary of
the Court's aid to parochial school decisions:
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks
that contain certain maps of the United States, but the State may not
lend maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State
may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend
a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in his-
tory class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend
workbooks in which the parochial school children may write, thus
rendering them nonreusable. A State may pay for bus transportation
to religious schools, but may not pay for bus transportation from the
parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a
field trip. A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the
parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a different
building; speech and hearing "services" conducted by the State inside
the sectarian school are forbidden, but the State may conduct speech
and hearing diagnostic testing services inside the sectarian school.
Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but it
must take place outside of the parochial school, such as in a trailer
parked down the street. A State may give cash to a parochial school
to pay for the administration of state-written tests and state-ordered
443. Note also that Lemon still has some, if few, supporters. In this vein, see Carol F. Kagan,
Squeezing the Juice from Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test for the Establishment Clause, 22 N.
KY. L. REv. 621 (1995) (arguing that a modified Lemon test provides a suitable framework for
Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
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reporting services, but it may not provide funds for teacher-prepared
tests on secular subjects. Religious instruction may not be given in
public school, but the public school may release students during the
day for religion classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at
those classes with its truancy laws.'
Simply put, the Court has become mired in separationist dogma and conse-
quently lost sight of the children disadvantaged by its decisions. 5 Although
the separationist fear" is understandable, none of the above situations, con-
sidered either individually or cumulatively, bestow upon religious schools a
substantial, direct financial gain. Indeed, all the benefits Justice Rehnquist
summarized are unrelated to the schools' religious emphasis and for the most
part unadaptable to sectarian purposes."'
A second and equally divisive concern in the parochial school arena con-
stitutes the appropriateness of providing tax relief to parents of children who
attend parochial school. Undoubtedly, these parents "bear a particularly great
financial burden in educating their children."' They are not, as many claim,
double taxed, because taxes by their nature are mandatory while parochial
school attendance is not. Yet parents of parochial school children contribute
greatly to the maintenance of public schools. By contributing through taxes to
the health of the public education system but sending their children to parochi-
al schools, these parents effectively subsidize the education of public school
students. Hence, those adverse to tax credits or exemptions for parents of
parochial school students would do well to consider the resultant strain on
both the public education system and the public coffers should enrollment in
nonpublic schools vastly decline. Consider that if the number of private school
students were to decrease and the pool of public school students necessarily
increase, the per student expenditures for public school students would fall
dramatically, thereby drastically reducing the quality of public school educa-
tion. When considered in this light, the effect of a paltry tax credit, deduction,
or exemption is negligible at most.
444. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
445. One commentator states that an unduly rigid separationism affects American society, not
just schoolchildren, in drastic ways. Lupu, supra note 188, at 279. Lupu posits, in fact, that strong
separationism favored irreligion by advocating secular rationality, which is in turn partial to a
particular set of institutions. Id. Nor "is secular rationality particularly conducive to the life of the
spirit, without which it may not be possible for a nation to thrive." Id.
446. Separationists are concerned not that religious schools will lead to a formal establishment
but rather that the more substantive and direct the aid becomes, the less the schools resemble reli-
gious schools and the more they resemble public schools which merely emphasize religion. While
one could conceive of situations where this could occur, e.g., if public funds were used to pay
religious school teacher's salaries, none of the parochial school aid cases discussed posed any real
threat of such an egregious effect.
447. Levy resolved the issue as follows: "If proper restraints exist on the funds for parochial
schools so that tax monies are not spent for religious purposes and the aid rendered is comparable
to the value of the secular education provided by the schools, fairness again seems to be on the
accommodationist side." LEVY, supra note 9, at 179.
448. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983).
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2. Public Education
An unfortunate side effect of both the Court's rulings and strict-
separationist pressure has been the ability of overzealous public interest law-
yers" 9 to threaten school boards with litigation, and thereby frighten them
into submission and foreclose all discussion of religion in the public school
curriculum.45° This does not have to be so. The Establishment Clause prohib-
its only those interactions between public schools and religion which are de-
signed with a religious purpose to reap benefits for a religion or a religious
sect. The Establishment Clause does not and could not prohibit discussion of
religious literature or the instruction of students in subjects such as religious
history or religious philosophy-provided, that is, that such courses contain
themselves to the objective study of religion.45 Simply put, there is a differ-
ence between teaching and preaching, and it is the line separating the two that
public schools may not cross. As Justice Black so eloquently put it in
McCollum:
Music without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or
painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and incom-
plete, even from a secular point of view. Yet the inspirational appeal
of religion in these guises is often stronger than a forthright sermon
.... Certainly a course in English literature that omitted the Bible
and other powerful uses of our mother tongue for religious ends
would be pretty barren. And I should suppose it is a proper, if not an
indispensable, part of preparation for worldly life to know the roles
that religion and religions have played in the tragic story of mankind.
The fact is that for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture
worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturat-
ed with religious influences .... One can hardly respect a system of
education that would leave the student wholly ignorant of the currents
of religious thought that move the world society for a part in which
he is being prepared.452
449. Levy made the following comments regarding this problem: "The American Civil Liber-
ties Union has not always understood. Suits brought by the ACLU to have courts hold unconstitu-
tional every cooperative relationship between government and religion can damage the cause of
separation by making it look overrigid and ridiculous." LEVY, supra note 9, at 240. For an exam-
ple of overrigid absurdity, see John M. Hartenstein, A Christmas Issue: Christian Holiday Cele-
bration in the Public Elementary Schools is an Establishment of Religion, 80 CALiF. L. REV. 981
(1992), in which the author posits that, among other things, creating Christmas art and decora-
tions, singing Christmas carols, and decorating the classroom and exchanging gifts at
Christmastime, violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1026.
450. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2149 (Scalia, J., concurring).
451. See Justice Clark's majority opinion in Abbington Township, where he posits:
[I]t might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of compara-
tive religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civiliza-
tion. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic
qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion,
when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effect-
ed consistently with the First Amendment.
Abbington Township, 374 U.S. at 225.
452. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948).
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Yet one has to wonder how many students at any level of public educa-
tion have a basic understanding of the tenets and the history of the major
religions. So long as comparative religious studies are ignored, then students
in public schools will not only be indoctrinated with distorted history but also
possess a fundamental lack of understanding regarding the advancement of
civilization.453 Moreover, failure to emphasize secular courses in comparative
religion and religious history may aid in the production of generations of
children who possess no moral code.454 While it is certainly not a function of
public education to indoctrinate children with religion, it is the sad realism that
if public schools do not attempt to provide pupils with moral guidance and
some semblance of a framework for resolving moral dilemmas and making
moral choices, then many students will never receive such instruction. Al-
though the study of morality may be attempted and perhaps accomplished
without a discussion of how various religions approach moral problems, it is
indisputably not complete without such discourse." It is this function which
the objective study of religion best serves.456
453. For a similar conclusion, see Warren A. Nord, Religion, the First Amendment, and Pub-
lic Education, 8 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 439 (1994), where the author states:
There are, however, good secular, liberal reasons for requiring the study of religion in
the public schools.
A liberal education must avoid indoctrination. We indoctrinate when we system-
atically avoid giving students the intellectual and imaginative resources to make sense of
competing interpretations of contested matters.... [A] good deal of what we teach stu-
dents-about history, nature, morality, and human nature-is religiously contested, yet
students are taught virtually nothing about religious interpretations of these contested
matters. In this respect, public education is strikingly illiberal; public education indoctri-
nates students against religion.
Id. at 439.
454. Consider in this regard, Justice Jackson's dissent in Everson. There, he stated that our
public school system
is organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious
teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also main-
tain a strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. The assumption is that after the individual
has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 23-24. Jackson's assumptions are unrealistic. Religious views, as are most
others, are usually developed during childhood and adolescence. It is highly unlikely that one who
has no concept of either the function of religion or an understanding of the major world religions,
will, upon completion of secular studies, be better fitted to choose his religion.
455. Unfortunately, this is the alternative currently in favor. One author explains the inconsis-
tencies between this view's supporters and their justification-liberal neutrality-for supporting
this view, as follows:
This is the phenomenon of selective multi-culturalism: boundless tolerance and
respect for some voices, and ruthless suppression of others.
The effect of selective post-modernism is to allow secular ideologies to use politi-
cal muscle to advance their causes, including using the public schools to inculcate their
ideals, without even the psychological constraint of liberal neutrality, but at the same
time to preserve liberal formalism in court to ensure that religion is not included in the
public dialogue. Thus, in New York City the children are read Heather Has Two Mom-
mies in the first grade and given information on anal intercourse in the sixth; but, as the
Tenth Circuit recently held, The Bible in Pictures must be removed from the shelf of the
first grade classroom library.
Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of Religion in the
Post-Modern Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 163, 187-88.
456. Note that such a study would not be complete without discussing the option of irreligion,
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Fear of Establishment Clause litigation has also chilled the willingness of
legislatures and school districts to authorize moments of silence, which, con-
trary to popular belief, the Court has not deemed unconstitutional. In fact, the
very Court that declared unconstitutional the Alabama statute in Wallace v.
Jaffree remarked that "[t]he legislative intent to return prayer to the public
schools, is of course, quite different from merely protecting every student's
right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence
during the schoolday."4 7 In that same case, Justice Powell agreed fully with
Justice O'Connor's assertion, which stated:
Nothing in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this Court
or in the laws of the State of Alabama prohibits public school stu-
dents from voluntarily praying at any time before, during or after the
schoolday. Alabama has facilitated voluntary silent prayers of stu-
dents who are so inclined by enacting [a law] which provides a mo-
ment of silence in appellees' schools each day. The parties to these
proceedings concede the validity of this enactment.45
Hence, states are free to authorize moments of silence provided they do not,
explicitly in the statute or its history, or as applied through teachers, encourage
students to use the moment for prayer. Because moment of silence statutes do
not aid, even incidentally, religion or religious sects, or favor religion over
irreligion, they should withstand Establishment Clause challenges. Similarly,
because moments of silence possess no coercive element sufficient to trigger a
Free Exercise Clause attack, they constitute a workable compromise between
mandatory school prayer and perceived separationist hostility towards religion.
Indeed, as Justice O'Connor noted in Wallace, "It is difficult to discern a
serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent, thoughtful schoolchil-
dren.
'459
In short, the Supreme Court's attempt to micromanage the smallest influ-
ence of religion in the nation's public schools has proved disastrous. Instead of
recognizing that cultural and religious practices vary by locale, it has imposed
a single standard by which it measures every state practice touching religion.
Rather than attempting to understand and compensate for these innumerable
differences, however, the Court should return to local school districts and state
legislatures control over its public school curriculum. If nothing else, Kiryas
Joel stands as a reminder of what happens when the Court interferes in effec-
tive local solutions to solely local problems.' Concerning the Court's over-
sight of public schools, a perceptive Justice once posited, "However wise this
Court may be or may become hereafter, it is doubtful that, sitting in Washing-
ton, it can successfully supervise and censor the curriculum of every public
or atheism, which like religion proffers an outlook on life and offers a method of moral problem
solving.
457. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985).
458. Id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
459. id. at 73. Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, remarked that he would add to O'Connor's
statement, "even if they choose to pray." Id. at 90 (Burger, J., dissenting). He then quoted sarcasti-
cally from Horace, "The mountains have labored and brought forth a mouse." Id.
460. See supra notes 260-75 and accompanying text.
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school in every hamlet and city in the United States. I doubt that our wisdom
is so nearly infallible. ' ' 6
C. (Mis)Interpreting Framers' Intent
The Supreme Court's entire Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including
its ill-fated Lemon test, is grounded in its separationist interpretation of
Framer's intent. Unfortunately, a person reading the Supreme Court's Estab-
lishment Clause opinions would presume first that Madison and Jefferson
opposed any governmental support, be it state or national, of religion, and
second, that no other Founder or Framer expressed any views on the matter.
While correct to an extent, such unnecessarily broad statements are mislead-
ing. Although Madison and Jefferson were strong advocates of separation of
church and state, neither adhered to, or practiced while in public office, an
overly rigid separation. In this respect, the Court, as well as many commenta-
tors, conveniently overlook the acts and writings of Madison and Jefferson
which either conflict with separationism or reflect a nonpreferentialist tenden-
cy. Moreover, those who overemphasize Madison's Remonstrance and
Jefferson's Danbury letter and Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom inadver-
tently simplify Madison's and Jefferson's church-state jurisprudence.
1. Madison
Consider in this respect that the Remonstrance is only one of many docu-
ments of a religious nature penned by Madison. In fact, only four years after
writing the Remonstrance, Madison drafted the Bill of Rights, including, of
course, the Establishment Clause. His first draft, which was not adopted, read
as follows: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the
full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, in-
fringed." 2 Although critics rightly dismiss this initial version as insignifi-
cant in determining the collective intent of the Framers, it serves one crucial
purpose: as the sole product of Madison, it is demonstrative of his, and only
his, intent at the time he introduced it. 3 Because Madison was unsure
whether the House would adopt his proposed amendment wholesale, the asser-
tion that it fails to reflect his intent is illogical.' Clearly, Madison's first
proposal manifested a fundamental concern with prohibiting the national gov-
ernment from establishing a national religion. 5
461. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 114 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
462. ADAMS & EMMEICH, supra note 19, at 17.
463. See CORD, supra note 8, at 26.
464. Id.
465. Levy states that nonpreferentialist assertions that Madison meant only a national church
when adopting the amendment are groundless. LEVY, supra note 9, at 123. Levy's claim belies the
available legislative history. While Madison may certainly have intended more, the scant history
and all the debate indicate that Madison, and the other Framers for that matter, were concerned
with national establishments. As will be shown, however, this does not mean Madison's views can
be characterized as nonpreferential.
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Other acts and documents further demonstrate that Madison developed not
a simple separationist viewpoint, but a complex church-state jurisprudence,
which was in some instances separationist, in other instances
nonpreferentialist. For example, not only did Madison oppose including minis-
ters in the census,' but he also objected vehemently, as a member of the
Continental Congress in 1785, to an attempt by that Congress to reserve, in
the Northwest Ordinance, public land for religious use throughout townships in
the western territories." Despite these undoubtedly separationist acts, Madi-
son later served on the Congress committee that authorized congressional
chaplains. '  Moreover, as a member of that same Congress, Madison never
objected to a proclamation for a day of thanksgiving to allow "the people of
the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by
acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the many signal favors of Almighty God,
especially by affording them an opportunity to peaceably establish a Constitu-
tion of government for their safety and happiness."'
Madison's actions as the fourth President further cloud the issue. While in
office, he issued three proclamations for days of fasting and one for a day of
thanksgiving.47 Although these proclamations were undoubtedly of a reli-
gious nature, Madison nonetheless vetoed two different bills concerning reli-
gious matters. The first involved a congressional attempt to reserve federal
land for a Baptist church which, because of a surveying error, had constructed
its building upon federal land.47' Congress's solution summarily granted the
land to the church. '72 Madison, however, objected to the transaction and ve-
toed the bill because it "comprise[d] a principle and precedent for the appro-
priation of funds of the United States for the use of and support of religious
societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution which declares that 'Con-
gress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment."'473 The second
bill Madison vetoed an attempt by Congress to incorporate an Episcopal
church in the District of Columbia. 74 Despite these vetoes, Madison ap-
proved chaplains for the armed forces,47 an action entirely inconsistent with
466. Id. at 130. To this end, he stated that with regard to those
employed in teaching and inculcating the duties of religion, there may be some indel-
icacy in singling them out, as the general government is proscribed from interfering, in
any manner whatsoever, in matters respecting religion; and it may be thought to do this,
in ascertaining who, and who are not ministers of the gospel.
Id.
467. Id. at 129. Madison voiced this opposition in a letter in which he stated, "How a regula-
tion, so unjust in itself, so foreign to the Authority of Congress ... and smelling so strongly of an
antiquated Bigotry, could have received the countenance of a Committee is truly a matter of aston-
ishment." Id. at 129-30. Notwithstanding Madison's admonitions, the Northwest Ordinance includ-
ed a provision reading, "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."
CORD, supra note 8, at 61.
468. CORD, supra note 8, at 25.
469. Id. at 28.
470. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 25.
471. LEVY, supra note 9, at 119.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 25.
475. LEVY, supra note 9, at 121.
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the views expressed in his Baptist church land grant veto that no appropriation
of government funds could be used to support religion.
Taken together, it is at the least difficult, if not impossible, to assimilate
this mass of writings and acts and produce a definitive, comprehensive state-
ment of Madison's intent with respect to church and state. Fortunately, one of
Madison's own writings, entitled the "Detached Memoranda,"476 clarifies
much of the confusion. Although Madison wrote the Detached Memoranda
after the end of his political career in 1817, it remained undiscovered until
1946, when it was found in the family papers of William C. Rives.4" In the
Memoranda, Madison took a very broad view of the Establishment Clause,
contending that thanksgiving day proclamations, other religious proclamations,
and congressional chaplains all violate the Constitution. He articulated this as
follows:
Is the appointment of Chaplains to the two houses of Congress
consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure principle of reli-
gious freedom?
In strictness the answer on both points must be in the negative.
The Constitution of the U.S. forbids anything like an establishment of
a national religion. The law appointing Chaplains establishes a reli-
gious worship for the national representatives, to be performed by
Ministers of religion, elected by a majority of them; and these are to
be paid out of the national taxes. Does not this involve the principle
of a national establishment, applicable to a provision for a religious
worship for the Constituent as well as of the representative Body,
approved by the majority, and conducted by Ministers of religion paid
out by the entire nation.
The establishment of the chaplainship to Congress is a palpable
violation of equal rights, as well as of Constitutional principles
478
This portion of the Memoranda denotes two important points. First, Madi-
son believed the Constitution forbad more than just establishments of religion.
As stated above, he construed the Constitution to prohibit "anything like an
establishment of religion." Second, despite his presidential proclamations and
his membership on the committee that approved the congressional chaplains,
he considered them unconstitutional. It is unclear, however, whether he consid-
ered the above issues and actions unconstitutional at the time he made the
proclamations and appointments, or whether these views developed over the
course of three decades and were ultimately embodied in the Memoranda. The
evidence dictates that it must be the latter. It is unlikely that the same Madison
who spoke out vehemently against legislative proposals regarding religion
would meekly submit without objection to the proposal of chaplains had he
476. James Madison, untitled manuscript, reprinted in Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's 'Detached
Memoranda', 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 535-68 (1946).
477. CORD, supra note 8, at 29. The document was purportedly in Madison's handwriting and
authentic. Id.
478. Madison, supra note 476, at 558.
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thought them unconstitutional.479 The same can be said of the Madison who
issued thanksgiving day and other religious proclamations while President, but
who in the Memoranda asserted that presidential proclamations of this nature
were unconstitutional."0 It stretches reason to assume that Madison, the most
outspoken figurehead of the separationists for thirty years, did so, as he
claimed in a letter in 1822, for political expediency. s' Rather, it is more
likely he considered the proclamations constitutional at the time he made
them, but later changed his mind.
Although this is a subtle distinction, its meaning is crucial. If Madison
believed the acts constitutional when drafting the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights and while serving as President, then as Cord states, "Madison should
be judged on his behavior, statements, and actions while he was a public ser-
vant in the House and in the Presidency, making policy and accountable for
it.",1 2 To the extent one attempts to discern the intent of Madison as a Fram-
er this is correct. Note that even if Madison, as a public servant, considered
the proclamations and appointments unconstitutional, no evidence exists to
suggest the majority of the remaining Framers shared this view and enshrined
it in the First Amendment. Certainly when one considers Madison's intent on
a singular rather than a collective level, the Detached Memoranda makes un-
mistakably clear that Madison, after contemplating the matter for many years,
concluded that religious proclamations, congressional chaplains, and any other
legislation 3 concerning religion should be unconstitutional. In other words,
if Madison believed that proclamations and chaplains were constitutional when
he approved them, then when using Madison as a barometer of original
Framers' intent, commentators should not rely on his later, more stringent
views such as those expressed in the Detached Memoranda. This is so be-
cause, as the debates evidenced, Madison was deeply involved in articulating
to the other Framers what he believed the Clauses to mean. It is not a fair
historical determination of intent to attribute to the other Framers views devel-
oped by Madison after the framing. Those views are relevant only to the ex-
tent that they are used to ascertain Madison's intent apart from the other
Framers, i.e., his individual church-state jurisprudence which only developed
into the strict views expressed in the Memoranda nearly thirty years after the
Constitution and Bill of Rights were framed.
2. Jefferson
Unlike Madison, whose works other than the Remonstrance have been
simply ignored, the works of Jefferson have been unabashedly misinterpreted,
and none more so than the fabled Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom." Al-
479. See CORD, supra note 8, at 32-33.
480. LEVY, supra note 9, at 123.
481. CORD, supra note 8, at 31.
482. Id. at 36.
483. In the Detached Memoranda, Madison also indicated, by way of an example in Ken-
tucky, his opposition to attempts to exempt churches from taxes. Madison, supra note 476, at 555.
484. This is not to suggest that courts and scholars have not ignored those acts and writings
of Jefferson which are inconsistent with the view adopted by that court or scholar, but rather that
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though the Supreme Court has alluded to this Bill on many occasions for
support of Jefferson's intent, it has severed the Bill from its historical context
and manipulated its intention and effect. Consider, for example, the Court's
sweeping assumption in Everson that the ideas expressed in the Virginia Bill
were not merely consistent with, but embodied and were in fact the same as
the provisions later enshrined in the First Amendment. 5 This assumption
effectively renders irrelevant the experiences and intent not only of every
Framer not involved in the Virginia struggle, but also of every state but Vir-
ginia. In fact, the Bill has no bearing whatsoever on the intent of the Framers
with respect to the Establishment Clause. It was passed by the Virginia legisla-
ture before the Establishment Clause even existed. Moreover, even had the
Clause existed, the Bill would be virtually irrelevant. Because the Establish-
ment Clause concerns only the national government, the state governments,
including Virginia's, were free to deal with religion as they so chose. Hence,
to this end the Bill's only interpretive use is as a barometer of
Jefferson's-and to a great extent, Madison's-impressions of the appropriate
church and state relationship. 6 Note that Jefferson's noninvolvement in the
framing of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights further decreases the Virgin-
ia Bill's utility as a reflection of the Establishment Clause."7
Jefferson was more consistent, although not entirely consistent, than Madison with respect to his
actions regarding religion while serving as a public official. For example, as President, Jefferson
demonstrated a separationist bent when he broke with the proclamation tradition instituted by
Washington and Adams, and refused to issue pronouncements for days of thanksgiving and na-
tional prayer. CORD, supra note 8, at 40. He explained his reasons in a letter to a Presbyterian
clergyman:
I consider the government of the United States as interdicted by the Constitution
from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, disciplines, or exercises.
This results not only from the provision that no law shall be made respecting the estab-
lishment or free exercise of religion, but from that also which reserves to the States the
powers not delegated to the United States. Certainly no power to prescribe any religious
exercise, or to assume authority in religious discipline, has been delegated to the general
government. It must then rest with the States, as far as it can be in any human authority.
Id. Although Jefferson's letter reveals his belief that presidential religious proclamations conflicted
with the Religion Clauses, it also underscores his objections to the proclamations on federalism
grounds. Id. Hence, even in the absence of the Religion Clauses, Jefferson would not have issued
any religious proclamations.
Notwithstanding Jefferson's break with tradition, he signed into law three extensions of an
act which purported to, among other things, "regulate the grants of land appropriated ... for the
society of the United Brethren for propagating the gospel among the heathen." Id. at 45. Jefferson
further sought and received congressional approval of a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians contin-
gent upon the national government using federal funds to support a Catholic priest and assist the
tribe in constructing a church. Id. at 38.
485. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
486. Not all commentators agree. For example, Richard Morgan concludes that Madison's
Remonstrance set the stage for the Virginia Bill which in turn led to development of a "secularist
theory of religious freedom and separation of church and state which within a few short years
came to underpin and inform the religion clauses of the new First Amendment." MORGAN,
supra note 76, at 18. The deficiency in this view, however, is that not all the Framers of the First
Amendment participated in drafting either Madison's Remonstrance or the Virginia Bill for Reli-
gious Liberty. Thus, Morgan's view belittles the views and intent of those nonparticipating Fram-
ers.
487. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the irrationality of the Court's heavy reliance on Jefferson
by stating, "He would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary
history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment." Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Courts and commentators also have conveniently overlooked the historical
context overlaying the Bill. Again, Everson serves as an example. There, Jus-
tice Rutledge opened his dissent by quoting the preamble to Jefferson's Vir-
ginia Bill and proceeded to state, "I cannot believe that the great author of
those words, or the men who made them law, could have joined in this deci-
sion."''  Rutledge was wrong. He either ignored or was not aware that Jef-
ferson, Madison, and all the rest of the Virginia Bill supporters passed statutes
much more entangled with religion than the one at issue in Everson. Indeed,
passage of the Bill was part of a "comprehensive revision of Virginia's laws,
which included: A Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and
Sabbath Breakers; A Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and Thanks-
giving; and A Bill Annulling Marriages Prohibited by the Levitical Law, and
Appointing the Mode of Solemnizing Lawful Marriage."' 9 Clearly, these
bills dabbled not only in religious subjects modem courts would unhesitatingly
label unconstitutional, but also on subjects much more pervasively supportive
of religion than simply busing children to and from religious schools. Yet the
very legislature that passed the Bill for Religious Freedom passed these bills
as well.4'
Finally, consider the religious nature of the Bill, which instead of being
neutral as regards religion, presumed a belief in God.49 Because of modem
separationist dogma with respect to any law which espouses a religious prefer-
ence, those courts which have historically touted the Bill's grandeur would be
required to strike it down should a state enact it today.492 The absurdity of
this belies both common sense and the Constitution.
Modem courts, in their quest for separationist support, have interposed
their misunderstanding of history upon the Virginia Bill. Undoubtedly,
488. Everson, 330 U.S. at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
489. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 23-24.
490. Note that the separationists are not alone in their misinterpretation of history. Consider,
for example, the opinion of Justice Thomas in Rosenberger, where his historical assessment, al-
though more accurate than Souter's, was not flawless. Admittedly, he understood the underlying
nature and limitations of both the Remonstrance and the Virginia Bill. For example, he correctly
noted that Madison objected not to religious participation in neutral government programs but to a
specific tax imposed solely for the benefit of Christian teachers. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2529 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Nonetheless, Thomas
proceeded to adopt a nonpreferentialist view, and unfortunately based this conclusion in part on
Madison's Remonstrance. Id. at 2529-30. Although Thomas correctly assumed Madison sought to
prevent the national govemment from establishing a national church, he failed to mention
Madison's Detached Memoranda, which clearly foreclosed any nonpreferentialist assumptions
regarding Madison's church and state jurisprudence. Indeed, it is these uninformed oversights that
reduce the credibility of Thomas's opinion. Consider also Thomas's discussion of the historical
support for excluding churches from property taxes. Id. at 2531. In this section, Madison's name
is nowhere to be found, yet in the Detached Memoranda he explicitly indicated his opposition to
such exemptions. Perhaps sensing the incompatibility of Madison's views with his own, Thomas
rightly remarked that "the views of one man do not establish the original understanding of the
First Amendment." Id. at 2530. In short, Thomas should have ended his historical appraisal upon
correctly concluding that "there is no indication that at the time of the framing [Madison] took the
dissent's view that the government must discriminate against religious adherents by excluding
them from more generally available government financial subsidies." Id.
491. Dreisbach, supra note 56, at 187.
492. See id. at 188 (citing American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 136
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J. dissenting)).
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Jefferson supported separation of church and the national government. His
refusal to issue thanksgiving and other religious day proclamations is but one
example of this conclusion. Nonetheless, Jefferson, as did Madison and every
other Framer, professed and practiced the belief that the states were free to
legislate with respect to religion.493 There were no limits on state power to
do so. The various Virginia bills pertaining to religion exemplify this federal-
ism-based precept. Furthermore, the notion that Jefferson favored a separation
of church and state is true only when considered in its historical context of
state freedoms.494 But Jefferson, and Madison for that matter, did not live in
a United States where the Supreme Court turned the Constitution inside out;
moreover, neither lived in the era of incorporation and federally imposed state
restraints. Surely, had they lived in such times, they would be most distressed
to see their tools, which were designed to ensure religious liberty, used so
spuriously and deceptively to destroy it.
3. The Lost Founders
An unfortunate byproduct of the understandable tendency of jurists and
commentators to emphasize the views of Madison and Jefferson is the corre-
sponding failure to consider the view of the other Framers and Founders.
Indeed, noticeably absent from most discussions of church and state are the
views of some of the nation's earliest and most esteemed leaders, such as
George Washington, John Adams, John Marshall, and others.495 Many of
these individuals were "political centrists," who not only "looked favorably on
organized religion as necessary for social cohesion," but also "believed that
religion was an essential cornerstone for morality, civic virtue, and democratic
government."496
493. See Poppel, supra note 416, at 250 ("In the search for the original intent of the Framers
concerning the Religion Clauses, one fact is taken as irrefutable by virtually all commentators: at
the time of the ratification of the Constitution, it was not the intention of the Framers to apply the
Religion Clauses to the States.").
494. One commentator has articulated this precept as follows:
Where the Court has gone astray in its Religion Clause jurisprudence is in using the
original intent of the Framers to justify a Religion Clause jurisprudence with respect to
First Amendment limitations on state action. The only clear "original intent" of the
Framers is that the Religion Clauses were not to apply to the states. Once the Court de-
cided to incorporate the Religion Clauses against the states, it nullified the importance of
"original intent" in this area, at least with respect to defining the limitations imposed on
the states. The grand searches for original intent seen in Everson, Wallace, and other
opinions are futile once it is understood that, while the Framers of the First Amendment
might have had an intention regarding the application of the Religion Clauses to the
national government, they had no such intention regarding application of the clauses to
the states except that they were not intended to apply to the states.
Id. at 267-68.
495. Levy stated that Madison's view, which Levy claims to be strict separation, "was widely
shared by the other framers of the Constitution." LEVY, supra note 9, at 119. This conflicts with
Adams's and Emmerich's position that the Founders (including the Framers) shared a wide variety
of views; Madison's and Jefferson's did not predominate. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at
26. For a discussion of the personalities of the Framers, see Frederick M. Gedicks, The Rise and
Fall of the Religion Clauses, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 499 (1992).
496. ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 26. Consider in this vein Benjamin Franklin,
who, although better known for other endeavors, played an important role in the early formation
of the United States, and deserves mention here. Franklin, a Framer at the Constitutional Conven-
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Washington exemplified this description. As President he proclaimed a
national day of thanksgiving for the people to acknowledge "that great and
glorious Being for the civil and religious liberty with which we are
blessed."497 The following reply to the Jewish Congregation of Newport fur-
ther indicates both his great respect for religion and his enthusiasm for reli-
gious freedom: "It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by
the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of
their inherent natural rights." 98 While in office, Washington also effected a
treaty in which the United States paid one thousand dollars to build a
church.4' This action, more than any other of Washington's Presidential ten-
ure, is inapposite separationism. If as separationists contend, any governmental
regulation respecting religion is prohibited, then Congress violated the First
Amendment three years after it became effective.5" Moreover, while Wash-
ington was an unavowed advocate of religious freedom and toleration, his
actions, particularly his proclamations, indicate he did not believe the Constitu-
tion precluded all federal government action with respect to religion. To this
end, consider the following remarks delivered at his farewell address:
[L]et us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be
maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influ-
ence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and
experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail
in exclusion of religious principle."'
Hence, while Washington certainly was not supportive of a national church or
establishment or preferential treatment for any one sect, he likely believed that
national encouragement of religious practice both was necessary and permitted
to preserve social order and maintain the moral good. °2
Other prominent figures shared Washington's convictions. John Adams,
for example, not only continued Washington's practice of declaring days of
tion in 1787, was bothered by the slow progress of the group. He stated:
I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I
see of this truth-that God Governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall
to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire cannot rise without his
aid? We have been assured, Sir, in the sacred writings, that "except the Lord build the
House they labor in vain that build it." I firmly believe this ....
I therefore beg leave to move-that henceforth prayers imploring the assistance
of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held in this Assembly every morn-
ing before we proceed to business, and that one or more of the Clergy of this City be
requested to officiate in that Service.
CORD, supra note 8, at 24-25. Although the motion was seconded, no vote was ever taken on it
because of fear expressed by others that although such a motion might have been proper at the
beginning of the Convention, if it was not adopted, the public might perceive that the Conven-
tion's troubles were so great as to resort only to divine assistance. See id. at 25.
497. CORD, supra note 8, at 26.
498. Id. at 27.
499. Id. at 58.
500. Id.
501. George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796, in ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at
21.
502. See, e.g., id. ("He believed that 'Religion and Morality are the essential pillars of Civil
society' and affirmed that everyone should be 'protected in worshipping the Deity according to the
dictates of their consciences."').
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Thanksgiving, but declared two national fast days to allow for the "promotion
of that morality and piety without which social happiness can not exist nor the
blessings of a free government be enjoyed."5"3 Chief Justice John Marshall
admitted that "[liegislation on the subject [religion] is admitted to require great
delicacy, because freedom of conscience and respect for our religion both
claim our most serious regard."5"4 By using the term legislation, Marshall
implicitly rejected a broad construction of the Establishment Clause because
separationism by definition precludes legislation.
Consider also Justice Joseph Story, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court from 1811 to 1845, who in his treatise on the Constitution said the
following with regard to religion:
The real difficulty lies in ascertaining the limits to which government
may rightfully go in fostering and encouraging religion. The real
object of the First Amendment was.., to exclude all rivalry among
Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establish-
ment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the
national government.0 5
These statements presuppose that the Constitution permits the federal govern-
ment, within prescribed limits, to use legislation to foster or encourage reli-
gion."°
To be sure, one cannot categorically characterize the Framers or Founders
collectively as strict-separationist or nonpreferentialist. It is instead both more
accurate and more reasonable to depict, as the evidence suggests, that the
Framers' views on church and state fell along a continuum which spans these
two extremes. 7 The Supreme Court has, unfortunately, relied exclusively on
the separationist writings of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson when con-
sidering Establishment Clause disputes. The Court has reduced the Establish-
ment Clause to nothing more than the collective intent of those two figures. In
any event, the Court's long held view, first proffered in Everson, that the
Framers' intent was indisputably separationist is historically baseless and inac-
curate.
D. Federalism and the Problem with Incorporation
As evidenced by the preceding case discussion, virtually every Establish-
ment Clause case involves disputes between individuals and state or local
503. Id. at 27.
504. Id. at 28. Marshall further stated: "The American population is entirely Christian and
with us, Christianity and Religion are identified. It would be strange indeed, if with such a people,
our institutions did not presuppose Christianity, and did not often refer to it, and exhibit relations
with it." Id. Although few would argue that the modem United States is as religiously homoge-
neous as when Marshall made his statement, his characterization demonstrates that not all Framers
thought the Constitution prohibited the national government from interacting with religion and re-
ligious institutions.
505. CORD, supra note 8, at 13.
506. For an argument that Story's views never led anywhere and were in effect meaningless,
see MORGAN, supra note 76, at 40.
507. See ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 19, at 22.
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governmental bodies. Only a scant few involve actions by the national govem-
ment. Moreover, the entire jurisprudential area is relatively young, dating back
only to 1947 and the Everson decision. In fact, Everson was the first substan-
tive Establishment Clause case heard by the Supreme Court, despite the fact
that the Clause had been in place for over 150 years. During this period, it
was the state governments, rather than the federal government, which exer-
cised control over religious legislation. It was only when the Establishment
Clause was incorporated in Everson that the Clause's mandates became bind-
ing upon the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The
Court's decision to fully incorporate the Establishment Clause has proved to
be a poor one.5" Mountains of litigation have resulted, and problems which
were previously resolved on a state and local level are now being decided by
various branches of the federal government which are insensitive to local
preferences, cultures, and problems."° More fundamental difficulties which
plague the Establishment Clause's incorporation are its lack of historical sup-
port and its rebuke of the federalism upon which its passage was based.
In short, any understanding of the Establishment Clause must be based on
an understanding of federalism. Federalism essentially mandates that the feder-
al government is one of enumerated powers, and that it may not, theoretically,
and consistent with the Constitution, take any actions not specifically and
explicitly authorized by the Constitution's text.5" ° This incontrovertible view
of federalism with respect to the Establishment Clause persisted for over 150
years, during which time the Supreme Court twice condoned it: first in Barron
v. Baltimore,"' later in Permoli v. New Orleans."' Those in favor of
508. Others agree. For example:
[C]onfusing case law has led the Justices themselves to describe their Establishment
Clause doctrine as a muddle that lacks clear principles and departs from the intent of the
Framers. Some commentators have argued that this doctrinal confusion was the inevi-
table consequence of the Court's decision to incorporate the Establishment Clause
against the states in spite of the intent of the Framers of the First Amendment.
Note, supra note 78, at 1702.
509. One commentator states that
perhaps the most important value to be served by restoring state authority over religion
would be the federalist value of decentralized decisionmaking. This method of political
organization confers two principal benefits. First, states and localities can better respond
to the needs and interests of the majority of their citizens than the national government
because they can tailor their laws to suit local conditions and preferences.
Id. at 1715.
510. Given these restricted federal powers, Madison and many other Framers felt a bill of
rights unnecessary. LEVY, supra note 9, at 125. Because the Constitution did not grant Congress
any power to legislate with respect to religion, speech, etc., the populace, at least theoretically, had
no reason to fear federal usurpation of state power. Rather, Madison believed that neither the
Constitution nor explicit guarantees would assure religious liberty. Instead, he declared that it was
a multiplicity of sects, i.e., religious pluralism, that protected and secured religious liberty. Id.
With numerous sects, one sect would be less likely to accumulate sufficient power to oppress the
others. Id.
511. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
512. 44 U.S. (I How.) 589 (1845). In addressing the New Orleans ordinance in Permoli, the
Court stated, "There is no repugnancy to the constitution, because no provision thereof forbids the
enactment of law or ordinance, under state authority, in reference to religion. The limitation of
power in the first amendment of the Constitution is upon Congress, and not the states." Permoli,
44 U.S. (I How.) at 606.
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extending the Establishment Clause's provisions to the states, however, found
their fortune in the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from de-
priving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
With respect to the Establishment Clause, the critical issue thus became
whether state legislation respecting an establishment of religion constituted a
deprivation of liberty.'
1 3
There can be no doubt that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend its liberty component to embody the Establishment Clause re-
straints."3 4 The proposed Blaine Amendment confirms this. In 1875, just sev-
en years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative
James G. Blaine sought approval of an amendment stating that, "No state shall
make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." ' This language, of course, correlates exactly with that in
the Religion Clauses, which constrain only Congress. Although the amendment
passed, it lacked the necessary two-thirds majority for submission to the
states.5 6 Its mere introduction, however, to a Congress which included twen-
ty three members of the Congress which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment,
illustrates undeniably that those who framed of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not intend it to apply the Establishment Clause to the states. In short, had the
Congress believed the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the Establishment
Clause, there would have been no need to affix to the Constitution a redundant
amendment encompassing the Religion Clauses.
As it turned out, however, the Supreme Court ignored this intent, and in
1947 held in Everson that the Establishment Clause applied to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The incorporation process began, however, at
least seven years before in Cantwell v. Connecticut."3 8 There, the Court said:
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth)
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the states as incom-
petent as Congress to enact such laws." 9
With these words, the Court cast the die that led to the Establishment Clause's
incorporation seven years later.
In the abstract, few would argue that the mandates of the First Amend-
ment should not apply to the states as well as Congress. Indeed, free speech
and free exercise of religion are two notions undoubtedly fundamental to the
concept of ordered liberty. Yet some sense an inherent distinction between free
513. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 148.
514. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to incor-
porate any provisions embodied in the Bill of Rights. See Alfred W. Meyer, The Blaine
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939, 945 (1951).
515. Id. at 941.
516. Id. at 944.
517. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
518. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
519. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
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speech and free exercise and the establishment of religion.52 These scholars
assert that the Establishment Clause, unlike the other First Amendment claus-
es, does not protect individual freedoms or grant a right to engage in some
specific action.52" ' In short, because establishment of religion need not neces-
sarily restrict an individual's free exercise rights, ordered liberty can exist in
the absence of Establishment Clause incorporation. 22 As one commentator
notes, however, Madison, Jefferson, and several preeminent religious founders
believed prevention of establishment essential to freedom. 23 To the extent
that this encompasses only formal establishments, I agree. But incorporating
the Establishment Clause and interpreting it to prohibit states from
nonpreferentially fostering and encouraging religion is inapposite to the First
Amendment, which by its terms reserved religion for the states. Indeed, per-
mitting states to make informed public policy decisions as to whether to en-
courage religion through nonpreferential means in no way detracts from any
plausible notion of liberty. 2 '
The federalist nature of the First Amendment theoretically renders the
national government incapable of legislating, even nonpreferentially, with
respect to religion. Yet that same Amendment theoretically preserves for the
states legislative dominion over religion. Hence, the Court has disrupted the
delicate balance of power intended by the Framers. The result is that the Court
has proscribed every governmental body-local, state, and national-from
enacting nonpreferential legislation on religious topics.525
As a feasible compromise, incorporation of the Establishment Clause
should apply to the states only to the extent that it prohibits them from creat-
ing formal establishments and enacting religious legislation which exalts one
religion or religious sects over others. The sensitive choice as to whether it
520. One commentator noted:
The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to embody a principle of federalism.
That is, the original purpose of the Clause was to prevent Congress from interfering with
the variety of church-state relationships that existed in 1791. For this reason, the Estab-
lishment Clause was a uniquely poor candidate for incorporation against the states.
Note, supra note 78, at 1700.
521. See LEVY, supra note 9, at 228.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Indeed, states should today possess this right to protect religions. Unlike 200 years ago,
as one author notes, "The great problem today is not the threat that religion poses to public life,
but the threat that the state, presuming to embody public life, poses to religion." Richard J.
Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 620, 632 (1992).
525. Others share this view. Consider the remarks of one commentator:
In particular, since the incorporation of those clauses, the Court has infused its decisions
with considerations of original intent and history that have the effect of misinterpreting
the meaning of the Religion Clauses as they are applied to the states. The result ... has
been the alteration of the basic structure of those clauses; what began as a limitation of
federal power designed to promote government regulation of religion at the state level, if
there was to be any regulation of religion at all, has been turned upside down so that
today the dominant force shaping church-state relations are the federal courts in general
and the Supreme Court in particular. [Tlhe Court has failed to heed the belief of the
founders that civil authority in religious matters, to the extent it could be exercised, was
a state function.
Poppel, supra note 416, at 249.
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wishes to expend valuable resources to foster, aid, or encourage526 religion
should rest with a state and its citizens."' Unlike the Supreme Court's ap-
proach, which was to fully incorporate and apply to the states the Establish-
ment Clause and then spend two decades creating a historically unsupported
and undoubtedly unworkable standard, this modified incorporation framework
is consistent with both history and the Framers' intent. Indeed, as one com-
mentator notes:
[T]he only consensus among the Framers of the First Amendment
about the appropriate relationship between church and state was to
allow the states to decide the issue themselves. Thus, the only theory
of the Establishment Clause that accurately captures the collective
intent of the Framers and reflects their divergent views is federal-
ism 528i . 2
VII. CONCLUSION
Modem Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence is based on
both misinterpreted history and unfounded historical assumptions. Indeed,
despite the wishes of Scalia or Souter, the Framers cannot be classified as
either nonpreferentialist or strict-separationist. Rather, the history of the Estab-
lishment Clause demonstrates that no one philosophy emerged which clearly
represented the entire group's beliefs. Moreover, the Supreme Court's incorpo-
ration of the Establishment Clause rendered the use of Framers' intent to
526. Encouragement of religion does not consist of prayer in schools or Bible reading in
schools, but rather tax exemptions for parents who send their children to private religious schools,
use of public school buses for sectarian school students to go on secular field trips, and teaching
various religious (and nonreligious) approaches to morality in the public school system.
527. To this end, I do not advocate overturning the incorporation doctrine in its entirety,
rather just a shift in its jurisprudential focus which reflects more Court respect for state rights and
local decisions. Few are so naive as to faithfully, and foolishly, propose that the Court abolish the
incorporation doctrine. However, the Court "might reinterpret precedents, distinguishing away
some, blunting others, and making new law without the appearance of overruling or disrespecting
the past." LEVY, supra note 9, at 232.
528. Note, supra note 78, at 1705. One commentator offers a compelling point in this respect
it is almost inconceivable that the Supreme Court will abandon the incorporation doctrine, and
highly unlikely that it would ever modify the incorporation doctrine sufficiently to solve the prob-
lems currently facing it. As such, modem scholars are essentially avoiding the issue, which can be
stated as follows:
[Elven scholars who have criticized the incorporation of the establishment clause have
typically assumed that the clause continues to restrict the national government, as it was
originally intended to do. But even that assumption seems unwarranted. If the religion
clauses were an allocation of jurisdiction over religion to the states, and if that allocation
has to be undone, then there is no justification-no originalist justification grounded in
the First Amendment's religion clauses, at least-for holding even the national govern-
ment to restrictions grounded in a jurisdictional arrangement that has long since been
repudiated.
More generally, the effort to develop an authoritative constitutional law of reli-
gious freedom based on the religion clauses of the First Amendment is in a sense similar
to an effort to discuss the states' current constitutional authority to permit or regulate
liquor on the basis of the Eighteenth Amendment, while ignoring the inconvenient fact
that this amendment has been repealed. If there is to be constitutional law on either
subject, it will have to be derived from some other source.
SMITH, supra note 40, at 50.
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analyze state religious legislation inapposite to the Framers' understanding of
the republic. It is like trying to put a round peg in a square hole-something
just does not fit. That something is federalism. In short, it existed in 1789, but
for all practical purposes exists in name only now. Recall that in the Framers'
era, states were free to legislate with respect to religion; they could establish
religions or restrict religious freedom-they were writing on a blank page. In-
corporation, however, disrupted this balance of power. Hence, it is merely
guesswork to suggest that Madison or Jefferson would have approved or dis-
approved of this or that bill. No one knows how any of the Framers would
regard modem religion clause jurisprudence. For sure, most would not even
recognize it as a product of the Constitution and Bill of Rights they created
over 200 years ago. Likewise, most would also consider the federal
government's encroachment into the sphere of state power, with respect to
religion and innumerable other matters, palpable violations of their republican
ideal.
Unfortunately, for nearly fifty years the Court has adhered to an unduly
rigid separationist viewpoint. As a result, modem Courts must fight the temp-
tation, and increasingly the popular demand, to shift too far the other way. The
incorporation model proposed earlier grants states discretion as to whether or
not to aid religion in evenhanded, neutral manners. Such an approach accounts
both for the separationist fear of formal establishments and the
nonpreferentialist appreciation for federalism. Finally, both sides would do
well to recall the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who said, "The true mean-
ing of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history." '529 In this
respect, nonpreferentialists must recognize the importance of the Establishment
Clause's underlying rationale-to secure the broadest possible level of reli-
gious freedom and protect the sanctity of the church. Similarly, separationists
should heed the warning of John Adams, the nation's second President, who
maintained, "Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious peo-
ple. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other."53
John E. Joiner
529. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).




VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J v. ACTON:
FLUSHING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT-
STUDENT ATHLETES' PRIVACY INTERESTS Go DOWN THE DRAIN
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is conta-
gious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.'
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1991, the government became a lawbreaker. This occurred
when a school district in Vernonia, Oregon imposed an unconstitutional man-
date upon middle and high school students wishing to participate in their ath-
letic programs. In order to compete, the students were required to submit to
random drug testing of their urine.
In an effort to support the federal government's "War on Drugs," the
Court sanctioned this illegal behavior when it failed to strike a balance be-
tween governmental power and individual rights. On June 26, 1995, the Court,
in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, held constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment a district-wide policy authorizing random, suspicionless, urinalysis
drug testing of students who participate in the District's public school athletic
programs.' Despite the Court's efforts to follow what the Constitution pre-
scribes, the Court did not adhere to precedent and instead created its own
social agenda dictating how society should view the threat of drug use in our
public schools.
This Comment analyzes the Court's decision regarding the constitutional-
ity of the Vernonia School District's drug testing policy. Part I discusses the
Fourth Amendment in both the criminal search and administrative search con-
texts. Additionally, Part I examines the various cases in which the Court de-
veloped a balancing test to resolve whether an administrative search is reason-
able. Part II provides the factual background and procedural history of Acton.
Part III scrutinizes the Court's reliance on New Jersey v. T.L.0 4 as precedent
for upholding the District's drug testing program. It specifically addresses how
the majority's inaccurate application of T.L.O. undermines the Court's prior
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
3. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397.
4. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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decisions, which held that full, intrusive, suspicionless searches were reason-
able if a compelling government interest beyond law enforcement was present.
Finally, this Comment argues that the Acton opinion represents an unclear and
unnecessary departure from Fourth Amendment standards. The decision effec-
tively strips public school students of their legitimate expectations of privacy
and security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Scope of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution "guarantees the
privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive
acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their discretion."' This
language protects individuals from two types of governmental invasions:
"searches" and "seizures."6 A "search" occurs when a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy is infringed upon.7 A "seizure" of property occurs
when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory
interest in that property.' In order to trigger Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable governmental intrusions, an intrusion, as a threshold
matter, must occur in an area where a citizen has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.' A reasonable expectation of privacy exists if a person has an expec-
tation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reason-
able.'0
5. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) (citing
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). The Court has espoused an exclusionary
remedy for violations of a defendant's constitutional rights. The first such decision was Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that it was prejudicial error for a trial court to
refuse to return letters and documents to the accused, and to allow their use in his trial, when
obtained through a warrantless search conducted by a United States official under color of office).
The exclusionary doctrine was later applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, due to the broad scope of the Fourth Amendment's right of
privacy). This rule prohibits the use of evidence or testimony obtained by government officials
through means violative of the Constitution. Id. at 648. Therefore, all evidence obtained by law
enforcement officials through means lacking the constitutionally required degree of suspicion
necessary to proceed are deemed invalid and inadmissible at trial if the defendant can establish
that the evidence was obtained in an unconstitutional manner. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245
n.13 (1983) ("In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether
particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular
types of non-criminal acts."). Likewise, evidence subsequently derived from evidence erroneously
obtained is inadmissible under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 488 (1963).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 616.
8. Id.
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). A governmental intrusion is deemed
reasonable if the intrusion was predicated either upon the issuance of a warrant by a detached and
disinterested magistrate upon a showing of probable cause, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
582 n.17 (1979), or for compelling reasons which would justify an exception to the warrant re-
quirement, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948). See generally 2 WAYNE
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987) (dis-
cussing the Fourth Amendment in detail).
10. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 73:2
PRIVACY INTERESTS GO DOWN THE DRAIN
1. The Fourth Amendment in the Criminal Search Context
An intrusion is reasonable in the criminal search context when a war-
rant" to search is issued based upon a showing of probable cause and a de-
scription of the things or people to be seized. 2 Once presented with an affi-
davit explaining, with particularity, the reasons for the intrusion and a descrip-
tion of the premises, a neutral and detached magistrate signs a court order
issuing the warrant. 3 Probable cause to search exists when the facts and cir-
cumstances would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that seizable
objects are located in the place to be searched. 4
The Court, however, carves out various exceptions to the warrant and
probable cause elements of the reasonableness requirement, which apply in
certain instances. The Court has not mandated warrants in searches: (1) while
in hot pursuit of a criminal suspect; 5 (2) if there is imminent destruction of
evidence; 6 (3) of automobiles; 7 (4) of items in plain view when an officer
is already at a lawful vantage point;" (5) incident to a lawful arrest; 9 (6) of
inventory pursuant to an arrest;2" (7) where consent has been given;2' and
(8) where probable cause is impracticable because the purpose of the search is
to satisfy some special need beyond law enforcement.22 Furthermore, in other
11. "A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that it is nar-
rowly limited in its objectives and scope." Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 622; see
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (stating that a seizure of personal property is per
se unreasonable when accomplished without a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and
particularly describing items to be seized); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (stating
that searches and seizures within a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948).
14. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 363-64 (1985) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 161 (1925)).
15. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305 (1967).
16. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (holding that the need for evidence of
blood alcohol content, given the rate at which the body metabolizes alcohol, and the fact that the
arresting officer incurred delays in seeking medical treatment for the petitioner, justified taking a
blood sample without a warrant).
17. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154-55 (1925) (holding that officers are indemni-
fied for stopping and seizing automobiles reasonably believed to be illegally transporting contra-
band liquor).
18. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
19. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (noting that this exception extends
to searches of the person and to the area within the person's control being arrested).
20. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-73 (1987) ("[Aln inventory search may be rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment even though it is not conducted pursuant to a warrant based
on probable cause."); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983) ("[Tjhe inventory search
constitutes a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.").
21. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 593-94 (1946).
22. CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 144-293
(1986); Greg Knopp et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 83 GEO. L.J. 692, 692 (1995). For
minimally intrusive searches, the Court reasons that a lesser degree of suspicion could still satisfy
the Fourth Amendment's ultimate mandate of "reasonableness." It would be excessive for the
Court to require a warrant, for example, every time a police officer briefly asks minimally intru-
sive questions of a person exhibiting suspicious behavior. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Because the warrant exceptions grant police officers wide discretion, the Court created the
exclusionary rule to deter officers from abusing the exceptions. United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
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instances, the Court employs a balancing test,23 permitting searches and sei-
zures on a showing of less than probable cause, allowing reasonable suspicion
to sometimes suffice. 24 The Court balances the government's interests in
maintaining societal order and providing effective law enforcement against the
relative intrusiveness to the individual.25
2. The Fourth Amendment in the Administrative Search Context
Administrative searches, also called regulatory, civil, or "special needs"
searches, can occur in a variety of contexts, and the intrusiveness of such
searches can range from minimal to highly invasive.26 As in the criminal con-
text, these searches, too, can occur with or without a warrant and with or
without individualized suspicion. Administrative searches sometimes do not
require a warrant, because the purposes of a warrant would not be fur-
thered."' Ordinarily, a warrant is only useful for law enforcement purposes, in
which a full criminal search targets specific individuals.28 In an administrative
search, however, the goal is not law enforcement, but some other public policy
goal.29 For instance, the goal of municipal fire, health, and housing inspec-
23. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
24. Id. at 538; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (sanctioning the use of a balancing test to
replace individualized suspicion).
25. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-37; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-25 (discussing the use of a bal-
ancing test).
26. See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2393 (1995) (deeming ran-
dom urinalysis drug testing of students who participate in athletics programs as an administrative
search); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21, 630 (1989) (finding
drug and alcohol testing authorized by Federal Railroad Administration regulations to be adminis-
trative search); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (finding
United States Custom Service's drug testing of employees applying for promotion to positions
which involve stopping transportation of illegal drugs or requiring them to carry firearms at
nation's borders to be administrative search); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (finding
warrantless administrative search of junkyard); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (holding vehicle stop at fixed checkpoint, Mexico-U.S. border, to determine citizenship to
be administrative search); Lesser v. Epsy, 34 F.3d 1301 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding warrantless ad-
ministrative search of animal dealer facilities); United States v. Branson, 21 F.3d 113 (6th Cir.)
(finding warrantless administrative search of auto repair shop), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 223 (1994);
In re Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 13 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting administrative search con-
ducted on showing that OSHA violated); Winters v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 F.3d 848, 853
(10th Cir. 1993) (finding warrantless administrative search of pawn shop), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1539 (1994); United States v. Seslar, 996 F.2d 1058, 1063 (10th Cir. 1993) (deeming warrantless
random stop of trucks to determine whether trucks carrying commercial load as administrative
search); United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting administrative search of
taxidermy shop); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing random urinalysis testing of students who participate in interscholastic sports to be administra-
tive search); Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, (S.D. Tex.
1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding urinalysis drug testing of students participating
in extra-curricular activities to be administrative search).
27. The Court analyzes the public interest involved:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public interest
justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to search should be
evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of ob-
taining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
28. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 619.
29. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61;
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tions is public safety;3" likewise, railroad employees and U.S. Customs Ser-
vice employees may be subject to drug and alcohol testing in the interest of
public safety.3
a. The Warrant & Probable Cause Requirements
A warrant supported by probable cause may be issued in an administrative
context. Unlike the criminal arena, however, administrative searches typically
are not subjected to a neutral, detached evaluation because the persons
searched are given notice that they are subject to such random searches. 2
Either a person has signed a consent form at some point prior to the search,33
or the very nature of the person's environment provides a lesser expectation of
privacy.34 In these instances, the need to check an arbitrary abuse of gov-
ernment discretion-the purpose of a warrant-is eliminated. Courts justify
this exception because random searches promote the special benefits of deter-
rence and accuracy. These benefits may be lost during the time necessary to
procure a warrant.35 If the search is reasonable, therefore, a warrant requiring
probable cause is not necessary to conduct an administrative search.
b. The Reasonableness Balancing Test
In the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion, both criminal and
administrative searches can require a balancing of interests in determining
whether or not a search is reasonable. The Court again balances the privacy
and security interests of the individual against the government's interest in
conducting the search.36 In the criminal context, the government seeks indi-
vidual convictions; whereas in the administrative context, the government
seeks to uphold a regulation or policy providing for public safety.3 An im-
portant distinction between administrative and criminal searches is that in an
administrative search, the government's interests are not driven by law en-
forcement purposes. Because the government interest is clear, the Court has an
easier time fashioning the appropriate balancing test.3" The reasonableness
balancing test required for criminal searches is clearly distinguishable from the
Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
30. Camara, 387 U.S. at 533-34.
31. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61.
32. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 622.
33. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
34. Id. at 2392-93; Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 628; Von Raab, 489 U.S.
at 672; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985).
35. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 623; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340; Dono-
van v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981); Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
36. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61.
37. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09 (discussing the public
policy goal of preventing alcohol and drug use by railroad employees, which had possibly caused
or contributed to a significant number of train accidents); Von Roab, 489 U.S. at 660-61 (discuss-
ing the public policy goal of preventing drug use by front line, drug interdiction Customs agents).
38. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09, 620-21; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
660-61; see Camara, 387 U.S. at 529.
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reasonableness balancing test employed by the courts in administrative search-
es.
39
c. Application of the Reasonableness Balancing Test
In order to apply a reasonableness analysis in an administrative search
context, the Fourth Amendment first requires that a search occur.' In the
absence of a warrant, the search must then be distinguished from a criminal
search."' To determine if a search is administrative rather than criminal,
courts examine several factors. One characteristic demonstrating this difference
is the randomness of administrative searches, which means a low probability
for an abuse of discretion. Another is that the environment in which the search
is conducted merits a lower expectation of privacy. An additional distinguish-
ing characteristic of administrative searches is that the persons to be searched
have notice of the policy. Fourth, the purposes of requiring a warrant are not
served in the administrative context. Fifth, and perhaps most important, is that
such a search does not further a criminal investigation; therefore, the
government's interests go beyond normal law enforcement.
The final requirement of the reasonableness analysis is that the govern-
ment action be reasonable." Reasonableness "depends on all of the circum-
stances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or sei-
zure itself."43 If the degree of invasion is outweighed by the government's
need to search, the search is likely to be found reasonable.4 In making this
determination, it appears as though the Court has employed two standards of
review which can be labeled as: (1) legitimate interests, which satisfy mini-
mally intrusive searches;45 and (2) compelling interests, which justify highly
39. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 606-09; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61;
see Camara, 387 U.S. at 529.
40. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 614-18; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 664-
65; see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (finding that a search of trash did not
constitute a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (finding that an aerial search did
not contitute a search). As stated above, a search is an infringement on an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at
616; see, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
This means that a government actor must invade a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.
While the Fourth Amendment applies to federal actors, it also applies to state actors through the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, prohibits an unreasonable invasion
of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy by state officials. See Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 213 (1960); see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (determining that the
Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
by state officers).
41. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 620-21 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)) (stating that there are "'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement
that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements").
42. See id. at 624-34.
43. Id. at 619 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
44. See id.
45. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding the detection and
detention of illegal aliens through checkpoint border stops).
In Martinez-Fuerte, government officials were permitted to stop, question, and visually
inspect the exterior of any vehicle. Id. at 558. However, the officials were not permitted to search
the interior of the vehicle or the occupants. Id. The Court reasoned that the heavy flow of traffic
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intrusive searches. 4
B. The Development of the Compelling Interest & Highly Intrusive Standard
of Review
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n47
Faced with the possibility that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employ-
ees caused or contributed to a significant number of train accidents, the Feder-
al Railroad Administration (FRA) promulgated regulations" mandating blood
and urine toxicological tests of all employees involved in a "major train acci-
dent."'49 Under these regulations, the railroad has the additional duty "of col-
lecting samples for testing after an 'impact accident.""'5 Following an occur-
rence that triggers the railroad's duty to test, all crew members and covered
employees directly involved in the accident are taken to an independent medi-
cal facility for the collection of blood and urine samples.5 After collecting
the samples, the railroad sends them by prepaid air freight to the FRA labora-
tory for analysis. 2
The FRA also adopted regulations authorizing, but not requiring, railroads
to conduct breath and urine tests where, after a reportable accident or incident,
a supervisor has "reasonable suspicion" that an employee's acts or omissions
at the border justified stopping each car without reasonable suspicion. Id. at 557. In addition, the
Court recognized that the government's goal of deterring aliens at the border furthered the purpos-
es of conducting random searches. Id. To make this determination, the Court balanced what they
believed to be a minimal intrusion on the motorists' privacy, with the effectiveness of the pro-
gram, the ineffectiveness of alternatives, and the legitimate interests of society in controlling the
flow of illegal aliens into this country. Id. at 556-57; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
663 (1979) (finding the questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops to be a mini-
mally intrusive method to promote the government's interest in maintaining highway safety);
Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (authorizing suspicionless searches of residential and commercial build-
ings for fire, health, and safety violations). In Prouse, the Court found the intrusion of stopping an
automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his or her driver's license and the registra-
tion of the automobile to be an unreasonable intrusion when the driver is subsequently indicted for
illegal possession of a controlled substance in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a motorist
is unlicensed, or that an automobile is not registered. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. The Court did
sanction states for stopping and questioning all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops even
though they involved less intrusion. Id.
46. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (finding testing of
railroad employees for drug use by urinalysis to be a highly intrusive invasion of privacy, yet
justified because of the government's compelling interest in preventing catastrophic train accidents
involving substantial casualties); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989) (finding the testing of United States Customs Service employees for drug use by urinalysis
to be a highly intrusive invasion of privacy, yet justified because of the government's compelling
interest in promoting safety and national security).
47. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
48. 49 C.F.R. § 219.101-.905 (1994).
49. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 609. Under the regulations, the definition
of a "major train accident" is any train accident involving "(i) a fatality, (ii) the release of hazard-
ous material accompanied by an evacuation or a reportable injury, or (iii) damage to railroad prop-
erty of $500,000 or more." Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1987)).
50. Id. An "impact accident is a collision that results in a reportable injury, or in damage to
railroad property of $50,000 or more." Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(2) (1987)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 610 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.205(d) (1987)).
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contributed to the incident or to the severity of the accident.53 In addition, the
railroad administers these tests to employees who violate specific safety
rules.54 In all situations, the samples are only tested for alcohol and drug use,
and not for any other medical information." Significantly, the Court noted
that although test results are not intended to be released to drug enforcement
officials, the regulations do not expressly prohibit the release of such re-
sults.56
In reviewing the constitutionality of these regulations, the Court scruti-
nized the level of intrusion involved. The Court initially determined that the
collection and testing of urine intruded upon expectations of privacy that soci-
ety recognizes as reasonable, because the invasion affected the privacy inter-
ests of the employees' bodies.57 However, the Court continued to discount
this expectation by finding that the employees tested pursuant to these regula-
tions have long been the focus of regulatory concern, and that they therefore
possessed a diminished expectation of privacy." In balancing this intrusion
with the government's "compelling"59 interest in preventing disastrous train
accidents involving great human loss, the Court reasoned that the government
interest outweighed the intrusion.' The Court found persuasive FRA statistics
demonstrating the high incidence of drug and alcohol abuse in the industry,
the FRA's estimations concerning the extent of property damage, and the num-
ber of fatalities and injuries caused by such abuses.6 Likewise, the Court
53. Id. at 611 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(2) (1987)).
54. Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(3) (1987)). Sub-part D of the regulations, entitled
"Authorization to Test for Cause," also provides that a breath test may be conducted where a
supervisor has a "reasonable suspicion" that an employee is under the influence of alcohol, based
upon personal observations of the employee's appearance, behavior, speech, or body odor. Id.
(quoting 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b)(1) (1987)). If impairment is suspected, urine tests may be re-
quired, but only if the decision to conduct such a test is made by two supervisors. Id. (citing 49
C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(2)(i) (1987)). Lastly, if drugs are suspected of causing impairment, one of the
supervisors making the determination must be specially trained in detecting drug intoxication. Id.
(citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(2)(ii) (1987)).
55. Id. at 626.
56. Id. at 621 n.5 (stating that although the biological samples had never been released and
are not intended for release to drug enforcement officials, the procedures do not expressly prohibit
such release). In dicta, the Court implied that release to law enforcement authorities was unlikely.
Id. at 621.
57. Id. at 617.
58. Id. at 628.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 633.
61. Id. at 607. The Court referenced a study conducted by the FRA:
The FRA noted that a 1979 study examining the scope of alcohol abuse on seven major
railroads found that "[ain estimated one out of every eight railroad workers drank at
least once while on duty during the study year." In addition, "5% of workers reported to
work 'very drunk' or got 'very drunk' on duty at least once in the study year," and
"13% of workers reported to work at least 'a little drunk' one or more times during that
period." The study also found that 23% of the operating personnel were "problem drink-
ers," but that only 4% of these employees "were receiving help through an employee
assistance program, and even fewer were handled through disciplinary procedures."
Id. at 607 n.l (citations omitted). The FRA also reported that:
[Alfter a review of accident investigation reports from 1972 to 1983, "the nation's rail-
roads experienced at least 21 significant train accidents involving alcohol or drug use as
a probable cause or contributing factor," and that these accidents "resulted in 25 fatali-
ties, 61 non-fatal injuries, and property damage estimated at $19 million (approximately
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viewed the ineffectiveness of previous attempts to control such abuses as
dispositive of the reasonableness of maintaining these regulations.62 In a 6-2
decision upholding the constitutionality of the alcohol and drug testing regula-
tions, the Court held that under the totality of the circumstances, the search of
the employees satisfied the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test.
63
2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab'
Decided the same day as Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, Von Raab also
involved drug testing. 65 However, the program involved United States Cus-
toms Service employees.' In implementing the drug testing program, the
Commissioner of Customs authorized testing only for employees in positions
meeting one or more of three criteria: (1) employment involving front line
drug interdiction, (2) the possession of a firearm, or (3) the handling of "clas-
sified" material. 67 After an employee qualifies for a position covered by the
$27 million in 1982 dollars)."
Id. at 607 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 607-08.
63. Id. at 634. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented. Id. at 635-55. The dissent strongly
criticized the majority's cursory treatment of the Fourth Amendment's requirements. Id. at 637.
They argued that the majority unjustifiably dispensed with the probable cause requirement for the
search at issue. "Without the content which [that provision gives) to the Fourth Amendment's
overarching command that searches and seizures be 'reasonable,' the Amendment lies virtually
devoid of meaning, subject to whatever content shifting judicial majorities, concerned about the
problems of the day, choose to give to that supple term." Id.
Likewise, the dissent scrutinized the majority's insistence on widening the "special needs"
exception to the probable cause requirement. Id. at 640-41. Justice Marshall asserted that in doing
so, the majority had undertaken the final and necessary steps toward eliminating the probable
cause requirement altogether. Id. at 640. "[T]he majority substitutes a manipulable balancing in-
quiry under which, upon the mere assertion of a 'special need,' even the deepest dignitary and
privacy interests become vulnerable to governmental incursion." Id. at 640-41. The dissent main-
tained that the majority was interested only in results:
The fact is that the malleable "special needs" balancing approach can be justified only
on the basis of the policy results it allows the majority to reach. The majority's concern
with the railroad safety problems caused by drug and alcohol abuse is laudable; its cava-
lier disregard for the text of the Constitution is not. There is no drug exception to the
Constitution ....
Id. at 641. "Constitutional requirements like probable cause are not fair-weather friends, present
when advantageous, conveniently absent when 'special needs' make them seem not." Id. at 637.
Finally, the dissent suggested that the majority should have evaluated the FRA's testing
regime by using the traditional analytical framework condoned by the Court in cases involving
full-scale searches implicating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 641-48. Specifically, Justice Marshall
commented that the majority should have first asked whether a search had taken place. Id. at 641-
42. Second, they should have inquired as to "whether the search was based on a valid warrant or
undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement." Id. at 642. Next, the
Court should have asked "whether the search was based on probable cause or validly based on
lesser suspicion because it was minimally intrusive." Id. Justice Marshall remarked that the final
question should have been whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. id.
The dissent concluded that the majority's constitutional framework for allowing such a
search was devoid of the "time-honored and textually based principles" which the Framers intend-
ed to include in the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 654-55.
64. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
65. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660.
66. The United States Customs Service is a bureau of the Department of Treasury. Id. at
659.
67. Id. at 660-61. The Court reasoned that because the Customs Service is the nation's first
line of defense against the smuggling of illicit narcotics into the country, they could not perform
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Service's testing program, the Service advises the employee that final selection
is contingent upon satisfying the drug test.' An independent contractor then
contacts the employee to arrange a time and place for producing and collecting
the urine sample.' The contractor then tests the sample for the presence of
marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, and phencyclidine." If an initial
screening test produces a positive result, the contractor conducts a second test
to confirm those results.7' If that test verifies the positive result, the contrac-
tor notifies the Agency, and the Agency dismisses the employee from the Ser-
vice.72 Unlike the regulations in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, however,
the Court maintained that the Customs Service's rules expressly prohibited the
release of test results to law enforcement authorities.73
In analyzing the Customs Service's drug testing program, the Court first
acknowledged that the program implicated the Fourth Amendment, since the
tests invaded reasonable expectations of privacy.74 Next, because the intrusion
on the Custom Service's employees served special governmental needs beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, the Court applied the Fourth Amend-
ment balancing test for administrative searches." The Court then balanced the
employee's privacy expectations against the government's interest.76 The
Court's analysis focused on the fact that the Customs Service is the nation's
first line of defense against the smuggling of illicit narcotics into the
country.77 Therefore, the Court reasoned that a drug abusing front-line Cus-
toms employee is susceptible to bribes and blackmail against the government,
risking "extraordinary safety and national security hazards."" Additionally,
the Court determined that an armed Customs Service agent with impaired
perception posed a further danger to the general public.79
The government provided no evidence of an existing drug problem among
employees, nor did they contend that they even perceived such a problem.'
such a vital task for this country if they were abusing drugs. Id.
68. Id. at 661.
69. Id. Upon producing the sample, the employee signs a chain-of-custody form, the monitor
initials the form, seals the sample in a plastic bag, and sends it to a laboratory. Id.
70. Id. at 662. Phencyclidine is an anesthetic used in veterinary medicine, which is also used
illegally as a hallucinogen. It causes elevated blood pressure, rapid pulse, increased skeletal mus-
cle tone, and occasionally myoclonic jerks. AM. JuR. PROOF OF FAcTs, CYcOOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1383 (3d ed. 1989) It is also referred to as "PCP or angel dust." Id.
71. Id. Confirmed positive results are reported to a "Medical Review Officer," defined as
'[a] licensed physician ... who has knowledge of substance abuse disorders and has appropriate
medical training to interpret and evaluate an individual's positive test result together with his or
her medical history, and any other relevant biomedical information."' Id. at 662-63 (quoting Man-
datory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 11,970, 11,980
(1988)).
72. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 665.
75. Id. This was the same test adopted in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 619-
20. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 6.65.
76. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665.
77. Id. at 668. The Court identified such smuggling as a "veritable national crisis" in law
enforcement. Id. (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
78. Id. at 674.
79. Id. at 671.
80. Id. at 673.
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Nonetheless, the Court held that the government's interest in ensuring that
front line interdiction customs agents are physically fit and possess unim-
peachable integrity and judgment,8' was compelling enough to justify such an
intrusion. 2
The Court next explained why customs employees have a diminished
expectation of privacy because of the nature of their positions within the Ser-
vice. 3 The Court reasoned that employees involved in drug interdiction
should expect such an invasion of privacy, because their health and fitness
bear directly on their ability to perform sensitive duties.8 4
In balancing both interests, the Court concluded that the government's
compelling interests outweighed the privacy interests of the Customs Service
employees. 5 Thus, in a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Customs
Service's drug testing program met the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. 6
81. Id. at 670.




86. Id. at 679. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented:
The Court agrees that [the requirement that an employee produce excretion and give it to
the government for chemical analysis] constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment-and I think it obvious that it is a type of search particularly destructive of
privacy and offensive to personal dignity.
Id. at 680. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia found particularly persuasive the lack of evidence
demonstrating that a "real problem" of drug use existed within the Customs Service. Id. at 681.
He continued to disparage the majority's response to this evidentiary problem when they made the
blanket statement that "'[there is little reason to believe that American workplaces are immune
from [the] pervasive social problem' of drug abuse." Id. at 684. Justice Scalia remarked, "[I]f such
a generalization suffices to justify demeaning bodily searches, without particularized suspicion, to
guard against the bribing or blackmailing of a law enforcement agent, or the careless use of a
firearm, then the Fourth Amendment has become frail protection indeed." Id. Justice Scalia con-
cluded by criticizing the Court's blindness toward the Government's underlying reasons for requir-
ing such an invasive bodily intrusion:
What better way to show that the Government is serious about its "war on drugs" than
to subject its employees on the front line of that war to this invasion of their privacy
and affront to their dignity? ... I think it obvious that this justification is unacceptable;
that the impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; that
symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs,
cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search .... Those who lose because of the
lack of understanding that begot the present exercise in symbolism are not just the Cus-
toms Service employees, whose dignity is thus offended, but all of us-who suffer a
coarsening of our national manners that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its con-
tent, and who become subject to the administration of federal officials whose respect for
our privacy can hardly be greater than the small respect they have been taught to have
for their own.
Id. at 686-87. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, also dissented. ("Here, as in Skinner,
the Court's abandonment of the Fourth Amendment's express requirement that searches of the
person rest on probable cause is unprincipled and unjustifiable.") ld. at 679-80 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
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3. New Jersey v. T.L.. 7
In T.L.O., the Court upheld the constitutionality of a high school
principal's warrantless search of a student's purse without probable cause."8
The search was precipitated by a teacher observing the student smoking in a
school lavatory. The teacher took T.L.O. to the principal's office because
smoking in the lavatories violated a school rule.' Once in the office, the as-
sistant vice principal questioned T.L.O. about whether she had been smok-
ing.9' T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking, and claimed she did not
smoke at all.92 After this brief questioning, the principal asked T.L.O. to go
into his private office, where he searched her purse and found a pack of ciga-
rettes.93 As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, he also noticed a
package of cigarette rolling papers.94 At that point, the principal associated
the possession of such materials with the use of marijuana.95 Therefore, he
proceeded to search T.L.O.'s purse thoroughly, intending to find further evi-
dence of drugs." The second search of a separate zippered compartment in
the purse revealed a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a
number of one dollar bills, an index card which appeared to him to be a list of
students owing T.L.O. money, and two letters implicating T.L.O. in the distri-
bution of marijuana.97 The assistant vice principal then notified T.L.O.'s
mother, and turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police.9"
Subsequently, the police requested that T.L.O. and her mother go to police
headquarters, where T.L.O. confessed to selling marijuana at school." Based
on the confession and the evidence seized by the assistant vice principal, the
state brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in the county juvenile
court."l The juvenile court found the search of T.L.O.'s purse reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, and sentenced her to a year's probation.'0 ' An
appellate court affirmed this finding. 2 T.L.O. appealed, and the Supreme
87. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).












100. Id. at 329. The principal also suspended T.L.O. for three days for smoking in a
nonsmoking area and seven days for possession of marijuana. Id. at 329 n.l. Based on T.L.O.'s
motion, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, found that the principal seized the
evidence of marijuana in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and thus, the court set aside the
seven-day suspension. Id. (citing T.L.O. v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., No. C.2865-79 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980)).
101. Id. at 329-30.
102. Id. at 330. The appellate court afffirmed the lower court's finding that there had been no
Fourth Amendment violation. It vacated, however, the adjudication of the delinquency conviction
and remanded for a determination as to whether T.L.O. had knowingly and voluntarily waived her
Fifth Amendment rights before confessing. Id.
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Court of New Jersey reversed, ordering the suppression of the evidence seized
from T.L.O.'s purse.'0 3 New Jersey then petitioned for and was granted cer-
tiorari in the United States Supreme Court."
In its opinion, the Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures by public school officials. 5 The Court
focused next on balancing T.L.O.'s legitimate expectations of privacy and
personal security against the school's need to maintain order"" and an envi-
ronment conducive to learning.' Acknowledging the value of preserving the
informality of the student-teacher relationship' 0 and the need for swift disci-
pline in schools,"9 the Court concluded that while students have an expecta-
tion of privacy, they nonetheless have a diminished one."' Since the princi-
pal searched the zippered compartment with individualized suspicion of crimi-
nal activity, and the intent to further law enforcement goals, the Court ana-
lyzed the intrusion as a criminal, rather than an administrative search."' The
Court first examined "'whether the ... action was justified at its incep-
tion."""' Second, the Court examined whether the search "'was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.""' 3
In applying this test, the Court considered how T.L.O. had been accused
of smoking, and had denied the accusation."' The Court explained that under
those circumstances, a determination of whether T.L.O. possessed cigarettes
103. Id.
104. Id. at 331.
105. Id. at 333-34. The Court further stated, "'[Tlhe basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amend-
ment ... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by gov-
ernment officials."' Id. at 335 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
The Court determined that since school officials are subject to the commands of the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept of school
officials acting as parents, and not as the state, when they search students "is in tension with con-
temporary reality and the teachings of [the] Court." Id. at 336. "[T]he Court has recognized that
'the concept of parental delegation' as a source of school authority is not entirely 'consonant with
compulsory education laws."' Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)). See
generally 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child §§ 10-22, at 75-76 (1987) (describing the rights,
duties, and authority of parents over their children, and the rights, duties, and authority of persons
acting in loco parentis).
106. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
107. Id. at 340; see Knopp et al., supra note 22, at 763-64 (discussing how the Court allowed
the state to dispense with the warrant and probable cause elements when special needs exist, and
instead, balanced the government's interests against the intrusion on individual privacy).
108. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
109. Id. at 329.
110. See id. at 339-40. In striking the balance, the Court determined that in the school setting,
the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject require some easing.
Id. at 340. In addition, the Court noted that in a school setting, "some modification of the level of
suspicion of illicit activity [is] needed to justify a search." Id.
111. See id. at 341.
112. Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The Court stated that "a
search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be 'justified at its inception' when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." Id. at 341-42.
113. Id. at 341 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
114. Id. at 345.
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was relevant to the charges against her. '5 Possession of cigarettes by T.L.O.,
the Court reasoned, would both corroborate the accusation that T.L.O. had
been smoking and undermine the credibility of T.L.O.'s defense to the charge
of smoking."6 Thus, the Court determined that if the assistant vice principal
had a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse, then the
search was justified and reasonably related to the circumstances which justi-
fied the intrusion at the outset."
' 7
The Court's conclusion that the first search was reasonable prompted them
to analyze whether the second search for marijuana, after the pack of ciga-
rettes was located, was reasonable."' The Court found that the discovery of
the rolling papers gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O.'s purse con-
tained marijuana, which in turn allowed the assistant vice principal to search
T.L.O.'s purse further."9 The Court concluded that it was not unreasonable
to extend the search to a separate zippered compartment of the purse and
examine the contents of that compartment. 20 Therefore, the search of
T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 2'
II. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J V. ACTON
22
A. Facts and Procedural History
In the fall of 1991, James Acton, then in the seventh grade, signed up to
play football at his middle school. 23 However, school officials would not
allow Acton to participate because Acton and his parents refused to sign con-
sent forms authorizing the school to conduct a drug test of Acton's urine.1 24
Vernonia School District 47J ("the District") operates one high school and
three grade schools in the logging community of Vernonia, Oregon."z The
District had not experienced a problem with drugs until the mid-to-late 1980s,
when teachers and administrators observed a sharp increase in drug use.'26
In support of their observations, high school teachers and administrators
offered testimony that they had witnessed students discussing their attraction
to the drug culture.'27 During this time, students became increasingly rude
115. Id.
116. Id. The Court stated, "The relevance of T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes to the question
whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked supplied the
necessary 'nexus' between the item searched for and the infraction under investigation." Id.
117. Id. at 345-46.
118. Id. at 347.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 347-48.
122. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
123. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2388. Vernonia, Oregon has a population of approximately 3,000, including those
living within or near the city limits. Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356
(D. Or. 1992).
126. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
127. Id. Allegedly, the organizations which formed within the "drug culture" adopted names
such as the "Big Elks" and the "Drug Cartel." Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356. "Loud 'bugling' or
'head butting' were the calling cards of these groups." Id.
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during class, and used profanity more often.' This led to a drastic increase
in the number of disciplinary referrals, and several students were suspend-
ed.
29
In addition, the District believed that student high school athletes were not
only involved in such drug use, but were also the leaders of the high school's
"drug culture."'30 The District felt that drug use could increase "the risk of
sports-related injuries."'' For example, the high school football and wres-
tling coach observed "a severe sternum injury suffered by a wrestler, [as well
as] various omissions of safety procedures and misexecutions by football play-
ers.' 32 The coach did not attribute these incidents to other possible causes,
such as aggressive play, nervousness, or mere misexecutions caused by the
opponent or opposing team. Instead, he attributed the incidents to drug
use.
133
Initially, the District offered special classes, speakers, and presentations
designed to educate students about the harmful effects of drug use. 34 How-
ever, after the District found these measures ineffective, they implemented a
"Student Athlete Drug Policy" ("the Policy"). 35 The stated purpose of the
Policy was "to prevent student athletes from using drugs, to protect their
health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance programs."'1
36
Under the Policy, all students participating in school sponsored athletics, and
their parents, are required to sign a form consenting to the student's urine
testing. 37 At the beginning of the fall, winter, and spring sports seasons, the
District tests athletes participating in sports for that season.' 3 In addition,
during each week of the season, ten percent of the athletes from the entire
athletic population for that season are randomly selected for testing.' 39 Ath-
letes selected for testing are notified and tested later the same day."4
Before administering the tests, the District requires each student to com-
plete a "specimen control form which bears an assigned number."' 4' At this
time, students must reveal all prescription medications that they are taking,
and show proof by providing a copy of the prescription or a doctor's authori-
zation."
128. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
129. Id. The Court recognized that "[b]etween 1988 and 1989 the number of disciplinary
referrals in Vernonia schools rose to more than twice the number reported in the early 1980's." Id.
130. Id. at 2388-89 (citing Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1357).




135. The Court found that there had been "unanimous" parental approval for the Policy,
which had been presented for consideration at a "parent input night." Id. The Policy applied to all
student athletes. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. "Approximately 60-65% of the high school students and 75% of the elementary
school students participate in district sponsored athletics." Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356.




142. Id. For example, the form would require the student to reveal prescribed medication for
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An individual student is then accompanied by an adult monitor of the
same sex into an empty locker room, where the student produces a sam-
ple. 43 The boys produce a sample at a urinal, remaining fully clothed with
their backs to the monitor.'" The girls produce samples in an enclosed bath-
room stall, where a monitor listens for the normal sounds of urination, but
does not visually observe the student.'45 The monitor checks the sample for
temperature and tampering."4 The monitor then transfers the urine to a
vial.
147
Thereafter, the District sends all samples to an independent laboratory for
testing." The laboratory tests every sample for the presence of marijuana,
cocaine, and amphetamines."4 The District permits the laboratory to send
test reports to the superintendent of the District, and to give the test results to
the District by telephone "after the requesting official recites a code confirm-
ing his authority." 50 The superintendent, principals, vice-principals, and ath-
letic directors all have access to the test results. 5'
Once a sample tests positive, the lab confirms the result by administering
a second test."2 If the sample tests negative the second time, no further ac-
tion is taken.'53 However, if the sample tests positive, the school principal
meets with the student and his or her parents. 5 4 The student then receives
the option of entering a six week drug assistance program (which requires
weekly urinalysis), or being suspended from athletics for the remainder of the
current and next athletic seasons."' Students selecting the latter option are
retested at the beginning of the next athletic season for which they are eligi-
ble. "'56 If a student violates the policy a second time, he or she is automati-
cally suspended from participation in athletics for the remainder of the current
and next athletic seasons.' 7 If a student violates the policy a third time, he
or she is suspended for the current and next two athletic seasons.'58
James Acton and his parents refused to consent to the District's drug
testing procedures.'59 Instead, they filed suit in United States District Court
for the District of Oregon, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from
epilepsy, AIDS, or birth control pills. See id.
143. Id.




148. Id. "The laboratory procedures are 99.94% accurate." Id.
149. Id. "Other drugs, such as LSD, may be screened at the request of the District, but the
identity of a particular student does not determine which drugs will be tested." Id. The identity of
a student who produces a sample is not revealed to the laboratory. Id.
150. Id. Test results "are not kept for more than one year." Id.
151. Id.
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enforcement of the Policy, on the grounds that it violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitu-
tion."6 At the conclusion of a bench trial, the district court dismissed the ac-
tion, denying each claim on the merits.16' The Actons appealed the decision
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
policy violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Oregon
Constitution. 62 The court reasoned that the students in the Vemonia School
District had legitimate expectations of privacy in their excretory functions.
Further, neither a student's participation in interscholastic athletics nor a
student's use of the school's locker rooms, diminished a student's expectation
of privacy. 63 The court determined that the District's interest in reducing
drug use was not compelling enough to justify the highly intrusive random
tests of the students' urine.' The District appealed to the Supreme Court.
B. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, held that the Vernonia
School District's student-athlete drug policy did not violate the student's feder-
al or state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches, as re-
quired by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, section 9 of
the Oregon Constitution.'65 First, the majority opinion acknowledged that the
District had determined that athletes in Vernonia played a large role in con-
tributing to the use of drugs in the District's high school." The Court refer-
enced several injuries sustained by high school athletes, which school officials
attributed to drug use.'67 In addition, the Court noted the District's perception
of a sharp increase in disciplinary problems."6
The Court next addressed whether under the Fourth Amendment, pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutional guarantee to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures extended to the actions of state offi-
cials." 9 In answering this question, the Court turned to precedent and
160. Id. The Oregon Constitution provides in pertinent part:
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no wan-ant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
OR. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
161. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1368 (D. Or. 1992). The court
found that the record contained "ample evidence" to substantiate the District's concern that the
classroom disciplinary problems were being caused by drug and alcohol abuse. Id. at 1367. Addi-
tionally, the court reasoned that the program would most likely repress the District's problem. Id.
at 1363.
162. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1527 (9th Cir. 1994).
163. Id. at 1525.
164. Id. at 1526.
165. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397.
166. Id. at 2388.
167. Id. at 2389.
168. Id. at 2388. The Court relied on the district court's assessment that "[dlisciplinary prob-
lems had reached 'epidemic proportions."' Id. at 2389.
169. Id. at 2390 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960) (holding that this
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concluded that the "state compelled collection and testing of urine, [as re-
quired] by the [District's] Policy constitutes a 'search' subject to the demands
of the Fourth Amendment.'
70
After establishing that the District's urine collection constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment, the majority addressed whether individualized
suspicion is necessary for a Fourth Amendment analysis in an administrative
search context. 7' The majority conceded that T.L.O. was based on individu-
alized suspicion of wrong-doing; however, the Court explained that "the
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.' 7 2
The Court noted that since its decision in T.L.O., it had upheld suspicionless
searches and seizures in an administrative context.
7 3
The fourth issue discussed by the majority was the nature of the privacy
interest involved in the search.17  The Court emphasized that the Fourth
Amendment only protects expectations of privacy that society recognizes as
legitimate. 75 In analyzing the interests of the students in Acton, the Court
noted that the reasonableness inquiry mandated by the Fourth Amendment
could not "disregard the school's custodial and tutelary responsibility for chil-
dren."'76 Therefore, the majority found that students have a legitimate, yet
diminished, expectation of privacy."7 Moreover, student-athletes have an
even lesser expectation of privacy.
7
1
guarantee is extended to searches and seizures by state officers)); id. (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1985) (finding that public school officials are state officers)).
170. Id. (citing Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 617; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
665).
171. ld. at 2391.
172. Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 341).
173. Id. Examples cited were Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n for its drug testing of railroad
employees involved in train accidents, and Von Raab's drug testing of armed customs officials in-
volved in drug interdiction. Id. Also cited were the maintainence of "automobile checkpoints look-
ing for illegal immigrants and contraband," United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-
67 (1976), and looking for drunk drivers, Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
455 (1990). Id.
174. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.
175. Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338).
176. Id. at 2392. "[A] proper educational environment requires close supervision of school-
children, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if
undertaken by an adult." Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339).
177. Id. Interestingly, as the Court made this determination that public school officials main-
tain a large degree of control over the actions and conduct of students, they also explained how
this does not constitutionally create a duty for those same officials to protect the students. Id. (cit-
ing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
178. Id. at 2392-93. The majority stated:
School sports are not for the bashful. They require "suiting up" before each practice or
event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the usual
sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy they afford. The locker rooms in
Vemonia are typical: no individual dressing rooms are provided; shower heads are lined
up along a wall, unseparated by any sort of partition or curtain; not even all the toilet
stalls have doors.
Id. Furthermore:
By choosing to "go out for the team," [athletes] voluntarily subject themselves to a
degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally. In Vernonia's
public schools, they must submit to a preseason physical exam, . . . they must acquire
adequate insurance coverage or sign an insurance waiver, maintain a minimum grade
point average, and comply with any "rules of conduct, dress, training hours and related
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The majority then scrutinized the character of the intrusion posed by
urinalysis.7 9 The Court explained that the degree of intrusion depends on
how the production and collection of the urine is monitored.") The Court
determined that the privacy interests involved in the collection of urine sam-
ples were not significant.'' The majority found important that under the
District's policy, male students produce their samples against a wall, fully
clothed, and that the female students provide their samples behind an enclosed
stall. ' 2 Thus, these conditions are identical to those typically encountered in
public rest rooms, which are used by men, women, and students on a daily
basis. 3 The Court further noted that another privacy-invasive aspect of uri-
nalysis is the information it discloses about the person's body and the mate-
rials they have ingested. 4 The majority believed this intrusion was permit-
ted, because the urine is tested only for drugs, and not for whether the student
is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.8 5
Finally, the majority examined the nature of the District's interests."'
Instead of following the Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n and Von Raab re-
quirement of a "compelling" government interest, the majority explained that
this phrase "describes an interest which appears important enough to justify
the particular search at hand, in light of other factors which show the search to
be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy."'8 7 Therefore,
the Court reasoned that whether the District's concern was important enough
was of no consequence, because it had been met.' Furthermore, the Court
explained that the individualized suspicion requirement established in Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n could be set aside if the District demonstrated an
"immediate" concern, meaning if their concerns required prompt action.'8 9
The majority believed that deterring drug use by the nation's schoolchildren
was important enough."9 They did not, however, address whether the
District's concerns needed to be addressed with any sort of urgency. Regard-









185. Id. But see supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (explaining that students were
required to disclose any medications they were taking).
186. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
187. Id. at 2394-95.
188. Id. at 2395.
189. Id.
190. Id. The majority stated:
School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of
drugs are most severe. "Maturing nervous systems are more critically impaired by intox-
icants than mature ones are; childhood losses in learning are lifelong and profound";
"children grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and their record of re-
covery is depressingly poor."
Id. (quoting Richard A. Hawley, The Bumpy Road to Drug-Free Schools, 72 PHI DELTA KAPPAN
310, 314 (1990)).
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less, the Court concluded that the nature and immediacy of the government's
concerns were sufficient. 9'
In balancing the students' privacy and security interests against the
District's interests, the Court found the latter to outweigh the former, and held
the Policy to be "reasonable and hence constitutional."''
2. Concurring Opinion
Written by Justice Ginsburg, the concurring opinion agreed with the
majority's decision, but questioned whether the Policy adopted by the Verno-
nia School District could constitutionally be imposed not only on those stu-
dents seeking to engage in scholastic athletics, but on all students required to
attend school.'93
3. Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, strongly dissent-
ed, criticizing the majority for ignoring the individual suspicion require-
ment.'94 Justice O'Connor explained that the Court overlooked this require-
ment on "policy grounds."' 95 She admonished such an approach by stating
that because blanket searches can potentially be conducted of many people,
they present a greater threat to liberty than suspicion-based searches, because
they affect only one person at a time.' However, the dissenters emphasized
that whether blanket searches are better than searches based on individualized
suspicion is not the issue."97 They claimed that the decision "is not open to
judges or government officials to decide on policy grounds which is better and
which is worse."'98 In support of their assertion, the dissent then discussed
how precedent had established that "mass, suspicionless searches [were] gener-
ally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amen-
dment."'" The dissenters added that while there were exceptions to this rule,
such exceptions only apply when a suspicion-based regime is ineffectual.'
Justice O'Connor concluded that this was not the situation in Acton.2°'
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2396.
193. Id. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
194. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
195. Id. "In making these policy arguments... the Court sidesteps powerful, countervailing
privacy concerns." Id. "First, [the majority) explains that precisely because every student athlete is
being tested, there is no concern that school officials might act arbitrarily in choosing who to test.
Second, a broad-based search regime, the Court reasons, dilutes the accusatory nature of the
search." Id.
196. Id. (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2398.
200. Id.
201. Id. The dissent then detailed an historical analysis beginning with Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Justice O'Connor stated, "The Carroll Court's view that blanket
searches are 'intolerable and unreasonable' is well-grounded in history." Acton, 115 S. Ct at 2398.
In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that this has been confirmed in an exhaustive analysis of the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amend-
ment Origins and Original Meaning (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate
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The dissenters criticized the majority's finding that accusatory suspicion-
based searches are ineffectual, because it was not based on the reality of pub-
lic schools."2 The dissent noted that the District's disciplinary scheme listed
many offenses that students are punished for, and therefore, suspicion-based
drug testing for student athletes could easily have been added to the list. 3
The dissent, referring to the evidence introduced by the District to justify
suspicionless testing as a great irony, pointed out that such evidence consisted
of stories of individual, identifiable students conducting themselves in a man-
ner which plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion.0 4 For example, drug
paraphernalia was confiscated on school grounds, and some teachers allegedly
observed students using drugs at a local cafe across the street from the high
school.0 5 Moreover, since the impetus for the drug testing policy was to
combat the rise in drug-related disorder and disruption in the classrooms, the
dissent criticized the District for not simply testing those students causing the
disruptions.2 °" The dissent concluded that intrusive blanket searches of stu-
dents-most of whom are innocent-sends the wrong message.
The final issue raised by the dissent was the lack of evidence in the court
record of a drug problem in the Washington Grade School which James Acton
attended." Indeed, three of the four witnesses who testified to drug-related
incidents were teachers or coaches at the high school, and the fourth witness
had been the principal at the high school prior to implementation of the Poli-
cy.
209
The Justices concluded that "the greatest threats to our constitutional
freedoms come in times of crisis, '2'0 and that here, the Policy implemented




The United States Supreme Court's decision in Acton is but another case
which marks the erosion of the fundamental constitutional requirement that all
searches satisfy the reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment. Rather than
School)). The dissent noted that mass, suspicionless searches, are generally unreasonable in the
criminal context. Id. at 2400. "As stated, a suspicion-based search regime is not just any less
intrusive alternative; the individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree as old as the
Fourth Amendment itself, and it may not be easily cast aside in the name of policy concerns." Id.
at 2403.
202. Id. at 2402-03.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2403.
205. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356-57.
206. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2406.
207. Id. at 2405. "[Suspicionless testing] sends a message to children that are trying to be
responsible citizens... that they have to prove that they're innocent .... and I think that kind of
sets a bad tone for citizenship." Id. (quoting the testimony of Acton's father, Tr. at 9 (Apr. 29,
1992)).
208. Id. at 2406.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2407. The "crisis" the Justices are referring to is the District's drug problem.
211. Id.
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protect the privacy and security interests of student athletes in the Vemonia
School District, the majority authorized highly intrusive, random, suspicionless
searches based on less than compelling interests.
Relying on its prior decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,2 2 the Acton ma-
jority held that children in school have a lower expectation of privacy than
other persons in our society." 3 In addition, the Court cited T.L.O. for the
proposition that "special needs" exist in the public school setting, thereby
alleviating the practicability of a warrant." 4 Justice Scalia concluded that be-
cause the Court in T.L.O. authorized a warrantless search of a high school
student's purse without probable cause, the search in Acton had to be upheld
because the District's twofold interest-maintaining order and discipline in the
classroom and athletic safety--outweighed the privacy and security interests of
the students.2 5 This misinterpretation resulted in a violation of the Vernonia
student-athletes' constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
under the Fourth Amendment.
At first glance, T.L.O. appears relevant to the Court's reasoning and deci-
sion in Acton.2 6 The Court certainly relied on T.L.O. when deciding the con-
stitutionality of the drug testing program at issue in Acton."7 T.L.O. involved
a search of a student," 8 and the degree of privacy accorded students.219
Since Acton also involved a search of a student, T.L.O. would seem control-
ling. However, while T.L.O. is instructive regarding the expectations of priva-
cy in a school environment, a close examination of T.L.O. demonstrates that
the two cases have different legal significance. '
The majority's reliance on T.L.O. is misplaced. T.L.O. involved a criminal
search; Acton, however, involved an administrative case. Although the search
of a purse in T.L.O. was highly intrusive, it nonetheless was not random or
suspicionless. An individual student was targeted on reasonable suspicion." °
Furthermore, the search uncovered marijuana, and the student suffered crimi-
nal penalties.22 ' The T.L.O. school officials conducting the search for mari-
212. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
213. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
214. Id. at 2391.
215. Id. at 2395-96.
216. See id. at 2386.
217. Throughout the Acton opinion, the Court cited T.L.O. to support their findings of fact
and conclusions of law. For example, the Court cited T.L.O. for the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment extends the constitutional guarantees of the Fourth Amendment to searches and sei-
zures by public school officials. Id. at 2390. The Court also cited T.L.O. to establish that in the
public school setting, "special needs" exist, thereby alleviating the practicability of a warrant. Id.
at 2391. In addition, the Court explained that a school search based on less than probable cause
was reasonable in T.L.O. Id. at 2391. The Court emphasized that in T.L.O. they rejected the notion
that public schools, like private schools, exercise only parental power over their students. Id. The
Court explained further that such a proposition "is not entirely consonant with compulsory educa-
tion laws" and is "inconsistent with [the Court's] prior decisions treating [public] school officials
as state actors for purposes of the Due Process and Free Speech Clauses." Id. at 2392 (citations
omitted). Finally, the Court cited T.L.O. for the proposition that students generally have a lesser
expectation of privacy than other members of the population. Id.
218. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
219. Id. at 326.
220. Id. at 347.
221. Id. at 328-29.
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juana were not furthering a special governmental need beyond law enforce-
ment; the purpose and consequence of the search was criminal. This raised the
question of whether school discipline was a special need in T.L.O. The answer
is yes, with respect to the principal's search for cigarettes. However, the char-
acter of the second search for marijuana was undoubtedly criminal.
The warrant exception recognized in T.L.O. is not due to any administra-
tive aspect of the search, but rather is an extension of Terry v. Ohio.222 The
Court's reliance on T.L.O. is flawed because T.L.O. applied Terry's reason-
ableness test rather than an administrative search analysis.223 The Terry deci-
sion authorized limited, warrantless searches of individuals, even when the
purpose of a warrant would be furthered, on a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, usually combined with warrant impracticability and a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy.22 Terry only authorized such limited searches on a reason-
able and articulable individualized suspicion of criminal activity; it never
authorized a highly intrusive suspicionless search of the kind involved in
Acton. Despite the temptation to combine these school search cases, they are
factually and legally quite different. Because T.L.O. is a criminal search case,
it is not controlling in an analysis of the constitutionality of Acton's adminis-
trative search; therefore, the Court's reliance on T.L.O. is misplaced.
In addition, by allowing such a highly intrusive search without individual-
ized suspicion, the majority ignored the guiding principles established by pre-
cedent, concerning the proper interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.225
Professor Thomas Clancy argues that the Court "has failed to attend to the
basic task of understanding the [Fourth] Amendment. The Court must return to
the fundamentals: history does provide guidance; the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect individual liberty; reasonableness does have meaning; and
individualized suspicion is a core component of reasonableness. '226
In addition, as the Acton dissent noted, it is a "great irony" that the evi-
dence introduced by the District to justify suspicionless testing consisted of
incidents recanting "particular, identifiable students acting in ways that plainly
gave rise to reasonable suspicion.""22 The District argued on the one hand
that individualized suspicion was impracticable, then on the other hand argued
that officials were able to identify particular students-the individual athletes.
Several Justices focused on this flawed reasoning in the District's oral argu-
ment; this inconsistency remains unresolved.228
222. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a limited, protective, pre-arrest search for weapons by
the police was reasonable if a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances would justifi-
ably believe the suspect posed a danger).
223. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
224. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
225. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment does
not denounce all searches and seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.").
226. Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reason-
ableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 635 (1995).
227. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2403.
228. See Oral Arguments at 6, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (No.
94-590).
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The majority's decision also ignores the Court's prior decisions in Rail-
way Labor Executives' Ass'n and Von Raab. These cases authorized full,
intrusive, suspicionless searches, which demonstrated an overwhelming depar-
ture from the Constitution's original definition of reasonableness: a warrant
supported by probable cause.229 Nonetheless, these searches were reasonable
in light of a compelling government interest beyond law enforcement. Like-
wise, because the District's urinalysis policy is highly intrusive, the District
must demonstrate a compelling interest to survive a constitutional challenge. A
legitimate or important interest is insufficient. Examples of compelling inter-
ests include railway collisions, as in Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, and
drug addicted, armed employees involved in front line drug interdiction, as in
Von Raab. As the Ninth Circuit correctly explained, "The extreme dangers and
hazards involved in the prior cases are simply not present here .... [The risk
of athletic injury] is not a risk of the same magnitude as an airplane or train
wreck, or a gas pipeline or nuclear power plant disaster.""23 The majority in
Acton inexplicably lowered this threshold and did not adhere to precedent
when it approved the Policy.
The majority held that athletes have a lower expectation of privacy than
other students. This holding is flawed because a student-athlete does not lose
his or her privacy by playing sports, in the way a railroad employee or a U.S.
Customs Service agent may expect a deprivation of their privacy. Moreover,
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n and Von Raab require a compelling interest,
despite a lower expectation of privacy. Without a compelling interest, the
District's Policy does not pass constitutional muster. As the dissent correctly
pointed out, nothing in the record demonstrated that a drug problem existed in
the grade school James Acton attended. The evidence, therefore, did not sup-
port the majority's reasoning as it applied to James Acton.
Even assuming arguendo that a drug problem did exist in the middle
school, one of the most glaring flaws in the Court's reasoning is that the Poli-
cy ultimately does not address the problem. Again, the District's interest is in
discipline and athletic safety, not criminal enforcement of alcohol and narcot-
ics laws. This is clearly distinguishable from the government's interest in
T.L.O., where the principal was clearly looking for evidence of criminal activi-
ty so that he could turn the evidence and student over to police."' Although
illegal alcohol and drug use may have caused the discipline and safety prob-
lems claimed by District officials, the Policy was created out of disciplinary
and safety concerns, not out of concern over the substances themselves. Only
229. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
230. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994); see International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1992)
(involving drug testing in the nuclear power industry); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th
Cir.) (involving random drug testing of airline personnel with safety responsibilities), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1083 (1991); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. Skinner, 913 F.2d 1454
(9th Cir. 1990) (involving random drug testing of employees working with natural gas, liquified
natural gas, and hazardous liquid pipelines).
231. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328-29.
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when District officials recognized that student drug use triggered disruptive
behavior did the District decide to implement the Policy.232
Furthermore, although the dissent warned the Court about casting away
established constitutional principles based on public policy concerns, it appears
as though the majority did exactly that.233 Masking their own policy goal of
furthering the "War on Drugs" behind an interest in promoting discipline and
athletic safety in the Vernonia School District, the Court succumbed to politi-
cal pressures." 4 Instead of adhering to established precedent, the majority
approved a policy which allowed school officials to "engage in a 'fishing
expedition' for drug and alcohol use [in furtherance of] a moral crusade.2 35
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of Justice Scalia's majority opinion is
his vehement departure from his dissent in Von Raab.236 While at first this
departure appears chameleon-like, it becomes obvious upon deeper reflection,
that Justice Scalia's change in position reflects merely a distinction between
searches imposed on adults and those imposed on children. In Von Raab,
Justice Scalia found that making an adult employee urinate into a testing jar
was a constitutionally impermissible "invasion of their privacy and affront to
their dignity"; however, in the context of children, he finds the same drug
testing so admirable that he is willing to write a majority opinion espousing its
virtue. In Justice Scalia's eyes, drug testing of a person's urine is an unconsti-
tutional intrusive search when applied to an adult. When applied to a child, it
is converted into a disciplinary necessity. The rights of children are suppressed
while the rights of adults are exalted. This follows a general trend in our coun-
try to criminalize the conduct of children.237
232. Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357-58 (D. Or. 1992).
233. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402.
234. As one commentator remarked:
[Tihe largely conservative ideology of the justices is matched by their views of the
judiciary's role in society. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin
Scalia, among others, have spoken about the importance of leaving contentious issues to
the political branches of government, at the federal level and below.
Focusing on what [cases] the Court is not taking may miss the far more important
fact that sometimes the justices set an agenda by concentrating attention on only a hand-
ful of key cases.
That concentration happened during the 1994-95 term, when the court's conserva-
tive majority set the agenda for the entire term by shrewdly selecting a half-dozen key
cases at the start of the term.
Among the . . .petitions granted by the Court at the start of the 1994-95 term
that produced decisions favored by conservatives [was] .. .Vernonia School District v.
Acton.
David G. Savage, Docket Reflects Ideological Shifts: Shrinking Caseload, Cert Denials Suggest an
Unfolding Agenda, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 40, 40, 42.
235. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1363.
236. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab, see supra note 86.
237. This is evidenced by juvenile facilities which mirror the environment in prisons, and the
overwhelming support for imposing stiffer sentences on juveniles:
The sentencing guidelines do not apply to a defendant sentenced under the Federal Juve-
nile Delinquency Act. However, the sentence imposed upon a juvenile delinquent may
not exceed the maximum of the guideline range applicable to an otherwise similarly
situated adult defendant unless the court finds an aggravating factor sufficient to warrant
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IV. CONCLUSION
In declaring the Vernonia School District's random, suspicionless, urinaly-
sis drug testing policy constitutional, the majority stripped James Acton and
other students seeking to participate in athletics of their legitimate expectations
of privacy and security under the Fourth Amendment. Drug abuse is an over-
whelmingly important societal problem that faces our entire nation. The Court,
however, did not follow established precedent; rather, it based its decision on
its own public policy view. Despite the Court's long held position that chil-
dren do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate," '238
this decision nonetheless demonstrates the Court's willingness to deny students
the full protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
Joaquin G. Padilla
an upward departure from that guideline range. Therefore, a necessary step in ascertain-
ing the maximum sentence that may be imposed upon a juvenile delinquent is the deter-
mination of the guideline range that would be applicable to a similarly situated adult
defendant.
See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § I B 1.12 (Nov. 1995); see also
Elaine R. Jones, The Failure of the "Get Tough" Crime Policy, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 803 (1995)
(discussing the shortfalls of implementing a "Get Tough" Policy in the United States); Barry
Krisberg et al., What Works with Juvenile Offenders?: A Review of "Graduated Sanction" Pro-
grams, 10 CrIM. JUST. 20 (1995) (examining various programs adopted around the country which
have studied the issue of juvenile offenders and the appropriate response to the problems raised by
this issue); George B. Smith & Gloria M. Dabiri, The Judicial Role in the Treatment of Juvenile
Delinquents, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 347, 360-65 (1995) (discussing how public perceptions concerning
juvenile crime have generated a public sentiment toward "getting tough"). "These new laws and
policies have included prosecuting younger children as adults for certain crimes, as well as im-
posing mandatory, longer and more restrictive placements of adjudicated delinquents and other
young offenders." Id. One commentator questioned the effect on the entire juvenile justice sysyem:
In recent years, many states have enacted laws specifically addressing the problem of
serious and habitual juvenile crime. Several prominant commentators have interpreted
this trend as an indication that society has rejected the juvenile court's traditional philos-
ophy of rehabilitation in favor of more punitive, offense-oriented sanctions, and some
have concluded that recent changes call into question the very viability of the juvenile
court system.
Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconciling Punish-
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